

THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW

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Although the nonproliferation community continues to analyze the implications of the events of September 11, 2001, traditional concerns about the nonproliferation policies of states remain an important topic of analysis. The United Kingdom, which now has the smallest arsenal of the recognized nuclear powers, is not usually regarded as a country of proliferation concern. However, as Malcolm Chalmers of the University of Bradford, England, and William Walker of the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, point out, recent constitutional changes, which grant autonomy to Scotland, will have a significant impact on the future of the United Kingdom as a nuclear power. China is a more traditional focus of concern, and Eric Croddy of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies offers a comprehensive survey of the development and current status of Chinese chemical and biological weapons programs. Mitchel B. Wallerstein of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation analyzes the past and prospective role of private foundations in shaping the international security agenda, arguing that despite the blows dealt by recent events to the arms control and nonproliferation agenda, foundations should continue funding research in this field. Basic terms of reference are critical to any field of study. Morten Bremer Maerli of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs and Roger G. Johnston of Los Alamos National Laboratory evaluate the often imprecise use of terminology in the fields of arms control and nonproliferation. They argue that clearer definitions of terms are necessary to avoid misunderstandings and to facilitate the implementation of practical arms control measures.

Increased conflict in South Asia during late 2001 has again stoked fears of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Robert E. Rehbein of the U.S. Air Force urges the United States to assist India and Pakistan in improving their nuclear command and control systems, in order to reduce the risk of escalation and inadvertent nuclear war. As the history of proliferation has repeatedly demonstrated, the advance of technology brings not just new opportunities, but new dangers. Mark Wheelis of the University of California, Davis, assesses the challenges to the chemical and biological arms control regimes posed by the ongoing revolution in pharmaceutical development technology. Jonathan B. Tucker of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies contends that in the wake of the fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States, innovative measures to strengthen the biological arms control regime are urgently needed. Since the end of the Cold War, middle-sized powers have played an increasingly important role in the nonproliferation regime. Yukiya Amano of the Japanese Foreign Ministry offers his assessment of critical issues currently facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, missile defenses, and strategic arms reductions. Martin B. Kalinowski of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and Wolfgang Liebert and Silke Aumann of the Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany, assess the German inventory of plutonium, concluding that Germany must devise new plans to store or otherwise dispose of its increasing plutonium surplus. Mohini Rawool-Sullivan of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Paul D. Moskowitz and Ludmila N. Shelenkova of Brookhaven National Laboratory analyze the unique proliferation challenges posed by the dismantlement of Russian Alfa-class nuclear submarines, which were powered by liquid-metal cooled reactors. Finally, in a new section, Nikolai Sokov reviews the recently published English-language edition of *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, edited by Pavel Podvig. From time to time, future issues will feature reviews of selected new publications in the nonproliferation field.

Scott Parrish
Editor

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