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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Outside Publications by CNS StaffSouth Korea, Russia Seek to Accelerate Development of South Korean Space Launch VehicleDaniel A. Pinkston - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies Copyright © WMD Insights. All rights reserved May 2007.
While in Moscow, Kim also attended an opening ceremony for a new Russia-South Korea Science and Technology Cooperation Center on March 31, 2007. In 2006, South Korea had offered to provide support to two bilateral research institutes in the fields of aerospace and optics; however, Russia agreed only to the establishment of a single joint research institute to cover general science and technology. [4] Russian-ROK Cooperation on KSLV-1 In 2000, South Korea’s Ministry of Science and Technology estimated that the country could complete the development of the KSLV-1 by 2005, but problems with engine development led the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) to seek Russian technical assistance after the United States rebuffed similar requests. High level cooperation with Russia had been initiated in September 2004, when South Korean President No Mu-hyŏn traveled to Moscow and signed a bilateral space cooperation agreement, but joint development of the KSLV-1 apparently ran into obstacles by October 2005, soon after KARI sought Russian assistance. [5] The first KSLV-1 launch, which had been rescheduled for October 2007, was postponed until late 2008. [6] According to Shindonga, a South Korean monthly news magazine, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) conducted a policy review during August and September 2006 to reassess planning for the country’s first satellite launch. Shindonga reportedly obtained a copy of the MOST report but was asked not to publish it or any of its contents. According to the report, by December 2005, Russian engineers had completed the design of the KSLV-1’s first stage, which is based upon the Khrunichev State Space Research and Production Center’s liquid-fuel Angara booster, but Russia has refused to deliver the design and production technology until the Duma ratifies the TSA. [7] The design of the launch tower system for the rocket was reportedly completed by January 2006, but it, too, was withheld. Without this design data, South Korea has been unable to complete the interface between the first and second stages or construction of the launch facility. (KARI is working with South Korea’s Hanhwa Corporation in developing the SLV-1’s second stage, which is solid-fueled.) [8] Despite these setbacks, Science and Technology Minister Kim U-sik claims that Russia is eager to share its space technology with South Korea. [9] During his Moscow visit, Kim met with Anatoly Perminov, director of the Russian Federal Space Agency, to discuss bilateral space cooperation, including development of the KSLV-1 and the training of two South Korean astronauts in Russia. The two astronauts have begun training at the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, and one will be selected in August for a mission aboard a Russian rocket to the International Space Station in April 2008. [10] U.S. Concerns about ROK SLV Developments Many South Koreans believe that the United States seeks to undermine the country’s SLV development because Washington fears that Seoul ultimately intends to use its space capability to develop long-range offensive missiles to match North Korea’s growing missile arsenal. In the 1990s, South Korea developed and launched the solid-fueled KSR-1 and KSR-2 sounding rockets, which raised Washington’s suspicions about Seoul’s intentions regarding ballistic missile development. Under a 1979 bilateral missile agreement with the United States, Seoul had agreed to limit ballistic missiles it produced to a range of 180 kilometers. [11] U.S. officials carried out on-site inspections at South Korean rocket facilities in May 1992, November 1993, September 1995, November 1997, and May 1999 to confirm that systems under development had capabilities below the agreed threshold. [12]
The lack of U.S. support for development of the KSLV-1, which could, in principle, be adapted to produce missiles of considerably greater range, is seen by some as an added strain in U.S.-South Korean relations that contributes to Korean doubts about the future of the two states’ security alliance. Apparently South Korea learned the extent of U.S. concerns when an official delegation visited the Russian Federal Space Agency on January 23, 2006. [14] Washington’s intervention reportedly caused Russia to demand strict monitoring of any transferred technology to ensure it is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, as well as a guarantee that South Korea would not retransfer any technology it received to third countries. [15] Conclusion Although Russian ratification of the TSA has been delayed, important cooperation between the two countries has proceeded in the area of technical education. By late 2006, South Korea had sent a total of 74 scientists and engineers to Russia for training and research in SLV development. [16] As South Korea continues to develop its human resources in this area, the country could develop an indigenous capacity to produce the KSLV-2, which is now scheduled for completion around 2012. [17]
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South Korean Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Science and Technology Kim U-sik visited Russia from March 28 to April 2, 2007, in an effort to deepen and accelerate scientific cooperation between Seoul and Moscow. One of Kim’s major objectives was to encourage Russian officials to effect the ratification of a bilateral “Technology Safeguards Agreement” (TSA) between Moscow and Seoul. [1] The Duma, the lower house of Russia’s national legislature, must ratify the agreement before Russia can begin transferring technology for the first stage of the South Korean KSLV-1, the country’s first space launch vehicle (SLV), currently scheduled to launch a small satellite from the South Korean Space Center in late 2008. [2] Moscow and Seoul signed the TSA in October 2006 and South Korea’s National Assembly ratified the agreement in December 2006, but the two sides only recently concluded some of the detailed negotiations on technology transfers, which may have been a factor in delaying Duma action. [3]
South Korea became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in March 2001. As a regime member, Seoul is potentially eligible to receive transfers from other MTCR members of advanced missile-relevant technology, including the most sensitive “Category One” transfers, as long as such transfers are destined for peaceful space exploration. However, the South Korean press has reported that Washington has applied intense diplomatic pressure to persuade Moscow to withhold such technology from South Korea. When it joined the MTCR, Seoul negotiated an understanding with Washington allowing the production of ballistic missiles with a range up to 300 kilometers; the regime focuses its greatest restrictions on missiles above this ceiling. [13]
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