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AHMADINEJAD CRITICS TAKE LEADERSHIP POSITION; IRAN ENTERS DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

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October 2007 Issue

By Khalid Hilal and Leah Kuchinsky

On September 1, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, Iran's supreme leader, appointed Brigadier General Mohammad-Ali Jafari (also known as Aziz Jafari or Ali Jafari) as the new commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and promoted him to the rank of major general. [1] Three days later, on September 4, former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected president of the Assembly of Experts. [2] The Assembly is a body of 86 clerics elected by the public that has the power to appoint and remove the country's supreme leader although it has never exercised this power. Both Jafari and Rafsanjani are considered moderate conservatives aligned with factions that have been critical of the radical politics of Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The two promotions come at a time when Iran is under considerable U.S. and international pressure to slow its nuclear program and curb its support for terrorist activities in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad has defiantly rejected such restraints and restricted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to nuclear sites in Iran. Simultaneously, he has pressed ahead with the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities, in particular uranium enrichment, a technology that could provide Iran with access to nuclear weapon material. However, in late August 2007, Iran entered into an agreement with the IAEA under which Tehran accepted a timetable for resolving all outstanding questions regarding the character of its nuclear activities. Events in coming months will tell whether Tehran's shift from defiance to at least partial cooperation with the international community regarding its nuclear program, together with the elevation of Jafari and Rafsanjani, signal the beginning of a reorientation of the country's foreign policy, away from Ahmadinejad's confrontational stance and toward one that is more pragmatic.

For additional background on recent domestic developments in Iran that may affect its weapon of mass destruction programs, see "Larijani's Struggle with Ahmadinejad: A Prelude to the 2009 Presidential Election?" WMD Insights, July/Aug 2007; "Mussavian's Arrest: National Security Risk or Domestic Political Ploy?" WMD Insights, June 2007; "Iran's Internal Debate on Nuclear Issues Heats Up; Russia Presses Tehran for Positive' Steps," WMD Insights, March 2007.

Jafari Named IRGC Commander
Jafari takes over the IRGC, an organization of increasing importance in Iranian society. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomein'i issued the decree establishing the IRGC on May 5, 1979, less than three months after Iran's Revolutionary Government took power. [3] While the Iranian armed forces are charged with defending Iran's territory, the IRGC's mission is to defend the revolution against any potential military coup or domestic uprising. By 1986, the IRGC had more than 350,000 members and had begun to build its naval and air forces. [4] Although the IRGC has fewer members than Iran's regular armed forces, it is said to be better equipped and better organized. The IRGC plays an important role in domestic politics and economics and allegedly controls numerous commercial and industrial firms in the country, providing it significant influence on Iranian economic affairs. It is also thought to be an influential player in Iran's foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, as the IRGC is in charge of spreading the revolution.

The IRGC ascended to a more powerful political role with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. Since then, the new president has installed many IRGC senior members on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), an organization under his chairmanship, that has responsibility for policy making on all foreign affairs, defense, and military security issues. [5] The Revolutionary Guards have also been closely linked with Iran's nuclear and missile programs. UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, for example, impose a freeze on the assets of seven senior IRGC officers, deemed to be "engaged in directly, associated with, or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems." [6] An official of the Iranian opposition group, the People's Mujahadin, which first brought Iran's secret uranium enrichment program to light -- but which has also been declared a terrorist organization by the United States -- alleged that "Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards are using front groups to defeat U.N. sanctions and acquire conventional weapons and material for Tehran's nuclear program." [7] He listed 15 companies used by the IRGC to circumvent UN Security Council sanctions that are not on the UN roster of sanctioned entities. [8] Referring to Iran's controversial uranium enrichment facility, he noted that the list of unsanctioned IRGC entities included, "Tose'eh Silo Co. and Sazeh Pardaz Co. of Iran as primary builders of Iran's Natanz nuclear site." [9]

As the new commander of the IRGC, Mohammad-Ali Jafari replaces Mohammed Rahim-Safavi, who had held the same position for 10 years. (After Jafari's promotion was announced, Khamene'i appointed Safavi as his senior adviser and assistant in military affairs.) [10] According to the Financial Times, Jafari served as IRGC's "land forces commander for 13 years and headed its strategic studies center for the past three years." [11] The Financial Times further reported that he "is believed not to have had any involvement in the guards' foreign operations arm, the Quds Brigade, which U.S. officials allege has supplied components for powerful roadside bombs to Shia insurgent groups in Iraq." [12] In addition, Mr. Jafari's name is not included on the list of IRGC leaders who are currently subject to UN sanctions under Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. [13]

Nonetheless, Jafari brings experience in military strategy to his new position. The IRGC Center for Strategic Studies, where Jafari worked, is believed to have carried out extensive research regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Jafari is also said to have become expert in the concept of "asymmetric warfare," the exploitation of vulnerabilities of more powerful adversaries using unconventional tactics. [14]

Some observers see Jafari's appointment as a move by Supreme Leader Khamene'i to counterbalance the more radically conservative camp of President Ahmadinejad. Mr. Jafari is believed to be close to a former IRGC commander, Mohsen Reza'i, who currently serves as secretary of the Expediency Council. [15] According to one analyst commenting on the Radio Free Europe website, Jafari's elevation "might be interpreted as a stimulus from Khamene'i to the Reza'i-Qalibaf clique -- a conservative sub-faction thought to be a counterweight to the radicalizers [sic] around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.... [Ousted IRGC chief] Rahim-Safavi is perceived to have become too openly sympathetic to the Ahmadinejad government, when officers are obliged to shun politics." [16]

However, exiled analyst and IRGC founding member Mohsen Sazegara perceived Jafari's appointment as a step toward increased involvement by the IRGC in Iranian politics and considered it to be part of the IRGC'S takeover of the main political institutions in Iran. He added that "Jafari's appointment strengthens the IRGC's access to political power and deepens its involvement in -- rather than distances it from -- politics. This interpretation suggests the move is not designed to strengthen one conservative grouping against another, but rather to tighten the IRGC's grip on institutions." [17]

Jafari's promotion came as the UN Security Council and the United States were considering the imposition of additional sanctions on Iran because of its failure to comply with Resolutions 1737 and 1747 and, in the case of the United States, because of Iran's continued sponsorship of U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. In both contexts, the United States was said to be pressing for the adoption of sanctions in the form of the seizure of assets against the IRGC as an organization, rather than continuing the approach of sanctioning only specific individuals or entities. [18] With respect to U.S.-imposed sanctions, in August 2007, Washington was said to be considering the designation of the guards as a global terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 (signed September 23, 2001). [19] Of particular concern to the United States were the activities in Iraq of the IRGC Quds Force. [20]

Against this backdrop, it is possible that Khamene'i's appointment of an individual not linked to President Ahmadinejad or to the Quds Force was, in part, an effort by the Supreme Leader to insulate the IRGC, at large, from UN and U.S. sanctions. Indeed, roughly ten days after Jafari's appointment, the Bush Administration was reported to have decided against imposing sanctions on the IRGC as a whole and to be seeking only to name the Quds Force as a terrorist organization. [21] It is not known, however, what role the change of leadership at the IRGC might have played in the U.S. decision compared to other factors, such as the opposition of Washington's European allies to the wholesale sanctioning of the IRGC. [22]

Presumably Jafari will have authority over the Quds Force, the UN-sanctioned IRGC officers, and the UN-sanctioned IRGC entities. Whether he will constrain their behavior and work with other elements of Iranian society to moderate the country's WMD- and missile-related activities remains to be seen.

Rafsanjani New President of the Assembly of Experts
While Jafari was appointed to his post, Rafsanjani was elected to his new leadership position by a vote within the Assembly of Experts. Usually linked to the "pragmatic conservative" camp, Rafsanjani won a majority of 41 votes out of a total of 76 in the Assembly balloting, prevailing over Ayatollah Ahmed Janati, a fervent supporter of Ahmadinejad, who received 34 votes. [23] Rafsanjani, who lost to Ahmadinejad in the 2005 Iranian presidential election, currently heads the Expediency Council and remains a prominent figure in Iranian politics.

Rafsanjani may use the constitutional powers of the Assembly of Experts to influence a broad range of policies currently pursued by Ahmadinejad with Khamene'i's acquiescence, including that of defying UN Security Council demands to suspend proliferation-sensitive aspects of the country's nuclear program. Indeed, as soon as the news of Rafsanjani's election as president of the Assembly of Experts became official, allies in Iran's reformist camp pressed him "to exert more control over the action of the supreme leader and the institutions under his jurisdiction." [24] In the past, Rafsanjani has been the main advocate of "a larger role of the Assembly of Experts in monitoring state affairs and...[of the idea] that the assembly can play the role of state affairs monitor." [25] As in the case of Jafari's new responsibilities, how actively Rafsanjani may push for more cautious management of Iranian foreign and nuclear policies and what success he may enjoy remains to be seen.

New Agreement with IAEA
The announcement of a secretly negotiated deal between the IAEA and Iran in late August 2007, in which Iran has reportedly agreed to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency, seems to be a development supportive of the pragmatic policies Jafari and Rafsanjani are said to favor. Commenting on the new deal, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, responsible for completing the agreement, stated on Al Jazeera News on September 15, 2007: "After our meetings with [IAEA chief] El Baradei and his deputies in Vienna and Tehran, we reached an overall agreement to resolve all the issues by setting a timetable...With the agreement, we left no excuses for those who were looking for them." [26] Larijani has been linked to the Iranian moderates, and his views have sometimes clashed with Ahmadinejad's. [27]

The framework creates a timetable into November 2007 of steps to be taken to resolve the outstanding issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program that have raised concerns at the IAEA. [28] It calls, among other measures, for the IAEA to be allowed to visit Arak, the site where Iran is constructing a research reactor capable of producing weapons-usable plutonium, and it notes that a "successful visit" to the facility took place on July 30, 2007. The Agency had been permitted to visit the location through April 2007; however Ahmadinejad then placed it off limits. According to an article in The Tehran Times published September 16, 2007, reporting on Larijani's comments on the deal, "Iran had made [the visit to Arak] possible, and the issue had been resolved." [29] Among other items, the deal allows additional inspectors into Iran and sets out steps aimed at allowing the IAEA to "close the files" on numerous outstanding issues, including:

• "plutonium experiments," secretly conducted by Iran without IAEA monitoring;
• the status of Iran's work with an advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge design obtained from the nuclear smuggling network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan (the "P-2" centrifuge);
• the source of contamination of certain Iranian centrifuges with highly enriched uranium, which Iran claims it has never produced;
• Iran's possession of documents regarding the casting of uranium metal hemispheres (suitable only for use in nuclear weapons);
• activities regarding the production of polonium-210 (used in some nuclear weapon triggers); and
• alleged studies relevant to nuclear weapons including those on uranium processing, high explosives testing, and missile re-entry vehicles. [30]

The deal, which was initially met with considerable criticism from various Western diplomats in Vienna, has attracted the support of several states, including South Africa, Brazil, and Italy. [31] Most importantly, however, Iranian analysts report that, as a result of the development, Russia and China will be less likely to support a third round of sanctions sought by the United States at the UN. [32] Iran has appealed to all countries to safeguard the deal, and at least one Iranian press source was quick to point out that the agreement is already working, citing an August 27 statement by the IAEA that "the issue of Iran's plutonium experiments -- which the U.S. claims is the evidence of Iran's non-peaceful intentions--has been solved." [33]

The deal appears to be having a significant impact on Russia, which earlier in the year had expressed irritation with Iran's recalcitrance in the face of UN demands for nuclear restraint. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that, "According to the IAEA director general, the agreement is being implemented fairly well, and we want the process to be completed without any hindrance." [34] Additionally, the Iranian press has quoted the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Reza Aghazadeh, as speculating that a new document will be signed between Iran and Russia regarding the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant prior to Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Tehran in mid-October. [35] If this prediction is true, it is a step back from Russia's rumored recent warning to Iran that it will not deliver nuclear fuel for the Bushehr plant until Iran meets its obligations under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. (For background on the Bushehr controversy, see "The Bushehr Payment Dispute: Moscow Signals the Limits of Its Support for Iran," WMD Insights, May 2007, and "Update: The Bushehr Payment Dispute," WMD Insights, June 2007.)

David Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, however, has called the deal "problematic," expressing concern that Tehran will use the process of addressing the IAEA's questions to deflect the imposition of further UN sanctions, while continuing to advance Iran's proliferation-sensitive capabilities, especially uranium enrichment. [36] He noted, moreover, that the text of the deal, "...appears to reflect an effort by Iran to preclude the IAEA from raising questions in the future about inconsistencies or troubling developments in its nuclear program." Stressing the need for continuing IAEA vigilance, he complained that "closing files," an action referred to in the deal, is "an idea that violates fundamental safeguards principles." [37] Many Western diplomats, however, have come to feel that resistance to the deal is futile. [38]

Conclusion
Important changes may be occurring in Iranian domestic politics that could eventually lead to new restraints on its nuclear program, as well as in other areas, although it is too early to assess the direction of events. The elevation of Jafari and Rafsanjani, two individuals thought to be critical of Ahmadinejad's confrontational international politics, to leadership positions, and the apparent success of Iran's top nuclear negotiator Larijani, another moderate, in striking a modus vivendi with the IAEA, suggest that Ahmadinejad may be losing a degree of influence.

It is difficult to determine the role international and domestic pressures have played in these developments. In the face of such pressure, including hints of possible U.S. or Israeli military strikes, Tehran may be attempting to defuse tensions by appearing more conciliatory on the nuclear front and by trying to put a new face on the IRGC. However, the nuclear deal with the IAEA may be little more than a stalling tactic to allow Iran to avoid additional sanctions, while continuing to advance its nuclear capabilities, and changing the chief of the IRGC may be an attempt to improve its fighting capability, in preparation for a possible military confrontation with the United States. For the remainder of 2007, key developments to watch will be the implementation of the IAEA agreement, Jafari's actions at the IRGC (in particular whether he curtails the activities of the UN-sanctioned IRGC individuals and entities and the Quds force), and the influence that Rafsanjani exercises in his combined role as head of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council.

Khalid Hilal, Leah Kuchinsky -- Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Ali Nuri Zadeh, "Iqala Moofajia li Raiim al Haras Athawri wa Stibdaluhu Bil Jafar al Moqarab Mina al Mukhabarat" [Head of IRGC Suddenly Removed from His Functions and Replaced by Jafari Who Has Close Ties to the Intelligence Services], Asharqalawsat, September 2, 2007.
[2] "Rafsanjani Raiis Limajliss Al Khubaraa" [Rafsanjani President of the Assembly of Experts], Al Mustaqbal, September 5, 2007.
[3] "Qods Force, IRGC," Global Security, September 13, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods.htm. [View Article]
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] UN Security Council Resolution 1737, paragraph 12, and Annex, Security Affairs. Three IRGC enterprises are also sanctioned by the latter resolution for their involvement in other military and asymmetric warfare activities.
[7] Paul Eckert, "Iran's Revolutionary Guards Beat Sanctions: Exile," Reuters, August 22, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2244375020070822?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews.
[View Article]
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] "Iran's Elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Gets New Commander," CNN.com, September 1, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/09/01/iran.islamicguards/index.html?iref=newssearch. [View Article]
[11] Najmeh Bozorgmehrin, "Iran Picks New Leader For Revolutionary Guards," Financial Times, September 3, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f3e67716-59b5-11dc-aef5-0000779fd2ac.html. [View Article]
[12] Ibid.
[13] See [6].
[14] Fakher Sultan, "Fi Dalalat Iqalat Qaid Al harass Athawri Al Iran" [Implications of Removing the Commander of the IRGC], Al Watan September 5, 2007; Vahid Sepehri, "Iran: New Commander Takes Over Revolutionary Guards," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, September 4, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/58297de1-5483-442f-98d9-e9bb64d94160.html. [View Article]
[15] The Expediency Council is an appointed body that includes representatives of the president, the parliament, and the judiciary, as well as clerics and other figures appointed by the supreme leader. The Council serves as policy adviser to the supreme leader and also mediates legislative disputes between the parliament and the Guardian Council. See "Governing Iran," Online NewsHour, November 8, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iran/structure.html. [View Article]
[16] Sepehri, "Iran: New Commander Takes Over Revolutionary Guard," see source in [14].
[17] Ibid.
[18] James Orr, "U.S. Set To Declare Iranian Revolutionary Guard a Terrorist Group," Guardian, August 15, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,2149187,00.html. [View Article]
[19] "Tougher on Iran: The Revolutionary Guard Is at War with the United States. Why Not Fight Back?" Washington Post, August 21, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/20/AR2007082001581.html. [View Article] Executive Order 13224 "authorizes both the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, or the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to designate individuals and entities" as posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism that threaten U.S. security. For purposes of the order, "terrorism" means an activity that "involves a violent act or act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure;" and appears to be intended to "intimidate or coerce a civilian population," "influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion," or "to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping or hostage-taking." Once an entity is designated under the order, all the entity's property in the United States is blocked, and all transactions, including contributions of funds, good and services, with U.S. persons or within the United States, are prohibited. See, "Fact Sheet: Executive Order 13224," Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, December 20, 2002, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/16181.htm.
[View Article]
[20] "Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?" International Crisis Group, March 21, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3328&CFID=26513039&CFTOKEN=38001407; [View Article] "U.S. to Build Military Base on Iraq-Iran Border," Agence France Press, September 10, 2007, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jNqFWaFI_yzPKjWIb9ZNSiX2kk3w; [View Article] "U.S. Wants New UN Sanctions on Iran," USA Today, September 18, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-09-12-sanction-iran_N.htm; [View Article] "Iran Condemns U.S. Move to Brand Guards Terrorist'," Reuters UK, September 27, 2007,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKBLA73634520070927. [View Article]
[21] Sue Pleming, "U.S. looks to Sanctions on Iran's Quds Force," Reuters, September 12, 2007, http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070912/ts_nm/iran_usa_dc. [View Article]
[22] "Tougher on Iran: The Revolutionary Guard Is at War with the United States. Why Not Fight Back?" see source in [19]; Robin Wright, "U.S., Europeans Planning Own Iran Sanctions," Washington Post, September 22, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/21/AR2007092102109.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
[View Article]
[23] "Rafsanjani Raiis Limajliss Al Khubaraa" [Rafsanjani President of the Assembly of Experts], see source in [2].
[24] "Al islahiyoon Yutalibun Rafsanjani Bimotaqbat Adaa Al Murshid" [Reformist Ask Rafsanjani to Monitor the Supreme Leader's Performance], Al Qabas, September 6, 2007.
[25] Ilyas Harfoosh, "Min Haqqi Khamene'I an Yaqlaq" [Khamene'i's Concern is Understandable], Al Hayat, September 7, 2007.
[26] "Larijani Hails Recent Iran-IAEA deal," Tehran Times, September 16, 2007, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=152979. [View Article]
[27] See "Larijani's Struggle with Ahmadinejad: A Prelude to the 2009 Presidential Election?" WMD Insights, July/August 2007, http://wmdinsights.org/I17/I17_ME3_LarijaniStruggle.htm. [View Article]
[28] See the text of the deal, INFCIRC7/11, entitled, "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues" at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf. [View Article]
[29] "Larijani Hails Recent Iran-IAEA Deal," see source in [26].
[30] See source in [28].
[31] Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, "An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and Its Foes," The New York Times, September 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/world/middleeast/17elbaradei.html?ref=world;
[View Article] "South Africa Commends Iran IAEA Agreement on Modality Plan," Tehran Times, September 16, 2007, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=152977; [View Article] "Brazil Backs Iran -- IAEA Agreement," Tehran Times, September 17, 2007, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=153068;
[View Article] "Italy Lauds Iran-IAEA Cooperation," Press TV, September 20, 2007, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=23837&sectionid=351020104. [View Article]
[32] Mahbod Ebrahimi, "Iran's Gambit Has Checkmated the U.S.," Press TV, September 11, 2007, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=22742&sectionid=3510304. [View Article]
[33] "Iran Tells Germany All Countries Should Safeguard IAEA Deal," Tehran Times, September 20, 2007, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=153312; [View Article] Ebrahimi, "Iran's Gambit Has Checkmated the U.S.," see source in [32].
[34] "Russia Believes Iran-IAEA Cooperation Must Not Be Obstructed," Interfax, September 18, 2007, http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/politics/28.html?id_issue=11859854. [View Article]
[35] "Document to be Signed With Russia on Bushehr Power Plant," IRNA, September 21, 2007, [http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-236/07092081179175121.htm].
[36] "IAEA Says Iran Resolves Plutonium Issues," Reuters, August 28, 2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL2759402120070827?pageNumber=3. [View Article]
[37] Mark Heinrich, "Iran's Transparency Deal with IAEA Seen as Flawed," Reuters, August 28, 2007, [http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070828/wl_nm/nuclear_iran_iaea_dc].
[38] Sciolino, "An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and its Foes," see source in [31].