NPT Review Conference

 
Report of Main Committee II
MIIS-NPT 2000 Review Conference
Adopted by consensus on April 19, 2000

Safeguards
Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II: Article III.

Backward-looking
1. Since the 1995 NPT Review conference, the State Parties have made a great deal of progress in the area of safeguards. The IAEA Board of Governors has adopted the Additional Protocol on May 16, 1997, which is designed to significantly strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards regime in order to ensure that there are credible assurances of no undeclared activities.  Forty-five countries have signed the Additional Protocol.

2. However, a significant number of State Parties has still not concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The IAEA, as part of its obligations under the NPT, has also been unable to confirm that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in all State Parties, and unable to carry out its Security Council mandated responsibilities in Iraq.

3. The State Parties consider it regrettable that it continues to be non-compliance in important aspects of the safeguards agreement between certain countries and the IAEA. The Safeguards Agreement remains in force and binding, and compliance constitutes a fundamental responsibility of the concerned State parties to the NPT. The State Parties call on the concerned countries to cooperate fully in the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement

4. The State Parties welcome and support the initiatives made to constructively address non-compliance the safeguards agreement with IAEA. The State Parties strongly support the efforts made of the UN Security Council in Resolution XX to ensure full compliance with the NPT of all State Parties.

5. The State Parties welcome unilateral decisions made by the NWS to accept IAEA safeguards on nuclear material no longer needed for defense purposes. The State Parties consider these initiatives important contributions to the promotion of IAEA Safeguards and to nuclear disarmament.

Export Controls
6. Multilateral export control mechanisms, the Nuclear Suppliers group, and the Zangger Committee have been strengthened and made more transparent. The number of participants in these mechanisms has also increased.

Physical Protection
7. The State Parties welcome the initiatives made to improve the Convention of Physical Protection.

Forward-looking
8. The States parties reaffirm that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the sole competent authority to verify the compliance of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III undertakings. In this regard, all State parties, which have not yet done, so should sign the full-scope safeguards agreements required by Article III of the Treaty. In order to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, many improvements still need to be made.

9. The State Parties consider full compliance with article III of all State Parties to be of vital importance for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

10. The States Parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any States Party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate and to draw conclusions within its mandate. In case of serious breach the results of such an investigation should be forwarded to the UN Security Council as the appropriate authority.

11. The effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be strengthened, and the importance of the Model Protocol approved on May 15, 1997, by the Board of Governors aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system needs to be stressed. In this context all States should conclude and implement Protocols to their safeguards agreements based on the Model Protocol (INFCIRC/540 Corr.) of the IAEA at the earliest possible time.

12. All supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment of material designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should accept IAEA full scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as a necessary precondition.

13. The State Parties urge all States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

14. States Parties call for the establishment of integrated safeguard system without substantially increasing its cost, but realize the financial and logistical burden imposed on States Parties by new strengthened IAEA safeguard system. Therefore the States Parties support the need to provide the IAEA with all necessary financial and human resources.

Export Controls
15. Nuclear Supplier Group member countries should continue to strengthen the effectiveness of their national nuclear export controls. Export controls are essential to implementing nuclear nonproliferation obligations. All NSG member states should implement a set of common Export Guidelines, which establish a list of nuclear, and nuclear related dual use items and the conditions under which a NSG state will authorize their sale and transfer. Nuclear cooperation should be strictly limited only for peaceful use, non-explosive purposes based on compliance with IAEA safeguards.

16. Transparency is an essential dimension to nuclear export controls.  The States Parties supports further efforts at promoting and enhancing transparency.  Properly structured and applied, export controls foster a climate of confidence in nuclear trade that encourages and facilitates international cooperation in pursuit of economic and technological development.

17. The governments of nuclear exporting countries should meet annually to review all nuclear cooperation agreements and to review the application of such agreements in order to prevent clandestine nuclear weapon development.

Physical protection
18. Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities is an integral part of effective nuclear non-proliferation.  States must implement strong and upgraded physical protection measures in order to prevent illicit trafficking.

19. States should pursue international standards of physical protection for all nuclear materials using the IAEA Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, INFCIRC/225.

20. The States Parties should review regularly the physical protection regime, including the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. The State Parties agree to the need for a revision of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in a way, which takes into account various country site-specific considerations. The State parties emphasize the need for standards in physical protection, in particular regarding a) domestic storage and transportation of nuclear material, and b) excess nuclear material. The conclusion and entry into force of an international agreement on physical protection of nuclear materials is needed.

Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials
21. The State Parties believe illicit trafficking of nuclear materials could seriously affect the global security, and the State Parties call upon all States to do their utmost to combat such trafficking.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II: Article IV, preambular paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2) and (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5.

22. The States Parties affirm that all states must cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, are required to conclude a legally-binding bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement that ensures that the partner country will respect stringent nuclear nonproliferation requirements.

Backward-looking
23. The State Parties welcome the results from the efforts made by IAEA in field of promotion of the safe use of nuclear technology and peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly in assisting in its developing member states. Technical cooperation and assistance is now being more sharply focused on responding to developing member states needs mainly through the introduction and implementation of model projects. The IAEA played a vital role in facilitating the international convention on nuclear safety.

Forward-looking
24. The States parties reaffirm their support to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and the Safe Management of Radioactive Waste, and believe all countries and particularly those with nuclear power programs should join these conventions.

25. All States should maintain the highest practicable level of nuclear safety including waste management, and observe standards and guideline in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection, and transport of nuclear materials, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation.

26. The non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT, especially developing countries, should be preferentially treated in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

27. The transparency and the use of international conventions as the basis for bilateral agreements in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy should be increased.  The highest possible accountancy and physical protection standards should be applied to the production, use, transport and storage of dual use nuclear material, and in the production, use, transportation, storage, decommissioning and destruction, without interfering with the inalienable right for the development of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

28. Attacks or threats on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.

29. The State Parties should reaffirm the importance to ensure the inalienable rights of all the parties to the NPT to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.  In this context, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear-weapon-free-zones: Article VII.

Backward-Looking
30. The States Parties welcome the steps that have been taken since 1995 to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, particularly the Bangkok Treaty (Southeast Asia) and the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa).  Nuclear weapon states, which have not signed the Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ, should take the necessary step as soon as possible. The States Parties welcome unilateral decision by Mongolia to become nuclear-weapon-free state.

31. The States Parties reaffirm the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing NWFZs to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.  The States Parties also call for the ratification of the treaties of these zones by all States of the region concerned.

32. States Parties recognize, taking into account the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of June 8, 1998, the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States and in light of the actual conditions of the regions concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.  Further efforts, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia, to establish such zones should be urgently pursued.

Forward Looking
33. The States Parties call on the nuclear-weapon States to adhere to the additional protocols of all existing NWFZs and to facilitate the commencement, negotiation and entry into force of nascent NWFZs in Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.  The establishment of additional NWFZs by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2005 would be welcomed.

34. States Parties support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and recognize its important contribution to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament at both regional and global levels.

35. States Parties call on the nuclear-weapon States to commit to concrete steps to facilitate the establishment of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone at an early date and, upon its completion, to sign and ratify the relevant protocol without delay.  Non-nuclear weapon States agree to adhere to the principles for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (not producing, acquiring, developing, deploying, installing, or stockpiling nuclear weapons in their territory or territories under their control).  Nuclear-weapon States assure non-nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

36. The States Parties recognize the continuing contribution that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons and call upon all States to work towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Southern Hemisphere.

The Middle East Resolution
Backward Looking
37. The States Parties endorse the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognize that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

38. The States Parties welcome the accession of Djibouti, Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the NPT and call upon the one remaining State in the region not party to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all its nuclear activities.

Forward Looking
39. The States Parties note with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and urge the only state in the region that operates unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic energy Agency safeguards, and all Middle East States reaffirm their commitment to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

40. The States Parties reaffirm the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and call upon the only State in the Middle East that has not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

41. The States Parties also call upon all States in the Middle East to take action in an appropriate forum, prior to the next Review Conference, aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, commencement of negotiations for the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, the establishment of a regional verification system, and the conclusion of a regional agreement banning the production and stockpiling of unsafeguarded fissile material and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of these objectives.

42. All States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts to commence these negotiations before the next Review Conference.


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