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Successes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

by Tariq Rauf

This century, the bloodiest yet in human history, which saw the invention and use of nuclear weapons, the most destructive and deadliest in history, will end in 83 days and pass on an unenviable nuclear legacy to the new millennium.

The fifty year history of the age of nuclear weapons witnessed the manufacture of more than 125,000 nuclear warheads-each of which packed a greater explosive force than the Hiroshima "Little Man" device. Five decades of nuclear weapon testing resulted in excess of 2,000 nuclear detonations in three environments-the atmosphere, under water and underground. The legacy of the Cold War also includes a glut of weapon-usable fissile material-highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon-grade plutonium. The number of ('proliferator') countries detonating nuclear explosive devices went from one in 1945 to four in 1960 when U.S. President-elect John Kennedy warned against the possibility of some 10 nuclear-weapon states by 1970 and 15 to 20 in the following decade.

Despite these inauspicious auguries, as we wind down the clock to the end of this century, we can chalk up a number of important non-proliferation successes (in addition to two failures and mounting new challenges). These successes include: the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its associated regime comprising safeguards and export controls; nuclear weapons renunciation by several countries; nuclear-weapon-free zones; a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; checking "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union; partial moratoria in production of weapon-usable fissile material; and dealing (albeit with limited success) with two instances of material breaches of the NPT. These successes have laid the basis for a solid foundation in checking the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the edifice of global nuclear non-proliferation norms still requires robust maintenance and further work.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed on 1 July 1968 represents the world's single most important multilateral nuclear arms control agreement, with the largest membership, and it remains the most successful exemplar of arms control. Today, with 182 non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and five NPT nuclear-weapon states (NWS), the Treaty's membership stands at 187. The number of states with large nuclear arsenals has been arrested at five. Today, only four states remain non-parties: Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan-however, the latter three possesses nuclear weapons.

The NPT remains the only global legally binding instrument committing the NWS to disarm, and its indefinite extension in 1995 strengthened the global nuclear non-proliferation norm. Responding to the most significant challenge to the NPT to date, i.e. the Indian nuclear detonations of May 1998, Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy stressed that: "The nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on, and anchored in, international law and norms, as well as incorporated into international mechanisms. The NPT is fundamental, but the broader regime is a complex system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, arrangements and mechanisms intended to promote and achieve a world without nuclear weapons, sooner rather than later. This was valid during the Cold War and remains valid today. At the same time, the regime is intended to provide a framework to enable the world to make effective use of nuclear capability for peaceful purposes."

The NPT was originally designed to prevent the advanced industrial countries of the day from acquiring nuclear weapons, such as Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. These countries were not prepared to renounce nuclear weapons permanently without similar parallel commitments by the NWS. As such, the NPT had an initial term of 25 years. In accordance with Article X.2, the NPT was made permanent in May 1995, when 174 (of the-then 178) member states meeting in New York at the Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) agreed without a vote to extend the duration of the Treaty indefinitely. The NPT's indefinite extension was one part of an inter-linked package comprising: a strengthened review process; principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; and a resolution on the Middle East (co-sponsored by the depositary states: the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom). Preserving the integrity and strengthening the commitment to this extension package, as well as to the principles and obligations of the NPT, is key to the future survival and well-being of the Treaty.

The NPT is the sine qua non for global efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation. The Treaty institutionalized a "safeguards principle" that enforces intrusive on-site monitoring and inspections to demonstrate compliance and facilitates peaceful non-explosive uses of nuclear technology and energy. The efficiency and effectiveness of the NPT safeguards system based on INFCIRC/153 was further enhanced through additional measures agreed in INFCIRC/540. IAEA and NPT safeguards laid the foundation for intrusive on-site inspections.

Agency safeguards-whether those based on the NPT or on nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties or bilateral arrangements-provide the assurance that nuclear material in peaceful use is not being diverted to explosive purposes. In some nuclear-weapon states, safeguards are also being applied to weapon-grade nuclear material declared excess to national security requirements and transferred irreversibly from military to peaceful use.

According to the IAEA Annual Report for 1998, 222 safeguards agreements were in force with 138 States (and with Taiwan, China). NPT related safeguards agreements were in force with 126 states. Forty-five INFCIRC/540 Protocols have been approved, 38 have been signed, and five are already in force. The Agency is safeguarding 103,883 significant quantities of nuclear material, and 897 facilities with 1,085 locations containing nuclear material are under IAEA safeguards. This safeguards effort is financed by approximately US$82 million annually from the regular safeguards budget and some US$20 million a year in additional contributions by member states. Thus, for a paltry US$100 million per year, the IAEA is safeguarding over 100,000 bomb-equivalents of nuclear material in 138 states. With the IAEA's budget effectively frozen, what conclusions can be drawn regarding states' commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation? One obvious conclusion is that the Agency is doing a remarkable job with very limited resources. Another is that those states which maintain a high profile in warning against further proliferation must seek to match non-proliferation rhetoric with multilateral commitments. It is difficult to believe that states are serious about preventing further proliferation, when they provide only $100 million a year for Agency safeguards but at the same time have no hesitation in spending billions of dollars on military programmes. States need to be persuaded to realize that the value of a "safeguards dollar" greatly outweighs that of a "defence dollar" when it comes to preventing proliferation.

The 1995 NPTREC also concluded that the IAEA was the competent authority to implement NPT safeguards and nothing must be done to undermine it. Increased financial contributions for the safeguards mission of the IAEA would help to fulfill that commitment. Furthermore, the integrity and independence of the Agency need to be protected. Its safeguards inspectors should never be compromised by national intelligence service taskings and the Agency must continue to operate in a scrupulously professional and even-handed manner.

The international non-proliferation regime also has emphasized multilateral control over nuclear technology transfer. National policies and export control instruments have been developed to supplement non-proliferation norms. The very first control instrument was the 19 August 1943 "Quebec Agreement" between the U.S., U.K., and Canada on controlling uranium. In November 1945, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and U.S. President Truman reached a tripartite agreement noting that international nuclear commerce requires "effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards". Fritz Schmidt, the current chairman of the Zangger Committee, noted that Article III.2 of the NPT required member states to only supply nuclear items (especially designed or prepared items) to NNWS if they had accepted NPT safeguards. The Zangger Committee, set up on 11 March 1971, had the task of establishing a list of items whose export would trigger safeguards, and defined procedures and conditions for permitting nuclear exports. This "trigger list" has been updated and revised over time. The Zangger Committee, with 33 members, is recognized as the "faithful interpreter" of Article III.2 of the NPT.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the London Club was set up in the aftermath of India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974. Its original membership included France, which at that time was not a party to the NPT, and the NSG's mandate was broader than that of the Zangger Committee, in that the NSG included controls on dual-use items and technologies, as well as physical security standards. The NSG's membership now stands at 35, including China. Export controls are obligatory for all NPT parties that are exporters of nuclear technology. INFCIRC/539 provided a useful summary history of the two nuclear export control regimes.

In practice though export controls remain controversial, with developing states claiming discrimination. Another valid question pertains to the effectiveness of export controls, particularly given the nuclear weapon programmes of India, Iraq, Israel and Pakistan. Export controls have also been tainted by charges of politicization and questions about their legality. A comparison of the treatment meted out to North Korea-which has been determined to be in breach of its NPT safeguards obligations, and Iran-which remains a NPT member in good standing with the Agency, is instructive in this context. For the future, what is required is greater transparency and co-operative dialogue between nuclear suppliers and nuclear recipients.

Nuclear Rollback

While perhaps South Africa has been the most notable country to have rolled back its nuclear weapon program, there are other examples of countries reversing themselves at various stages in their quest for a nuclear weapon capability. Canada was the first state that had the capability to make nuclear arms to renounce such a capability. Others under different circumstances have included among others, Australia, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Italy, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.

The three successor states to the USSR-Brazil, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine constitute special cases in terms of non-proliferation. None of the three former Soviet republics had indigenous nuclear weapon programs, rather they were accidental inheritors of the legacy of a collapsed nuclear superpower and did not have either the resources or capabilities necessary to maintain a status as nuclear-weapon states. In the event, they agreed to the removal of former Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory by a combination of financial inducements, security guarantees, and political considerations. Countries such as Australia and Sweden never seriously took their interest in nuclear weapons to the point of developing nuclear explosives, and chose to remain non-nuclear weapon states.

Iraq, which was pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapon programme was several years away from developing an operational nuclear explosive device, and had its nuclear infrastructure forcibly destroyed both as a result of a defeat in a war and as mandated by the UN Security Council. North Korea, as well, as agreed to give up its controversial nuclear activities in return for economic and technical assistance and political considerations, however, the "Agreed Framework" with the United States will take time to be fully implemented.

Argentina and Brazil agreed to renounce aspirations of making weapons and agreed to set up a bilateral nuclear inspection system in addition to fully implementing the Tlatelolco Treaty. Neither country achieved a significant capability to produce weapon-usable fissile material or that of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Both Argentina and Brazil acceded to the NPT. The Argentine-Brazilian model could have some precedents or lessons for other regions in terms of achieving a rapprochement and engaging in transparency in nuclear matters.

South Africa's decision to destroy its six nuclear explosive devices as well as its weapons infrastructure and then to join the NPT as a NNWS was unprecedented, but reflected changed political dynamics and threat perceptions. The biggest challenge was not that of dismantling South Africa's weapon capability but that of the IAEA subsequently verifying the completeness and correctness of Pretoria's declaration of inventory of nuclear material and facilities. This was the first time that the IAEA had "looked back" at a state's nuclear activities and had to verify operating records, declared outputs, completeness of dismantling and destruction, and the reassignment of dual-use equipment to peaceful or non-military work. In this task, the IAEA's tasks were facilitated by full and extensive disclosures by South Africa and cooperative verification. The experience gained by the IAEA will be useful in verifying other similar renunciations of weapon capabilities-were they to take place-in the NWS or the three non-NPT weapon states.

The challenge will remain, however, of assuring the international community that in cases of nuclear rollback all materials and activities have been effectively accounted for and that any regeneration of a nuclear weapon program can be detected in a timely manner. Other challenges concern devising appropriate incentives and security guarantees for states to enable them to renounce nuclear weapon capabilities.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in populated parts of the globe (as distinct from uninhabited areas, such as the Antarctic) was devised primarily to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states. To the extent that the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons may emerge from regional security considerations, the establishment of such zones strengthens the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

NWFZs have come to be recognized by the international community as a part of a phased approach to the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this regard, the four existing NWFZ arrangements have a number of common characteristics, i.e.: 1) a legal obligation to place all nuclear material and installations under full-scope IAEA safeguards; 2) to clearly demarcate the geographic limits of the zone of application in the territories of member states; 3) to specify the obligations, rights and responsibilities of contracting and protocol parties; 4) to promote international cooperation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy under safeguards; and 5) to give indefinite duration to the NWFZ treaties. In contrast to the NPT, NWFZs do not permit the "stationing" of nuclear weapons on the territories of states parties or "nuclear sharing" arrangements among nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. Currently, more than 100 non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) are parties to NWFZ treaties.

Treaty of Tlatelolco: The October 1962 Cuban missile crisis brought home the danger of nuclear war to the countries of South and Central America. Following a Mexican initiative of April 1963 supported by five Latin American presidents, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was signed in Tlatelolco (a suburb of Mexico City) on 14 February 1967, and entered into force on April 22, 1968. It has been signed by 33 regional states and ratified by 32 (all except Cuba). Signatories: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (All countries in the region except for Martinique have signed the Treaty.) Additional Protocol I calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply the denuclearization provisions of the Treaty to the territories in the zone "for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible". All four powers having such territories have signed-France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. Additional Protocol II calls on the nuclear weapon states: (1) to respect the denuclearized status of the zone; (2) not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the parties; and (3) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties. All five nuclear weapon states have signed and ratified Additional Protocol II. The Tlatelolco Treaty has served as a model for all subsequent NWFZ agreements. Thirty-one of the 32 States Contracting Parties have safeguards agreements in force with the IAEA.

Argentina-Brazil: Another distinguishing feature of the Latin American region is the nuclear accounting and transparency regime between Argentina and Brazil-both of which at one stage had an active interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. These two states serve as models of non-proliferation and confidence-building for others which might currently have nuclear weapon aspirations.

Treaty of Rarotonga: It was not surprising that the Asia-Pacific region was concerned about nuclear weapon issues since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945. Following the nuclear detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the region became a testing ground for such weapons. Between 1946-1958, the United States conducted some 66 atmospheric and under-water tests in the Marshall Islands in the northern Pacific region, which lies outside the SPNFZ zone of application. The United Kingdom conducted atmospheric tests between 1952-1957 on Australian territory at Maralinga, Emu Field and Monte Bello Island, and then both the U.K. and the U.S. conducted atmospheric nuclear tests on Christmas Island until the signing of the PTBT in 1963, banning further atmospheric nuclear detonations. That same year, France established a nuclear test site in French Polynesian atolls and proceeded to carry out some 190 nuclear detonations (including more than 40 above ground) between 2 July 1966 and early 1996 at the Mururoa and Fangataufa sites. South Pacific states besides being concerned about nuclear testing in their region and its vicinity, were also worried about dumping of nuclear wastes at sea, fearing radioactive contamination of the marine environment. The South Pacific Forum took up the issue in 1975 in response to a New Zealand proposal calling for the setting up of a NWFZ in the region.

The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty was signed in Rarotonga (Cook Islands) on 6 August 1985, and entered into force on 11 December 1986 with the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification. The Treaty has 13 signatories, and 12 have ratified: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa-(Tonga has yet to ratify). Three dependent territories not located within the zone-Marshall Islands Republic, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau-are not parties to the Treaty but are eligible to join; if they elect to sign and ratify the SPNFZ treaty, then the SPNFZ area would be enlarged to incorporate the territory of each new party. Protocol I calls on each party "in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, to apply the prohibitions" of the Treaty. France, United Kingdom, and United States have signed the Protocol and the Treaty therefore applies to American Samoa and Jarvis Island, as well as to the dependent territories of France and the United Kingdom. However, since the United States has not yet ratified the SPNFZ protocols, these are not yet in force for the United States. Protocol II calls on the nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any party to the Treaty or against each other's territories located within the zone. China signed this protocol in 1967, the Soviet Union in 1986, whereas the remaining three nuclear weapon states signed it in 1996 (after France ceased nuclear weapon testing in the zone). Protocol III calls on the nuclear weapon states not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty. China signed this protocol in 1967, the Soviet Union in 1986, whereas the remaining three nuclear weapon states signed it in 1996 (after France ceased nuclear weapon testing in the zone). IAEA safeguards agreements are in force with 11 states parties.

Bangkok Treaty: The South East Asian NWFZ Treaty was signed in Bangkok on 15 December 1995 by 10 states and entered into force on 27 March 1997, when the seventh signatory ratified the Treaty. The signatories comprise: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam-all except the Philippines have ratified. This treaty constitutes a major step forward in achieving a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN), as elaborated in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971. The SEANWFZ Treaty includes two elements that go beyond other existing NWFZ agreements: (1) the zone of application also includes the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the contracting parties; and (2) the negative security assurance implies a commitment by the NWS not to use nuclear weapons against any state-contracting or protocol party-within the zone of application. In other aspects, the SEANWFZ contains all the standard obligations, prohibitions, and verification and control measures found in previous zonal treaties. Thus far the NWS have not signed the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty due to their objections over the inclusion of continental shelves and exclusive economic zones, and to the restriction not to use nuclear weapons within the zone or from within the zone against targets outside the zone. NPT safeguards agreements are in force with seven states parties.

The first ever meeting of the Commission for SEANWFZ, to oversee implementation and compliance matters, was held in conjunction with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Singapore on 24 July 1999. Reportedly, at this meeting, China agreed to sign the Protocol, as did India. (Since India does not fall within the definition of an NWS as stipulated in the NPT, if the contracting parties accept an Indian signature to the Protocol they might be in technical violation of both the NPT and the Bangkok treaties.) At this ARF meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers set up the Commission, as well as a working group on the implementation of SEANWFZ. The Bangkok Treaty does not have any designated Secretariat, given the informal style of ASEAN, but the Commission at the level of foreign ministers and the working group of Senior Officials will work to promote the full implementation of the zone. No specific target date has been identified for the implementation of the SEANWFZ, though an ASEAN Vision 2020 adopted in December 1997 envisioned that by that year all of the NWS would have adhered to the protocol, and that the region could be free of all mass destruction weapons.

Pelindaba Treaty: Concerns over French atmospheric nuclear testing in Algeria among other security considerations led to a nearly thirty-year long effort to establish a NWFZ in Africa. The African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba) Treaty was opened for signature in Cairo on April 11, 1996, and has been signed by 52 of the 53 African states (all except for Madagascar). Signatories: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (Gambia, Liberia, and Mauritania have ratified-some reports suggest seven ratifying states.) Protocol I calls on the nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use a nuclear device against any party to the Treaty or any territory within the zone for which a state party to Protocol III is internationally responsible. Protocol II calls on the nuclear weapon states not to test or assist or encourage the testing of any explosive device within the zone. Protocol III calls on France and Spain to apply the provisions of the Treaty in respect of the territories situated within the zone for which they are de jure or de facto internationally responsible. All five nuclear weapon states have signed Protocols I and II, but only France has ratified. France, but not Spain, has signed and ratified Protocol III.

Central Asia: Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and driven by environmental concerns about nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk polygon and other nuclear weapon related activities, at the 1995 NPTREC Kyrgyzstan proposed the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia. In February 1997, the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan endorsed a Central Asian NWFZ in their Almaty Declaration. This initiative received further impetus through a Foreign Ministers Declaration at the Tashkent Conference in September 1997. Since that time a draft treaty text has been prepared and there are expectations that barring unforeseen developments, a Central Asian NWFZ treaty could be signed some time in 2000.

Korean Peninsula: Denuclearization agreements can also contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. On 20 January 1992, North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, due to a variety of reasons this agreement has yet to be implemented, and it's implementation will have to await satisfactory resolution of problems regarding the IAEA's verification of the correctness and completeness of North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear material and of the nuclear aspects of the United States-DPRK Agreed Framework (October 1994). Should all the outstanding questions regarding North Korea's nuclear activities be satisfactorily resolved and the denuclearization accord implemented, this would constitute a major success for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Ending nuclear weapon testing has been on the global arms control agenda for more than forty years. In 1954, India proposed a standstill agreement of nuclear testing, and since then this matter has been a fixture of international diplomacy. Tripartite discussions between the U.S., the U.K., and the USSR that had been underway since 1958, eventually were successful in reaching agreement in 1963 on banning nuclear explosions in all environments except underground. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), agreed in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, was characterized as an interim step along the road to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions...for all time."

Over a decade later, the two nuclear superpowers were only able to agree on limiting the yield of their underground test explosions not to exceed 150 kilotons. The 1974 U.S./USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty was agreed on the eve of the first review conference of the NPT mainly for political not arms control reasons. Two years later, it was complemented by the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty that carried over the restrictions of the PTBT to "peaceful nuclear explosions". These two treaties delayed the achievement of a total ban.

Nuclear weapon states traditionally conducted nuclear tests for at least six reasons: 1) to achieve and demonstrate a weapons capability; 2) to develop, certify, and modernize warheads; 3) to maintain stockpile reliability; 4) to determine and evaluate weapons effects; 5) to enhance safety of existing designs; and 6) to retain the technological infrastructure for nuclear armaments.

Negotiations on an Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were conducted in three phases not directly related to one another. During 1957-1963, tripartite-U.S., U.K., and USSR-discussions took place but fell apart due to differences over verification, with the Soviets holding out for a minimal inspection regime. From 1977 to 1980, another attempt was made at tripartite talks on a CTBT, and limited progress was achieved on a set of principles, but differences continued over verification. The Reagan administration launched a major strategic modernization program and did not pursue talks on a CTBT. Frustrated by this lack of progress on a CTBT and given robust testing programs in the NWS, a group of non-aligned states sought to amend the PTBT in 1991 and to convert it to a CTBT with the insertion of an additional article and two protocols. With the U.S. and the U.K. openly opposed, and given the absence of China and France as non-parties, the PTBT Amendment Conference was doomed to failure. Following an October 1990 Soviet unilateral moratorium on testing, in September 1992 the U.S. Congress proclaimed its own moratorium and obligated the administration to conclude a CTBT by 30 September 1996. Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) took on a new impetus after September 1993 resulting in a treaty that was opened for signature at the UN on 24 September 1996. Thus, after some 2,050 nuclear test explosions since 1945, many believed that the era of nuclear weapon testing had ended. India's nuclear tests, followed by those of Pakistan, in May 1998 however came as rude shock.

The CTBT, when it enters into force, will become a critical part of the system of interlocking treaties and agreements that help prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. It presently has 154 signatories with 51 ratifications, and 26 states have ratified of the 44 whose ratification is necessary for entry-into-force. Two of the five NWS-France-and the United Kingdom-have already ratified, and France remains the only NWS to have dismantled its national test site. An international conference on facilitating the CTBT's entry into force was held in Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999, at which ninety-two ratifying and signatory states to the CTBT unanimously agreed on a "Final Declaration" reinforcing the importance and authority of that Treaty and called for its early entry-into-force.

Once the CTBT enters into force an international monitoring system comprising 321 monitoring stations, supported by 16 technical laboratories, will come into effect. Four technologies are being used by the proto-type international data centre, of the provisional technical secretariat of the CTBT Organization, to monitor nuclear tests: seismic, infra sound, hydro-acoustic, and atmospheric sampling. Despite it being "history's most sought after and hardest fought prize", the CTBT represents a compromise treaty that leaves it open to charges of allowing nuclear weapons modernization through the backdoor. So-called virtual nuclear testing through sub-critical tests, fusion experiments, and simulations using networked supercomputers, which is not prohibited, threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the new treaty in serving nuclear non-proliferation interests and provides justification to proliferators for testing.

Despite its weaknesses though, a CTBT will help in de-legitimizing nuclear weapons and bring additional pressure on NPT hold-outs to refrain from weapon development and to join the regime. A CTBT would prevent countries such as India, Israel, and Pakistan from validating theoretical designs and calculations for nuclear warheads, and raise the political costs of violating the global non-proliferation norm. A CTBT also would help eliminate a critical element of friction and dissatisfaction concerning the inequality of obligations assumed under the NPT by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. NNWS parties to the NPT from the Third World constituted by far the overwhelming majority of NPT members-these states regarded a CTBT as a sine qua non for NPT extension-and their support was crucial in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. While it could be argued that a CTBT per se will not necessarily contribute to nuclear arms reductions and will freeze the current superiority in nuclear weapons technologies of some of the NWS, many non-nuclear weapon states consider a CTBT as an important and visible indicator of the nuclear weapon states' compliance with Article VI of the NPT.

Unless serious measures are undertaken to promote the early entry-into-force of the CTBT and a legally binding norm against further testing is established, there will be pressures in some of the NWS to resume nuclear testing and it will remain difficult to prevent further testing by India and Pakistan. Such a resumption of testing would be justified in the United States on the grounds of revitalizing an aging arsenal and maintaining the nuclear weapons production infrastructure, in Russia in terms of certifying existing or new sub-strategic warhead designs to compensate for declining conventional forces, and in China as required for nuclear force modernization to respond to deployment of theater- or national-missile defences by the United States These pressures are likely to be the strongest in Russia and China, and should these two countries resume nuclear testing it is unlikely that the United States would not respond in kind.

Fissile Material Treaty

Banning further production of weapon-usable fissile material as a barrier to further nuclear proliferation was also first envisaged in the early 1950s. The failure to secure an early agreement eventually led to the production of nearly two thousand metric tonnes of highly-enriched uranium and some three hundred metric tonnes of weapon-usable plutonium. Given sufficient stocks, the United States halted plutonium production (not separation) in 1988, curtailed HEU production in 1964 and suspended all HEU production (including that for naval reactors) in November 1991. In Russia, which had 13 plutonium production reactors in operation in 1994, only two remain in production and are likely to be shut down over the next couple of years; but it is not clear whether Russia is still producing HEU even though President Gorbachev promised a halt.

As part of its Strategic Defence Review in July 1998, the United Kingdom declared 7.6 tonnes of plutonium and 21.9 tonnes of HEU. Apparently it stopped HEU production in January 1993. In February 1996, France announced a halt in HEU production and the closure of production facilities. A production halt of both HEU and plutonium has been declared by the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom-apparently, among the NWS, only China might still be producing weapon-usable nuclear material. India, Israel and Pakistan are also reportedly still producing such material.

In 1993, the UN General Assembly agreed by consensus on a resolution calling for negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. But disagreements over scope of a treaty and negotiating mandate frustrated progress at the CD as well as on a subsequent UNGA resolution. After two years of deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament over whether negotiations on a FMT and discussions on a future programme for disarmament should proceed in parallel, the South Asian tests prompted establishment of an ad hoc committee in August 1998 on a FMT based on the mandate contained in the March 1995 report of the Special Coordinator, and also resulted in a UN General Assembly resolution in December on the need for a FMT. However, during its 1999 session, the CD was unable to re-establish an ad hoc committee on FMT, due to differences over parallel negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and consideration of "prevention of an arms race in outer space" to prevent weaponization of space, among other reasons.

Originally conceived as a nuclear disarmament instrument, a FMT has come to be regarded by the NWS principally as a non-proliferation treaty. The inclusion of existing stocks or historic production of weapon-usable fissile material has become a matter of contention, with the NWS and India and Pakistan arguing for exclusion while the G-21 and other (Western and Eastern) states would prefer to include such stocks. In order to be effective, an FMT will have to fulfill both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation functions, and will have to be fully consistent with the principles and obligations of the NPT. Other complexities pertaining to definitions, scope, declarations, verification etc. will not be addressed here due to space considerations. Suffice it to add that a FMT negotiation will be the most complex and controversial yet at the multilateral forum of the CD.

Decommissioning of Weapon Systems and Control of Sensitive Nuclear Materials in the former Soviet Union

With the unexpected and sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the fate of some 25,000 to 30,000 nuclear warheads became a major issue of international concern. The command and control, accounting and safe storage of these warheads poses an important challenge to Russian authorities and the world community. Other proliferation concerns relate to the possible export of nuclear expertise and weakened state control over nuclear materials.

Reportedly, U.S. military authorities and intelligence agencies are quite confident, and have received categorical assurances from the highest authorities in Russia, that all non-strategic nuclear warheads-some 19,000 in all-were properly accounted for and removed to the territory of the Russia under appropriate controls by 1 July 1992 under the terms of the Alma Ata Declaration of 22 December 1991.

The Alma Ata accord and the Lisbon Protocol to the START treaty of 23 May 1992, committed Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to transfer all strategic nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantling and to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Further, in letters by the presidents of these three states to the U.S. president, each state pledged to ratify START I, to guarantee the removal of all strategic nuclear forces on its territory during the seven-year period as provided for in START I, and to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. All three states have acceded to the NPT as NNWS and former Soviet weapons based on their territories have been removed and dismantled with the financial and technical assistance provided by the United States.

Current nuclear arms reduction agreements are resulting in the release of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and weapon-usable plutonium (Pu) from dismantled nuclear warheads. Dealing with these radioactive materials will be a major challenge in terms of assuring their physical safety, accountability, and storage or disposal under proper monitoring. According to one study, fissionable materials to be released from nuclear warheads as a result of disarmament include: for the U.S., 50 tons of Pu, and 210 tons of HEU; and for Russia, 89 tons of Pu and 430 tons of HEU. Russia still lacks safe, secure storage facilities for the large quantities of weapon-usable nuclear materials from dismantled warheads, and only one large storage facility is under construction.

Various proposals have been forwarded in this context. These include, for instance, the establishment of an international storage facility under the supervision of the IAEA, something akin to Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" plan of 1953. Article XII.A.5 of the IAEA Statute authorizes the Agency to extend safeguards over weapon-grade nuclear materials placed under its supervision or control, and the IAEA has offered its services in this regard. Other proposals include converting HEU to reactor grade fuel for burn up in commercial power reactors to generate electricity, and to convert Pu to mixed-oxide fuel for burn up in CANDU and/or "fast burn" reactors that have yet to be built or in civilian breeder reactors (since these last two options will add to the amount of Pu in civil stockpiles they do not seem viable).

Beginning in December 1995, the United States started buying from Russia 500 tons of HEU over 20 years released from dismantled former Soviet nuclear warheads. The U.S. was to purchase 10 metric tons of HEU in each of the first five years beginning in 1995, and no less than thirty metric tons during each of the following fifteen years. The 94% U-235 was to be diluted to an enrichment level of about 4% and sold by the Department of Energy to commercial customers in the United States. This programme, however, has run into serious difficulties due to domestic political and economic considerations in the U.S., as well as concerns about the origin of HEU being transferred from Russia, and high-level attention is now required to bring it to a successful outcome.

Canada, Japan, and France, all have expressed interest in burning up plutonium released from Russian warheads in power reactors (as MOX fuel) in Canada and Japan, while the French proposal calls for MOX burn up in Russia with French technical assistance.

Other non-proliferation activities include core conversion programmes for converting reactor cores from HEU to other forms of uranium in Russian reactors and reactors elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Assistance is also being provided to Russia to help it safely dismantle more than 200 nuclear-powered submarines. And nuclear material protection, accounting and control measures continue to be the focus of attention in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.

A U.S. "Cooperative Threat Reduction" programme is directed at eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Thus far, programme activities have facilitated the destruction of 365 ballistic missiles, 343 ballistic missile launchers, 49 strategic bombers, 136 submarine missile launchers, sealed 191 nuclear test tunnels, as well as deactivated 4,838 nuclear warheads.

Conclusion

"We have met the enemy and he is us," said the comic-strip sage Pogo. While the end of the Cold War has greatly reduced the traditional threat of superpower conflict, maintaining and even strengthening global non-proliferation regimes have become important new challenges. Despite its successes, the non-proliferation regime has sustained some severe blows and it remains the responsibility of the international community to shore up the regime. The NPT bargain comprising nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards remains essential to the future integrity and longevity of the regime. New strategies need to be devised to engage the holdouts and to encourage their normative behaviour-this would require, at a minimum, standardized responses to proliferation activities in India, Israel and Pakistan. In addition, the UN Security Council, which belatedly issued a statement on 31 January 1992 to the effect that proliferation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and agreed to resolutions 687 on Iraq, on North Korea, and 1172 on India and Pakistan, remains unfocused and divided. On matters relating to combating proliferation, the permanent members might consider suspending their right of veto, or alternatively requiring two vetoes, to prevent Security Council non-proliferation enforcement action.

It is generally recognized that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are inter-linked. In this context, the challenge to the NWS is to fashion a strategy to de-legitimize nuclear weapons that follows the new logic of post-Cold War security dynamics and capitalizes on the possibilities opened by emerging strategic realities where inter-state war is declining. Establishing new norms in concert with pro-active diplomacy to resolve regional conflicts, meshing supply-side restraints and demand-side motivations, offer the best prospect of reversing proliferation and shoring up a fraying NPT regime. A fundamental question that has not yet been adequately answered is: How important is nuclear non-proliferation, and what price in terms of nuclear disarmament are the NWS prepared to pay to realize the non-proliferation objective? The commitment of the NWS to the NPT is under question not the least given the lack of progress in achieving further nuclear disarmament, but also in terms of their living up to other negotiated arms control treaties.

General (ret'd.) George Lee Butler, former C-in-C of the United States Strategic Command, who was one of a very few nuclear war planners to evaluate the entirety of the 12,500 targets in the U.S.' single integrated operational plan (SIOP) for using nuclear weapons and reduced it down to 3,000 targets, concluded: "I long ago took to heart the words of Omar Bradley, spoken virtually a half century ago, when he observed, having seen the aftermath of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thus: 'We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We live in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We've unlocked the mysteries of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living'."

Living with nuclear weapons for more than half a century has been possible because of a non-proliferation regime anchored in the NPT. The overwhelming majority of states has concluded that their security interests are better served by not having nuclear weapons. The NPT regime has created a legal barrier against proliferation, established norms for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and put in place a comprehensive system of nuclear material accountancy and control buttressed by remote and on-site surveillance. But the world, despite its non-proliferation rhetoric has gotten by on the cheap-expending a mere $100 million dollars a year on the IAEA safeguards system. Non-proliferation and disarmament require adequate financial investment.

Leadership whether on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament or regional security issues depends on clarity of vision and clarity of commitment. Being satisfied with the lowest common denominator of agreement among states is at best an unreliable guide to security and stability. It is therefore vital to formulate a grand strategy for the prohibition of nuclear weapons as part of a broader vision of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons.

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