![Visit MIIS [ Image: MIIS Logo ]](/_navimages/logos/miis_logo_white_260x55_80percent.png "Visit MIIS [ Image: MIIS Logo ]"){kind=logo}
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
|
| You are here: HOME > Programs > IONP > Training > Page |
NPT Review ConferenceMIIS-NPT 2000 Review Conference Adopted by consensus on April 19, 2000 In their Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, The States Parties to the Treaty, Article I & II, preambular paragraphs 1 to 3: 1. Reaffirming that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty, 2. Noting with concern the cases of non-compliance with the Treaty by two States Parties which demand the close attention and effective response of the States Parties to the NPT, 3. Recalling international condemnation of the nuclear test explosions in South Asia in 1998 and Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998), 4. Call upon the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to reaffirm their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, 5. Call upon the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to reaffirm their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. 6. The States Parties reaffirm that in accordance with Article IX, States not currently States Parties may accede to the Treaty only as non-nuclear-weapon States. Article VI, preambular paragraphs 8 to 12: 7. Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, 8. Welcoming the achievements to date and the commitment to future Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in the pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons, 9. Welcoming the ratification of START II by the United States in 1996 and the Russian Federation in 2000, 10. Recognizing that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty remains a cornerstone of international strategic stability, the States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to continue efforts to prevent an arms race and the proliferation of strategically destabilizing weapons, 11. Noting the bilateral agreement of 1994 on no-first-use of nuclear weapons between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, 12. The States Parties call upon the Russian Federation and the United States to vigorously pursue bilateral disarmament agreements, including substantive negotiations of a START III agreement, with a view to its early conclusion, and 13. Call upon the nuclear-weapon States to take early steps to examine the possibilities for de-alerting and removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, to further examine nuclear weapons policies and postures including no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and to demonstrate transparency of their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories, and 14. Acknowledging the need to maintain the safety of existing stockpiles of nuclear warheads until such time as the total elimination of nuclear weapons is achieved, the States Parties urge nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations to eventually abolish all nuclear-weapons-related testing. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Reductions
16. Recognizing the significance of the new tactical nuclear weapons initiative "Tactical Arms Reduction Program" (TARP) negotiated by the United States and the Russian Federation in March 2000, 17. The States Parties to the NPT call upon the United States and the Russian Federation, under Article VI of the Treaty, 18. To begin, without delay, a program of transparency, whereby they agree to comply with 1991 parallel and unilateral declarations, and begin negotiations to strengthen and codify these declarations, in a way that will provide for data exchange and a formal verification regime, 19. To report annually to the Conference on Disarmament compliance with the Tactical Arms Reduction Program, including reports on progress in the reductions, de-alerting and de-mating of all tactical nuclear weapons, as agreed to in TARP. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
21. Welcoming the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States, 22. Noting the Final Declaration that was adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in October 1999, 23. The States Parties call upon all States, especially those States whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the CTBT ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the CTBT without conditions and without delay, 24. Urge the remaining three nuclear-weapon States to accelerate their CTBT ratification processes, in view of their special responsibility in ratifying the CTBT, 25. Underscore that the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 have been condemned by the international community and call upon these States to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without conditions, 26. Call upon all states to act in accordance with all provisions of the CTBT in good faith and to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty until such time as the Treaty enters into force, and 27. Call also upon all states to pursue efforts to ensure that necessary support is provided to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization. Fissile Material
29. Welcoming also the announcements made by some nuclear-weapon States that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and call upon all States to declare a moratorium on the production of such material for such devices, without delay, 30. Reaffirming the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, 31. The States Parties urge all states with unsafeguarded fissile materialsthe nuclear weapons states and relevant non-NPT statesto voluntarily increase the transparency of their fissile material stockpiles without delay, and to begin a process of internally auditing their stocks, and publishing the results on a regular and timely basis, 32. Call upon the five nuclear-weapon States to place as much excess fissile material as possible, including weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear warheads, irreversibly under international verification as soon as practicable, 33. Call upon all those nuclear-weapon States that have not already done so to place all civilian stocks of fissile materials under IAEA safeguards pursuant to their voluntary offer agreements, 34. Urge States, whether they are party to the NPT or not, to make unilateral commitments to place under IAEA safeguards facilities previously used to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and to decommission and dismantle facilities they have used previously for that sole purpose, and 35. Call upon all nuclear-weapon States to commit to the safe storage of excess plutonium and HEU, in forms less usable in nuclear weapons than metallic nuclear weapons components, and to the reduction and eventual disposal of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU. Security Assurances
37. The States Parties to the Treaty call for the ad hoc committee to reconvene and begin negotiations on an internationally legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the progress of which will be discussed and assessed at the next Review Conference. Universality
39. Welcome the accession of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1995, 40. Emphasize that universality implies both universal membership in the NPT, as well as universal adherence to its provisions, 41. Repeat their urgent call upon all states not yet party to the Treaty Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, at the earliest possible date, without condition or further delay, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, 42. Undertake to make determined and unequivocal efforts towards achieving the goal of universality of the Treaty, bearing in mind the great urgency and importance of universal adherence to the NPT as an essential element in the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, 43. Furthermore, undertake not to undermine the universality of the Treaty by cooperating with the non-States Parties by providing or sharing nuclear-related technologies, facilities, and materials, which are not under IAEA safeguards, 44. Call upon all the States Parties to make every effort toward improving regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia, and to commence negotiations on nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions as one means to achieve universality, 45. Invite the four non-parties to the Treaty to discuss issues of accession
to the Treaty during the PrepComs and Review Conferences.
|
| Return to Top |
@CNS Updates