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The historical paths of different states to policies of nonproliferation can shed considerable light on efforts to stem proliferation today. New archival research on Norway's early nuclear program by Astrid Forland (University of Bergen) shows how economics and security interacted to promote nonproliferation choices in this country, once among the leaders in the nuclear field. The history of China's nonproliferation behavior, as presented by Mingquan Zhu (Fudan University, Shanghai), shows that—despite the continued presence of U.S.-Chinese differences—remarkable changes have taken place in the evolution from Mao Zedong's nuclear war-winning strategy of the 1960s to China's current acceptance of most nonproliferation norms. Arguably, greater differences exist today between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear signatories to the NPT. At the upcoming NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in April, Tariq Rauf (a Canadian NPT delegate, now at the CNS) notes that these tensions are likely to come to the fore as the non-nuclear states begin to examine what they have received in return for the indefinite extension of the treaty. To some, the NWS—especially the United States and Russia—are drifting, rather than pursuing a clear path towards further disarmament. In a thought-provoking essay, Nikolai Sokov (a former Soviet START negotiator) argues that mutual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would be a useful means of re-engaging the disarmament process, while also helping to ease Russian concerns over NATO expansion. These views are consistent with Harald Müller's (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) suggestion that the example of the NWS matters greatly in promoting nonproliferation elsewhere in the world, especially among states that remain outside of the NPT. As Adam Bernstein (a CNS physicist) notes, however, the switch in U.S. plutonium disposition policy towards possible acceptance of burning options may backfire: by creating exactly the types of proliferation threats it seeks to avoid. In this regard, Oleg Bukharin (Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University) proposes new measures to safeguard Russian reactors from possible sabotage, while Todd Perry (Union of Concerned Scientists) examines U.S.-Russian efforts to end Russian military plutonium production. Building trust through transparency is the goal of the U.N. Conventional Arms Register, whose fourth report is the subject of a comprehensive analysis by Tracy Keith (an independent expert). When trust is inadequate, as in the current Biological Weapons Convention, greater intrusiveness through inspections may be necessary. Annabelle Duncan (CSIRO, Australia) and Kenneth Johnson (Canadian National Defence Headquarters) explore possible new measures, drawing on the experience of the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq. The upcoming entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in April is likely to raise similar debates. Still, the risks of moving ahead with knowingly imperfect regimes must be balanced against the perhaps greater risks internationally of continuing to allow states to possess these weapons.

James Clay Moltz
Editor

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