CNS Programs: IONP

THE 1999 NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

by Tariq Rauf and John Simpson

(Tariq Rauf is Director, International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He has been a member of Canada's delegation to NPT review meetings since 1990, and previously worked for many years on international security issues at the Canadian Centre for Global Security. Professor John Simpson is the Director of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton in England; Programme Director of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN); and was until recently, a Member of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters. He has attended all NPT meetings since 1985. Both write in their personal capacities and do not represent the views of any organization with which they are associated. ) This article is a longer version of "The 1999 NPT PrepCom," published in The NonProliferation Review (Winter 1999), pp. 118-132. (Contacts: trauf@miis.edu and JS10@socsci.soton.ac.uk).


 

Introduction

On Monday, 10 May 1999, the third two-week session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the review conference in 2000 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is scheduled to convene at United Nations headquarters in New York.(1) On the one hand, this meeting is unlikely to remove any of the specific proliferation threats that currently confront the international community. On the other hand, however, it will be an important indicator of the health of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the issues that may need to be addressed in the future if political support for the Treaty from the majority of NPT parties is to be sustained. The outcome of the meeting will therefore be of concern to all of those seeking to strengthen this regime to meet the challenges of the next century.

The content and nature of this PrepCom session are a direct result of decisions taken in 1995 to make the NPT review process more effective, and in particular more forward-looking and product-oriented. These were linked politically to a concurrent decision to give the Treaty an indefinite duration. An important method of sustaining political support for the regime and persuading parties that it is in their interests to back its further strengthening is thus to ensure that the changed review process for the Treaty is fully implemented. Unfortunately, events at the 1997 and 1998 sessions of the PrepCom suggest that this is far from being achieved, and that disagreement exists among the parties on both how to strengthen the review process and the substantive objectives they should seek through it for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Unless substantial progress can be made in both of these areas in 1999, the parties will go into the 2000 review conference with little to show for their participation in the changed review process. This will place great pressure upon that conference to produce a positive, forward looking, result. At the same time, the core of the Treaty may have been weakened. For the NPT lacks a permanent executive organization and its review process is its functional equivalent. If this process is discredited in the eyes of the Treaty parties, the credibility of the Treaty itself, and its related regime, may also be undermined. Much therefore rides on the outcome of the 1999 PrepCom session. A positive product from the session, in the form of a set of clear recommendations, will be an indicator that the reform and strengthening of the Treaty and the regime, initiated in 1995, is back on track: a negative one may be perceived as undermining the common interests that underpin both the Treaty and the regime, and promoting a fragmentation of the political support so necessary for them to survive.

The primary aim of this paper is to contribute some thinking on how best to approach the conduct of the 1999 NPT PrepCom and of the next-the sixth-Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT which will the first under the strengthened review process. It is organized in four parts: background-what happened in 1995-1998; procedural and organizational matters for the 1999 PrepCom; substantive issues for the 1999 PrepCom; and conclusions-what are the prospects for a positive outcome and what may need to be done to secure such a result.

Background

The NPT signed on 1 July 1968 is the bedrock of the post-World War II global non-proliferation regime. With 187 states parties, this Treaty is the most widely adhered to and the most successful multilateral arms control treaty in history. At present it has more members than the United Nations, (2) and only four states are non-parties: Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan.

The NPT created the precedent of periodic reviews to assess the implementation of multilateral arms control agreements.(3) Article VIII.3 specifically provided for the first review conference to be held in Geneva in 1975, five years after the Treaty's entry into force in 1970, and left open the option for subsequent quinquennial reviews thereafter if requested by a majority of states parties. As a consequence, NPT review conferences were held every five years after 1975 to review the implementation of the Treaty in the preceding five-year period.

In the negotiations on drafting the NPT, that took place between 1965 and 1968, the leading industrial non-nuclear weapon states were reluctant to accept a non-proliferation instrument of indefinite duration. As a result, Article X.2 of the NPT stipulated that:

Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. The decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.(4)

Consequently, in accordance with this provision, the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) was convened at the United Nations in New York, from 17 April to 12 May 1995. On 11 May, 174 states parties gave the Treaty an indefinite duration by agreeing without a vote to a package of interlinked decisions. Decision 1 on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,"(5) elaborated a framework for an enhanced and a more substantive Treaty review process to facilitate a full and balanced review of the implementation of the NPT and to forward recommendations on future steps to the quinquennial NPT Review Conferences. Decision 2 on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,"(6) set out substantive guidelines and indicative targets designed to promote greater accountability regarding the full implementation of the Treaty. Decision 3 on "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"(7) taken in accordance with the provisions of Article X.2, emphasized the two preceding decisions adopted by the NPTREC and reaffirmed the provisions of Article VIII.3. Its main function, however, was to provide a vehicle for confirming in a legally binding form that the Treaty was to have an indefinite duration.

The two decisions on principles and objectives, and a strengthened treaty review process, have been referred to respectively as "the hammer and the anvil of the post-NPT extension epoch."(8) In addition, a resolution on the Middle East(9) was also adopted which inter alia endorsed the on-going peace process and called upon all states in the region to accede to the Treaty and to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

In the four years that have elapsed since the indefinite extension, and after two sessions of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the next NPT review conference in 2000, while progress has been made on certain procedural issues. Significant differences have emerged also over the nature and interpretation of the NPTREC decisions as well as on their implementation. The original concept of linking a "strengthened review process" to the extension decision, was first elaborated in a Canadian "non-paper" in early 1995.(10) This paper outlined the characteristics of an "enhanced review process", which might involve, inter alia:

1) retention of the existing structure of review conferences (i.e. the continuation of three main committees to discuss the implementation of the Treaty and ways of strengthening it);

2) investing the preparatory process with a more substantive character (i.e. discussion of both procedural and substantive issues);

3) elaborating, at Review Conferences, indicative targets for compliance with given articles of the Treaty; and

4) establishing a framework for ways of strengthening the Treaty and its implementation.

These ideas found their way into the South African draft on the enhanced review mechanism, and through the process of the President's Consultations at the NPTREC were eventually elaborated in the decisions on the extension package. The term "strengthened" review process, in Decision 1, was crafted by Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat (Venezuela), who prevailed in arguing that "enhancing implied only 'cosmetic' changes and that what was required was a process that should lead to a full implementation of the NPT, having in mind, specifically, Article VI."(11) During the President's Consultations, the drafters struck a political compromise between those who feared that in indefinitely extending the NPT the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) would lose their leverage as regards the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) in relation to their nuclear disarmament obligations, and those who preferred a simple extension of the Treaty without any collateral measures to assist in the future implementation of the NPT. This compromise made all States parties accountable for full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, and in particular the NWS in respect of Article VI. To quote Ambassador Christopher Westdal (the-then Canadian ambassador for disarmament and the head of Canada's delegation to the NPTREC):

"The nuclear-weapon states need to understand that the non-nuclear weapon states accepted indefinite extension because they want the nuclear-weapon states to be permanently held accountable to Article VI on disarmament."(12)

Ambassador Dhanapala, the President of the 1995 NPTREC, in his closing statement also emphasized the concept of permanence with accountability, originally coined by Canada:

"The strengthened review process that we have established will now ensure a sharper focus on review conferences of the future and their preparatory committees. These forums of rigorous accountability will play a more crucial role in the operation of the treaty than ever before. As States Parties to the Treaty, we have to ensure that we make maximum use of this mechanism of accountability in the fulfilment of the undertakings of the Treaty."(13)

Dr. Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), speaking on the same issue but in a slightly different vein, summed it up as:

"Interest in 'strengthening' or 'enhancing' the traditional treaty review process grew out of a concern shared by many non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear weapon states would lose any incentive to make progress toward nuclear disarmament as called for by Article VI of the NPT once they had secured indefinite extension. A way to deal with this desire for greater nuclear weapon state accountability was to endow the NPT review conferences and the associated preparatory meetings with a more substantive character, thus 'strengthening' the process. This struck a chord with the NPT non-nuclear weapon state members who saw this as an opportunity to promote the goal of full implementation of the Treaty by all its parties including the nuclear weapon states."(14)

Ambassador Dhanapala, in his present capacity as UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, recently reiterated this view succinctly:

"I believe that it is important to recall that with the decision in May 1995 to strengthen the review process for the NPT, States parties had underlined their willingness to accept greater accountability of their actions and to ensure that the undertakings contained in the Treaty and in the decisions adopted at the Review and Extension Conference will have greater prospects of being achieved.":(15)

Decision 1 on "strengthening the review process" comprised seven operative paragraphs, of which five dealt with review conferences (1,2, 5, 6, and 7), while two (3 and 4) related to the PrepComs for these conferences. The meaning and scope of some of the paragraphs may better be understood if read in conjunction with others.

Decision 1 institutionalized the past practice of five-yearly reviews by regularized quinquennial review conferences. After 1995, there was to be a near-continuous review process. The formality of a majority of states parties requesting the depositaries to arrange a review conference was no longer required. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee would meet in sessions of 10 working days, instead of the previous five, in each of the three years prior to the next review conference, and if necessary, a fourth session could be held in the year of the conference. This doubling of the working days of the PrepCom was intended to facilitate a full and frank exchange of views on Treaty implementation, as well as making possible the negotiation of recommendations on this for transmission to review conferences.

The PrepComs for previous review conferences had focused primarily on procedural, logistical and legal matters. The third and fourth sessions of the PrepCom for the 1995 NPTREC, had also engaged in discussions on substantive matters, though this was the exception rather than the rule. Decision 1 thus served to formalize the inclusion of substantive matters in the work of the Preparatory Committee by specifying that:

"The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the procedural preparations for the next Review Conference."(16)

In many ways this is the crux of the strengthened review process, in that the Preparatory Committee is now specifically mandated to consider: 1) principles; 2) objectives; and 3) ways, in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality.(17) In the 1997 and 1998 sessions of the PrepCom, these issues have become a source of controversy and conflict as competing interpretations of Decision 1 have emerged.(18)

While endorsing the current structure of the three Main Committees (MC), at review conferences, Decision 1 (paragraph 5) also empowered their General Committees to delegate responsibility for review and subsequent reporting on each specific issue to only one of the MCs, thus removing any overlaps between them. It also discussed setting up subsidiary bodies within the MCs. This procedure was not entirely new as, at previous review conferences, informal working groups had been created within the MCs, to try to resolve certain clusters of issues and to draft language for the MCs' report on the review of the Treaty. In 1995, for example, MC.I established an open-ended working group on security assurances, while MC.II established two working groups, one to consider nuclear-weapon-free zones and the other export controls. After 1995, however, the task of recommending the establishment of subsidiary bodies was assigned to the PrepCom. Even this was not entirely a new practice, as the PrepCom for the 1995 NPTREC had set up a working group to consider and report on its Rules of Procedure, and this group continued to meet during the first few days of the conference to try to finalize Rule 28.3 on the extension decision. Decision 1, in building upon informal past practice, thus formalized the role of subsidiary bodies in providing for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. In so doing, it left open several questions concerning the life, mandate and number of such subsidiary bodies, (e.g. would they continue to function in between review conferences or adjourn sine die at the end of each review conference; would the PrepCom itself could set up its own subsidiary bodies; would their mandate be confined to a single or to a cluster of related issues; and how many of them would be created?

The final paragraph of Decision 1 enjoined states parties attending review conferences to both look back at the period under review, as well as forward to the future, and to make recommendations on the areas where further progress was required and to identify the necessary means for its achievement. Future Review Conferences were charged with specifically addressing ways to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality. This suggested that at least two products were expected from future review conferences: an assessment of the operation of the Treaty, in the five-year period under review (i.e. 1995-2000); and a set of goals to promote the implementation of the Treaty in the next five-year period (i.e. from 2000 through 2005).

The 1997 and 1998 Sessions of the NPT PrepCom

At its 1997 session, the PrepCom for the 2000 NPT review conference was formally tasked with both making procedural preparations for that conference and implementing Decision 1 by addressing substantive matters. The 1997 PrepCom therefore established an important precedent for future Treaty reviews as well as for the interpretation and implementation of the NPTREC decisions. At its first meeting, on 7 April 1997, the PrepCom adopted a nine-item Agenda. This sought to create a qualitatively different review process by addressing "specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality." Accordingly, the PrepCom engaged in a substantive discussion over four-and-a-half days on Agenda item 4, "Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons."(19)

One of the first actions of the 1997 PrepCom was to agree that Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland would chair the session, as a nominee of the Western Group. It was also agreed that a representative of the Group of Eastern States (named at the end of the meeting as Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak of Poland), would be the Chairman of its second session, while a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States would Chair the 1999 session and the 2000 Conference. Past practice was that the Chairs of the three PrepCom sessions also served as Chairs of the MCs. The two years since 1997 have witnessed significant turbulence over these arrangements. Due to the reassignment of Ambassador Pasi Patokallio, Ambassador Markku Reimaa led the Finnish delegation in 1998 and served as Vice-Chairman of the PrepCom. He will probably Chair one of the MCs at the 2000 Conference. Ambassador Strulak was also reassigned, and Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland took his place as Chair of the 1998 PrepCom. Ambassador Andelfo Garcia Gonzalez of Colombia, who was the nominee of the NAM to Chair the 1999 PrepCom, was also reassigned in late 1998, and Ambassador Camilio Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia will now replace him. Finally, the NAM has yet to formally nominate its candidate for the Presidency of the 2000 Review Conference, though unconfirmed reports suggest that Ambassador J.S. Selebi of South Africa may be a leading candidate for that post.

The PrepCom also agreed on the dates and venues for its future sessions. These would take place from 27 April-8 May 1998 in Geneva, and from 12-23 April 1999, in New York. The Review Conference itself would be held from 24 April -19 May 2000, in New York. In December 1998, however, the issue of the dates of the 1999 PrepCom resurfaced. Apparently, certain NAM delegations proposed moving the dates previously agreed so as to avoid overlap with the annual Human Right Commission meetings in Geneva-which several of the Geneva-based PrepCom heads of delegation would have to attend. Possible dates being considered were May 3-14, or April 26-May 7 in the event the UN Disarmament Commission is cut back to two weeks.(20) While the dates were still subject to finalization at the time of writing in late January, this issue does not have any material bearing on the issues and questions discussed here.

With one exception, the PrepCom at its first session in 1997 decided to use the three sets of issues (or "clusters") contained in annex V of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,(21) as the basis for structuring its discussions. This comprised: Cluster 1 (i.e. Main Committee I issues)--nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and security assurances; Cluster 2 (i.e. Main Committee II issues)--safeguards and export controls; and Cluster 3 (i.e. Main Committee III issues) --peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The one exception was nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), which in 1995 were discussed as a Main Committee II issue, but in 1997 as a Cluster 1 matter. In addition, universality or universal adherence to the Treaty was also to be discussed by the PrepCom, together with a reaffirmation of the commitment of states parties to the preamble and articles of the NPT.

Thus, while the PrepCom began a new practice in 1997 of devoting at least half of its working time to a discussion of substantive matters, it nevertheless decided to continue with the old arrangement of structuring discussion along the traditional lines of the three main conference committees. However, the PrepCom also chose in presenting its report to integrate the seven themes of the "principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament," agreed as Decision 2 at the NPTREC into this structure of the "clusters".

The 1997 PrepCom decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the PrepCom would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis. The PrepCom at its second session considered the 1995 rules of procedure as the basis for the conduct of the 2000 NPT Conference, but agreement could not be reached on one aspect, whether in Rule 34 the term "subsidiary bodies" (used in Decision 1) should be substituted instead of "working groups".

The PrepCom decided to follow past practice and to permit non-NPT states to attend the open sessions as "observers". They were to have the right to receive PrepCom documentation and could circulate their own documentation, if any, at their own cost to NPT parties. Their representatives could sit at the back of the meeting room behind their country name-plates but would not have the right to make statements, interventions, or to participate actively in the deliberations. Accordingly, Brazil, Cuba, Israel and Pakistan attended the 1997 session as observers, but in 1998 Pakistan was not present. Representatives of specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, such as the South Pacific Forum and the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), were also permitted to attend open meetings as observers with the same privileges as accorded to States non-parties. NGOs, as well, were accorded privileges to attend the open sessions, while seated in the public gallery, to receive official documentation but to circulate their own documentation at their own cost, outside the official meeting room. One afternoon at each session was set aside for NGOs to make presentations to delegates. Representatives of more than 100 NGOs attended the 1997 session, while 76 were present in 1998.

On the question of the report and recommendations from one session to the next session of the PrepCom, there remains intense discussion and controversy. In 1997, it was agreed (on the basis of a Canadian suggestion of producing a "distilled compilation" of proposals, not necessarily based on consensus, but to promote accountability and continuity) that the PrepCom would produce a "rolling" progress report or text that could be updated at each of its subsequent sessions. Following Canadian and South African suggestions made in the Chairman's consultations, Ambassador Patokallio proposed a report comprising three sections: I--Introduction, giving logistical details; II-a factual or technical report prepared by the Secretariat on the organization of the work of the PrepCom, and of the 2000 Review Conference-comprising substantive and procedural issues and official documents submitted by participating delegations; and III--recommendations to the next session of the PrepCom, with an annex containing summary records, and another annex (Chairman's Working Paper) consisting of points of general agreement, subject to review and updating (paragraph 3),and an inventory or rolling list of proposed recommendations for consideration at subsequent sessions of the PrepCom (paragraph 4).

Originally, the Chairman had proposed language for part III of the report, on recommendations to the next session of the PrepCom, that included:

1) reference to the annex comprising the Chairman's paper (on recommendations to the next session) as a basis for further work on draft recommendations to the review conference; and

2) the PrepCom's recommendation that in its second session the PrepCom should continue the consideration of all aspects of the Treaty in a structured and balanced manner (i.e. in clusters and subdivided according to the principles and objectives) and that within this framework the second session should allocate time for the consideration of:

(a) security assurances for NPT parties (proposed by South Africa);

(b) the 1995 NPTREC resolution on the Middle East (proposed by Egypt); and

(c) a fissile material 'cut-off' treaty (proposed by Canada and Germany).

This particular categorization of items for special consideration at the second session of the PrepCom was perceived by Mexico as having the consequence of down-grading the relative priority of nuclear disarmament, and also of giving a higher priority to the Chairman's paper over that of proposals made by national delegations and regional groups. The rationale for this was that both security assurances and a fissile material cut-off treaty were already included under cluster 1 (Main Committee I) issues, as was nuclear disarmament, and that allocating specific time for them could be perceived as diluting the importance that states parties attached to nuclear disarmament. In addition, Mexico appeared to be concerned, as did some other delegations, that it was premature for the PrepCom to determine the items for discussion at its future sessions or at the Review Conference itself.

As a consequence of the decisions made in 1997, the 1998 PrepCom had to consider and decide on several items of business including:

1) confirmation of the dates and venues of the third (and last) session of the PrepCom and of the Review Conference;

2) nomination and confirmation of the Chair of the third session of the PrepCom and confirmation of the President of the 2000 Review Conference;

3) finalization of the PrepCom report on substantive and procedural issues and recommendations to the Review Conference;

4) provisional agenda of the Review Conference;

5) financing of the PrepCom and of the Review Conference;

6) rules of procedure; and

7) preparation and consideration of background documentation.

In addition, the PrepCom at its second session had to allocate time for the consideration of the three substantive items noted in the Chairman's statement, and both parts of the Chairman's working paper, as well as the official documents submitted by delegations at the first session. The documentation alone comprised over 100 pages, with states submitting at least 27 official documents. This documentation and inventory of proposals remained "subject to review and updating" with no possibility of reaching agreement on recommendations to the review conference "pending final agreement on all draft recommendations at the last session."

On procedure, the 1998 session confirmed the dates and venue of the 1999 session and on NAM's chairmanship, as proposed at the 1997 session. Although the other items listed above were discussed to a greater or lesser extent, no agreement could be reached on them.

The cluster discussion on substantive matters, including the three special issues identified in 1997, was somewhat repetitive and did not contribute much to raising the level of debate or promoting common ground. Above all they comprised a series of national statements of position, rather than an interactive debate. As in 1997, the NWS made a joint statement, in addition to their national statements, describing the progress made unilaterally or bilaterally on nuclear disarmament (Article VI). Some of the non-nuclear weapon states applauded the progress achieved and called for renewed efforts for START II ratification and for further strategic reductions, while several others expressed dissatisfaction at the current slow pace in nuclear disarmament.

In contrast to 1997, the Chairman's consultations in 1998 produced major disagreements over the procedure of "enriching" the 1997 "Chairman's Working Paper" through consideration of and agreement on, a streamlining of the text contained in paragraph 4. Some delegations submitted additional new text and refused to delete previous text that in many cases was repetitive or redundant. Only Canada and Japan appeared to make a serious effort to delete portions of their respective texts from the previous session. The NWS for the most part went into a holding strategy, which thwarted most efforts by various NNWS to develop consensus text on nuclear disarmament and other issues. The NWS also opposed proposals on the product of the PrepCom and on organizing the discussion on substantive matters at the 1999 session. Continuity of process in this situation was not helped by the absence of the 1997 Chairman, Ambassador Patokallio, and the fact that the 1998 Chairman, Ambassador Wyzner, although a highly experienced senior diplomat, had not been present in 1997.

In addition, a new issue emerged in 1998 following a proposal by Canada that the PrepCom should pursue a two-track approach. Track 1 was to enrich the Chairman's Working Paper by building upon the agreed recommendations from 1997, while track 2 was to draft a short document reflecting the views of NPT states on issues of current interest or concern, such as: security assurances, the resolution on the Middle East, negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, CTBT and safeguards.(22) The rationale was that NPT parties should be able to express views on promoting the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as on agreed issues of concern, at the PrepCom rather than having to wait for a review conference. Furthermore, this track 2 document was to lead to the production of a text that could provide language for the Report of the PrepCom under heading "II: Procedural and Substantive Issues" of the 1997 report, which was split into procedural issues and "III. Substantive Issues".(23) The text that Canada proposed was for insertion under paragraph 21 of the draft report from the PrepCom session which stated: "The Committee [PrepCom] held an in-depth consideration of all three issues [security assurances, the Middle East resolution, and the FMCT] during which a number of proposals were made. In this connection, the following documents were issued:...."(24)

The purpose and utility of this Canadian document was not fully understood, and hence was opposed by some states from the Western Group who argued that it could undermine the Chairman's Working Paper and would in certain cases duplicate material in it. Even though it had been drafted as a result of intense consultations with South Africa, Egypt (and the Arab group), and others, the United States indicated that it opposed the "track 2" concept in principle. Thus, as the Report of the PrepCom was being discussed paragraph by paragraph for adoption, on the final day of the meeting, it was the United States which openly objected to the inclusion in it of the Canadian proposal. Canada then called for a show of support, paragraph by paragraph, for its proposals, and again the single objection was voiced by the United States, which systematically rejected first the proposed text on security assurances and then the text on the resolution on the Middle East. It was the rejection of the compromise text on the Middle East resolution that triggered the collapse of negotiations on the Report from the PrepCom session, following a blunt statement by the Chairman-designate of the 1999 PrepCom, speaking on behalf of the NAM, that his group would not agree to any part of the Chairman's Working Paper unless it contained this Middle East language. Yet, while the Middle East text provided the catalyst for the failure of the 1998 PrepCom, it was the deep-seated differences over the meaning and content of the strengthened review process that lay at the heart the disagreements. For earlier, led by the United States, the NWS had opposed in the Chairman's Consultations any attempt to structure the debate at the 1999 PrepCom by adding the three special issues to the cluster debate; or to consider a similar setup for the 2000 Conference. Nevertheless, the PrepCom in 1999 will have to find a way of reporting on the substantive part of its deliberations in its three sessions-perhaps, in this context, the wisdom of the Canadian proposal might yet become apparent to its opponents.

In the end, a stunted report on the work of the session was finally adopted late on 8 May 1998.(25) This five-page report(26) comprised: I. Introduction-providing summary information on the opening, chairmanship, listing of participating States parties, meetings held (16), and officials and representatives of intergovernmental organizations present; II. Procedural Issues-giving details on the organization and work of the PrepCom and on the organization of the 2000 conference, election of officers, dates and venue of the third session, listing of documents submitted, draft rules of procedure, and financing. This meant that the report did not refer to any aspect of the substantive deliberations at the 1998 PrepCom, even though some 4.5 days were devoted to the "cluster debate" in addition to 1.5 days spent on discussing security assurances, the resolution on the Middle East, and the FMCT.(27)

Furthermore, the status of the 1998 version of the "Chairman's Working Paper"(28) remains unclear, as it was not formally or even provisionally adopted and consequently the report of the PrepCom makes no reference to it, even though it was listed as a conference document in the 1998 report. As compared to the 13 sub-paragraphs of provisionally agreed draft recommendations in the 1997 version, the 1998 draft was expanded to 27 sub-paragraphs and the structure changed somewhat. The 1998 version of the Chairman's Working Paper remains repetitive in places and is poorly drafted. Yet, although the list of specific proposals put forward by delegations and contained in paragraph 3 (of the 1998 "Chairman's Working Paper"), is larger than its equivalent paragraph 4 in Annex II in the 1997 version, it could still form part of the raw material for inclusion in the final version of the Chairman's Paper containing recommendations for the review conference. It also remains uncertain whether paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Chairman's Paper would form the basis for a new version of the "principles and objectives" or a similar decision document to be adopted at the 2000 review conference.

Procedural Issues at the 1999 NPT PrepCom

The third session of the PrepCom in 1999 will face a range of challenges at its outset and it is important for both the incoming Chairman and for States parties to carefully prepare their strategies to promote an efficient use of time and constructive dialog. Part of this may involve seeking to resolve outstanding matters at an early stage in the meeting. For unless States parties go into the third session with a clear sense of intent to reach agreement on both procedural matters and substantive recommendations, it is probable that the 1999 session will be as inconclusive as the 1998 one. Only 10 working days are now available to the Preparatory Committee, assuming that a fourth session in 2000 will not be held, and a number of key items need to be finalized before the start of the Review Conference in 2000. These include:

1) nomination of the President of the 2000 Review Conference;

  • finalization of the PrepCom report on substantive and procedural issues and recommendations to the Review Conference;
  • provisional agenda of the Review Conference;
  • rules of procedure; and
  • preparation and consideration of background documentation.
In addition, the PrepCom at its third session will have to consider whether to allocate time for the consideration of certain substantive items separately from any cluster debates; and whether to further develop the 1997 (and 1998) Chairman's working paper(s) and the official documents submitted by delegations at the previous two sessions, or to start anew in drafting a report and recommendations. An efficient way of dealing with these documents and proposals might be to divide them by subject matter under the appropriate articles of the Treaty, or failing that within the appropriate clusters, and to discard duplicate proposals. Working groups could be established to deal with material falling within clusters of Treaty articles or the existing PrepCom clusters, in order to speed up the consideration of the various issues and to facilitate progress in drafting the recommendations of the PrepCom to the review conference. To promote efficiency in its work, the PrepCom could decide to focus its deliberations on producing a forward-looking "distilled compilation" of recommendations for the 2000 review conference. In this regard, it would be encouraging if the general debate could be dispensed with altogether in the third session, and for the PrepCom to start with a short series of cluster debates to reflect developments since 1998, and then move rapidly into a drafting mode to finalize its report and recommendations to the 2000 conference.

It may also be essential that some effort be devoted at the next PrepCom toward developing common ground on the meaning, interpretation and implementation of the concept of the "strengthened review process". In this regard, much will depend upon the skill, preparation and leadership demonstrated by the Chairman. Although the Chair's responsibilities are enormous, as are the challenges facing him, an astute and impartial Chairman could play a major role in shaping a positive outcome to the session by showing clear direction, resolution and determination.

The PrepCom should adopt the rules of procedure for the 2000 conference, and thus find a way of finessing disagreement on Rule 34. For example, the PrepCom could state in its report that "working groups" subsume "subsidiary bodies". Regarding background documentation, given the short time available prior to the review conference, it might be advisable to follow precedent to charge the Conference secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Argentine-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, to prepare appropriate brief but factual documentation covering the period 1995-2000, and for this documentation then to be considered in a special one-day session of the PrepCom to be convened in the margins of the 1999 UN General Assembly, rather than at a fourth full session of the PrepCom.

Role of the Treaty and the NPTREC Decisions at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

The traditional view of States regarding the scope of previous NPT review conferences was that it was the implementation of the Treaty that is being reviewed. The Treaty is the source of legally binding commitments on the part of signatory States and, therefore, it is the Treaty which lies at the heart of the review process-in terms of "assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized"-as noted in Article VIII.3. In September 1996, the United States made clear that it preferred "past practice...as a guide...in determining how to proceed" in the PrepCom process.(29) And at the 1997 PrepCom, the U.S. stressed that:

"It was essential to bear in mind that the obligations of the States parties stemmed from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should, therefore, be considered the primary source of guidance."(30)

Another prevalent view was that the Treaty had been enhanced by the decisions of 1995 and future reviews must take into account not only the Treaty but the decisions and resolution agreed at the 1995 NPTREC. For example, at the 1997 PrepCom, China stated that:

"The 2000 Review Conference would be the first meeting since the indefinite extension of the Treaty. In addition to full consideration of the three decisions and one resolution adopted by the 1995 Conference, consideration should also be given to a number of relationships in order to enhance the review process and ensure the success of the 2000 Review Conference.... Secondly, the consideration of substantive issues at the Review Conference and in its Preparatory Committee should be based on the Treaty, and full use should be made of the principles and objectives. The review process should focus on the implementation of the provisions and on the preamble of the Treaty and should take the relevant principles and objectives fully into account."(31)

Canada emphasized that:

"...while the review process should focus on the Treaty itself, work should be guided by the conclusions of the 1995 Conference of the Parties, specifically the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives and in the decision on strengthening the review process...."(32)

And New Zealand, for its part, noted that:

"The indefinite extension decided in 1995 was an important statement of confidence in the Treaty and its role as a cornerstone of international cooperation in the field of security. The decisions adopted at the same time had placed the Treaty and its subsequent reviews within the framework of an enhanced multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament process."(33)

The preceding statements reveal that States parties still have not come to a common understanding on the scope of the strengthened review process and of the role of the Treaty and the NPTREC outcomes in that process. Jayantha Dhanapala recently cautioned that:

"The success of the [2000 Review] Conference will ultimately depend on the evolution of fresh consensual approaches transcending political divisions and the abandonment of rigid postures or complacent attitudes over the 'done deal' of the Treaty's indefinite extension."(34)

Decision 1 of the 1995 NPTREC on "strengthening the review process for the Treaty", provided guidance on the structure of three Main Committees and on the possibility of establishing subsidiary bodies within each Main Committee, but it only provided limited clarity on the scope of future review conferences. It included the provision that:

"The Conference agreed further that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality."(35)

Given the context of the negotiation in 1995 on the decisions and resolution adopted by that Conference, it can be asserted that future reviews would need to focus not only on the implementation of the Treaty but also that of the NPTREC outcomes. As such, the 1995 principles and objectives serve to provide an important context and touchstone to assess the implementation of the Treaty in the period under review. The principles and objectives comprise a loose compilation of an expression of general principles as well as an expression of key goals to be achieved to further the full implementation of the Treaty and its universality.

The two sessions of the PrepCom to date have reinforced the concepts of "permanence with accountability" (outlined in 1995) and of a qualitatively different review process. In this context, it can be asserted that the 1995 decisions on "principles and objectives" and on a "strengthened review process" are politically binding, whereas the extension decision is legally binding. Under customary international law, politically binding decisions could become equally as binding as those taken under specific treaty law. Failure to honour the 1995 NPTREC decisions could dissolve commitments to the Treaty's permanence. As such, it may be argued that the scope of future review conferences is: 1) to review the implementation of the Treaty per se as well as of the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 NPTREC; and 2) to make specific recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the Treaty (including achieving its universality) through a new principles and objectives document.

The first task would involve a product, i.e. a final report, comprising an assessment of the implementation of the Treaty, plus the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution, from 1995 to 2000. In addition the report would identify the areas in which progress should be sought in the full implementation of the Treaty over the next review period-e.g., nuclear disarmament; strengthened safeguards; nuclear-weapon-free zones-and the means through which-e.g., ratification and implementation of START II; negotiation, ratification and implementation of START III & IV involving the participation of all five NWS; negotiation, ratification and implementation of a fissile material treaty involving the five NWS, India, Israel and Pakistan; negotiation and implementation of INFCIRC/540 Additional Protocol by all NPT NNWS; negotiation of a NWFZ in Central Asia; and entry-into-force of the CTBT, Bangkok and Pelindaba NWFZ treaties. This document-the final report-of the 2000 Conference could be structured either along traditional lines, based on the reports of the three Main Committees, comprising both an evaluation of past implementation and recommendations for future progress; or could be based on an article-by-article review of the Treaty factoring in the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution.

The second task would involve the drafting and adoption of a Year 2000 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" (Y2KP&O), comprising specific recommendations and milestones directed at strengthening the full implementation of the Treaty and the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution. This Y2KP&O could either emulate the structure of the1995 P&O, or alternatively it could reflect the articles and preambular paragraphs of the Treaty plus universality and security assurances. A Y2KP&O should strive to better reflect the structure of the Treaty and in this context to lay out the preferred goals and strategies for the next five year period. As such, the document while being substantive, pragmatic and results oriented, should also be concise and avoid unnecessary platitudes.

Adopting both products either by consensus or without a vote would be a worthy goal to strive for in 2000. However, given the present penchant of the NWS to minimize the scope of the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolutions and that of some members of the NAM to push grandiose disarmament schemes, it is unlikely that harmony will prevail at the 2000 Review Conference. In the event that neither consensus nor agreement without a vote is achievable, it might be worthwhile for the Chair in consultation with an extended bureau and the "Friends of the Chair" to find an appropriate mechanism for capturing the views of an overwhelming majority of States present, rather than risking yet another failed NPT meeting.

Substantive Issues for the 1999 PrepCom

The substantive issues which have in the past played a central role in determining the outcome of NPT conferences and meetings fall into two categories: matters which are linked to the inherent nature of the Treaty and the commitments contained within it, and issues which arise out of contemporary events, often taking place in parallel with these conferences and meetings. The impact of the former upon an approaching NPT meeting can be predicted with some certainty: the consequences of the latter are much more problematic. Examples of the first are the debates over the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by the NWS which have occurred in virtually every NPT review meeting that has been convened. Examples of the second include the 4 May deadline for completion of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle East, just after the 1999 PrepCom session is scheduled to conclude; the 50th anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Alliance in Washington, D.C. which might witness some controversy on the issues of non-strategic nuclear weapons and no-first-use of nuclear weapons in the context of the review of NATO's Strategic Concept; and the dynamics at the 1999 session of the Conference on Disarmament as it resumes its deliberations on the negotiation of an FMCT and consideration of sensitive subjects such as nuclear disarmament and security assurances

The task of identifying the key substantive issues inherent in the Treaty and likely to confront the 1999 NPT PrepCom session has been made slightly easier by the existence of the decision document on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"(36) agreed at the 1995 NPT Review Conference and the outcomes of the PrepCom sessions in 1997(37) and 1998(38). As a consequence, these substantive issues are most conveniently discussed using the "principles and objectives" headings of Universality, Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Security Assurances, Safeguards and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. However, since there was no agreement at the 1998 session on the agenda for the 1999 session, in particular whether the concept of structuring debate around clusters of issues should be retained, and whether specific time should be devoted to particular issues, as occurred in 1998 with security assurances, the resolution on the Middle East and a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), it remains unclear how the way the meeting is structured might shape the salience of these substantive issues in determining the outcome of the session.

Universality

In both the 1997 and 1998 sessions, there was agreement on the desirability of achieving universality of membership of the Treaty, and that the-then five states not party to it (Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) should accede to it(39). However, in 1998 the PrepCom became deadlocked by disagreement between Arab states and the United States on whether more specific recommendations for action should be made in the context of the Middle East, and in particular whether Israel should be named in them as the only remaining state in the region outside the NPT. This was the overt cause of the failure of that session to agree any recommendations to the 1999 session or the 2000 Review Conference, as discussed in an earlier section. It is worth recalling that the question of identifying non-parties by name, especially Israel, was problematic even at previous review conferences. In recent weeks, Egypt has again raised the issue of Israel's nuclear weapon capability and its own continuing commitment to the NPT in the absence of Israel's membership in the Treaty as a NNWS.

The issue of Israel and the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East will therefore almost certainly loom large in discussions at the 1999 PrepCom session. The new element in this situation in 1999 is both the proximity of the session to the 4 May deadline for completing the Oslo Peace Process; the threat from the Palestinians to declare themselves to be an independent state at that date if the process has not been completed on time; and the elections for a new Israeli Prime Minister and Government due to start in mid-May. Whether the Arab states and the United States, the two chief protagonists in this context, are prepared to compromise on this issue is likely to be dependent upon both starting discussions on the matter very early in the session, and upon the evolution of both political attitudes and actions within Israel and Palestine in the period before and during the PrepCom session.

Until 1997, the issue of universality in general lacked a clear focus, as several significant states still remained outside the Treaty. By early 1998, only five states remained in this category, and in practice the issue revolved around the three states, India, Israel and Pakistan, which were known to have unsafeguarded facilities capable of producing fissile material that could be used to make nuclear devices. Arguments had occurred at previous NPT meetings about the desirability of naming all states which were in this position, but non-aligned solidarity had tended to militate against any naming of India and Pakistan in this context.

Events in May 1998 have significantly changed this context. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and India's overt declaration of being a NWS and its intention to "induct" its nuclear devices into its military forces generated concerns over a heightened possibility of a nuclear arms race, and even nuclear war, breaking out in the sub-continent. More specifically, they suggested that under current circumstances these two states were unlikely to accede to the NPT through the route taken by South Africa, namely by dismantling their covert nuclear explosive capabilities and then joining the Treaty, while the wording of the Treaty itself precluded them joining it as nuclear-weapon states(40). This situation was compounded by the strong reactions to the tests from many significant NNWS, whose original decision to seek membership was heavily conditioned by an assumption that no more nuclear-weapon states would be created beyond the initial five, and who in several cases terminated nascent nuclear weapon program in order to do so, as well as acquiring positive security assurances provided through formal military alliances with the United States.

While there is not likely to be any positive support for the tests from NPT parties, it is unclear how they will choose to react to these events at the 1999 session. It is likely that time will be devoted to denouncing the two rounds of nuclear detonations conducted by India in mid-May, and the retaliatory tests by Pakistan. Some parties will undoubtedly wish to strongly condemn the actions, but whether agreement can be reached on specific moves that all parties should take is less certain, particularly if any agreements brokered by the United States (41) to limit the consequences of the tests appear to be rewarding, or at least not penalizing, the two states for their actions. However, the international community has already spoken authoritatively on the South Asian tests and has elaborated benchmarks as stipulated in Security Council Resolution 1172 and the Group of Eight Industrialized States (G-8) statement, and in the sentiment expressed in the statement of the NAM Summit in Durban. Thus, the parties could settle for registering condemnation of the tests, and restating these existing benchmarks.

More profoundly, the actions of the two states have challenged the assumption that a norm of non-proliferation had been created and was being sustained in appearance, if not in fact. In this context, it would be useful to recognize that India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests cannot change the nuclear non-proliferation architecture. Neither India nor Pakistan, or Israel for that matter, can be recognized as NWS under the NPT. Their status continues as threshold states, and thus pariahs as regards the NPT regime. At the same time these developments attest to the need for uniform and harmonized anti-proliferation strategies to be devised and implemented in South Asia and the Middle East. In addition, although the states were not parties to the NPT or constrained by any legal commitments from conducting their nuclear tests, their actions have generated a perception that the NPT should have been able to prevent their activities and, by its inability to do so, has in some ill-defined manner failed. This perception may need to be refuted by the PrepCom, and emphasis placed on more positive developments, such as Brazil's accession to the NPT in September last year.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The core issue in this context is compliance with the Treaty, but more particularly Articles I and II. If past NPT meetings are a guide, this could result in three sets of issues being ventilated in 1999. The most prominent of these would be alleged breaches of Article II of the Treaty(42) by NNWS, through actions designed to facilitate the production of nuclear devices, in particular by the DPRK(43) and Iraq(44), and just possibly by Iran. Much will depend on how events on the Korean Peninsula and the fate of UNSCOM and the IAEA monitoring activities in Iraq have evolved. A second, more controversial set of issues, is the legitimacy of storing or stationing nuclear weapons belonging to one of the five NWS on the territory of a NNWS. Finally, there is the question of whether the NWS have breached their nuclear disarmament commitments under Article VI of the Treaty.

Events in Iraq at the end of 1998 make it probable that the general issue of how to respond to cases of alleged non-compliance with the NPT will play an increasingly significant role in debates surrounding the NPT. On the one hand, an overt inability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to respond to cases of non-compliance in an effective way seems likely to bring the regime into disrepute and weaken support for the NPT. It may also undermine belief in the goal of nuclear disarmament, if the international community is seen as incapable of controlling Iraq's weapon of mass destruction programs despite the sweeping inspection powers nominally possessed by the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).(45) On the other hand, the NPT lacks internal mechanisms for dealing with such allegations: unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention, it does not even have a permanent secretariat. This has led to suggestions in the past for creating ad hoc mechanisms such as a compliance committee. Thus both specific cases and the general issue of how to deal with non-compliance seem likely to be central to any debates on the matter in 1999.

Nuclear Disarmament

Disagreements over whether progress, or otherwise, has occurred toward the goal of nuclear disarmament have been a perennial feature of past NPT review meetings. Their significance derives from several factors. One is that the NPT is the only legal document in which NWS have committed themselves to "pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to ...nuclear disarmament".(46) Its significance in this context was highlighted by the use made of it by the Judges in the International Court of Justice in 1996 in delivering their advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, when they argued that this committed the NWS to not just negotiate on nuclear disarmament, but also to conclude agreements on it(47). Thus the NPT is seen as a valuable context within which NNWS can pressure NWS for more action on nuclear disarmament. A second factor is that implicit in the NPT text is the proposition that the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS is not a permanent situation, and that the NPT is both a nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation treaty, with the latter being a contributing condition for achievement of the former, and vice versa. Thus politically and from a security perspective, nuclear disarmament is regarded as an important method of strengthening both the NPT and the non-proliferation regime.

The context in which the "principles and objectives" decision document of 1995 was concluded involved a debate between two perspectives upon the disarmament process: that it had to be driven by a "time-bound framework" for achieving disarmament, which would be linked to a nuclear-weapon convention and a target date for the achievement of the nuclear disarmament goal, or that it should be seen as an interactive process where actions would change perceptions, and permit further actions to occur,(48) and thus only the initial actions could be specified in detail and have time-targets attached to them.

The decision document was based on this second set of ideas. It specified a "programme of action" containing three specific measures: an immediate objective, the completion of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the end of 1996; a follow-on objective, the "early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices" (otherwise known as a Fissile-Material Cut-Off Treaty or FMCT); and the "determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally".(49)

By January 1999, three developments had taken place in this context. One was that a CTBT had opened for signature in September 1996, but with an entry-into-force provision(50) which made this dependent upon ratification by all 44 states operating research reactors. In the event that these ratifications had not been forthcoming three years after its opening for signature, a conference of those states which had ratified it would be held to consider how to expedite entry into force, and repeated annually thereafter. This conference is being planned for late September 1999. In addition, only two NWS, France and the UK, have currently ratified the Treaty. Three of the 44 still have not signed: DPRK, India and Pakistan. It is unclear whether this issue of entry into force of the CTBT will be left to the September 1999 conference, or will figure in discussions in the April 1999 NPT PrepCom session.

A second development was that after two years of deadlock in the CD over whether negotiations on a FMCT and discussions on a future program for disarmament should proceed in parallel, the aftermath of the South Asian tests saw the setting-up of an ad hoc committee on a FMCT based on the mandate contained in the March 1995 report of the Special Coordinator.(51) The substantive issue which had been preventing progress on this matter had been whether stocks of nuclear materials should be covered by this treaty, as well as a prohibition on new production. The decision to proceed suggested that this conflict will in future be conducted within the negotiations, rather than before they start, but it still remains uncertain whether this decision will hold, and the ad hoc committee will be re-established for the 1999 CD session. The significance of the FMCT for the 1999 PrepCom session may thus depend on how negotiations within the CD on this matter evolve in early 1999. One irony underlying the two year deadlock was that the main protagonists against proceeding on the basis of the mandate for the negotiation agreed by the UN General Assembly (i.e. banning only new production) were states outside of the NPT, even though the "Shannon Report" and the mandate contained therein provided for the consideration of all relevant issues (including the disposition of existing stocks).

A third development has been the increasing frustration felt by representatives of many NNWS at the lack of any agreed new international vision for nuclear disarmament. The so-called "decalogue", or agenda for the work of the CD, had its origins in the 1950s. Given the vastly different international environment of the 1990s, there has been an increasing perception that this needs to be revisited and a new agenda created to reflect the disarmament realities, perspectives and possibilities. This was seen on 9 June 1998 in the announcement of an eight-nation initiative "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda,"(52) bringing together eight states from all the existing main UN caucus groups,(53) which later sponsored Resolution L.48 at the First Committee and Resolution 53/77Y in the UN General Assembly. What was notable was that 12 NATO states abstained rather than voting no, as urged by the three Western NWS, thus hinting at a major change in their nuclear policy. This group will undoubtedly wish to develop this issue further in the 1999 NPT PrepCom session, while the five NWS may also wish to produce a further joint statement on this issue, as they did in 1997 and 1998.(54)

In reality, however, not much has changed on the nuclear disarmament front since 1995: START II still remains to be ratified by Russia and has not entered into force for either party to that agreement; the protocols to the Bangkok NWFZ treaty still need to be ratified by all five NWS, and the Pelindaba protocols by three of the NWS (i.e. Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States); and the CTBT has not been ratified by three NWS. Both Russia and China are modernizing strategic nuclear forces, and the United States is repackaging certain existing warheads and formulating new missions for its nuclear forces. More negatively, on January 20, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen announced that the United States was restructuring its missile defense program for a decision point in June 2000 that would allow for the deployment not only of theater missile defences but also for a limited national missile defense.(55) This would require amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, or if the Russians were not amenable to this, to renouncing the ABM Treaty. Not surprisingly, the responses from China and Russia to this announcement were not encouraging,(56) thus potentially setting the stage for fractious discussion at the PrepCom and further delaying if not scuttling any hopes for Duma ratification of START II. It must be recognized that with imperilled top leadership both in Moscow and in Washington, together with a right-wing dominated U.S. Congress which is fundamentally opposed to nuclear arms reductions and a nationalist Duma struggling to maintain some semblance of respect for Russia as a great power, the die is cast. Significant new movement in nuclear disarmament may now be impossible before 2001.

On the positive side of the ledger, however, both France and the United Kingdom have deactivated certain aging non-strategic nuclear weapon systems and cut-back on some modernization programs while continuing with others. The U.K. in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review has reduced the number of deployed strategic weapons and has moved to a lower tempo of readiness.

The issue of a new disarmament agenda is closely linked to a further internal NPT question, namely whether in 2000 the review conference should attempt to formulate a similar listing of measures constituting a "programme of action" to that generated in 1995. While a FMCT might take the place of a CTBT as an immediate objective, there is no obvious agreed follow-on objective even though a number of intermediate and follow-on steps can be identified. The 1999 PrepCom session may therefore see debate on the range of alternatives that exist in this category, and some attempt to identify those around which a consensus might be created.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

In 1995, the NPT review conference set itself a target of creating an additional nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) by 2000. In fact two additional zonal agreements are now in existence, the Southeast Asian NWFZ opened for signature in December 1995 and entered-into-force in 1997, and the African one, which opened for signature in April 1996 but has yet to enter into force. Two different substantive issues are currently arising in relation to these zones. In the case of the zone in Southeast Asia, the problems arise from difficulties that some of the NWS perceive they have with specific aspects of the Treaty, such as the method of delineating the zone, and whether their commitments are towards the zone as a whole, or the individual states which have ratified the Treaty. As a result the NWS have yet to ratify the Protocol attached to the zone providing the states within it with negative security assurances. In the case of the African Zone it is the slowness of those states within the zone to ratify the Treaty, and thus produce the 28 ratifications necessary to bring it into force, that has resulted in the mechanisms for implementing the Treaty not yet being created. So although two additional zones are in existence, neither is yet fully in force. Some discussion on how this might be achieved can thus be expected to occur in the 1999 PrepCom.

Four other NWFZ proposals are also at various stages of development. One concerns Mongolia, which is seeking to declare a single state NWFZ, and sponsored a resolution to that effect at the 1998 UN General Assembly.(57) A second is for a NWFZ in Central Asia, where the text of a treaty is in the process of being drafted.(58) The third concerns a NWFZ in the Middle East,(59) whose aims were mentioned in the context of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPTREC in 1995. In addition, several states put forward a resolution on a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ at the UN General Assembly in 1998.(60) In all these cases, some attempt to encourage development of these zones can be expected to emerge from the discussions in 1999.

Security Assurances

Security assurances are regarded by many NPT NNWS parties as interim measures for their security pending the complete nuclear disarmament of the NWS. Their provision is seen by many NNWS states as part of the "bargain" inherent in the NPT. Two types of Security Assurances have been discussed in this context, negative and positive. The former involves the NWS providing assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against a NNWS in any circumstances: the latter that they will come to the aid of any state which is threatened with nuclear weapons, or upon which nuclear weapons are used. Two further issues have impinged on this debate: whether the assurances should be given to NPT parties only, and whether they should be in the form of a "legally binding instrument", as against a unilateral declaration.

In 1998, an ad hoc committee was formed in the CD to discuss the issue of nuclear security assurances, but there have also been perceptions that some NPT parties would like to see a "legally binding instrument" providing security assurances negotiated within an NPT forum and applying to those parties alone. At the same time, the United States, which provides conditional negative security assurances to NPT NNWS parties [the conditions being that they should not attack the United States, its territories, its troops its allies or a state towards which it has a security commitment in association or in alliance with a NWS] has indicated an unwillingness to go beyond such a unilateral commitment except in the case of states which are party to a NWFZ treaty. The potential number of NPT parties in this position now numbers more than 100.

One issue which has been seen to be closely associated with security assurances is that of no-first use agreements. This idea has been strongly advocated by China, on the basis that such an agreement would provide negative security assurances to NNWS, as well as generating greater stability in the relationship between the NWS.

The issue of security assurances has been on the agenda of NPT meetings since 1975, and it is unclear under current circumstances how significant it remains for NNWS. However, it seems likely that both negative and positive nuclear security assurances will remain on the agenda of the 1999 PrepCom, arguments will continue to be advanced for the negotiation of no-first-use agreements, and actions will be taken to encourage movement towards a negotiation which transforms the existing unilateral declarations into a multilateral legally binding instrument.

Safeguards

The negotiation of an agreement with the IAEA for the implementation of safeguards, known as an INFCIRC/153 agreement, on all the fissile material within a state is mandatory for all NPT NNWS. However, many states have no nuclear materials under their jurisdiction, and have not negotiated such an agreement. Thus one standard item of business at NPT meetings is to encourage them to do so for the sake of universal compliance with the Treaty.

Until 1990, little questioning took place publicly concerning the adequacy of the existing safeguards regime, but in that year the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, an NPT party, led to the revelation of the existence of the latter's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme. As a consequence a process of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system was implemented, culminating in what was known as the 93+2 programme. This involved items which could be implemented using existing authority contained in the INFCIRC/153 agreement, plus some which could not. To cover the latter, an "Additional Protocol" was negotiated to add to existing INFCIRC/153 agreements. States have now started to ratify this new agreement-INFCIRC/540 (corrected)-and the IAEA to implement it, but one consequence is that two IAEA safeguards systems are emerging, one applicable to those states which have signed the Additional Protocol and the second to those that have not. Thus it can be expected that at the 1999 PrepCom session efforts will be made to encourage all parties to ratify the Additional Protocol, so as to create a unified system once more.

Three other issues are usually addressed under this heading. One is conditions of supplying nuclear items to non-parties, the second the disposition of fissile material from weapons, and the last is physical protection of nuclear material. One issue in relation to the former that is likely to be raised in the 1999 PrepCom session is whether any supply of nuclear material, or equipment to produce it, from an NPT party to a non-NPT state should be conditional upon the latter accepting IAEA safeguards over all fissile materials within its jurisdiction, as against the items in question. This is essentially an argument about the export policies of China and Russia, with the latter taking the position that sales to India are "grandfathered" by earlier agreements. A new issue which is now arising is whether such safeguards should also include acceptance of the Additional Protocol.

Negotiations have been taking place for some time between several advanced industrial states on transparency of plutonium stocks, and between Russia, the IAEA and the US on methods of placing fissile material surplus to weapon requirements under some type of international safeguards or supervision. Agreement has been reached between nine states on plutonium management guidelines, and in November 1998 the IAEA published data on holdings of certain types of civilian plutonium in these states.(61) In addition, all the NWS have agreed to implement appropriate elements of the Additional Protocol. Encouragement of these developments can be anticipated in 1999.

Furthermore both in the context of the IAEA and the NPT review, an effort is underway to promote the implementation in all states possessing fissile material of criteria on the physical protection of nuclear material (as set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3) as well as of strengthening these controls. There is also a need to sustain standards of physical security and safety within nuclear plants, prevent nuclear smuggling and to deter attacks on nuclear facilities. In addition, an effort is being made to prevent nuclear terrorism. These issues are also likely to surface at the 1999 PrepCom.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Other issues which may emerge in 1999 relate to the tension between the exercise of the "inalienable right" of all the parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty, and the duty of exporting states not to assist nuclear proliferators, and thus to exercise close control over their exports. This arises in particular over the case of Iran, an NPT party in good standing, where the US has been attempting to constrain other states from exporting nuclear equipment to it. It also centres upon the alleged lack of information available to states outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on the guidelines used by its members in implementing their national export controls, and the need for greater transparency over these guidelines. In this context, the NSG is planning to hold its second international seminar on the role of nuclear export controls in nuclear non-proliferation just prior to the April 1999 PrepCom.

Some Conclusions about the 1999 NPT PrepCom Session

The effect of the failure to agree anything other than a formal report from the 1998 PrepCom session is that no recommendations are available for participants in the 1999 session concerning its agenda or schedule of activities. This makes prior consultations on these matters among the parties, and vigorous leadership from the chairman of the session, essential elements in ensuring that time is not lost at the start of the meeting debating and attempting to reach an understanding on them. If this has not been achieved by the time the session commences, it will offer a discouraging precedent for achieving agreement on the procedural and substantive issues that will need to be addressed during the session.

The issues that will need to be decided in these preliminary discussions are whether there should be a plenary session; whether there should be cluster debates; whether time should be allocated for discussion of specific issues; and how the production of recommendations to the review conference should be scheduled. Although the shortage of time suggests that the session should focus on the last of these tasks, it is probably inevitable that some type of more open-ended discussions should take place, if only to offer the nuclear-weapon states an opportunity of accounting for their actions over the last year in the area of nuclear disarmament. Provision for some type of plenary session therefore appear necessary, whether in the form of an open-ended discussion or a more structured one involving clusters and specific topics. At the same time, it will also be necessary to create the maximum opportunities for negotiating the text of recommendations to the review conference, either in a chairman's consultative group or in a number of working groups tasked with handling specific sets of issues. The precise format in which these two sets of activities are to be undertaken may be less significant than making sure that they take place, and in particular enabling adequate time to be allocated to negotiating texts on the recommendations from the PrepCom to the review conference. For if the session fails to produce such recommendations, and thus any agreed product, it will be interpreted by many parties as proof that the strengthened review process has failed to materialize, and thus part of the decisions agreed in 1995 in association with the indefinite extension of the Treaty has not been implemented.

Two types of recommendations should emerge from the PrepCom session to the review conference: procedural and substantive. The four main procedural decisions that need to be taken are the nomination of a President for the 2000 review conference; the drafting of a provisional agenda for the conference; agreement of its rules of procedure; and the commissioning of background documentation for parties attending it. Rapid and early progress on these matters at the PrepCom session would enhance the prospects for an agreed product from the substantive discussions.

The central issue in relation to the substantive recommendations that may emerge from the PrepCom session is how they will relate to the activities of the review conference itself. In the two previous PrepCom sessions, a short document developed at the 1997 PrepCom, containing possible agreed recommendations (Annex II, Para. 3), and a longer one containing a collation of individual state proposals (Annex II, Para. 4), formed the focus of their drafting work. While the purpose of these documents was never formally clarified, there was some expectation that the former should form the basis for a 2000 version of a forward-looking 1995-type Principles and Objectives document, and that the collation of proposals could contribute to any evaluative Final Declaration produced in 2000. These expectation implied that in 2000 the review conference would attempt to produce agreed versions of both types of document. In practice, it remains unclear whether all the parties remain committed to these objectives, but on the assumption they will seek to produce both documents, rather than concentrate as in 1995 on agreeing the forward looking one, the PrepCom session will need to organize itself to undertake two tasks: to produce recommendations for specific objectives the parties might seek to achieve by 2005, and to remove overlaps from, and streamline, the collation of proposals accumulated from the two previous sessions. These tasks might be allocated to two different negotiating groups.

While the task of streamlining the proposals from previous sessions is likely to be time consuming, but in the main largely a mechanical editing operation, discussions on the content of the forward-looking document are likely to be more controversial. They will almost certainly focus on several specific issues. One will be universality of the Treaty, with its associated questions of implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and the consequences of the South Asian nuclear tests and possible responses to them over the next five years. A second is specific allegations of non-compliance with the Treaty, and whether revised mechanisms can be agreed to handle such allegations. A third is progress toward nuclear disarmament, and in particular the impact of the South Asian tests upon this and the need for a new agenda for disarmament. More specific issues are whether a time-target should be set for completion of an FMCT and what options should be considered for the next incremental step to take once this treaty has been agreed. A fourth issue is whether a target should be set for additional NWFZ's and a fifth whether a negotiating timetable might be proposed for a Treaty on Security Assurances. Finally, there is the issue of how to handle the tension between the desire to implement effective national export controls in order to prevent states inadvertently assisting nuclear proliferators, and the concerns of many NNWS that this will deny them access to a valuable and necessary energy source. Moreover, what may be crucial is not only how debates evolve over individual issues, but also how those individual debates interact with each other.

All the indicators are that the 1999 NPT PrepCom session will be very problematic in its outcome. Many issues will have to be resolved in an orderly manner if it is to move forward and produce useful substantive recommendations for the 2000 review conference. Prior consultations and discussions may be essential to facilitate such an outcome, as will a willingness to limit discussion, negotiation and recommendations to those objectives which will be directly relevant to discussions at that review conference. Yet despite the difficulties inherent in achieving such a result, the alternative of not agreeing any product from the session will lead the NPT regime into unknown waters, as many may conclude that the strengthening of the review process has failed, and that at least one of the decisions agreed in 1995 has not been implemented. April 1999 will therefore truly be a testing time for the NPT.
 
 
 

NOTES
 

1. While these dates were provisionally agreed at the 1997 PrepCom and subsequently confirmed at the 1998 PrepCom, a proposal is under consideration to shift the PrepCom to May 3-14 (or April 26-May 7 in the event the UN Disarmament Commission is cut back to two weeks). While the dates were still subject to finalization at the time of writing in late January, this issue does not have any material bearing on the issues and questions discussed here.

2. See, "Worthwhile NPT Review outcomes in the lead-up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference," Peace and Disarmament News (August 1998), p. 90.

3. 3. Ben Sanders is probably the first analyst to make this observation. See Ben Sanders, "NPT Review Conferences and the 1995 Extension Conference: Working Towards Consensus,"in Tariq Rauf ed. Extending the NPT: Perpetuating the Global Norm Aurora Papers 27, (Canadian Centre for Global Security: Ottawa, 1997), pp.43-44.

4. "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Treaty Series, Vol. 729 (United Nations, New York).

5. 5. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, Decision 1 "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, p.8.

6. 6. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, Decision 2 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, pp.9-12.

7. 7. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, Decision 3 "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, p.12-13.

8. 8. Dr. Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director, Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Remarks to the 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," Le Chateau Montebello, Ottawa Canada, March 13, 1996.

9. 9. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization and work of the Conference, "Resolution on the Middle East," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex, pp.13-14.

10. 10. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs (Canada), A Non-Paper on Strengthening Review Conferences, (Ottawa: March 1995), unpublished.

11. 11. Personal communication dated January 6, 1997. See also, Ambassador Taylhardat's comments in Susan Welsh, "Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference," The Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring-Summer 1995), p. 9.

12. 12. As quoted in Welsh, p. 5.

13. "Statement by the President," Verbatim Record of the 19th Meeting (12 May 1995), 1995 NPTREC Final Document, Part III, Summary and Verbatim Records, NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part III), (United Nations, New York: 1996), p. 214.

14. 14. Dr. Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director, Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Remarks to the 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," Le Chateau Montebello, Ottawa Canada, March 13, 1996.

15. See, Jayantha Dhanapala (Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations), "The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges," statement at The Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11, 1999, on-line at: http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/dhanapala.htm.

16. 16. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Decision 1, paragraph 4.

17. 17. Scheinman goes even further than the language in Decision 1, in saying that the 'Principles and Objectives" agreed to at the 1995 NPTREC "is one element that could be considered by NPT parties in determining 'ways and means' to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty during the 2000 NPT Review Conference" (emphasis added). See Scheinman, 13th Annual Ottawa NACD Verification Symposium," March 13, 1996.

18. See, for example, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2, the statements by the Netherlands (on behalf of the European Union), China, Canada, South Africa, and Japan at the 1997 session, pp. 2-16; and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.1 (30 April 1998), the statement by South Africa, and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.3 (4 May 1998), statement by Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Egypt.

19. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32 (18 April 1997), p. 3.

20. We are grateful to Ambassador (ret'd.) George Bunn (Consulting Professor at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University; and a former negotiator of the NPT) for reminding us of this pending problem.

21. NPT/CONF.1995/1 (1 February 1995), Final Report of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Annex V: "Proposed Allocation of Items to the Main Committees of the Conference".

22. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/34 (8 May 1998), "Proposals for inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee at its second session-Submitted by Canada."

23. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/CRP.2 (7 May 1998), "III. Substantive Issues" (paragraph 21),

p. 9.

24. Ibid.

25. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/36 (9 June 1998), Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session (5 pp.); on-line at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/PCII36.htm.

26. Ibid.

27. Refer to the Indicative Timetable of the second session of the PrepCom, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/INF.2 (28 April 1998).

28. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35 (9 June 1998), Chairman's Working Paper (29 pp.); on-line at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/PCII35.htm.

29. The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman (Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), "Preparing for the 1997 NPT PrepCom," Address to the Regional Seminar sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, and The National Institute for Strategic Studies (Ukraine), Kyiv, September 28, 1996.

30. Summary of Statement by The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman (United States), Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting, New York, 8 April 1998, p. 9 (paragraph 41).

31. Summary of Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang (China), Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, First Session, Summary Record of the 2nd Meeting, 8 April 1998, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2, p. 8 (paragraphs 34-35).

32. Ibid., p. 10 (paragraph 44).

33. Ibid., p. 24 (paragraph 123).

34. See, Jayantha Dhanapala (Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations), "The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges," statement at The Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11, 1999, on-line at: http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/dhanapala.htm.

35. NPT/CONF.1995/32/DEC.1, paragraph 7, 11 May 1995.

36. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, Decision 2 (pp. 9-12), adopted 9 May 1995; on-line at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/1995DEC2.htm.

37. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.1/32.

38. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/35.

39. Ibid. p. 1 and PC.1/32, p. 12.

40. Article IX:3 of the Treaty states that "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967".

41. See, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Address at The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, November 12, 1998, "U.S. Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report," on-line at: http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/981112_talbott_southasia.html. In his talk, Talbott refers to the "irreversibility" in the foreseeable future of the nuclear weapon programs of India and Pakistan.

42. Under this article non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty commit themselves "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices".

43. Since 1993, the DPRK has not allowed the IAEA to fully implement its safeguards agreement covering the nuclear facilities in that country, and also claims its membership of the NPT is in suspension, although this is not accepted by other parties. The non-proliferation crisis of which these actions were a part was partially resolved by the negotiation of a US-DPRK "Agreed Framework", under which the DPRK was to be provided with two light-water power reactors in return for IAEA safeguards being implemented on all nuclear materials within the country. The implementation of this arrangement, which should result in the DPRK situation being normalized early next century, has been the subject of periodic crises.

44. The evaluation of the IAEA action team in Iraq is that its clandestine nuclear weapon programme has been dismantled, and the monitoring arrangements it intends to implement will be adequate to offer early-warning of any change in this position. However, whether it will be allowed to implement this monitoring programme may be dependent upon the fate of the overall effort to prevent Iraq acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

45. In this context, however, it might be appropriate to point out the apparent incompatibility of effectively monitoring or verifying the destruction of weapons programs under non-negotiated and non-cooperative circumstances, as in the case of Iraq, and where in addition the inspecting agency might have compromised its neutrality; as opposed to verification and monitoring conducted as part of negotiated arms control agreements that facilitate cooperative monitoring, as in the case of the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and START I and II, which is carried out either by professional international inspectorates as the International Atomic Energy Agency of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or by national inspectors under mutual inspection arrangements.

46. Article VI of the NPT.

47. International Court of Justice, "Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations)," Communiqué No. 96/23 (8 July 1996).

48. Harald Mueller and Makarim Wibisono, Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament: Two Views, PPNN Issue Review No. 12, April 1998.

49. Para. 4.

50. Article XIV.1.

51. CD/1299.

52. On-line at: http://www.basicint.org/8nation.html.

53. Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.

54. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2, Statement by the delegations of France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference; and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/8, Letter dated 29 April 1998 from the Head of the Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, transmitting a statement by the delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

55. Special Defense Department Briefing with Defense Secretary William Cohen, Also Participating: Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Hugh Shelton and BMDO Director Gen. Lester Lyles, U.S. Department of Defense, January 20, 1999; National Security Staff Briefing on Defense and Arms Control by Robert Bell (Special Assistant to the President for National Defense and Arms Control), The White House, January 21, 1999; and Steven Lee Myers, "U.S. Asking Russia to ease the pact on missile defense-threatens to end Treaty...," The New York Times, January 21, 1999, p. A1.

56. See, Bill Gertz, "Russia, China denounce U.S. plans for missile defense," The Washington Times, January 22, 1999, p. 5; David Hoffman, "Russia says START II is Imperilled: U.S. Missile System Plan Could End Hopes for Ratification," The Washington Post, January 22, 1999, p. 5.

57. A/RES/53/77D, adopted by consensus, on "Mongolia's International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status".

58. A/RES/53/77A, adopted by consensus, on "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia".

59. A/RES/53/74, adopted by consensus, on "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East".

60. A/RES/53/77Q, adopted by 154:3:10, on "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas."

61. The nine states are: Belgium, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. See, Communication Received From Certain Member States Concerning Their policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549 (16 March 1998), IAEA.


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