CNS Programs: IONP

Paper for Presentation at the "Ninth Annual International Arms Control Conference", "Entering the New Millenium: Dilemmas in Arms Control", Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 16-18 April 1999.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review - 2000

by Tariq Rauf(1)

Barring any last minute schedule changes, the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will take place at United Nations headquarters from 24 April to 19 May 2000. It goes without saying that expectations will be high regarding the review of the operation and implementation of the Treaty during the five years since the historic 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC), which on 11 May 1995, agreed without a vote to a package of decisions and resolution that extended the Treaty indefinitely.

The conduct of the 2000 Review Conference will be governed, in large part, through the lens of the 1995 package of extension decisions and resolution. Decision 1 on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,"(2) elaborated a framework for an enhanced and a more substantive Treaty review process to facilitate a full and balanced review of the implementation of the NPT and to forward recommendations on future steps to the quinquennial NPT Review Conferences. Decision 2 on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,"(3) established substantive guidelines and indicative targets designed to promote greater accountability regarding the full implementation of the Treaty. Decision 3 on "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"(4) which emphasized the two preceding decisions adopted by the NPTREC and reaffirmed NPT Article VIII.3, was taken in accordance with Article X.2 that provided for the indefinite continuation in force of the Treaty and hence it was legally binding. The importance in this context of the two decisions on principles and objectives, and a strengthened treaty review process, is reflected in that they have been referred to respectively as "the hammer and the anvil of the post-NPT extension epoch."(5) In addition, a resolution on the Middle East(6) co-sponsored by the depositary States was also adopted which inter alia endorsed the on-going peace process, stressed the importance of the treaty's universality in the region, and called for the establishment in the region of an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The euphoria following the indefinite extension of the NPT quickly evaporated as bickering broke out at the NPTREC between some members of the Group of Non-Aligned States (NAM) and certain members of the Western and Others Group (WEOG) including the three Western nuclear-weapon states (NWS), over the heavy pressure applied by the NWS to secure indefinite extension and over the lack of binding agreement on a framework for nuclear disarmament.(7) This resulted in the failure of the 1995 Conference to cap its historic success with a Final Declaration.

In the four years that have elapsed since the indefinite extension, and as states finalize preparations for the next NPT review conference in 2000, differences are already rife over the meaning and interpretation of the NPTREC decisions and on their implementation that possibly threaten to cast a cloud over the new Treaty review process, even before it gets underway.

The aim of this paper is to contribute some thinking on how best to approach the conduct of the next-the sixth-Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, and the first under the strengthened review process, scheduled for the year 2000. It will be crucial to ensure a full and balanced review of compliance with all of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as the implementation of the decisions of the 1995 NPTREC. This paper begins with an analysis Decisions 1 and 2 of the NPTREC, comments on the enhanced review process for the Treaty in light of these decisions, and offers perspectives on how to approach the work of the Review Conference.

Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty

The original concept of a "strengthened review process" in the context of the extension decision, was first elaborated in a Canadian "non-paper" in early 1995.(8) The Canadian concept paper outlined the characteristics of an "enhanced review process" as comprising, inter alia:

1) retention of the current structure of review conferences;

2) investing the preparatory process with a more substantive character (i.e. discussion of both procedural and substantive issues);

3) elaborating, at Review Conferences, indicative targets for compliance with given articles of the Treaty; and

4) establishing a framework for ways of strengthening the Treaty and its implementation.

These ideas found their way into the South African draft on the enhanced review mechanism, and through the process of the President's Consultations at the NPTREC were eventually elaborated in the decisions on the extension package.(9) The term "strengthened" review process, in Decision 1, was crafted by Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat (Venezuela), who prevailed in arguing that "enhancing implied only 'cosmetic' changes and that what was required was a process that should lead to a full implementation of the NPT, having in mind, specifically, Article VI."(10) During the President's Consultations, the drafters struck a political compromise between those who feared that in indefinitely extending the NPT the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) would lose their leverage as regards the NWS' nuclear disarmament obligations and those who preferred a simple extension of the Treaty without any collateral measures to complement the future implementation of the NPT. In other words, the compromise provided not only to make all States parties accountable for full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, but more specifically to hold the NWS to fulfilling their Article VI commitments. To quote Ambassador Christopher Westdal (the-then Canadian ambassador for disarmament and the head of Canada's delegation to the NPTREC):

"The nuclear-weapon states need to understand that the non-nuclear weapon states accepted indefinite extension because they want the nuclear-weapon states to be permanently held accountable to Article VI on disarmament."(11)

Ambassador Dhanapala in his closing statement to the NPTREC also emphasized the concept of permanence with accountability, originally coined by Canada"

"The strengthened review process that we have established will now ensure a sharper focus on review conferences of the future and their preparatory committees. These forums of rigorous accountability will play a more crucial role in the operation of the treaty than ever before. As States Parties to the Treaty, we have to ensure that we make maximum use of this mechanism of accountability in the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Treaty."(12)

Dr. Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), speaking on the same issue but in a slightly different vein, summed it up as:

"Interest in 'strengthening' or 'enhancing' the traditional treaty review process grew out of a concern shared by many non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon states would lose any incentive to make progress toward nuclear disarmament as called for by Article VI of the NPT once they had secured indefinite extension. A way to deal with this desire for greater nuclear weapon state accountability was to endow the NPT review conferences and the associated preparatory meetings with a more substantive character, thus 'strengthening' the process. This struck a chord with the NPT non-nuclear weapon state members who saw this as an opportunity to promote the goal of full implementation of the Treaty by all its parties including the nuclear weapon states."(13)

Decision 1 comprised seven operative paragraphs, of which five dealt with review conferences (1,2, 5, 6, and 7), while two (3 and 4) deal with the Preparatory Committee, though some of the paragraphs may better understood if read in conjunction with others.

The NPT created the precedent, for multilateral arms control agreements, of periodic reviews to assess the implementation of the Treaty after its entry into force.(14) Article VIII.3 specifically provided for the first review conference to be held in Geneva in 1975, five years after the Treaty's entry into force in 1970, and left open the option for subsequent quinquennial reviews thereafter if requested by a majority of states parties. In practice, however, NPT review conferences have been held every five years since 1975. The traditional procedure had been for a majority of parties to request the three depositaries (the United States, United Kingdom, and the-then USSR now Russian Federation) to initiate proceedings to hold a review conference. This wish was manifested through a draft resolution crafted in the UNGA First Committee (disarmament and international security) and subsequently adopted by the General Assembly, two years prior to the next Conference. The Final Declaration of the 1985 review conference, however, noted in its review of Article VIII that the "States Party to the Treaty participating in this Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a fourth Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1990".(15)

Decision 1 institutionalized the past practice of five-yearly reviews, thus in effect it could be said to indirectly clarify the meaning of Article VIII.3 in regularizing quinquennial reviews, as a way of strengthening the review process for the Treaty and to provide greater accountability. From now on, there will be a near-continuous review process, that no longer requires the formality of a majority of states parties requesting the depositaries to arrange a review conference. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee will now meet for a duration of ten working days, instead of the previous five, and the Committee will meet in each of the three years prior to the next review conference, and if necessary, a fourth session may be held in the year of the conference. This doubling of the working days of the PrepCom was designed to facilitate a full and frank substantive exchange of views on the operation and implementation of the Treaty, with the decisions of the NPTREC providing the guidance.

For the most part, the Preparatory Committee for previous review conferences traditionally focused primarily on procedural, logistical and legal matters. The third and fourth sessions of the PrepCom for the 1995 NPTREC, had also engaged in discussion on substantive matters, though this was more the exception than the rule. Decision 1 thus served to formalize the inclusion of substantive matters, along with procedural issues, in the work of the Preparatory Committee and clearly specified that:

"The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference."(16)

In many ways this is the crux of the strengthened review process, in that the Preparatory Committee is now specifically mandated to consider: 1) principles; 2) objectives; and 3) ways, in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality. In the 1997 and 1998 sessions of the Preparatory Committee, these issues have become a source of controversy and conflict as competing interpretations of Decision 1 have emerged. The "intent" of the drafters was to transform the review into a more credible and meaningful process of accountability for the Treaty's implementation by all states parties, and for future reviews to encompass the full scope of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation agenda. The reference to the terms "principles" and "objectives" in this context included those captured in the framework of Decision 2 on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".(17) Furthermore, the term "ways", added in one of the pen-ultimate revisions of the draft decision, was taken to mean defining ways or setting indicative targets to promote the full implementation of the Treaty. In practice, however, with the passage of time memories have faded, officials have been reassigned, differing interpretations have emerged, as have some efforts to challenge the negotiating history or the "intent" of the drafters, that might result in dampening down the scope of Decision 1.

While endorsing the current structure of the three Main Committees (MC), at review conferences, Decision 1 (paragraph 5) also empowered the General Committee to resolve the question of overlap in the work of the MCs in a manner as to delegate responsibility for review and subsequent reporting on each specific issue to only one of the relevant Main Committees. The record of the previous five NPT review conferences suggests that the Main Committees' program of work has been organized in an inefficient, somewhat redundant, and inordinately complex manner. It's worth recalling that the 1975 and 1980 Review Conferences each operated with only two Main Committees. MC. I dealt with political and disarmament matters, while MC. II dealt with safeguards/export controls and peaceful uses. The near-failure of the 1975 RevConf, and the complete failure of the 1980 RevConf, to agree on a Final Declaration, together with the political requirement to give the Eastern Group the chairmanship of a main committee, led the United States at the third Review Conference in 1985 to propose three Main Committees and this established the precedent for the current MC structure and their allocation of work.

The issue of setting up subsidiary bodies (paragraph 5), within the respective Main Committees, was not entirely new, as at previous review conferences informal working groups had been created to resolve certain clusters of issues and to draft language for the MC's report on the review of the Treaty. In 1995, for example, MC.I established an open-ended working group on security assurances, while MC.II established two working groups, one to consider nuclear-weapon-free zones and the other export controls. After 1995, the task of recommending the establishment of subsidiary bodies was assigned to the Preparatory Committee. Even this was not entirely a new practice as the PrepCom for the 1995 NPTREC had set up a working group to consider and report on its Rules of Procedure, and this group continued its work through the first few days of the NPTREC to try to finalize Rule 28.3 on the extension decision. Decision 1 in building upon informal past practice formalized the role of subsidiary bodies in providing for a focused consideration of such issues. The "Strengthened Review Process" did not in any way limit the duration of such subsidiary bodies. There can be no reason why specific subsidiary bodies should not be mandated to work inter-sessionally or even on an on-going basis. An improvement in the quality of debate and better chances for the success of more complex initiatives, including those regarding institutional objectives, might thereby be expected.

The final paragraph of Decision 1 enjoined states parties that the focus of Review Conferences on the implementation of the Treaty could look both back at the period under review as well as make recommendations on the areas where further progress was required and to identify the necessary means for its achievement. Future Review Conferences were charged with specifically addressing ways to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and its universality. This suggested that at least two products were expected from future review conferences: an assessment of the operation of the Treaty, in the five-year period under review (i.e. 1995-2000); and a set of goals to promote the implementation of the Treaty in the next five-year period (i.e. from 2000 through 2005).

One of the most important aspects of the Decisions on Strengthened Reviews and of Principles and Objectives was that of the evolving nature of the contents of both documents. That the process of reviewing the operation of the treaty was augmented at the NPTREC in 1995 implied that this could-and should-be repeated in the future. The same holds true of the Principles and Objectives. It would be wise to regard both documents as rolling texts to be reviewed and appropriately augmented quinquennially.

Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

In many respects, interpreting and implementing Decision 2 will be even more challenging than Decision 1. The drafters of this decision, while negotiating in the President's Consultations at the NPTREC, apparently intended to establish what has been variously referred to subsequently as a "yardstick" or a "template" against which to measure future implementation of the Treaty.(18) Further, this decision has been characterized as comprising a rolling text that was designed to be dynamic and responsive to changing international conditions. John Holum (Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) described Decision 2 as "a rolling report card on the world's efforts to live up to the bargains struck in the NPT and since affirmed."(19) In Dr. Scheinman's view, "The decision on principles and objectives outlined an 'agenda' of issues that the parties identified as important to future efforts to implement and sustain the NPT. It encompassed the elements generally regarded as critical to the long-term success of the treaty and of the non-proliferation regime that it supports."(20) He noted further that:

"Some NPT countries refer to the 'Principles and Objectives' decision as the 'yardstick' against which future progress will be measured.... For the United States, the 'Principles and Objectives' decision represents the important collective political interest and commitment of NPT parties to see further progress made toward assuring the full implementation of the NPT and a useful reference point for our continued efforts toward that end. The recommendations outlined in the decision are ones we and others should strive to meet. However, it is the Treaty itself that is the source of our obligations and a full and balanced review of the Treaty is the objective of NPT review conferences."(21)

As noted by Peter Goosen (South Africa's delegate at the NPTREC), in formulating the principles agreed in Decision 2 "it was important to stretch the parameters of the debate but yet not to break the envelope of what was possible."(22) Ambassador Christopher Westdal (Canada) captured this theme succinctly:

"Non-nuclear weapon states see indefinite extension as a permanent commitment by the nuclear weapon states to pursue disarmament. Thus, the non-nuclear weapon states will now in effect call on the nuclear weapon states to fulfill their commitments under Article VI: to lower the numbers of such weapons, and to get rid of them. That is the message to nuclear weapon states, a message some of them might not welcome. The world has, in effect, proclaimed permanent values and what must be done now is to get on with the hard work of fulfilling them."(23)

Decisions 1 and 2 established new parameters of discourse on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, however, the nature and context of this debate will need to be worked out during the deliberations of the 2000 Review Conference. The challenge will remain of finding credible ways for a balanced review of the Treaty, but this balance inevitably will need to favour a greater focus on the nuclear disarmament provisions of the NPT, as it was never the intent either of the drafters of the Treaty or of the extension package, or of the states parties at the NPTREC, to perpetuate the status of the nuclear weapon states.

Decision 2 set out, under seven headings comprising 20 operative paragraphs, a set of indicative targets for the full implementation of the Treaty. These indicative targets relate both to Treaty compliance issues as well as to other related nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament priorities that emanate from the NPT. Falling into the former category are non-proliferation (Articles I and II), nuclear disarmament (Article VI), nuclear-weapon-free zones (Article VII), safeguards (Article III), and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV). In the latter category belong universality and security assurances. In practice, both sets of issues have been routinely discussed at previous review conferences. At the 1995 NPTREC, Main Committee I discussed security assurances, while both Main Committees II and III discussed universality ("measures aimed at promoting the wider acceptance of the Treaty").

One of the key issues to be resolved was whether the principles and objectives outlined in Decision 2 represented fixed targets or indicative targets that could be updated periodically, and as certain objectives were achieved (e.g., a comprehensive test ban treaty) other objectives take their place (e.g., multilateral nuclear arms reductions or general and complete disarmament)? The intent of the drafters was to regard Decision 2 as a "living document" that could be added to or subtracted from as merited by progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and other related developments.

Substantive Issues at the 2000 Review Conference

Previous review conferences have traditionally addressed substantive matters in terms of the three general objectives of the NPT: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and safeguarded cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy under a three Main Committee structure. It is likely that format for a structured and balanced review will continue, however, the merits of an article-by-article review might be examined in the search for a more harmonious and productive review. In practice, however, the next review conference will have to deal with substantive issues of two types: issues emanating directly from the NPT itself; and issues that bear on NPT matters but which do not stem directly from the Treaty. In general, political and security issues of the day have tended to play an important role at review conferences, since such conferences are intensely political. External events threatening to cast their shadow over the 2000 review conference might include, among others: the longer-term implications of Russian reactions to NATO expansion and the alliance's out-of-area use of force; the fate of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and U.S. plans for theatre and national missile defence systems; status of START II before the Duma; the tenor of U.S.-China relations; developments in the Middle East, Korean Peninsula and South Asia; progress or lack thereof at the Conference on Disarmament; and CTBT ratification and entry-into-force developments.

The 1995 Decision 2 on "Principles and Objectives" set out seven key items and established a set of parameters to evaluate the implementation and operation of the Treaty that included: universality, security assurances, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, safeguards, peaceful uses of atomic energy and nuclear-weapon-free zones (I have changed the order to reflect the order of the articles of the NPT.)

Universality

At the time of the NPTREC the NPT had attracted 178 adherents. The number of states parties now stands at 187 (not including Taiwan and Yugoslavia), which means that 9 additional states have joined the Treaty. With the near-universal adherence to the Treaty-only Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty. Last May's nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and both countries' overt declarations claiming NWS status, posed a grievous challenge to the integrity of the Treaty and its associated regime. While UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of last June rejected recognition of any new NWS and established certain non-proliferation benchmarks for South Asia, there is growing ease about the nature and thrust of U.S. engagement policy with India and Pakistan.

Since 1995, the Middle East, especially the question of Israeli accession to the NPT as a NNWS has emerged as an issue squarely pitting the U.S. and its allies against the Arab states as well as the non-aligned countries (NAM). There are clear signs that the U.S. would like to undermine the 1995 NPTREC Middle East Resolution and is opposed to utilizing the NPT review forum as a way of highlighting Israel's unsafeguarded and nuclear weapon activities, or to bring pressure upon Israel. Indeed, the U.S.' disagreement to accept any compromise language on the Middle East was the catalyst that led to the collapse of the 1998 NPT PrepCom. Lost in the shuffle is the crucial fact that the Middle East Resolution, every word of which was cleared by the U.S. with Israel before the document was adopted by the NPTREC, served as the mechanism which made it possible for the Arab states not to stand in the way of the Treaty's indefinite extension. As noted earlier in this paper, the 1995 package of decisions and resolution reflects an historic compromise reached at the NPTREC that enabled agreement on indefinite extension without a vote. Having said that, more thought needs to be devoted to what actions might be required regarding this resolution at the 2000 Review Conference, where it is virtually certain that the Arab states, led by Egypt, will again stress the importance of universal application of the Treaty within their region. How will the Treaty membership react to, or deal with, any notice by some or all of the Arab states to either suspend their acceptance of the Treaty or to withdraw from it, if Israel does not renounce its nuclear weapon capability and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon states within some specified time frame?

At the 2000 Review Conference, political pressure is bound to increase on the three perennial hold-outs--India, Israel, and Pakistan. In practice, however, bringing these three undeclared nuclear-weapon states into the Treaty poses not only major political but also technical challenges. In all three instances NPT membership will have to be preceded by a process of nuclear rollback and the precedent established by South Africa would be useful in this regard. By way of background, the biggest challenge was not that of dismantling South Africa's weapons capability but that of the IAEA subsequently verifying the completeness of Pretoria's declaration of inventory of nuclear material and facilities.(24) This was the first time that the IAEA had "looked back" at a state's nuclear activities and had to verify operating records, declared outputs, completeness of dismantling and destruction, and the reassignment of dual-use equipment to peaceful or non-military work.(25) In this task, the IAEA's tasks were facilitated by full and extensive disclosures by South Africa and cooperative verification. This experience gained by the IAEA will be useful in verifying post facto other similar renunciations of weapons capabilities--were they to take place--in the threshold states or eventually in the NWS.

Operative paragraph 1 of Decision 2 calls upon all states parties to promote universal adherence to the NPT. However, proponents of NPT universality need to exercise great care that in the interest of promoting universal adherence, the Treaty itself is not damaged or weakened. Better to have three pariahs who are denied nuclear assistance and remain the focus of political and economic pressure than to damage the credibility of the Treaty by admitting these states without first clearly establishing the total destruction of all nuclear weapons and conversion of weapon-related facilities and fissile materials, as well as a comprehensive accounting of all previously unsafeguarded nuclear materials. Finally, pending the capture of the three holdouts by the Treaty, it might be useful for NPT parties to consider, in the context of the deliberations of the Preparatory Committee, a harmonized approach for devising ways to encourage the adherence of all states still remaining outside the Treaty in conjunction with the application of full-scope safeguards on all (not just new) supply arrangements. Further, the traditional approach of selective pressure and differentiated policies toward the three holdout states might well be re-examined with a view to developing a common non-proliferation strategy. I would strongly recommend that the Review Conference explicitly name the countries still remaining outside the NPT and examine a variety of diplomatic and economic instruments to pressure the hold-outs to join the global nuclear non-proliferation norm.

Security Assurances

Since the initial attempts to conclude the NPT, security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have been considered an important component of a credible global non-proliferation regime. UN Security Council Resolution 255 (1968) provided positive assurances, i.e., a pledge to come to the assistance of non-nuclear weapon states threatened with nuclear attack. The NNWS have also sought negative assurances, (i.e., pledges by the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear arms against NNWS). Negative security assurances are defined as a pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear weapon states. At the First Special Session of the UN on Disarmament in 1978, the five nuclear powers gave separate negative security assurances. Only China's assurance was comprehensive and unconditional. Since that time, Egypt and Nigeria have worked on various drafts of negative security assurances.

Over time all five declared nuclear powers made unilateral and conditional statements on negative assurances, but the NNWS wanted to harmonize these negative assurances into a legally binding document. On the eve of the 1995 NPT Conference, the nuclear weapon states (NWS) agreed to Security Council Resolution 984 updating the earlier resolution, and four of the five nuclear weapon states harmonized their unilateral declarations. China did not join because its commitments are more far-reaching. One continuing problem is that except for China, none of four other nuclear powers have unconditionally renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. In the context of the 1995 NPT Conference, many developing states voiced the requirement for legally binding security assurances from the five nuclear weapon states -- in the form of a multilateral, binding, Security Council resolution. In practice, however, the NWS issued a statement in Geneva in March 1995 on negative security assurances to NPT states and also agreed to Resolution 984 (April 11, 1995) on positive assurances to NPT member states.(26) These, however, still fall short of legally binding assurances.

The controversial PDD 60 of the US, referred to above, whereby the role of US nuclear weapons includes deterrence of CBW attacks raises questions about the efficacy of Washington's NSAs. Some prominent US-based international lawyers are of the view that perhaps the ICJ could be asked to render an opinion to clarify this matter.

At the 1997 PrepCom, South Africa proposed special time for discussion of security assurances at the 1998 session. At the 1998 PrepCom, South Africa outlined some ideas about a legally binding instrument on security assurances to be negotiated at the 2000 Review Conference. This caused some controversy and certain states argued that such a course would undermine the CD, where this issue is also considered. Nonetheless, South Africa seems determined to raise this matter at the 2000 Review Conference. The Conference, however, could usefully consider a process to encourage the NWS to agree on enhanced, uniform and multilateral security assurances to NPT parties. Since declaring itself to be an NWS, in fall 1998 India offered security assurances to member states of NWFZs, however, this offer was not considered to be serious or to have any legal standing.

Non-proliferation (Articles I / II)

The global non-proliferation norm was further strengthened with the indefinite extension of the NPT. In this context the review process of the Treaty provides states parties with the opportunity to exercise vigilance regarding full compliance with the Treaty in all its aspects as agreed in paragraph 2. In this context it would be useful to recall the statement released on January 31, 1992 by the Security Council on the maintenance of international peace and security in a post-Cold War world.(27) The real importance of this Council statement lies in its recognition that the primary threat to international security now emanates from the spread of nuclear weapons to countries in conflict prone regions, and that proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction must be prevented. In a sense, this statement also reflects the divergence in views on nuclear arms issues between the countries of the North and the South. For the North, now that the Cold War is over and a number of arms reduction and confidence-building agreements are in the process of being implemented, the threat to security emanates not from the former East bloc but from the countries of the South that are believed to possess capabilities for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. For the South, the principal interest is in seeing not just the US and Russia, but also Britain, China, and France reduce their nuclear arms in the first instance, with total elimination to follow, as well as a permanent end to unsafeguarded production of weapon-usable fissile material. Other important issues concern NATO nuclear sharing arrangements and stationed nuclear forces, whether an international non-proliferation norm has been created by the NPT regime and if so how will challenges to it be dealt with?

Nuclear Disarmament (Article VI)

Paragraphs 3-4 related to nuclear disarmament, and reaffirmed the commitments under Article VI of the NPT. Paragraph 4 outlined a programme of action in regard to the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI, that included: a) a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be concluded no later than 1996; b) the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a multilateral convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives; and c) global nuclear weapon reductions, with the goals of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, and general and complete disarmament. In practice, however, in addition to the two specific measures noted above, additional nuclear disarmament measures will need to be considered, such as, for example: limitations on non-strategic nuclear weapons; verified destruction of warheads; and the disposition of excess weapons fissile materials.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

After nearly fifty years of debate and years of complex negotiations, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed at the United Nations in New York on September 24, 1996. Currently 152 states have signed the Treaty including the five nuclear weapon states, and some 33 states have ratified. Of the 44 states whose ratification is necessary for entry into force, 41 have signed (excluding DPRK, India, and Pakistan)(28) and 17 have thus far ratified, including France and the United Kingdom. The compromise entry into force (EIF) formula depends upon treaty ratification by 44 states of the CD, listed by name, that operate research or power reactors. India rejected this compromise, denied consensus at the CD on the adoption of the draft CTBT, and refused to sign the Treaty. Pakistan too linked its signature to that of India, and the DPRK also has not as yet signed. As already noted, both India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests last May. In September, at the UNGA India committed "not to stand the way of the CTBT", which was widely interpreted as meaning that India would join the treaty, however, this statement has never been clarified or interpreted by New Delhi. Pakistan too at UNGA committed to join the CTBT, but continued to link its signature to that of India. May is the month when conditions are propitious in the Pokhran desert area for nuclear tests, it is not clear whether India will conduct additional nuclear tests this year-if it does, then very likely Pakistan will follow.

The earliest that the CTBT could have entered into force was September 24, 1998, but without the ratification by all 44 designated states the CTBT cannot enter into force at all. However, under CTBT Article XIV(2) which was added at Canada's insistence, the signatories to the Treaty are scheduled to hold a political conference in 1999 to discuss the implementation of the CTBT.

Given the current pace of ratifications, it is highly unlikely that the CTBT's EIF conditions will be met by April 2000. Thus the Review Conference could report that one of the items in the programme of action had been achieved and that barring surprises nuclear weapon testing by the original five proliferators halted, even though the CTBT had not yet entered into force. On the other hand, it is also likely that will be intense debate on issues such as: the science based stockpile stewardship (SBSS) programme in the US (and similar programmes in China, France and Russia); the efficacy of the proto-type International Monitoring System (IMS), and the status of national test sites.

Fissile Material Treaty

The programme of action outlined in paragraph 4(b) of Decision 2 called for the "immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Such a multilateral treaty purportedly would further strengthen the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime, and would add to the pressure on the hold-out states to place all of their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. As well, it is claimed that it would complement strategic arms reduction treaties by facilitating verifiable stockpile reductions and prevent the manufacture or stockpiling of new weapon-grade fissile material.

As long ago as 1946, under the Baruch Plan tabled at the United Nations, the US proposed placing under international control all dangerous aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing. Other proposals to this effect were made, in 1956 by President Eisenhower, in 1964 by President Johnson, in 1969 by President Nixon, and in 1993 by President Clinton. The Soviet Union in 1982, for the first time proposed a cut-off, as a first step toward a freeze on nuclear weapons, at the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament. In 1988, US plutonium production was stopped due to safety reasons and a lack of demand. In 1989, President Gorbachev stated that the USSR would halt the production of HEU, and closed two plutonium producing reactors, with the remaining two to be closed by the year 2000. President Clinton in his UN speeches in 1994, 1995, and 1996 has reiterated the call for such a ban on the production of weapon-grade material, and Russian President Yeltsin is also in favour. Clinton in his speech noted that the US, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom had already halted production of fissile material for weapons.(29)

In November 1993, UN General Assembly Resolution No. 48/27, on the "Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapon Purposes" was adopted by consensus. During 1994-1995, discussions took place at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to define a mandate to commence negotiations. On March 25, 1995, the Special Coordinator recommended a negotiating mandate based on the UNGA resolution of 1993, which was then adopted by the CD.

However, due to disagreements between the NWS and the threshold states, as well as others, no agreement had been possible in the CD even to agree on the negotiating format, i.e. to establish an Ad Hoc Committee. In the aftermath of the CTBT fiasco at the CD in August, India had linked the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a cut-off to that on nuclear disarmament--a move strongly opposed by the three Western NWS--thus continuing the stalemate at the CD into its 1997 and 1998 sessions. Furthermore, the General Assembly also had been unable in its 1994-1997 sessions to agree on a resolution on a fissile material production ban. Decision 2 specifically called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

At the 1997 PrepCom, it was agreed (as a result of Canadian and German joint proposals) to set aside time for consideration of a FMCT at the 1998 PrepCom. Such a discussion did take place at the 1998 PrepCom but it only served to air well known positions from all sides. Acceptance of a compromise statement calling for the start of negotiations at the CD was rejected by the United States, on the grounds that the PrepCom was not empowered to make statements on substantive matters.

Feeling the political heat after their nuclear detonations, both India and Pakistan modified their positions and the CD reached agreement on a decision and a presidential statement on 11 August 1998, "...to establish under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty...".(30) Consequently, Ambassador Mark Moher (Canada) was appointed chair of the ad hoc committee, but no progress was registered on any of the key issues (such as scope, verification, stocks, etc.) In the remaining weeks of the 1998 session of the CD. And, thus far, at its 1999 session the CD has failed to re-establish the ad hoc committee.

Given current developments, barring some miracle, it is unlikely that serious negotiation will have commenced on a fissile material treaty by the opening of the 2000 NPT conference, thus representing failure on the second item in the 1995 programme of action. Perhaps, it might be best if at the Review Conference the issue of a multilateral fissile material treaty (FMT) were abandoned in lieu of an agreement among the five NWS to codify their moratoria on new production and to include transparency and safeguards measures. An FMT is a relic of the Cold War arms control agenda and it will not succeed in achieving through the backdoor what the NPT has not achieved-capture of the three undeclared NWS.

Nuclear Disarmament

The third item in the programme of action referred to nuclear disarmament. With the end of the Cold War, "classical" nuclear arms control has moved away from its emphasis on confrontational and technological approaches to focusing on co-operative and essentially political approaches to avoiding nuclear war and furthering nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon states have not put forward any agenda for the phasing-out of nuclear arms. Despite declaratory statements favouring an eventual phasing out of nuclear weapons, both the US and Russia have only concurred to "study" the prospects of further reductions. At the March 21-22, 1997, Helsinki summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the US proposed a START III framework of ceilings of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic warheads on either side, as a way of facilitating ratification of START II by Russia.(31) Of the three lesser nuclear weapon states, both France and the United Kingdom have unilaterally removed obsolete non-strategic nuclear weapons, cancelled or slowed down certain strategic modernization programmes, and in some cases reduced the op tempo of their alert nuclear forces-but neither was prepared to renounce reliance on nuclear arms.(32) China continues to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, citing the threat from the U.S. and reportedly is to continue with modernization as long as large nuclear arsenals continue to exist.

Even after the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain the principal danger to global security. The United States and Russia plan to reduce their strategic arsenals by about 80 percent by the year 2007 and to cut back their non-strategic nuclear weapons by about a third to a half (under the framework of the 1991 unilateral reductions). Even so, by the turn of the century the five nuclear powers will still retain a greater number of strategic nuclear warheads than they had collectively in 1970, when the NPT entered into force. The 1994 US Nuclear Posture Review endorsed a nuclear force structure that will remain at START II level, with an additional 2,500 intact but non-deployed warheads as a 'strategic hedge'. Furthermore, in fall 1996 President Clinton approved a new Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 60) authorizing the use of nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological weapon threats. Russia's new nuclear doctrine has reintroduced the concept of a nuclear first strike, it is building and deploying new mobile ground-launched strategic missiles albeit fewer than it previously planned in order to meet START II levels, and has threatened to deploy new non-strategic nuclear weapons as response to NATO enlargement. China's nuclear modernization continues, while the United Kingdom and France have cancelled or cut back certain strategic and non-strategic programmes but persist with strategic modernization in general. Nuclear weapon programmes in India, Israel, and Pakistan are also continuing. In sum, rather than diminishing in importance, nuclear weapons probably will continue to have a major impact on international security. Increasingly arms control experts are making the case for moving to minimal nuclear forces and the elimination of all nuclear arms, while others have noted that the United States and Russia will be hard put even to dismantle the number of warheads required under START I/II/III, given their limited warhead dismantling and fissile material storage capabilities.

Many non-nuclear weapon states took the opportunity of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to press the case for nuclear elimination as called for under Article VI, and the decision on "principles and objectives" contained the compromise language on this issue. As noted above, the NPTREC was unable to agree on a Final Declaration, due to irreconcilable differences between the NAM and the Western nuclear powers over the report of Main Committee I. These unresolvable differences were essentially over nuclear disarmament--the NWS did not offer any new proposals, nor were they willing to countenance any kind of a timetable for nuclear weapon reductions or elimination.(33)

The frustration of the NNWS has continued throughout the 1997 and 1998 sessions of the NPT PrepCom, and the NWS have nothing useful or new to report at the 1999 PrepCom. The NWS have taken to issuing joint statements extolling their virtues and listing the great progress achieved in nuclear disarmament. While indeed nuclear disarmament has and is continuing to take place, there have been no new strategic arms reduction agreements since 1993 and the existing ones might be in jeopardy. Furthermore, expansive new justifications for retaining nuclear weapons and broadening the conditions of their use, i.e. deterring biological and chemical attacks, as well as "rogue" states, have been espoused.

Three developments are likely to shape much of the consideration of Article VI issues at the 2000 Review Conference: a) the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; b) the continuing stalemate at the CD; and c) the "New Agenda" for nuclear disarmament (furthering the process initiated by the 1996 Canberra Commission Report).

On July 8, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on an advisory opinion requested the UN General Assembly (Resolution 49/75K of 15 December 1994) on the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.(34) While the ICJ opinion was inconclusive in general, the Court effectively concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons could be legally defensible only in extremis where national survival was at stake. The Court, however, unanimously ruled that:

"There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."(35)

More specifically, the ruling added:

"[T]he legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result - nuclear disarmament in all its aspects by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith."(36)

Attempts by a number of states to establish an ad hoc committee at the CD to discuss nuclear disarmament have been consistently opposed particularly by the US and Russia, with the support of the lesser NWS. For example, a US view held that:

"Supporters of nuclear disarmament thus must take care what they ask for. To demand complete elimination of nuclear arms according to a fixed calendar is to throw sand into the gears of disarmament. It is a formula not for pressing ahead, but for standing still and resuming a sterile argument that leads nowhere. For it challenges not only existing weapons, but an unshakeable premise of defence planning.

As a staunch friend of the CD, let me say that nuclear disarmament there would be an inappropriate forum taking up an unamenable subject. It is no act of friendship to elevate expectations for a forum far beyond its capacities. Climbing down from Cold War peaks of nuclear weapons has been an intricate process, involving careful bilateral trade-offs, specialized verification, and a constant and shifting menu of sensitive national security calculations. There is no realistic prospect that the CD could manage such an effort. And given the CD's recent history, I must ask as well, do we really want to make all further nuclear disarmament progress subject to the CD's rule of consensus?

But, we're told, the CD would not negotiate the treaties, but merely ventilate the issues -- and tell the nuclear weapon states how to proceed. Well, the CD is a negotiating body. As to further NWS nuclear disarmament, if it is a negotiation, the CD is ill-suited to do it; on the other hand, if it's not a negotiation, we should not water down the CD mission.

Last year's NPT conference itself recognized the practical realities. The program of action declares that the test ban and the fissile cutoff should be completed by the Conference on Disarmament. But it says efforts to reduce nuclear weapons should be pursued 'by the nuclear weapon states'. Those are the right assignments."(37)

It is evident that positions on the future of nuclear disarmament, and the proper venue and format for negotiations, remain polarized with no compromise in sight. As expected, at the opening of the 1997 through 1999 sessions of the CD, discord has reigned over the "Agenda" of the CD, with the NAM pressing for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament and the three Western NWS plus Russia opposing any such initiative. What is needed is flexibility in the NWS' position allowing for discussion and consideration of nuclear disarmament at the CD, with the actual negotiation left to the parties concerned.

Frustrated by the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, on 9 June 1998, eight states issued a Joint Declaration on "A Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda". The foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden joined together in reiterating the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This New Agenda Coalition then went on at the 1998 UNGA with 30 co-sponsors to introduce Resolution 53/77Y "Towards a nuclear-weapons-free world: The need for a new Agenda", that was adopted by a vote of 114:18:38 on 4 December. What was significant was the pressure from the U.S. on its NATO allies to join it in opposing this resolution. Countries such as Canada, which have been pushing for discussion on nuclear disarmament at the CD, were inclined to support the resolution, but in the end under U.S. pressure 12 NATO countries decided to abstain rather than to oppose the new agenda resolution.

Furthermore, on 2 February 1999, Belgium on behalf of five NATO members-Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway) proposed an ad hoc working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views within the CD on endeavours toward nuclear disarmament.(38)

Thus, the stage is being set for yet again a fractious debate on nuclear disarmament in the context of an NPT review conference. The United States has already warned that "efforts to treat the NPT process as a single-minded referendum on the nuclear weapon states' progress in nuclear disarmament are not well conceived."(39) What might be useful during the Review Conference would be a consideration of different views on Article VI, with the aim of promoting a realistic and balanced consideration of the complex and highly political issues involved in the context of NPT obligations. While actual negotiations on nuclear weapon reductions properly belong within the purview of the NWS, the NPT review process could usefully serve to provide an opportunity for a discussion on the guiding principles for future measures such as: enhanced transparency in the reduction process, i.e. reports provided by the NWS on the actual numbers of warheads currently deployed, in active and inactive status, and dismantled; greater openness on nuclear doctrine, i.e. current status of alert forces and targeting practices; and steps already taken and contemplated for further nuclear arms reductions leading to the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Strengthened IAEA Safeguards (NPT Article III) and Export Controls

Decision 2 devoted five paragraphs to safeguards, the most on any one issue, thus highlighting the importance that states parties placed on compliance. Effective international safeguards, under NPT Article III and the related INFCIRC/153 type agreements with the IAEA, are an essential element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Export controls have also become an indispensable part of that regime, and derive from Article III.2. Safeguards are a technical means to the political goal of verifying that NPT non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are in compliance with their obligations under the Treaty. Following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, and questions about North Korea's nuclear activities, safeguards have been strengthened through a greatly enhanced flow of information, the reaffirmation of the Agency's right to conduct "any time, any place" special inspections, together with new verification techniques (such as environmental monitoring and use of intelligence data). The IAEA now has in place an enhanced safeguards regime under its Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)-40 states have concluded the Additional Protocol and it is now in force in five states. However, 38 NPT states still have to conclude NPT safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153).

The safeguards programme is under threat from two quarters: first, a zero-growth IAEA budget for the last decade, at a time of rapid expansion of safeguards to cover the entire scope of nuclear activities in South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and NIS states; and second, resistance from some developing countries that perceive safeguards as an invasion of national sovereignty, as well as from certain traditionally secretive European Union countries reluctant to permit greater inspection access to their nuclear industries.

The Review Conference could endorse a call for an increase in the IAEA's budget as well as reinforcing the Agency's primary role in the verification of NNWS compliance with the NPT, and to the extent possible support an enhanced role for the IAEA in verifying nuclear disarmament by the NWS-but the additional costs of safeguards activities in the NWS must be borne by these five states.

Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

The principal suppliers of nuclear materials and technology (except for China) have also agreed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) upon new guidelines governing such exports, including dual-use items. Further, the NSG has agreed that nuclear items not be supplied to a NNWS that has not accepted full-scope safeguards, i.e., has not accepted IAEA monitoring over its entire spectrum of nuclear activities. Many developing countries regard export controls as onerous and discriminatory. Supplier countries, on the other hand, consider export controls as supplementing safeguards and preventing nuclear proliferation. Some developing countries have raised this issue at both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and at previous review conferences, and it is probable that at future Review Conferences differences over export controls could well jeopardize the enhanced NPT review process.

The Review Conference could profitably discuss ways of promoting the early implementation of "strengthened safeguards" and of creating increased transparency in export controls, with a view to providing assessments on the political and technical feasibility on issues including, but not limited to: enhanced flow of information on national nuclear activities to the IAEA; new verification techniques (such as environmental monitoring and use of intelligence data); "any time, any where" inspections; and enhanced transparency in export controls.

A controversial issue waiting in the wings is the question of the treatment certain NPT parties found in breach of their safeguards agreements are receiving as compared to some in good standing. This refers to the nearly $6 billion package offered to DPRK, including the supply of light water reactors, in return for allowing IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities; while Iran where IAEA safeguards are in normal application without problems is facing a U.S.-led blockade banning transfers of nuclear and dual-use items.

Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones (NPT Article VII)

Article VII of the NPT both recognizes and encourages the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) as a means of promoting nuclear non-proliferation through regional measures. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference also endorsed the concept of NWFZs and recommended that countries in various regions consider the establishment of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction, in particular the Middle East and Central Asia.

NWFZ agreements present additional effective options to complement global non-proliferation efforts and can serve to roll back proliferation where it has already taken place. Furthermore, NWFZs can create mutually binding obligations that can be more wide-ranging than those subsumed under the NPT. Although the concept of NWFZs actually pre-dates the NPT, until 1990 no NWFZ, except the Antarctic Treaty, was fully operational. Recently, however, considerable progress has been made in expanding the territory covered by NWFZs, and there is now a good prospect that before long five regional treaties covering over 100 countries and the entire southern hemisphere will be in full force. Since the 1995 NPTREC two additional NWFZ agreements have been signed that establish such zones in Southeast Asia and in Africa. In 1996, the US, the UK, and France, all signed the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. While attempts at UNGA, to set up a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ were unsuccessful, it was clear that there exists a broad measure of support for such a treaty.(40) Further, informal discussions have taken place on setting up a NWFZ in Central Asia, and Russia has been joined by Belarus and Ukraine in calling for a NWFZ in Central/Eastern Europe, as a counter to NATO expansion. On February 28, 1997, the five Central Asian heads of state signed the "Almaty Declaration", followed by the Tashkent Declaration by their foreign ministers on September 15, both of which called for the establishment of a NWFZ in their region. In addition, UNGA resolutions on a CANWFZ were adopted unanimously in 1997 and 1998.

The Review Conference could recommend modalities to assist countries and regions in assessing the viability of a NWFZ in their particular geographic environment, with a view to promoting a balanced and productive discussion on during the new review process of the NPT, establishing additional zones.

Role of the Treaty and the NPTREC Decisions at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

The traditional view of States regarding the scope of previous NPT review conferences was that it was the implementation of the Treaty that is being reviewed. The Treaty is the source of legally binding commitments on the part of signatory States and, therefore, it is the Treaty which lies at the heart of the review process-in terms of "assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized"-as noted in Article VIII.3. In September 1996, the United States made clear that it preferred "past practice...as a guide...in determining how to proceed" in the PrepCom process.(41) And at the 1997 PrepCom, the U.S. stressed that:

"It was essential to bear in mind that the obligations of the States parties stemmed from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should, therefore, be considered the primary source of guidance."(42)

Another prevalent view was that the Treaty had been enhanced by the decisions of 1995 and future reviews must take into account not only the Treaty but the decisions and resolution agreed at the 1995 NPTREC. For example, at the 1997 PrepCom, China stated that:

"The 2000 Review Conference would be the first meeting since the indefinite extension of the Treaty. In addition to full consideration of the three decisions and one resolution adopted by the 1995 Conference, consideration should also be given to a number of relationships in order to enhance the review process and ensure the success of the 2000 Review Conference.... Secondly, the consideration of substantive issues at the Review Conference and in its Preparatory Committee should be based on the Treaty, and full use should be made of the principles and objectives. The review process should focus on the implementation of the provisions and on the preamble of the Treaty and should take the relevant principles and objectives fully into account."(43)

Canada emphasized that:

"...while the review process should focus on the Treaty itself, work should be guided by the conclusions of the 1995 Conference of the Parties, specifically the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives and in the decision on strengthening the review process...."(44)

And New Zealand, for its part, noted that:

"The indefinite extension decided in 1995 was an important statement of confidence in the Treaty and its role as a cornerstone of international cooperation in the field of security. The decisions adopted at the same time had placed the Treaty and its subsequent reviews within the framework of an enhanced multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament process."(45)

The preceding statements reveal that States parties still have not come to a common understanding on the scope of the strengthened review process and of the role of the Treaty and the NPTREC outcomes in that process. Jayantha Dhanapala recently cautioned that:

"The success of the [2000 Review] Conference will ultimately depend on the evolution of fresh consensual approaches transcending political divisions and the abandonment of rigid postures or complacent attitudes over the 'done deal' of the Treaty's indefinite extension."(46)

Decision 1 of the 1995 NPTREC on "strengthening the review process for the Treaty", provided guidance on the structure of three Main Committees and on the possibility of establishing subsidiary bodies within each Main Committee, but it only provided limited clarity on the scope of future review conferences. It included the provision that:

"The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality."(47)

Given the context of the negotiation in 1995 on the decisions and resolution adopted by that Conference, it can be asserted that future reviews would need to focus not only on the implementation of the Treaty but also that of the NPTREC outcomes. As such, the 1995 principles and objectives serve to provide an important context and touchstone to assess the implementation of the Treaty in the period under review. The principles and objectives comprise a loose compilation of an expression of general principles as well as an expression of key goals to be achieved to further the full implementation of the Treaty and its universality.

The two sessions of the PrepCom to date have reinforced the concepts of "permanence with accountability" (outlined in 1995) and of a qualitatively different review process. In this context, it can be asserted that the 1995 decisions on "principles and objectives" and on a "strengthened review process" are politically binding, whereas the extension decision is legally binding. Under customary international law, politically binding decisions could become equally as binding as those taken under specific treaty law. Failure to honour the 1995 NPTREC decisions could dissolve commitments to the Treaty's permanence. As such, it may be argued that the scope of future review conferences is: 1) to review the implementation of the Treaty per se as well as of the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 NPTREC; and 2) to make specific recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the Treaty (including achieving its universality) through a new principles and objectives document.

The first task would involve a product, i.e. a final report, comprising an assessment of the implementation of the Treaty, plus the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution, from 1995 to 2000. In addition the report would identify the areas in which progress should be sought in the full implementation of the Treaty over the next review period-e.g., nuclear disarmament; strengthened safeguards; nuclear-weapon-free zones-and the means through which-e.g., ratification and implementation of START II; negotiation, ratification and implementation of START III & IV involving the participation of all five NWS; negotiation, ratification and implementation of a fissile material treaty involving the five NWS, India, Israel and Pakistan; negotiation and implementation of INFCIRC/540 Additional Protocol by all NPT NNWS; negotiation of a NWFZ in Central Asia; and entry-into-force of the CTBT, Bangkok and Pelindaba NWFZ treaties. This document-the final report-of the 2000 Conference could be structured either along traditional lines, based on the reports of the three Main Committees, comprising both an evaluation of past implementation and recommendations for future progress; or could be based on an article-by-article review of the Treaty factoring in the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution.

The second task would involve the drafting and adoption of a Year 2000 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" (Y2KP&O), comprising specific recommendations and milestones directed at strengthening the full implementation of the Treaty and the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution. This Y2KP&O could either emulate the structure of the1995 P&O, or alternatively it could reflect the articles and preambular paragraphs of the Treaty plus universality and security assurances. A Y2KP&O should strive to better reflect the structure of the Treaty and in this context to lay out the preferred goals and strategies for the next five year period. As such, the document while being substantive, pragmatic and results oriented, should also be concise and avoid unnecessary platitudes.

Adopting both products either by consensus or without a vote would be a worthy goal to strive for in 2000. However, given the present penchant of the NWS to minimize the scope of the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolutions and that of some members of the NAM to push grandiose disarmament schemes, it is unlikely that harmony will prevail at the 2000 Review Conference. In the event that neither consensus nor agreement without a vote is achievable, it might be worthwhile for the Chair in consultation with an extended bureau and the "Friends of the Chair" to find an appropriate mechanism for capturing the views of an overwhelming majority of States present, rather than risking yet another failed NPT meeting.

Salvaging the NPT review process

The failure of the 1998 session of the NPT PrepCom, due to the single-minded opposition of the NWS, in particular the United States, in rejecting moderately worded recommendations on nuclear disarmament and related nonproliferation priorities, has reduced the strengthened review process to a virtual dead letter. For the NWS, a strengthened review has come to mean only a discussion of substance and drafting of recommendations to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, without States Parties necessarily addressing issues of substance, or identifying agreed priorities for the implementation of the Treaty and the NPTREC decisions, or even expressing views on current matters of importance to the Treaty.

What might be done to complete the preparations for the 2000 review conference, with a view to salvaging some vestiges of a strengthened review? The only practical way forward seems to be that based on innovative yet practical initiatives-i.e. devising qualitatively new modalities to promote the review and implementation of the Treaty, in accordance with the NPTREC decisions and resolution.

In 1995, a small number of states that were committed to the continuing viability of the NPT were successful in establishing unprecedented new parameters which were captured in NPTREC Decisions 1 and 2. A similar effort is now required to ensure "permanence with accountability" of the NPT-an effort that once again explores unprecedented measures--and stretches the parameters of the debate. These might include, for example: redefining the consensus rule; revising the structure of the review process; refocusing the role of the depositaries; and augmenting the role of the chairs.

Redefining the consensus rule

According to the "Draft Rules of Procedure for the 2000 Review Conference"(48), reflecting the traditional rules of procedure governing the conduct of NPT review conferences, Rule 28 deals with the "Adoption of Decisions". This particular Rule (28) states that:

  • The task of the Conference being to review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty, the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.
  • Decisions on matters of procedure and in elections shall be taken by a majority of representatives present and voting.
Given the failure of the 1998 PrepCom, and the record of failures at previous review conferences to produce a consensus final report, perhaps it would be opportune to learn from past mistakes and to amend or adapt the rule for decision-making on substantive matters.

First, the rule needs to be updated from its present 1995 vintage. In making the Treaty of permanent duration in 1995, States Parties enriched the Treaty with the adoption without a vote of the decisions on a "strengthened review process" and on "principles and objectives", as well as the Middle East resolution. Hence, any and all future strengthened reviews must take into account not only the Treaty but also the NPTREC outcomes. This leads us to the conclusion that the wording in Rule 28 needs to be updated to reflect the new reality. A preliminary draft of an updated Rule 28.1 might be as follows:

The task of the Conference being to review, pursuant to paragraph 3 of article VIII of the Treaty and of paragraph 7 of NPTREC Decision 1, the implementation of undertakings of States parties under the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty [and the NPTREC decisions] are being realized, and thus to strengthen its effectiveness, every effort should be made to reach agreement on substantive matters by means of consensus. There should be no voting on such matters until all efforts to achieve consensus have been exhausted.

Generally speaking, "consensus" is understood to mean the absence of any objection by expressed by a participating State to the taking of the decision in question. Consensus, as such, could be redefined as to mean consensus minus "x", i.e. with 187 States parties consensus could be deemed to have been achieved if all States present and voting (at PrepCom sessions and at review conferences) agree to a common text except for a very small number (say between one to five, which desist from joining the rest). Such a modified definition of consensus is by no means unknown in other international security fora. For example, several OSCE mechanisms envisage the possibility of undertaking executive action without the requirement of a traditionally defined consensus(49)-the Prague mechanism of 1992 and the Moscow mechanism are two such cases in point. Hence, a modified Rule 28.1 could provide for agreement on matters of substance-such as a "Principles and Objectives 2000"-by means of a modified consensus definition. Such an approach, on substance, would be preferable to a resort to voting as provided for in Rule 28.1.

The disadvantages of such an approach might be that the NWS and some of their allies could end up in this small group of five whose views might be over-ridden in the interests of the over-whelming majority. However, the risk of being over-ridden might well result in a more productive exchange of views between the NWS and the NNWS possibly resulting in compromise forward-looking text.

Already, in the context of the Preparatory Committee, some States parties have voiced their opinion on the merits of moving away from a strict definition of consensus as it has traditionally been applied.

For example, it is interesting to recall that in its plenary statement at the second session of the PrepCom, New Zealand stated:

"There may be many areas on which we can agree now: those can be folded into the consensus recommendations before us. But we do not think that we need to necessarily be bound by consensus at this time. Rather our inclination would be, in areas where this is not achievable, to capture initiatives and proposals on the basis of them enjoying broad support and agreement. Confining ourselves to a consensus product might risk a sterile and probably meagre outcome. On many issues there is a strong coincidence in approach. But on others there are obvious differences. We should not be coy in recognizing them or in attempting to paper over them."(50)

And, at the 1997 PrepCom session, Japan went so far as to state that:

"The Preparatory Committee should not prepare a consensus document at each one of its sessions, since doing so would be extremely difficult and much too time-consuming. Rather, the most appropriate and productive procedure would be for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the session to issue his own summary report, with the relevant annexes. The report would be drafted under the Chairman's sole responsibility and would not be binding on any delegation."(51)

At the 2000 RevConf, procedural and factual reports could be issued under the authority of the "Chairman in consultation" with an expanded bureau and the "Friends of the Chair", even though Rule 28.2 provides for adoption of decisions on procedure by means of a majority of States present and voting. Thus, the final report of the 2000 RevConf-final report is preferable to a final declaration-dealing with the implementation of the Treaty from 1995 to 2000, could be adopted either under the authority of the Chair (as described above) or through the mechanism of voting as stipulated under Rule 28.2-6. Again, in order to avoid the possibility of divisiveness resulting from voting, it would be preferable to rely upon the authority of the Chair (in consultation) to decide on matters of procedure.

Revising the structure of the Treaty review process

Since 1985, NPT review conferences have structured the review of the Treaty into three main committees-broadly dealing respectively with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, safeguards and export controls, and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This three main committee structure was devised by the U.S., for the 1985 review conference, in part to provide a committee for the Eastern group to chair. The division of work between the three main committees tends to overlap in places and has not proven especially efficient or conducive to generating agreed reports. Indeed three of the previous five NPT review conferences have failed to agree on final documents, while the 1985 conference only agreed on a report that reflected fundamental differences in views between States parties.

NPTREC Decision 1, in its wisdom, retained the existing main committee structure but recommended discussion of the issue of overlap, and also recommended the establishment within the main committees of 'subsidiary bodies' or working groups to provide focused consideration of specific issues. Decision 1 empowered the PrepCom to recommend the creation of such subsidiary bodies for each review conference. This recommendation for subsidiary bodies merely regularized past practice at review conferences, where working groups or 'friends of the chair' would break off from the main committees to resolve differences on specific items, such as rules of procedure, security assurances, and export controls at the 1995 NPTREC. It was noteworthy that at the 1998 PrepCom, the NWS rejected attempts to draft recommendations on setting up such bodies at the 2000 review conference.

The 1997 PrepCom contributed to further complicate the structure of the review process by creating so-called "clusters" based on the allocation of work of the main committees and then sub-divided the "clusters" according to the seven headings under the "principles and objectives". Instead of contributing to a "structured and balanced" review this procedure introduced imbalances between the "clusters" even though each of the three "clusters" would be given equal time-leading inevitably to sterile, unproductive, debate..

A practical, common sense, approach to a revitalized review of the Treaty suggests an article by article approach, factoring in the relevant preambular paragraphs and NPTREC decisions (which would include items such as universality and security assurances, as well). In this context, it would be useful to modify the existing Main Committee structure and to re-organize the review process to deal sequentially with the articles and related preambular paragraphs of the Treaty, factoring in as required the seven principal themes from the 1995 "principles and objectives". Subsidiary bodies, or working groups, could be established for the purpose of deliberation and drafting assessments and recommendations for the final report on Treaty implementation. A preliminary breakdown of working groups could be as follows: A) nuclear non-proliferation-including universality, security assurances, nuclear-weapon-free zones, compliance); B) nuclear disarmament-including fissile material treaty, CTBT implementation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, compliance; C) safeguards and export controls-including cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, compliance. Such an approach might facilitate a structured and balanced review of the Treaty and the NPTREC outcomes, in addition to providing greater focus on those elements of the Treaty requiring further effort for ,full implementation. The 1999 PrepCom could recommend a revised structure for review to the 2000 Conference, which forum would have the power to adopt a decision governing its methods of work

Refocusing the role of the depositaries

The NPT established the precedent for reviewing the operation of the Treaty. NPT article VIII.3 provided authority for the first review conference to be held in Geneva five years after its entry into force. At intervals of five years thereafter, further review conferences could be convened at the request made to the depositaries by a majority of States parties. Since 1975, NPT review conferences have been convened every five years. NPTREC Decision 1, however, reinterpreted article VIII.3 to the effect that review conferences shall continue to be held every five years in perpetuity beginning with the 2000 conference.

Traditionally the depositaries, at the request of NPT parties, made the preliminary preparations for review conferences, and in doing so heavily influenced the structure of the reviews. As noted above, the three main committee structure was invented by one of the depositaries. Over the years, reportedly the depositaries have come to exercise a preponderant degree of influence over the chairs of the PrepCom sessions and of the main committees, as well as over the presidency of the review conferences and their bureaux.

The Treaty does not invest the depositaries with any special privileges or responsibilities, save under article VIII.3 on convening review conferences, and under article IX.5 and 6, respectively, on recording and reporting accessions to the NPT and registering the Treaty pursuant to article 102 of the UN Charter. As such, the Treaty itself does not devolve any special or specific role or responsibility to the depositaries as regards the nature or the structure of the review process. However, traditionally the depositaries have exercised a lead role and the NNWS by default have allowed the depositaries to bring what could be considered as an undue degree of influence on how Treaty reviews are structured

Under the authority of NPTREC Decision 1, review conferences have been institutionalized on a quinquennial basis and there is no longer a requirement for NPT states to request the depositaries to convene review conferences. This is now the responsibility of all NPT States parties and can easily be expressed through appropriate resolutions drafted through the First Committee for adoption by the UN General Assembly. Thus, all States parties would take on the responsibility of ensuring the continuation of the strengthened review process.

The review process of the Treaty could benefit from the input of interested States parties, in addition to that provided by the depositaries. At the 1999 PrepCom, a recommendation could be made to enlarge the bureau beyond comprising the depositaries and the coordinators of the three political groups. The expanded bureau could include several States with a past record of bridge-building in contributing to the review process, and might include for example: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Ukraine and Zimbabwe. An expanded bureau could not only provide useful assistance to the chair but also reflect a broader constellation of views, that could serve to democratize the process and to potentially facilitate an improved and more productive consultative mechanism.

Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary General for Disarmament, has the formation of "a voluntary group of 'bridge-builders' drawn from all regional and political groups to establish links among the treaty parties and to act as a 'fire-brigade' to defuse controversies and seek negotiated solutions to problems as they arise".(52) Such a group-called an "Executive Council" as suggested by Dhanapala or an expanded bureau-could be set up at the next review conference and could serve to assist the president and vice-presidents.

Augmenting the role of the Chairs

One unfortunate result of the dominant role of the depositaries is their seemingly excessive influence on the Chairs. In some cases, Chairs do not receive adequate support from their own national delegations, in other cases due to political considerations Chairs might be more receptive or susceptible to the views of the depositaries, and in yet other cases (direct or indirect) pressure might be brought to bear. There are unconfirmed reports that in some cases Chairs engage in private consultation with the depositaries, singly or jointly, and their chairmanship, rulings and drafts then tend to be sympathetic to the views of the depositaries, to the detriment (in some cases) of the interests of the majority of States parties and the review process itself.

It would be unrealistic, except in the most exceptional cases, to expect Chairs to resist the influence or pressure exercised by the depositaries. An innovative approach might be to establish a "troika plus" whereby the previous, current, and future Chairs, together with an expanded bureau, meet to deliberate on issues relating to the structure and procedure of the review process. Chairs could also rely informally upon the advice and expertise of qualified NGOs and academic experts, as well as NPT anciens.

Political Groupings

Even though the Cold War has ended and the old ideological divisions have been transformed for the most part, on international security issues the traditional regional groupings persist, despite their not being reflective of the current status of the international community.. It can be said that all three regional groupings are facing internal stresses and strains. The Western group no longer represents a homogenous viewpoint, and within it a sub-group--the European Union--is emerging as a force with its own interests. Some non-nuclear-weapon states within the Western group, contrary to the preferences of their nuclear-weapon states allies and other friends, favour not only continuing but achieving greater progress in nuclear disarmament. The Eastern group rarely meets and it suffers from serious internal contradictions apparent to all. One specific contradiction is the continuing membership in this group of certain former Eastern bloc or former Warsaw Treaty Organization members, which are now members of an expanded NATO--the lynchpin of the Western group. In this regard, with Poland joining NATO and the Western Group at the 1999 PrepCom, a new country will need to be found to take over the chairmanship vacated by Poland.

The non-aligned movement (NAM) continues in serious disarray to its own detriment and apparently while the NAM has lost coherence, common interests might coalesce on general principles, though on balance NAM cohesion cannot be counted upon. Reportedly, some 80 percent of group members reportedly do not actively participate in NAM deliberations. Nonetheless, at the 1998 PrepCom, the NAM demonstrated new found solidarity and it will be interesting to see if this continues and grows under South African chairmanship.

Given the unnecessary tendencies toward rigidity and confrontation emanating from the obsolete Cold War driven group structure that still persists, interest-based coalitions could be formed on the basis of shared goals and involving the participation and involvement of the great majority of NPT states from across the traditional regional groupings to push for structural innovations as suggested above as a means of promoting substance and efficiency in the work of the Review Conference.

Conclusions

While NPTREC Decision 1 clearly established that the purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings is to undertake both preparatory and substantive work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in keeping with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPTREC, it became painfully evident in 1998 that the NWS have scant interest in or commitment to ensuring a qualitatively new strengthened review process that goes beyond tedious statements on matters of substance. They clearly opposed the preparatory committee becoming a on-going review mechanism for ensuring permanence with accountability. During the 1998 PrepCom, speaking to NGOs, Dhanapala cautioned that the strengthened review process must be more than a mere "talk shop".(53)

Though the NWS have signed off on devoting at least fifty percent of the PrepCom's working time to statements on substantive matters, by the same token they do not want the PrepCom to engage in any substantive work other than procedural preparations and drafting a list (whether agreed or not) of recommendations to the review conference. It would not be a surprise, if at the 2000 Conference, the NWS insisted on allocating time to go through the verbiage generated by the PrepCom and resisted or delayed the formulation of a new document on "principles and objectives". Again, as Dhanapala has noted:

"The leverage that the NNWS may have lost by agreeing to an indefinite extension does not have to be regained through confrontation or the extreme step of exercizing their rights under Article X.1.... Initiatives must also come from the NWS to stimulate the review process in the same way that the decision to negotiate a CTBT paved the way for the success of the 1995 NPTREC. The review process must be given a fair chance to prove itself and realize its potential."(54)

The package of inter-related extension decisions adopted at the 1995 NPTREC were the means by which NPT parties agreed without a vote to indefinitely extend the Treaty. The decisions were the product of both compromise and expectation. Compromise to make the NPT permanent as it enhanced the security of all states. Expectation that the decisions would help establish new parameters of discourse on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, beginning with the April 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee. It is somewhat disturbing that the political milieu in which the 2000 Review Conference will convene does not look particularly hospitable to a harmonious and productive ushering in of the much vaunted "strengthened review process", as not unexpectedly the NWS are seemingly striving to deflect attention from the lack of substantive new progress on nuclear disarmament while the NNWS will attempt to "hold the feet of the weapon states to the fire." As aptly noted by Ambassador Hasmy bin Agam of Malaysia: "A new phase of persuading and prodding nuclear-weapon States to rethink their nuclear policy in the post-cold war era must begin."(55)

The burden on the shoulders of Ambassador J. S. Selebi of South Africa, the President-designate of the 2000 Review Conference will be both heavy and shifting. Given South Africa's key role at the 1995 NPTREC, it would not be out of character for South Africa (assisted by other staunch proponents and defenders of a strengthened review process) to ensure that the first review conference of the strengthened process establishes a positive and constructive precedent for future reviews of the Treaty. The main challenge likely will be that of the high expectations and ambitious agendas of many non-nuclear weapon states led by South Africa, that will be pitted against the conservatism and obstructionism of most of the NWS-especially the U.S., which has already let it be known that it will be cautious about the creation of new precedents and will dampen down high expectations.

In the end, politics will prevail as NPT reviews have always been intensely political and will remain such due to the very nature of the issues discussed, as at its heart the NPT is a security bargain. It must not be forgotten, however, that unless states parties are willing to demonstrate the same shared sense of purpose and compromise that delivered the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, they risk undermining the very Treaty that provides for their own and for global security. If the NPT is undermined, or if some or a group of states threaten to leave the Treaty citing their dissatisfaction with the way in which the package of extension decisions is being implemented, the results would be disastrous--not only would proliferation dangers increase but the present climate for nuclear disarmament could be severely disrupted. It is up to all NPT parties to ensure that the indefinite extension of the Treaty and its effectiveness is buttressed by the full implementation of the NPT in the context of the decisions of the 1995 NPTREC, and that this is manifested through a successful 2000 Review Conference that reaches consensus agreement on both a new "principles and objectives" as well as a final declaration.

----

NOTES
 

1. This paper draws heavily upon previous writings by the authors on the subject of the NPT review, in particular: "The 1999 NPT PrepCom," by Tariq Rauf and John Simpson (The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1999, pp. 118-133) on-line at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/62toc.htm; "Decision-making, and the Role of the Treaty and of the 1995 NPTREC Decisions in structuring the discussions at, and the products of the 2000 NPT Review Conference," by Tariq Rauf; and "The 1998 PrepCom: Farewell to the NPT's Strengthened Review Process," by Tariq Rauf (Disarmament Diplomacy/May 1998), on-line at:

http://www.gn.apc.org/acronym/26tariq.htm.

2. 2. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, Decision 1 "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, p.8.

3. 3. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, Decision 2 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, pp.9-12.

4. 4. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, Decision 3 "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, p.12-13.

5. 5. Dr. Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director, Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Remarks to the 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," Le Chateau Montebello, Ottawa Canada, March 13, 1996.

6. 6. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, "Resolution on the Middle East," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, pp.13-14.

7. 7. For a description, see Tariq Rauf & Rebecca Johnson, "After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime,"(hereafter "Rauf & Johnson") The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995), p. 30; and Susan Welsh, "Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference," (hereafter "Welsh"), The Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring-Summer 1995), pp. 5-9.

8. 8. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (Canada), A Non-Paper on Strengthening Review Conferences, (Ottawa: March 1995), unpublished.

9. 9. The term "strengthened" review process was

10. 10. Personal communication dated January 6, 1997. See also, Ambassador Taylhardat's comments in Welsh, p. 9.

11. 11. As quoted in Welsh, p. 5.

12. "Statement by the President," Verbatim Record of the 19th Meeting (12 May 1995), 1995 NPTREC Final Document, Part III, Summary and Verbatim Records, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part III), (United Nations, New York: 1996), p. 214.

13. 13. Dr. Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director, Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Remarks to the 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," Le Chateau Montebello, Ottawa Canada, March 13, 1996.

14. 14. Ben Sanders is probably the first analyst to make this observation. See Ben Sanders, "NPT Review Conferences and the 1995 Extension Conference: Working Towards Consensus,"in Tariq Rauf ed. Extending the NPT: Perpetuating the Global Norm Aurora Papers 27, (Canadian Centre for Global Security), pp.43-44.

15. 15. Rauf & Johnson, note 32, pp. 40-41.

16. 16. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Decision 1, paragraph 4.

17. 17. Scheinman goes even further than the language in Decision 1, in saying that the 'Principles and Objectives" agreed to at the 1995 NPTREC "is one element that could be considered by NPT parties in determining 'ways and means' to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty during the 2000 NPT Review Conference" (emphasis added). See Scheinman, 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," March 13, 1996.

18. 18. Rauf & Johnson, p. 34.

19. 19. The Hon. John D. Holum (Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Remarks to the International Conference on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment," Washington, D.C., February 12, 1996.

20. 20. Scheinman, "Remarks to the 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," March 13, 1996.

21. 21. The Honourable Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director, Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Preparing for the 1997 NPT PrepCom - Address to the Regional Seminar sponsored by The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, International Organizations in Nonproliferation Program; University of Southampton, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation; and The National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine)," (Kyiv: September 28, 1996).

22. 22. Quoted in Welsh, p. 3.

23. 23. Quoted in Welsh, p. 5.

24. 24. Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation," letter to the editor, Security Dialogue (December 1993), pp. 497-498. For an interesting account of South Africa's nuclear weapon programme, see: Frank Pabian, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1), pp. 1-19.

25. 25. Adolf von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin Vol. 37, No. 1), pp.42-48.

26. 26. Lewis A. Dunn, "High Noon for the NPT," Arms Control Today (July/August 1995), p. 7.

27. 27. United Nations Security Council, S/23500, 31 January 1992, Report No. 92-04224F -- (Statement at the 3046th meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government).

28. 28. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, PPNN Newsbrief Number 36 (4th Quarter 1996), p. 5.

29. 29. Remarks by the President in Address to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations, p. 3.

30. CD/1547, 12 August 1998, adopted at the 802nd Plenary on 11 August 1998.

31. 31. Alison Mitchell, "Summit Talks End With Agreements, but Not for NATO," The New York Times, March 22, 1997, p. A 6.

32. See, example, United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review, 'Modern Forces for a Modern World', United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (8 July 1998).

33. 33. Rauf & Welsh, p. 29.

34. 34. International Court of Justice, "Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations)," Communiqué No. 96/23 (8 July 1996).

35. 35. Ibid., paragraph F.

36. Ibid., Summary of the Advisory Opinion: "Obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament (paras. 98-103)." I am indebted to Ambassador George Bunn (Former General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a negotiator of the NPT) for highlighting the nuances and importance of the ICJ decision.

37. 37. The Honourable John D. Holum (Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Remarks to An International Seminar on Nuclear Disarmament after the Indefinite Extension of the NPT," Kyoto, Japan (December 2, 1996).

38. CD/PV.812 of 2 February 1999, reported under "Geneva Update No. 43" by Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament Diplomacy (December 1998/January 1999), p. 21.

39. 39. Holum (December 2, 1996), speaking in Kyoto.

40. 40. The vote on UNGA resolution (A/53/77Q) on 4 December 1998 was 154:3:10; and on resolution (A51/56/Add.11), on 10 December 1996, was 129:3 against (France, United Kingdom, and United States):38 abstentions.

41. The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Preparing for the 1997 NPT PrepCom," Address to the Regional Seminar sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and The National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine), Kyiv, September 28, 1996.

42. Summary of Statement by The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman (United States), Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting, New York, 8 April 1998, p. 9 (paragraph 41).

43. Summary of Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang (China), Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting, 8 April 1998, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2, p. 8 (paragraphs 34-35).

44. Ibid., p. 10 (paragraph 44).

45. Ibid., p. 24 (paragraph 123).

46. See, Jayantha Dhanapala (Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations), "The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges," statement at The Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11, 1999, on-line at: http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/dhanapala.htm.

47. NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, paragraph 7, 11 May 1995.

48. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/CRP.1, 6 May 1998.

49. See "OSCE Decision-Making" at http://www.osceprag.cz/info/facts/decsmake.htm.

50. Statement by the New Zealand Head of Delegation, HE Mr Clive Pearson, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 27 April 1998, pp. 3-4.

51. Summary of Statement by Japan, Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting, New York, 8 April 1998, p. 15 (paragraph 69).

52. Jayantha Dhanapala, "The NPT Review Process: Identifying New Ideas to Strengthen the Regime," The Enhanced Review Process: Towards 2000, UNIDIR Newsletter No. 37, p. 10.

53. Cited in Douglas Roche, "An Analysis of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000 Review of the NPT," Project Ploughshares at the University of Waterloo, p. 9, http://watserv1.uwaterloo.ca/~plough/98prepcom.html.

54. Dhanapala, op. cit., UNIDIR Newsletter No. 37, p. 14.

55. United Nations General Assembly, Press Release GA/DIS/3052 (October 14, 1996), p. 10.


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