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Outside Publications by CNS StaffRUSSIAN STRATEGIC AVIATION BEGINS REGULAR LONG-RANGE FLIGHTS: PUTIN ANNOUNCES "ENHANCED AIR PATROLS"Copyright © WMD Insights. All rights reserved. October 2007 Issue By Nikolai Sokov
Putin's announcement appeared to reverse a practice that emerged at the end of the Cold War, when the United States and Russia, by parallel unilateral decisions, stopped heavy bomber combat patrols. That informal arrangement helped to improve the political and security relationship between the two countries. Nonetheless, as Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) analyst Aleksandr Pikaev noted, Putin's decision "did not violate any international agreements [because] Russia did not sign any agreements with the United States [on this issue]." [3] Still, the resumption of regular patrols of Russian heavy bombers far from Russian territory could signify an important change of policy. The majority of Russian media lauded Putin's statement as a further sign that Russia is reasserting itself after 15 years of internal crisis. Not surprisingly, praise was loudest from the Russian Air Force. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1991-98) Petr Deynekin declared: "We have always demonstrated our capabilities to those who provoke us." During the Cold War, he explained, "Russian long-range aviation performed similar missions on a regular basis, but the Americans have just forgotten that we can do this." [4] Amid the chorus of endorsements a few criticisms were also heard. Military analyst Vladimir Yevseev pointed out that Putin's decision could have negative consequences as it might encourage the United States to resume strategic patrols of its own. [5] An editorial in Nezavisimore Voennoe Obozrenie, an influential weekly that covers issues of defense policy, criticized the government for diverting still scarce funds from solving the social problems of servicemen in order to make a political statement. [6] Washington's reaction to Putin's announcement was deliberately low-key, however. According to State Department spokesman Sean McCormack, the United States was not "in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet Union. It's a different era. If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that's their decision." [7] Patrols or
Training? So far "air patrols" have been flown approximately every two weeks and have lasted less than 24 hours. It is unclear how long the Russian Air Force will be able to sustain this rate of training, given the limited number of heavy bombers it possesses and the high cost of fuel. (In the past, the cost of fuel and of aircraft maintenance had been the primary obstacle to regular training of heavy bomber crews).
According to Russian sources, even at the time of the first round of long-range training flights, the Norwegian military classified the Russian heavy bomber missions as "unusually lengthy" and "reaching farther south" than usual. [11] A similar assessment was given three weeks later by U.S. Air Force General Gene Renuart, who commented that "over the last probably three months or so the Russians have been flying their bomber force maybe a little bit more than we've seen in the past; certainly they're ranging farther than they have in the past." [12] On August 8-9, the Russian Air Force conducted another large-scale exercise; approximately 30 bombers (four Tu-95, 12 Tu-160, 14 Tu-22M3, and four refueling Il-78) flew toward the North Pole, the Atlantic, and the Pacific Oceans, including toward Guam, home of a major U.S. military base. [13] The exercises, which Putin announced on August 17, were apparently the third in a series. Thus, his speech at the Chebarkul training center did not inaugurate a new policy -- although it was probably meant to sound as if it did -- but rather made public a policy that had been in effect for more than a month. The time and place for that announcement were deliberately chosen to maximize the political effect and were probably intended as much for Russia's SCO allies as for the West. (See related story "Bishkek Summit of Shanghai Treaty Organization Attacks U.S. BMD Plans, Defends Iran's Nuclear Program, and Proposes WMD Nonproliferation Measures," in this issue of WMD Insights.) The next round of patrols took place two weeks later, on September 5-6, 2007. The new series of flights took Russian heavy bombers "around the corner" to the northern Atlantic, to the Sea of Japan, and beyond the North Pole. [14] On September 14, it was announced that two Tu-160s were sent to patrol the Arctic Ocean for 15 hours. [15] The missions flown since mid-July reveal a rather stable pattern; they all have been training flights that lasted less than 24 hours and usually involved 10 or more aircraft simultaneously flying in different directions. Russia has not attempted to maintain a permanent presence in the air, suggesting that there was no intention to transition to a "war posture." The choice of patrol areas, however, suggests that the Russian Air Force continues to train for combat missions even though Putin emphasized in his August 17 statement that patrols would be conducted in the areas of Russian economic interests and active shipping, rather than in regions required for "deterrence of a missile-nuclear attack on Russia." [16] In fact, the list of areas unveiled since July closely correlates with missions flown by heavy bombers during almost every large-scale exercise since 1999. During these exercises heavy bombers apparently simulated limited strikes (against targets in the United States, NATO, other U.S. bases, and naval targets) in response to attacks against Russia by the United States and its allies. Even the flight toward Guam in August 2007 was not particularly new; in 2003, Russian Tu-95s flew to the Indian Ocean to practice cruise missile launches against land-based targets (presumably the U.S. base at Diego Garcia). Training for these types of missions fits the "de-escalation" strategy set forth in Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine and subsequent documents. [17] The only difference is that previously these missions were flown only once or twice a year and only in the context of large-scale maneuvers that involved all or most branches of the armed forces, while now they are being undertaken more often and independently of other services. The true nature of the new policy (training rather than permanent patrols) was admitted by Putin himself on August 18, the day after his declaration on the flights. In a clear attempt to explain and somewhat mitigate its impact, he remarked: "Our pilots are restless. We have aircraft, but they do not fly." He expressed the hope that "Russia's partners will understand this decision." [18] First Vice Premier and former Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov, who is well known for tough, sometimes hawkish pronouncements, also hastened to declare that the new policy did not signify a return to Cold War practices: "They are not related to bloc thinking, confrontation, much less to a return to the Cold War." [19] Similarly, Commander of Long-Range Aviation Major-General Pavel Androsov quickly clarified that Russian heavy bombers would be flying "air patrols" rather than "combat duty" missions. [20] He elaborated that during the last several months the frequency of flights had increased 2.5-3 times in order to enhance training of the crews, but that the nature of missions remained the same. Seeking to allay fears and suppress what he saw as the "unhealthy sensationalism" of the media, retired Major-General Pavel Zolotarev, deputy director of the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote that the new policy was not close to the Cold War pattern, when Soviet and American heavy bombers, often with nuclear weapons, maintained an almost permanent presence in the air. This is simply enhanced training, he said, an opportunity for heavy bomber crews to "restore qualifications that had been lost in previous years." [21] He also praised the "calm and pragmatic" reaction to enhanced training in the United States, which, he claimed, demonstrates that "experts understand that the words of the Russian President about combat patrols mean something other than what they meant during the Cold War." In the future, funding permitting, the same pattern will be expanded to other elements of the Air Force, he added. Do They
Carry Nuclear Weapons? Uncertainties with regard to the new developments were clarified a few days later by Androsov, who explained that during these "patrols", Russian heavy bombers do not carry weapons at all -- they only train for long-range flights with a full load (that is, simulators that have the same weight and dimensions as weapons). [25] Deputy Commander of the Long-Range Aviation Major-General Anatoly Zhikharev confirmed that statement, saying that all aircraft taking part in air patrols "were equipped with training missiles." [26] Shadowing by NATO Aircraft Seen as a Positive
Sign Commenting on the flight toward Guam in early August, Androsov noted, with some pride, that U.S. fighters were sent to intercept Russian aircraft as they were flying toward Guam and that Russian and American pilots "exchanged smiles" [27] -- a clear reference to the practice typical of Cold War encounters between Soviet and American aircraft. This parallel suggests that representatives of the Russian Air Force regard such encounters as an important symbol of a return to the times when the Soviet military considered itself second to none and on equal footing with the U.S. military. Thus, the intercepts are considered a symbol of status rather than of hostile action. According to U.S. sources, no attempted interception took place. A U.S. Pacific Command spokesperson in Honolulu revealed that Russian bombers came within 300 miles of U.S. ships and 100 miles of U.S. aircraft and thus there was no need to intercept them. According to Lieutenant Commander Chito Peppler, a Pentagon spokesperson, "U.S. forces were prepared to intercept the bombers, but they never came close enough ... to warrant an air-to-air intercept." [28] Almost every Russian report about flights of heavy bombers, however, included mentions of shadowing and intercepts. For example, when talking about the August 17-18 maneuvers, Androsov remarked that 21 NATO fighters approached Russian aircraft and followed them for five hours. [29] Drobyshevski made a similar announcement with regard to the September 5-6 exercises; NATO aircraft, he said, "followed almost every Russian strategic bomber" and he specifically mentioned intercepts by Norwegian and British aircraft. [30] The incidents that received the most comments in Western media were the intercepts of Russian Tu-95MS heavy bombers near British airspace by RAF fighters, which occurred several times during the last two months. [31] Russian Air Force representatives have not presented these encounters in hostile or confrontational tones. Instead, they have treated them as a routine part of the business of flying long-range patrols and an indication that the Russian Strategic Air Force has assumed its rightful place on the global scene.
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