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October 2007 Issue

By Sharad Joshi

This is the fourth article in an on-going series by WMD Insights on the intensifying competition between India and Pakistan in the development of increasingly advanced, nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. See "India Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone to an ICBM?" WMD Insights, May 2007, "Pakistan's Missile Tests Highlight Growing South Asia Nuclear Arms Race, Despite New Confidence Building Measures," WMD Insights, April 2007, and "India's Missile Program: Diverging Trajectories," WMD Insights, February 2007. With both states conducting tests of new systems, while continuing to announce the launch of programs to develop still others, it is important to return to this subject in order to keep readers current on the latest developments.

In recent months, India and Pakistan have announced important advances in their respective missile programs. Key developments in India are the announcement that it will not seek to develop an intercontinental-range missile, but that it will extend the range of the Agni-III ballistic missile from 3,500 to 5,000 kilometers (km); the disclosure that it is developing a short-range submarine-launched ballistic missile; the entry into service of a land-attack version of India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile; and the announcement of plans to develop the Nirbhay, a new long-range land-attack cruise missile. India's planned missile advances have not appeared to damage relations with the United States, which reached an understanding with India during this period on the text of an agreement for nuclear cooperation.

For its part, Pakistan was reported to have deployed its longest-range ballistic missile, the 2,000-km-range Shaheen II; conducted a further test of its Hatf-VII/Babur cruise missile; and also test fired a short-range air-launched cruise missile, the Hatf-VIII, or Ra'ad.

India's Ballistic Missile Program

"Agni-III*" Not an Intercontinental Missile
In April 2007, India successfully tested the Agni-III missile, which has a range of 3,000-3,500 km. [1] After this test, reports surfaced that India would begin efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range in excess of 5,500 km. [2] However, in June 2007, the Indian government reportedly ordered a cap on extending the range of its ballistic missile systems, with the result that the Agni missile will be developed to a maximum range of only 5,000 km. [3]

Currently, India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which designed the Agni-III, is working on a 5,000-km extended range Agni missile, referred to as the Agni-III* ("Agni Three Star") or in some reports as the Agni-IV. [4] Sources within the DRDO stated that this system will be the longest range missile the country is planning to develop. [5] Some reports noted that the Agni-III* will have counter-measures to defeat missile defenses, as well as enhancements to improve its thrust-to-weight ratio. [6] This missile, expected to require three years to produce, will be constructed with the addition of a third stage to the Agni-III; all three stages will use solid propellant. [7]

Reasons for Limiting Agni's Range
News stories indicate that India decided not to develop an ICBM to avoid creating tension with the international community, particularly while the U.S.-India nuclear trade deal is still pending. [8] Shortly before news reports of the range cap, then Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, a key figure in the country's missile development program, revealed that after the Agni-III test in April, several unnamed countries had refused to export polyacrylonitrile (PAN) fiber to India. [9] This material is an essential precursor in the manufacture of carbon fiber, used for missile bodies and components. Given the high re-entry speeds of ICBM warheads, carbon-fiber-based ablative materials would be needed for the heat shields of ICBM reentry vehicles. Kalam may have had this use in mind when he referred to PAN as "critical" for the ICBM program to proceed. [10] While there is no other public information on the denial of this item, whose export is regulated under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it is possible that this was an indication of potential pressures on India not to pursue an intercontinental-range system. By capping India's missile program, New Delhi apparently hopes to demonstrate to the international community that its strategic interests and threat perceptions are restricted to Asia and do not impact any Western power. [11]

Indeed, a June 18, 2007, news report quoted unidentified Indian government officials as stating that New Delhi has decided not to develop missiles with ranges over 5,000 km as a "goodwill gesture" specifically towards Washington. [12] Whether such a gesture was needed, however, is not clear: Washington responded mildly to the Agni-III test and did not publicly press India to limit the range of its missiles. State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack declared only that states in the region should not take any measures that would risk stability in the area, while also noting that India had shown "a certain level of responsibility with respect to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology." [13] There is no direct evidence that the U.S.-India negotiation on their pending nuclear agreement was affected by the Agni-III test -- or by India's decision to defer possible development of an ICBM. [See Text Box, "Agni-III Test and the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Negotiations."]

Within India, there has been only limited public debate on the range cap issue. One conservative commentator criticized reports of the range restriction, stating that by taking this step, New Delhi would not be able to compete with European firms in the international market for satellite launches. [14] At the same time, other proponents of the ICBM program in New Delhi have stated that for a growing power like India, an ICBM would be a natural next step. [15]

Importance of a 5,000-km Range
India may be seeking a missile with a 5,000-km-range so it can credibly target major cities in China without the constraint of having to base its strategic missiles in eastern India, near the Chinese border. If based in central or southern India, an Agni-III missile with a range of 3,500 km would not be able to reach northern and eastern China, where major cities, such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai, are located. [16] A 5,000-km Indian missile could reach these targets from such bases, however, offering New Delhi considerably greater strategic depth and enabling India to keep its retaliatory forces beyond the range of all but China's most capable missiles. It has also been suggested that Indian missile designers seek more powerful missiles not to increase the range of these systems, but to increase their payload capacities, in order to accommodate India's "heavier proven warheads." [17] Both the 3,500-km-range Agni-III and the 5,000-km-range Agni-III*/Agni-IV would allow India to strike targets in Pakistan from bases beyond the range of Pakistan's most capable missile systems.

Nonetheless, despite the apparent support for the Agni-III*/Agni-IV, some Indian specialists believe that the Agni-III provides a sufficient deterrent vis--vis China. [18]

The Surya
For several years, there have been periodic reports that an ICBM named Surya has been under development by the Indian government. [19] After the April 2007 Agni-III test, there was speculation that the Surya ICBM was in development, but the recent reports on the extension of the Agni-III (into the Agni-III* or Agni-IV) do not mention the Surya. [20] As characterized in the past, the Surya was to have a range of 9,000-10,000 km or possibly more. [21] India's recent announcement of the missile-range cap suggests that this project is no longer being actively pursued.

The Sagarika
Apart from developments related to the extension of the Agni missile's range, news reports in July 2007 hinted that the Indian government might officially reveal information on the Sagarika (Oceanic) missile program. For several years, Indian defense scientists have been working on the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (which has also been described elsewhere as a cruise missile). [22] The Sagarika, a key future component of India's nuclear triad, is a two-stage missile with a reported range of 800 km. [23] The missile will be installed on India's indigenous nuclear submarine (the Advanced Technology Vessel), which is scheduled for sea trials in 2008. [24]


After the April 2007 Agni-III test, DRDO head M. Natarajan stated that, while India could develop an ICBM, the country's political leadership would have to make the decision to do so. [1] A key objective for New Delhi in considering this matter has been to avoid derailing the pending U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, a prime Indian foreign policy objective. [2]

Negotiations between India and the U.S. on the nuclear agreement (known as a "Section 123 Agreement" after the provision of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act authorizing such arrangements) remained unresolved throughout the first six months of 2007, despite several rounds of talks that took place both before and after the April Agni-III test. However, reports on disagreements with respect to the Section 123 Agreement did not mention the missile issue as a hurdle. Rather, throughout the several rounds of negotiations, the main points of dispute centered around: India's right to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel created in U.S.-supplied nuclear reactors (reprocessing rights); India's desire for guaranteed supplies of nuclear reactor fuel; the U.S. demand for a stipulation that, should India violate the agreement, the United States would have the right to repatriate all U.S.-origin nuclear materials and equipment; and provisions in U.S. law providing for the termination of all U.S. cooperation in the event of a future Indian nuclear test. Indeed, two weeks after the missile test, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns wrote a highly positive review of Indo-U.S. ties and of the nuclear agreement in particular. [3]

At the same time, despite disagreements over the Section 123 Agreement, there was no break in negotiations between the two sides. Less than three weeks after the April 12 Agni-III test, Indian Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon held another round of talks with his U.S. counterparts, and subsequently, officials from both sides stated in early May that the agreement could be finalized within a month. [4] There were further negotiations in the first week of June between delegations led by Undersecretary Burns and Foreign Secretary Menon. [5]

Reports of the Indian decision to cap the range of its missiles appeared in the Indian media in the third week of June, roughly a month before the text of the Section 123 Agreement was finalized on July 27. [6] There is no indication that the missile cap had any impact on the negotiations. Indeed, according to some news reports, one of the stated reasons for the breakthrough in negotiations was the Indian offer of a separate facility for reprocessing spent fuel, rather than any commitment by India to cap the Agni's capabilities. [7]

While terms of the Section 123 Agreement have been negotiated, there are several other steps that have to be taken before it can come into force, including: changes in the rules of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow nuclear transfers to India by member states; conclusion of a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency covering U.S. nuclear exports; and finally, approval of the Section 123 Agreement by the U.S. Congress.

[1] Girija Shankar Kaura, "5,000 km is Not Far Off: DRDO Chief," Tribune, April 14, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070414/nation.htm#7. [View Article]
[2] Josy Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," Daily News and Analysis, June 18, 2007 [http://www.dna.india.com/report.asp2newsid:1103986]; see also "Thinking Cap," Daily News & Analysis, June 18, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1104221&CatID=19. [View Article]
[3] See Nicholas Burns, "Heady Times' for India and the U.S.," Washington Post, April 29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042702014.html. [View Article]
[4] The Indian foreign secretary is the highest ranking career diplomat in the government, while the external affairs minister, a political appointee, is the head of the ministry. "Nuke Deal Back on Track," Hindustan Times, May 2, 2007, Lexis-Nexis; "U.S. Officials Say Deal with India Could be Settled This Month," International Herald Tribune, May 1, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/01/america/NA-GEN-US-India-Nuclear.php. [View Article]
[5] "India, U.S. Conclude 4th Round of Nuclear Talks Without Breakthrough,' " BBC Monitoring South Asia, June 3, 2007, Lexis-Nexis.
[6] Foster Klug, "U.S., India Settle Talks on Nuclear Deal," Washington Post, July 27, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/27/AR2007072700834.html?hpid=sec-world. [View Article]
[7] "India makes New Proposal to End Impasse in Nuclear Talks," Press Trust of India, June 8, 2007, http://www.deccanherald.com/Content/Jun92007/national200706096502.asp?section=updatenews. [View Article]

In July 2007, DRDO chief M. Natarajan stated that a "special purpose missile" for the Indian Navy had been developed, and some officials stated that this program would soon be revealed publicly. [25] Natarajan also declared that the new missile would be ready in the next two to three years. [26] Defense Ministry sources stated that Natarajan was referring to the Sagarika or the "PJ 02" SLBM project. [27] Senior defense scientists, who were involved in the missile's development, also hinted that the missile would be formally announced soon. [28]

India's Cruise Missile Program

The BrahMos
In June 2007, the Indian Army inducted the land-attack version of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (the product of an Indian-Russian joint venture) into its arsenal, ahead of its scheduled July 2008 delivery date. [29] This variant of the BrahMos has a range of 290 km, a speed of Mach 2.8, and can be launched vertically and then made to travel horizontally. [30] It can carry a conventional payload of 300 kilograms. [31]

The BrahMos land-attack cruise missile (LACM) will give the Army increased flexibility and accuracy in striking potential targets, such as terrorist camps across the border in what India refers to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. [32] According to DRDO officials, this variant had demonstrated pinpoint accuracy, having a circular error probability during tests of zero (50 percent of missiles strike precisely on target). [33] Furthermore, the missile can be prepared for launch within two minutes, in contrast to the 20 minutes or more required to fire India's short-range Prithvi ballistic missile. [34] Indian Army sources have stated that the missile will be deployed against high value targets in Pakistan near the Indo-Pakistani border. [35]

As of August 2007, the Indian government has approved three BrahMos regiments for the Army, with the first regiment comprising three missile batteries, each of which would consist of four mobile launchers. [36] However, given the scale and diversity of the missiles now under the Indian Army, it is possible that the Army could establish an entire missile division. [37]

The Navy is also proceeding toward testing the submarine version of the BrahMos, and in September 2007, Defense Minister A.K. Antony announced that this variant was ready, although the platforms on which it will be based have yet to be selected. [38] Experts have stated that the German HDW and the Russian Kilo-class submarines in the Indian Navy are not configured to operate the missile and therefore, New Delhi has requested Moscow to loan it submarines on which underwater trials of the BrahMos can be conducted. [39] Some Indian Defense Ministry sources have stated that such a test will be carried out later in 2007 on an unnamed Russian submarine. [40] Meanwhile, the ship-borne version of the missile has already been inducted, and the Indian Air Force variant is under development. [41] The Air Force variant will be deployed on Sukhoi fighters and on the Indian Navy's long-range IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft. [42] BrahMos officials have stated that the next major step in the missile's evolution would be development of a hypersonic (Mach 5 and above) version of the missile, to be completed in the next 5-6 years. [43]

The Nirbhay
Indian defense scientists and military planners are now considering development of cruise missile options, in addition to the BrahMos. [44] On July 20, senior defense scientists announced the proposed development of a new multi-platform, terrain-hugging, subsonic cruise missile, titled Nirbhay (Fearless). The system would have a range of 1,000 km, putting it in the same class as the U.S. Tomahawk. [45] According to the plan, a technology demonstrator for the Nirbhay will be ready by early 2009. [46] With its longer range, the missile will be able to strike targets at greater distances than the 290-km range BrahMos. [47] Indian defense scientists point out that the range of the proposed Nirbhay would be significantly greater than that of Pakistan's 500- to 700-km range Babur. [48] They have also stated that the Nirbhay's low-altitude flight path will enhance its ability to evade enemy radars. [49]

Finally, there have been reports that in a bid to counter Pakistan's growing cruise missile strength, New Delhi has concluded an initial agreement with Israeli Aircraft Industries for development of a cruise missile interceptor that is based on a "naval point defense system," in which the interceptor missile is launched vertically and subsequently leans and moves toward its target. [50] According to some reports, the system, based on Israel's Barak-8 missile, will be meant for the Navy as well as the Air Force. [51] Other reports spoke of the proposed system in the context of defense against Pakistan's land attack capabilities. [52]

Pakistan's Ballistic and Cruise Missile Programs

A report in the May/June 2007 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists stated that Pakistan is in the process of deploying its most powerful ballistic missile, the Shaheen-II/ Hatf-VI, which has a range of 2,000-2,500 km. [53] Satellite imagery from June 2005 made available to the Federation of Atomic Scientists for this report revealed 15 Transporter Erector Launchers at Pakistan's National Defense Complex that were in different phases of being combined with their missiles. [54] The Pakistani government dismissed the report as "part fact and part fiction." [55] The Shaheen-II, which is said to be a response to India's proposed deployment of the Agni-II (range 2,000 km), can potentially strike targets in most of India. [56] It was last tested in February 2007. [57] (See "Pakistan's Missile Tests Highlight Growing South Asia Nuclear Arms Race, Despite New Confidence Building Measures," WMD Insights, April 2007.)

Apart from ballistic missile modernization, Pakistan has taken further steps to augment its cruise missile arsenal. On July 26, 2007, Pakistan successfully tested the Hatf-VII/Babur cruise missile, which was test-fired last in March. This subsonic missile, which can carry a nuclear warhead, can be launched from Pakistan's Agosta submarine and from its F-16 and JF-17 Thunder aircraft. [58] The mating with the Agosta is key to Islamabad's quest for a second-strike capability. [59] According to the Pakistani military, the missile has "near stealth" capabilities. Since the last test, Pakistani engineers have extended the range of the missile from 500 to 700 km, increasing its ability to reach targets in India, including the capital, New Delhi, with ground-launched or air-launched versions of the system. [60]

One Indian official linked the Babur test to the on-going negotiations between India and the United State on a formal nuclear cooperation agreement, whose successful completion was announced on July 27, 2007. According to one senior official in New Delhi, "the timing may be more than incidental.... They [the Pakistanis] want to remind us about their nuclear capability." [61] Indeed, within days of the test, as well as the conclusion of the 123 Agreement, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), which is headed by President Pervez Musharraf and includes top military leaders and nuclear scientists, criticized the Indo-U.S. agreement. In a statement, the NCA warned that the agreement would cause an arms race in the Subcontinent, and that the United States should have considered a package deal that also included Pakistan. [62]

While there was no official reaction by the Indian government to the Babur test, the opposition Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party condemned the launch, stating that this was a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) because of allegations that China had transferred cruise missile technology to Pakistan. [63] The charge was denounced in Islamabad, where officials stated that the country's cruise missile program was indigenous. [64] (The Indian BrahMos cruise missile, it may be noted, is a joint India-Russia venture, and Pakistan has alleged in the past that this cooperation between India and Russia is in violation of the MTCR.) [65]

The Hatf-VIII or Ra'ad
On August 25, 2007, Pakistan successfully tested its latest cruise missile, the Hatf-VIII, or Ra'ad ("Thunder" in Arabic), a nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). [66] According to the Pakistan military, the Hatf-VIII provides the Air Force with a "strategic standoff capability." [67] The officially announced range of the missile is 350 kilometers. [68] The Pakistan military further stated that the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad has a "low detection probability due to stealth design and materials used in its manufacturing." [69]

One analyst has stated that the Hatf-VIII is likely to be deployed on Pakistan's F-16A fighter aircraft or its planned fleet of F-16C warplanes. [70] He further noted that the relatively short range of the missile suggests it is a new design that relies on assistance from an external actor that does not want to violate range and payload limits set by the Missile Technology Control Regime. [71] The regime restricts the transfer of technology by member states for ballistic and cruise missiles that can carry a payload of 500 kilograms to a distance of 300 km or more. Were the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad based on the Hatf-VII/Babur, the analyst suggested, it would have had a range closer to that of the latter missile. This implied that the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad was a new system, which was likely built with outside assistance, given Pakistan's limited indigenous cruise missile design capabilities. [72] At present there is no indication of the deployment schedule for the Hatf-VIII/Ra'ad.

Recent missile developments in India and Pakistan indicate that a missile arms race is well under way in South Asia. This competition is exacerbated by India's need to address potential strategic adversaries on two fronts. Nonetheless, India's decision to refrain from building missiles able to strike targets at intercontinental distances is an important sign of restraint, which seems to reflect India's official doctrine of pursuing only a "credible minimum deterrent." [73] Pakistan's missile objectives are more straightforward, and demonstrate a continuing attempt to match India's missile improvements and, perhaps, to signal its unease with growing ties between New Delhi and Washington.

Sharad Joshi -- Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

[1] "Agni III Test-Fired Successfully," Business Line, April 13, 2007, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/04/13/stories/2007041304811000.htm. [View Article]
[2] Sharad Joshi and Peter Crail, "India Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone to an ICBM?" WMD Insights, May 2007.
[3] Vishal Thapar, "Missile Capped: Govt Under Fire," CNN-IBN, June 19, 2007, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india-softens-missile-power-for-us/43179-11.html. [View Article]
[4] Y. Mallikarjun, "DRDO Begins Work on Agni-IV Missile," Hindu, August 9, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/09/stories/2007080961571300.htm. [View Article]
[5] Josy Joseph, "Missile Programmes Disappoint Scientists," Daily News & Analysis, June 19, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1104296. [View Article]
[6] Mallikarjun, "DRDO Begins Work on Agni-IV Missile," see source in [4].
[7] Joseph, "Missile Programmes Disappoint Scientists," see source in [5]; Josy Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," Daily News & Analysis, June 18, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1103986; [View Article] "New Models for India's Missile Family," Aviation and Aerospace, July 9, 2007, http://www.domain-b.com/aero/july/2007/20070709_models.htm.
[View Article]
[8] Thapar, "Missile Capped: Govt Under Fire," see source in [3]; Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," see source in [7].
[9] "India Denied Access to Critical Component after Agni III Launch," NewKerala.com, June 8, 2007, http://www.newkerala.com/news.php?action=fullnews&id=37482. [View Article]
[10] Ibid.; Carbon Fiber Forum website, http://www.madehow.com/Volume-4/Carbon-Fiber.html; [View Article] U.S. Department of Defense, "Polyacrylonitrile (PAN) Carbon Fibers, Industrial Capability Assessment, OUSD(AT&L) Industrial Policy, Report to Congress," October 2005, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/pan_carbon_fiber_report_to_congress_10-2005.pdf. [View Article]
[11] "India Toes U.S. Line, Caps Missile Plan," Yahoo News India, June 18, 2007, http://in.tech.yahoo.com/070618/211/6h44x.html. [View Article]
[12] "Report: India to Limit Missile Program to Aid U.S. Nuclear Deal," Yahoo News India, June 18, 2007, http://in.news.yahoo.com/070618/210/6h403.html. [View Article]
[13] "U.S. Reacts Cautiously to Agni III Missile Test," Hindu, April 14, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/04/14/stories/2007041400891300.htm. [View Article]
[14] Varghese George, "Sonia Vs Kalam," Indian Express, June 28, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/203047.html. [View Article]
[15] Joseph, "Govt Scales Down Missile Range, Aims Closer Home," see source in [7].
[16] Ashley J. Tellis, "India's Emerging Nuclear Posture," RAND, 2001, pages 563-564, see also maps on pages. 562, 563, and 566.
[17] Rajeev Sharma, "Agni-III Being Seen as India's ICBM," Tribune, April 14, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070414/nation.htm#6. [View Article]
[18] "After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs," DefenseNews.com, April 16, 2007, http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=2687888&C=asiapac. [View Article]
[19] See "India's Nuclear Forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2005, p. 74, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/147052n7g76v4733/fulltext.pdf; [View Article] "India's Nuclear Forces, 2002," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2002, page 72. Interestingly, while the 2002 and 2005 reports on India's nuclear forces in the Bulletin mention the Surya, the most recent report, in the July/August 2007 issue, does not. See "India's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2007, p. 76, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hm378jxpm12u4342/fulltext.pdf; [View Article] Richard Speier, "India's ICBM: On a Glide-Path to Trouble?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, February 7, 2007, http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/060207SpeierICBM.pdf. [View Article]
[20] See "Going Ballistic Makes Sense," Hindustan Times, April 13, 2007, in Lexis-Nexis; "After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs," DefenseNews.com, April 16, 2007.
[21] See, for example, "After Testing China-Specific Missile, India Eyes ICBMs," see source in [20]; "Agni-III Test-Fired Off Orissa Coast," Indian Express, July 10, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/8201.html. [View Article]
[22] See, for example, Anupam Srivastava, "India's Growing Missile Ambitions," Asian Survey, March/April 2000, 40:2, Vol. XL, No. 2, p. 32; Joshi and Crail, "India Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone to an ICBM?" see source in [2]; Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "India and Pakistan: Nuclear Related Programs and Aspirations at Sea," in Lowell Dittmer (ed.) South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, pp. 89-90.
[23] "DRDO Chief Confirms Submarine Ballistic Missile Ready," Indian Express, July 8, 2007, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/204164.html. [View Article]
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] "New Models for India's Missile Family," Aviation and Aerospace, July 9, 2007.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid; Vishal Thapar, "India Gets Submarine Missile Power," IBNLive.com, July 7, 2007, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/india-gets-submarine-missile-power/44268-3.html. [View Article]
[29] For background on the BrahMos program, see Sharad Joshi, "India's Missile Program: Diverging Trajectories," WMD Insights, February 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I12/I12_SA1_IndiaMissileProgram.htm. [View Article]
[30] T.S. Subramanian, "Cruising Along," Frontline, June 30-July 13, 2007, Vol. 24, Issue 3, http://www.flonnet.com/fl2413/stories/20070713003202800.htm; [View Article] Rahul Singh, "Indian Army Gets BrahMos Power," Hindustan Times, June 22, 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/storypage/storypage.aspx?id=efec61d3-d145-4e23-a723-1e111d30f33&Match
ID1=4502&TeamID1=2&TeamID2=6&MatchType1=1&SeriesID1=1122&PrimaryID=4502& Headline=Indian +Army+gets+BrahMos+power. [View Article]
[31] T.S. Subramanian, "Army Acquires BrahMos Missile," Hindu, June 22, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/22/stories/2007062250541300.htm. [View Article]
[32] Vishal Thapar, "Indian Army Gets BrahMos Power," IBNLive, June 22, 2007, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/indian-army-gets-brahmos-power/43380-11-16.html. [View Article]
[33] "Army to Induct BrahMos Ahead of Schedule," Times of India, May 13, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Army_to_induct_Brahmos_ahead_of_schedule/articleshow/2039984.cms.
[View Article]
[34] Ibid.
[35] Sandeep Dikshit, "BrahMos to be Used in Plains," Hindu, June 22, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/06/22/stories/2007062250611300.htm. [View Article]
[36] Rahul Singh, "Indian Army Gets BrahMos Power," see source in [30].
[37] "Army to Induct BrahMos Ahead of Schedule," see source in [33].
[38] "India Develops Submarine Version of BrahMos Missile," Rediff.com, September 5, 2007, http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/sep/05brahmos.htm. [View Article]
[39] Ibid.
[40] Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India to Launch BrahMos from Russian Sub," Defense News, September 6, 2007, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3017909&C=asiapac. [View Article]
[41] Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Retains BrahMos Chief for Missile's Upgrade," Defense News, July 31, 2007, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2936399&C=asiapac. [View Article]
[42] Josy Joseph, "Navy Wants BrahMos in Submarines," Daily News & Analysis, June 21, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1104880. [View Article]
[43] "BrahMos to Develop First Hypersonic Cruise Missile in 5 Years," Pravda, July 10, 2007, http://www.inteldaily.com/?c=166&a=2687. [View Article]
[44] "India Plans to Test New Medium-Range Missile in 2009," Daily News & Analysis, July 24, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1111569. [View Article]
[45] Sujan Dutta, "Fearless Tomahawk-Type Missile on Radar," Telegraph, July 20, 2007, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070720/asp/nation/story_8080771.asp; [View Article] "India Plans to Test New Medium-Range Missile in 2009," Daily News & Analysis, July 24, 2007.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Josy Joseph, "Nirbhay to Beef up Missile Muscle," Daily News & Analysis, July 22, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1111269. [View Article]
[48] Neelam Mathews, "Plans to Test New Missile by End of '09," Asian Age, July 25, 2007.
[49] Mallikarjun, "DRDO Begins Work on Agni-IV Missile," see source in [4].
[50] "Israel Likely to Devise Missiles for India," United Press International, July 27, 2007, http://www.upi.com/International_Intelligence/Briefing/2007/07/27/israel_likely_to_devise_missiles_for_india/8477/.
[View Article]
[51] "IAI Signs $2.5 Billion Deal with India," YNetnews.com, July 15, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3425400,00.html. [View Article]
[52] "Israel Likely to Devise Missiles for India," see source in [50].
[53] "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 72-73 [http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k4q43h2104032426/fulltext.pdf]; "Pakistan to Deploy New Nuclear Missile as Counter to India's Nuke Build-up," SpaceWar.com, May 11, 2007, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Pakistan_To_Deploy_New_Nuclear_Missile_As_Counter_To_India_Nuke_
Build_Up_999.html. [View Article]
[54] Ibid.
[55] Qudssia Akhlaque, "FO Rejects Foreign Role," Dawn, May 11, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/05/11/top16.htm. [View Article]
[56] "India's Nuke Build-up' Gives Pak the heebie-jeebies," Times of India, May 10, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indias_nuke_build-up_gives_Pak_the_heebie-jeebies/articleshow/2024928.cms.
[View Article]
[57] For a discussion of the deployment of the Agni-I and the Agni-II, see "India's Nuclear Forces, 2007," see source in [19].
[58] "Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile," CNN.com, July 26, 2007, http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/07/26/pakistan.missile.test.reut/index.html; [View Article] "Pakistan Successfully Test-Fires Hataf-VII Missile," PakTribune, July 26, 2007, http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=185117. [View Article]
[59] S.M. Hali, "Second Strike Capability," Nation, August 16, 2006, http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2006/16/columns5.php. [View Article]
[60] Bruce Loudon, "New Delhi Suspicious of Test," The Australian, July 27, 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22139886-2703,00.html; [View Article] "Pakistan Tests Cruise Missile," United Press International, July 26, 2007, http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/2007/07/26/pakistan_tests_cruise_missile/4066/; [View Article] "Pakistan Tests Nuclear-Capable Missile," Guardian, July 26, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6806390,00.html; [View Article] "Pakistan Nuclear-Capable Missile Test Successful," Moscow News, July 26, 2007, http://www.mnweekly.ru/world/20070726/55263972.html; [View Article] Neelam Mathews, "Plans to Test New Missile by End of '09," Asian Age, July 25, 2007 (article accessed 07/24/2007; no longer available online).
[61] Loudon, "New Delhi Suspicious of Test," see source in [60].
[62] Jo Johnson and Edward Luce, "Pakistan Warns US of Asia Arms Race," Financial Times, August 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/287d8882-4121-11dc-8f37-0000779fd2ac.html. [View Article]
[63] "BJP Condemns Pak's Missile Test," Chennai Online, August 4, 2007 [http://www.chennaionline.com/colnews/newsitem.asp?NEWSID=%7B7C88D27D-065F-4A12-A3B8-5BE746643630%7D&CATEGORYNAME=NATL].
[64] Muhammad Saleh Zaafir, "Pakistan Rejects BJP Contention Against Missile Programme," The News, August 5, 2007, http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=9428. [View Article]
[65] See for example, Shaukat Piracha, "BrahMos Missile Test Violates MTCR," Daily Times, April 30, 2002, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-4-2002_pg7_1. [View Article]
[66] "Pakistan Military Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile," International Herald Tribune, August 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/25/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Missile-Test.php. [View Article]
[67] Ibid
[68] "Pakistan Test Fires Cruise Missile," CNN.com, August 26, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/08/25/pakistan.missile/index.html?iref=newssearch. [View Article]
[69] Ibid.
[70] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan Tests Hatf 8 Air-launched Cruise Missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, September 1, 2007.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Rajesh M. Basrur, "India's Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture," in Michael Krepon, Rodney Jones, and Ziad Haider (eds.), Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004, pp. 56-67, http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER3.pdf. [View Article]


Author(s): Sharad Joshi
Related Resources: Missile, South Asia
Date Created: October 8, 2007
Date Updated: -NA-
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