NOTE FROM THE CENTER DIRECTOR

Inquiries regarding the projects and publications of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies should be addressed to

Recent international developments, especially following the end of the Cold War, have focused international attention on the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Greater awareness and importance have been accorded by international organizations to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Evidence of this concern about proliferation is revealed in the more dynamic roles assumed by the UN Security Council and the IAEA; in the creation of new nonproliferation machinery such as the UNSCOM on Iraq and the UN Register of Conventional Arms; in the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention with its implementing mechanism; in the establishment of ABACC; in vast expansion of adherence to the NPT and other nonproliferation treaties; in strengthening international export control regimes. These developments have led to a renewed need for in-depth analysis of the activities of such international organizations.

The increased interest in nonproliferation and international organizations on the part of policy makers and scholars, however, has yet to be matched by systematic data collection and analysis. There is still insufficient understanding and agreement about the roles that international organizations can and should play in containing proliferation in today's global environment. The Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes seeks to fill this void by providing a comprehensive source of general information on the most active and important organizations with responsibilities for nonproliferation.

The Inventory seeks to cover the wide diversity of nonproliferation organizations, and therefore employs a broad definition of "international organizations," which includes formal organizations, non-charter regimes, multilateral groupings of states, treaties, and regional and bilateral arrangements. It is designed to identify the full range of actual and potential international organizational nonproliferation actors and their existing institutional ties, interrelationships, and overlapping areas of responsibility. It is envisaged to be a useful tool for research, as well as a general reference source for policy makers, analysts, and students.

We have included, as appendices, membership lists of the organizations and regimes. These lists reflect the various categories that reincluded in the Inventory: global organizations, international treaties, and regional organizations. In order to provide a simple graphic overview of international nonproliferation organizations, we have also included a general matrix of these organizations and a matrix that categorizes them by object type.

The first edition of the Inventory was published in June 1993 and the second in February 1994. This is the third edition of the Inventory. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute intends, as it did in the past, to include updates of the Inventory in The Nonproliferation Review, which is published three times a year.

Established: 1945.

Membership: 185 states.

The principal organs dealing with international peace and security, arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation are the General Assembly, Security Council, and Secretariat.

Consists of all UN members.

Functions: Under Art. 11 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly (UNGA) may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members of the UN or to the Security Council.

Some major actions of the General Assembly in the field of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament include endorsement of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), endorsement of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons (1972), adoption of the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament (1978), and endorsement of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1992).

The General Assembly held three special sessions on disarmament ­ in 1978, 1982, and 1988.

Under the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency and under the IAEA Statute, the IAEA annually submits reports to the UN which are considered at the UNGA plenary meetings.

In his address to the UNGA on October 17, 1994 IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the IAEA's efforts to implement safeguards agreements. Blix noted the Agency's efforts to strengthen its detection capability and stated that it will present a comprehensive program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system at the March 1995 Board of Governors meeting. He cited areas in which the Agency may take on responsibilities which are new, but consistent with its mandate, including safeguards on US and Russian fissile material no longer needed for defense purposes, verification of a fissile fuel production cutoff treaty and a CTBT, and stepped up technical assistance in accountancy, control and physical protection to address the problem of illicit trafficking in nuclear material (49/PV.33).

The 1994 regular session of the UNGA adopted a resolution in which it took note of the IAEA report for the year 1993; welcomed measures and decisions by the Agency to strengthen technical assistance and cooperation activities; commended the Director General and the secretariat of the Agency for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreements between the Agency and the DPRK; urged the DPRK to cooperate without further delay with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement; commended the Director General and his staff for their strenuous efforts in the implementation of the UNSC resolutions on Iraq; stressed the need for Iraq to continue its cooperation fully with the Agency in achieving their complete and long-term implementation; welcomed the initiatives taken by the Agency to intensify international cooperative efforts in this respect (49/65).

Subsidiary organs of the General Assembly: Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) ­ deals with all disarmament and nonproliferation questions. The 1993 regular session of the UNGA decided to adopt measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee by addressing, in a more systematic manner, the issues of disarmament and the related issues of international security, and by streamlining its functioning (48/87).

On recommendation of the First Committee, the 1994 regular session of the UNGA adopted the following resolutions relating to nonproliferation:

• to call upon all member States to report annually their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year (49/66);
• to take appropriate action to enable the Group of Experts designated by the UN in cooperation with the OAU to meet jointly with the Intergovernmental Group of Experts of the OAU early in 1995 at Pretoria in order to finalize the draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to submit the text of the treaty to the General Assembly at its fiftieth session (49/69);
• to call on participants of the CD to advance work on the basis of the rolling text during the inter-sessional negotiating period with a view to making substantial progress toward a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and to proceed to a new phase of negotiation (49/70);
• to urge all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards (49/71);
• to reaffirm the endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia (49/72);
• to recommend that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternate approaches, including in particular those considered in the CD, should be further explored, and recommend that the CD should actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (49/73);
• to reaffirm that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce the legal regime applicable to outer space, enhance its effectiveness, and emphasize the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space (49/74);
• to request the IAEA to continue keeping the effective implementation of the IAEA code of Practice on International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste under active review, including the desirability of concluding a legally binding instrument in this field (49/75A);
• to welcome the moratoria already declared by certain states on the export of anti-personnel land-mines, and urge states that have not yet done so to declare such moratoriums at the earliest possible date (49/75D);
• with general areas for step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat, to recommend to the CD that in 1995 it develop a comprehensive set of practical, verifiable measures for possible negotiation in their next five- and ten-year periods and determine from that set a year-by-year sequence and combination of negotiations on specific measures to be commenced (49/75E);
• to invite states parties to provide their legal interpretations of article X, paragraph 2, and their views on the different options and actions available, for compilation by the Secretary-General as a background document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the NPT (49/75F);
• to vigorously urge states not parties to the NPT to accede to it at the earliest possible date, and call upon the nuclear-weapon states to further pursue negotiations on progressive and balanced reductions of nuclear weapons in light of article VI of the NPT, with a view to the ultimate objectives of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery as part of international efforts for general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (49/75H);
• to call upon Israel and all other states of the region that are not yet party to the NPT, not to develop, produce, test, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to accede to the Treaty (49/78);
• to note with satisfaction the progress made by the group of governmental experts on reviewing the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and in discussing other weapon categories at present not covered by the Convention, and takes note of this group's decision of hold an additional meeting to convene the review conference in Geneva in October 1995 (49/79);
• to note with satisfaction the full adherence of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and to urge the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty (49/83).

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) ­ originally established in 1952, and later re-established and strengthened in 1978. It is a specialized deliberative body of universal membership mandated to submit concrete recommendations on specific disarmament issues.

The UNDC, at its 1993 session, completed work on its agenda item dealing with a regional approach to disarmament. It adopted the Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament in which it inter alia declared that the "establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure," and that "in order to contribute to the effectiveness of zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, extra-regional States should respect the status of such zones" (A/48/42, Annex II). The 1993 regular session of the UNGA endorsed the guidelines and recommendations adopted by the UNDC, and recommended them to all UN members for implementation (48/75G).

At its 1994 session, the UNDC failed to achieve consensus on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, and concluded consideration of that issue. It also did not reach consensus on nuclear disarmament and agreed to include that item on its 1995 agenda. The 1994 regular session of the UNGA requested the Commission to continue its work and recommended to consider including in its 1995 agenda a new item which would reflect, inter alia a proposal concerning guidelines for nonproliferation (49/77A).

Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean ­ established in 1971. The 1994 regular session of the UNGA requested the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its elaboration of new alternative approaches, including those discussed during the 1994 session, with a view to giving new impetus to the process of strengthening cooperation and ensuring peace, security, and stability in the Indian Ocean region; and to hold a session during 1995 (49/82).

UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) - is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations. It was established by the General Assembly for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. UNIDIR was established in October 1980 on the basis of UNGA resolution 37/99 K. The Statute of UNIDIR was approved by the UNGA in 1984 (resolution 39/148 H). The Director of UNIDIR reports annually to the UNGA on the activities of the Institute. The UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters functions as UNIDIR's Board of Trustees.

The work of the Institute aims to:

• Provide the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armament race, and disarmament in all fields;
• Promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;
• Assist ongoing negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments by means of objective and factual studies and analyses; and
• Carry out more in-depth, forward-looking, and long-term research on disarmament so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved and to stimulate new initiatives for new negotiations.

UNIDIR organizes conferences, publishes papers and a quarterly newsletter, and implements policy projects on many issues. In 1995, its work will cover three main lines of research, namely:

• non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, notably in view of the 1995 Extension Conference of the NPT and the implementation of the CWC;
• disarmament and conflict resolution processes, concentrating on the disarmament of warring parties as an integral part of peace-keeping operations; and
• regional security issues, mainly on arms control and confidence-building measures in the Middle East; an academic exercise conducted in parallel with the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group.

UNIDIR cooperates with and among research institutes; develops and maintains a computerized information and documentation database service; publishes Research Papers, Research Reports and Newsletters; and organizes regional conferences. It also has a fellowship program to enable scholars from both developed and developing countries to do research at the Institute.

The Institute's budget is financed mainly by voluntary contributions from governments and public or private organizations. A contribution to the costs of the Director and staff may be provided from the UN regular budget.

Director - Sverre Lodgaard (Norway), Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, SWITZERLAND. Tel: (41 22) 917 31 86, FAX: (41 22) 917 01 76, E-mail: Internet, unidir@ties.itu.ch.

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters ­ established in 1978, it advises the UN Secretary-General on general and specific disarmament issues and advises him on the implementation of the UN Disarmament Information Programme, and serves as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR.

UN Disarmament Information Programme (prior to 1992 ­ World Disarmament Campaign) ­ instituted in 1979, it is a global program to inform, educate, and generate public understanding of UN activities in the field of disarmament.

UN Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme ­ established in 1979. Senior Co-ordinator ­ Sola Ogunbanwo (Nigeria), Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, SWITZERLAND. Tel: 41 22 917 36 44.

Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament ­ located in Asia (Kathmandu), Africa (Lome) and Latin America (Lima). The centers were established to promote regional cooperation in order to contribute to the implementation and coordination of regional activities under the UN Disarmament Information Program, and to facilitate the development of effective measures of confidence building, arms limitation, and disarmament.

UN Register of Conventional Arms ­ established January 1, 1992, under UNGA resolution 46/36L, Transparency in Armaments, of December 9, 1991.

Its purpose is to serve as a universal and non- discriminatory confidence-building measure designed to give early warning and prevent the excessive and de-stabilizing accumulation of arms.

Procedures approved by the UNGA call for the voluntary submission by member states of data on all items exported or imported in seven major weapon categories. Background information is also requested on each country's military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies. Submitted information is made available to the public.

All member states were invited to participate by providing information for each calendar year by 30 April of the following year. Thus far 91 states have done so for calendar year 1992 and 86 for 1993 (including "nil" reports by those states which had no imports or exports in the Register-relevant categories).

In 1994 a group of governmental experts from 25 states met in three sessions to review operation of the Register and consider its further development, including the addition of new categories of equipment and data on military holdings and procurement through national production. The group did not reach consensus on any substantial expansion or changes. Subsequently, the UNGA passed resolution 49/75 C which called for continued participation in the Register and requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to be convened in 1997, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the register and its further development for submission to the UNGA with a view to a decision at its 1997 session.

The Centre for Disarmament Affairs of the UN Secretariat is responsible for maintaining an electronic database for the import/export data submitted, and files on background information.

Reduction of Military Budgets: Instrument for Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures ­ established by the General Assembly in 1980. In 1985, the General Assembly reiterated its recommendation that all member states should annually report by April 30 to the Secretary-General their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available, using the reporting instrument. For fiscal year 1993-94, 37 member states reported to the UNGA on their military expenditures (49/190, 49/190/Add.1, and 49/190/Add.2).

Consists of 15 members, including five permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK, and US; and ten non-permanent members, currently: Argentina, Botswana, Czech Republic, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Nigeria, Oman, and Rwanda.

Functions: Under Art. 26 of the UN Charter, in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans to be submitted to the UN members for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

On June 19, 1968, the Security Council adopted a resolution which recognized that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a NNWS would create a situation in which the Council, and above all its NWS permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter; welcomed the intention expressed by certain states that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any NNWS party to the NPT that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; and reaffirmed the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a UN member, until the Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (255/(1968)).

According to the Summit Declaration adopted by the Security Council on January 31, 1992, the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council committed themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or the production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end. They emphasized the integral role in the implementation of the NPT of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. They would take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA. They recognized the importance of all states providing all the information called for in the General Assembly's resolution on the UN register of arms transfers.

In connection with the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT, on April 8, 1993, the President of the Security Council made a statement in which members of the Council expressed concern about the situation which had arisen, and reaffirmed the importance of the NPT and of the parties adhering to it. They welcomed all efforts aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encouraged the IAEA to continue its consultations with the DPRK and its constructive endeavors for a proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue in the DPRK. On May 11, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 825 (1993), in which it called upon the DPRK to reconsider its announcement of March 12, 1993, and thus to reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty; called upon the DPRK to honor its nonproliferation obligations under the Treaty and to comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of February 25, 1993; and requested the Director General of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues, and to report to the Security Council. On November 4, 1994, the President of the Security Council issued, on behalf of the Council, a statement in which the Council noted with satisfaction the Agreed Framework between the US and DPRK as a positive step in the direction of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and security in the region; underlined that the safeguards agreement remains binding and in force and looked to the DPRK to act thereon; requested the IAEA to take all steps it may deem necessary to verify full DPRK compliance with the safeguards agreement; also requested the IAEA to continue to report to it on implementation of the safeguards agreement until the DPRK has come into full compliance with agreement; and that it will remain seized of the matter (S/PRST/1994/64).

Subsidiary organs of the Security Council: Military Staff Committee ­ under Art. 47 of the UN Charter, is to advise and assist the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

Sanctions Committees ­ charged with monitoring the implementation of Council-established sanctions. Some of the committees, each consisting of all members of the Security Council, perform nonproliferation functions such as mandatory sanctions against Iraq, resolution 661 (1990); arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, resolution 724 (1991); aerial, arms, and diplomatic sanctions against Libya, resolution 748 (1992); weapons and military embargo against Somalia, resolution 751 (1992); arms embargo against Angola, resolution 864 (1993); arms embargo against Rwanda, resolution 918 (1994).

Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) ­ established pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of UNSC resolution 687 (1991), for the purpose of eliminating Iraq's capabilities vis-à-vis weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, and ensuring that Iraq does not reacquire these capabilities. In the nuclear area, UNSCOM provides assistance and cooperation to the IAEA. Both UNSCOM and the IAEA have extensive rights that enable them to fulfill the mandate, emanating from resolution 687 and elaborated upon in the exchange of letters between the UN Secretary-General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq in May 1991, and from UNSC resolutions 707 and 715 (1991), which require the destruction, removal, and rendering harmless of Iraq's capabilities proscribed by the UNSC, and provide for the long-term monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolutions.

During the period May 1991-December 1994, UNSCOM and the IAEA conducted 112 inspections in Iraq: 33 nuclear, 25 chemical, 18 biological, and 36 ballistic missile, plus 1 computer search and 42 special inspections. These concentrated mainly on the detection and destruction of Iraq's capabilities prohibited under the terms of resolutions 687, 707 and 715 (1991). On 14 June 1994 it completed destruction of Iraq's declared chemical stocks. Recent inspections have also focused on establishing a long-term monitoring system to verify ongoing compliance with the resolutions.

Budget: Iraq is responsible for all costs incurred by UNSCOM and the IAEA during their operations in Iraq, but to date it has not paid anything to the UNSCOM account. The bulk of UNSCOM's expenses is met directly by supporting governments in the form of contributions in kind of personnel, supplies, and equipment, the costs of which do not pass through the UNSCOM budget. In the meantime, operational expenses are met from cash contributions made from various countries and from unfrozen Iraqi assets made available to the UN. In the period from the inception of UNSCOM operations in April 1991 to the end of 1994, some US$81.5 million was allotted to cover the costs of UNSCOM and IAEA operations in Iraq in support of UNSC resolutions.

The Special Commission consists of 21 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, UK, US, and Venezuela.

UNSCOM has a staff of 139: 42 in the Office of the Executive Chairman, 23 in the Bahrain Field Office, and 74 in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre.

Executive Chairman of the Special Commission ­ Rolf Ekus (Sweden). Deputy Executive Chairman ­ Charles A. Duelfer (US), Office of the Special Commission, United Nations, Room S-3120, New York, NY 10017 US. Tel: 212 963 3018. Spokesman for the Commission ­ Tim Trevan (UK), Tel: 212 963 3022.

Consists of an international staff from member states. Headed by the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the organization.

Functions: Services the organs of the UN and administers the programs and policies laid down by them. Under Art. 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion may, threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs (prior to October 1993 the Office for Disarmament Affairs) ­ part of the Department of Political Affairs, administers UN activities in the field of nonproliferation.

Director ­ Prvoslav Davinic, United Nations, Room S-3150A, New York, NY 10017 US. Tel: 212 963 5590, FAX: 212 963 1121, Telex: 177642.

UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch ­ Chief ­ Abdelkader Bensmail (Algeria), Palais de Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, SWITZERLAND. Tel: 41 22 917 3440, FAX: 41 22 917 0034.

Established: 1957.

Membership: 122 states.

Functions: to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that such activity assisted by the Agency is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; to apply safeguards to relevant activity at the request of member states; to apply, under the NPT and some other international treaties, mandatory comprehensive safeguards in NNWSs party to such treaties.

In carrying out its functions, the Agency conducts its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the UN for furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament.

The Agency's safeguards system is spelled out in Art. XII of the IAEA Statute, and in documents INFCIRC/66 (designed to be applied in any state that concluded a safeguards agreement), INFCIRC/153 (used as a basis for agreements with states parties to the NPT; the Tlatelolco Treaty; the Treaty of Rarotonga; the ABACC, Argentina, and Brazil), and other relevant documents.

Principal organs: General Conference, Board of Governors, Secretariat.

Consists of all IAEA member states.

Functions: The General Conference has a broad review and policy-guidance function in regard to all IAEA programs, but no day-to-day safeguards role. It may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the IAEA Statute or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the Statute.

The General Conference endorsed safeguards systems adopted by the Board of Governors, and approved the IAEA's safeguards role under the NPT.

The 1994 session of the General Conference adopted the following resolutions relating to nonproliferation and safeguards:

• to request the Director General to continue the development of "Programme 93+2" in order that a more effective and cost-efficient system of safeguards may be achieved and to present to the Board of Governors in March 1995 proposals for a strengthened and more cost-efficient safeguards system (GC(XXXVIII)/RES/10);
• to invite the Director General to examine additional options available in the field of collecting, verifying and analyzing data relating to incidents of illicit trafficking and the field of physical protection, to prepare proposals in consultation with a group of experts, and to submit his proposals to the Board of Governors if possible at its December 1994 session (GC(XXXVIII)/RES/15);
• to strongly endorse the actions taken by the Board and to commend the Director General and the Secretariat for their impartial efforts to implement the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the DPRK and to urge the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement (GC(XXXVIII)/RES/16);
• to commend the African states for their efforts toward the establishment of an African NWFZ and to request the Director General to continue to assist them in this regard (GC(XXXVIII)/RES/17);
• to commend the Director General and the Agency's Action Team for their strenuous efforts to implement Security Council resolutions 687, 707 and 715 on Iraq and to request them to continue their efforts (GC(XXXVIII)/RES/19);
• to affirm the urgent need for all states in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards in all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all states in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a NWFZ (GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21).

In accordance with the Statute and the existing practice, the Board is responsible for approving safeguards procedures and safeguards agreements, and for the general supervision of the Agency's safeguards activities. In case of non-compliance with safeguards, the Board is to call upon the violator to remedy such non-compliance and to report the non-compliance to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

The 35 member states on the Board for 1994-95 are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, and USA and Uruguay.

The 1994-95 Board of Governors elected Dr. R. Chidambaram (India) as Chairman. Vice-Chairmen are Mr. Yalcin Sanalan of Turkey and Mr. Nikolai Shteinberg of Ukraine.

Strengthening of safeguards. After the Gulf War, the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a number of measures aimed at strengthening the Agency's safeguards system. At its February 1992 session, the Board reaffirmed the Agency's right to undertake special inspections under comprehensive safeguards agreements in order to ensure that all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities are under safeguards. The Board further reaffirmed the Agency's rights to obtain and have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency's Statute and comprehensive safeguards agreements.

The February 1992 session of the Board also decided that design information on nuclear facilities should be transmitted to the Agency at the time of the decision to construct or to authorize the construction of any nuclear facility or to modify an existing facility.

The February 1993 session of the Board authorized the Secretariat to implement its proposals for a system of reporting on the export, import, and production of nuclear material and specified equipment and non-nuclear materials commonly used in the nuclear industry, as a means of strengthening the Agency's safeguard system. Under this plan, states will report on imports and exports of these items and on their production of nuclear material. Initially, the procedure is voluntary, with the hope that it will eventually develop into a worldwide scheme.

At its June 1993 session, the Board of Governors considered recommendations by the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system. A program for the development, assessment, and testing of SAGSI's recommendations (known as "Programme 93+2") was undertaken by the IAEA Secretariat. At its June 1994 session, the Board commended the Secretariat for the efforts made so far in the implementation of the program for a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system; reiterated the importance of an appropriate balance being maintained between strengthening and cost efficiency measures; reiterated the importance of the legal and financial implications of the proposals being examined at a sufficiently early stage; and expressed the hope that the Board would receive proposals in time for consideration at its March 1995 series of meeting at the latest (GOV/INF/737, 742, and Mod.1).

Safeguards in the DPRK On February 9, 1993, the Director General requested the DPRK to provide access, under Article 73b of the safeguards agreement (provision on special inspections), to additional information and locations in the DPRK, in order to clarify inconsistencies between Agency verification results and DPRK-declared data and materials. After the DPRK refused to give the requested access, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, calling upon the government of the DPRK to urgently extend full cooperation to the IAEA to enable the Agency fully to discharge its responsibilities under the Safeguards Agreement. Confronted with the continued refusal to give access to additional information and locations, on April 1, 1993, the Board of Governors decided to report the DPRK's non-compliance to the UNSC and to inform all members of the Agency.

On June 11, 1993, the Board welcomed the fact that Agency inspectors had carried out surveillance and maintenance activities in the DPRK in May, but expressed regret that its earlier resolutions had not been fully implemented. The Board requested the Director General to intensify his efforts and continue consultations with the DPRK.

After consultations held between the Agency and the DPRK in August 1993, Agency inspectors were permitted to carry out only part of the required inspection activities. Further consultations on September 1-3 1993 did not result in any progress.

At its February 1994 session, the Board of Governors expressed concern that the Agency's inspectors had not yet been allowed to travel to the DPRK for the inspection. At its June 1994 session, the Board of Governors found that the DPRK continued to widen its noncompliance with its safeguards agreement; decided in conformity with the provisions of Article XII.C of the Statute to suspend non-medical Agency assistance to the DPRK; and requested the Director General to transmit that resolution to the all members of the Agency and to the UN Security Council (GOV/2742).

On June 13, 1994, the DPRK officially withdrew from the IAEA membership.

At its September 1994 session, the Board of Governors expressed continued concern at the DPRK's noncompliance with its obligations under the safeguards agreement, which remained in force, notwithstanding its withdrawal from the Agency; took some encouragement from recent positive developments, both in the bilateral negotiations between the DPRK and the US (reference to the August 12 Agreed Statement between the US and the DPRK) and in the DPRK's recently reported intention to lift some of the restrictions it had placed on inspection activities; and urged the DPRK to cooperate with the Agency and to comply fully with the terms of its safeguards agreement.

At the December 1994 session of the Board of Governors, the Agency's Director General reported that the DPRK was cooperating fully with the IAEA over the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, as agreed upon in the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October 21, 1994, and that the DPRK had indicated its willingness to consider the designation of additional inspectors and to facilitate the granting of visas for inspectors.

Safeguards Agreements. In 1994, the Board of Governors approved safeguards agreements pursuant to the NPT with Belarus, Croatia, Dominica, Kazakhstan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia, Uzbekistan, and Zambia. The Board also approved a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Ukraine and an amendment to the safeguards agreement with India.

Nuclear Safety Convention. At its February 1994 session, the Board of Governors authorized the Director General to convene a diplomatic conference to adopt a convention on nuclear safety. The conference met at the headquarters from June 14-17, 1994 and adopted the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) ­ ad hoc committee established by the Board of Governors in 1980, to seek agreement between supplier and recipient states on a regime that would assure the latter more dependable supplies, under adequate international nonproliferation safeguards. The CAS Bureau periodically holds informal consultations and has recommended the Secretariat's preparation of papers on the global supply and demand situation, the latest of such papers having been prepared for the Board of Governors consideration in September 1994.

Headed by the Director General, who is the chief administrative officer of the Agency. The Director General is responsible for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the Agency's staff. Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) ­ advises the Director General on matters related to the improvement of safeguards procedures.

The Director General annually submits to the Board of Governors the Safeguards Implementation Reports (SIRs). SIRs have contained basically the same statement, that no event was detected which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material placed under Agency safeguards for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or for any other military purpose, or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device, or for purposes unknown. In the SIR for 1991, in addition to that statement, it was reported that inspection activities carried out pursuant to UNSC resolution 687 revealed that Iraq had not complied with the obligations under its safeguards agreement to declare certain nuclear activities and place all relevant nuclear material under safeguards. In the SIR for 1992, it was reported that the Agency could not confirm the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial report, and for this reason the Agency requested access to additional information and sites. In the SIR for 1993, it was reported that the Agency was unable to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards in the DPRK.

The Secretariat's Department of Safeguards carries out practical safeguarding activities. It has a staff of approximately 200 inspectors and a support staff of 300.

The IAEA Action Team for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 687 on Iraq is comprised of three professionals and two support staff.

On December 7-8, 1992, the IAEA Secretariat convened informal meetings of China, France, Russia, UK, US, Japan and Germany to discuss suggestions for dealing with surplus plutonium and to consider the possibility of reviving the concept of International Plutonium Storage (IPS), provided for in the Agency's statute. At a follow-up meeting held on November 22-23, 1993, participants from the same major plutonium user or producer countries discussed possible confidence-building measures (CBMs) related to the safety, security, and proliferation risks of Pu and HEU. They generally agreed that any such CBMs should build upon existing elements of the nonproliferation regimes, and should have as a major focus the provision of additional transparency. Further meetings were held in February and June 1994. Additional states joined the original participants of the meetings on plutonium management ­ Belgium and Switzerland.

A meeting of governmental experts on enhanced security of nuclear and radioactive materials convened in accordance with the decision of the General Conference (GC/(XXXVIII)/RES/15) was held on November 2-3, 1994 at which the Agency was encouraged to take measures in support of member states' efforts. Proposals have been prepared by the Secretariat for the intensification of the Agency's activities related to illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.

At the 1994 session of the General Conference, the Agency adopted a budget of US$211,557,000 for 1995, which represents zero growth in real terms. This included US$72,745,000 for safeguards. This safeguards allocation is 34 percent of the 1995 budget, the same percentage as in the previous year.

Director General ­ Hans Blix (Sweden), . Tel: (43-1) 2360, ext. 1111. Deputy Director General for Safeguards ­ Bruno Pellaud (Switzerland). Tel: (43-1) 2360, ext. 1800, FAX: 43 1 230 45 64. Assistant Director General, External Relations ­ Mohamed ElBaradei (Egypt). Tel: (43-1) 2360, ext. 1250, FAX: 43 1 230 77 85. Address at the IAEA: Wagramerstrasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, AUSTRIA; Telex: 112645 atom a; E-mail: eaeo@iaea1.or.at.

Formed in 1979 as the single multilateral negotiating body of the international community after agreement was reached among member states during the first special session of the UNGA devoted to disarmament. The CD is a successor to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC), Geneva, 1960; the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), Geneva, 1962-68; and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), Geneva, 1969-78.

As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members. In 1994, 37 countries participated in the work of the Conference: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Sweden, UK, US, Venezuela, and Zaire. Forty-seven non-member states which requested participation were invited by the Conference to take part in its work.

During 1994, consultations continued among CD members on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. Requests for membership have been received from 34 states.

The CD has a special relationship with the United Nations: it adopts its own rules of procedure and its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the UNGA and the proposals presented by its members. It reports to the General Assembly annually or more frequently, as appropriate. The budget of the CD is included in that of the United Nations, and the CD meets on UN premises and is serviced by UN personnel. The Conference conducts its work by consensus. The terms of reference of the CD include practically all multilateral arms control and disarmament issues.

The CD and its predecessors have negotiated such multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements as the NPT, ENMOD and Seabed treaties, BW and CW conventions. Since the beginning of 1994, the CD has conducted intensive negotiations on a CTBT.

At the beginning of its 1994 session, the CD re-established Ad Hoc committees on Nuclear test ban, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, Effective international arrangements to assure NNWSs against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and Transparency in armaments. The mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Test Ban, adopted by the CD, directs it to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable CTBT, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament, and, therefore, to the enhancement of international peace and security. Nuclear test ban. The Ad hoc committee on a Nuclear Test ban worked intensively during the 1994 session and decided to include the results of its ongoing negotiations on the draft treaty in a rolling text.

Security Assurances. The Ad hoc committee for the Effective international arrangements to assure NNWSs against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons reaffirmed that, pending the effective elimination of nuclear weapons, NNWS should be effectively assured by the NWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was a general agreement that a discussion on negative security assurances could not be conducted in isolation from a general assessment of the security situation both at regional and global levels.

Transparency in armaments. The Ad hoc committee concluded that although agreement on discussed topics had not been reached, some progress in the understanding of the issues under consideration had been recognized.

Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The CD appointed a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. During the 1994 session of the CD, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on this issue, there was agreement, in principle, that an ad hoc committee should be established as soon as a mandate had been agreed.

Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the CD ­ Vladimir Petrovsky (Russia). Deputy Secretary-General ­ Abdelkader Bensmail (Algeria), 8-14 Avenue de la Paix, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, SWITZERLAND. Tel: 41 22 917 2280, FAX: 41 22 917 0034.

First met in 1975 in London.

Membership: 30 supplier states ­ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US.

Regime goal: to ensure that nuclear exports are made only under appropriate safeguards, physical protection, and nonproliferation conditions, and other appropriate restraint. The NSG also seeks to restrict the export of sensitive items that can contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Regime procedures: NSG requires IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply, with full-scope safeguards as the norm; national control laws and procedures; physical protection against theft for sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle; restraint of enrichment and reprocessing plant assistance to countries of proliferation concern; common control list; export restraint to regions of conflict and instability; and information-sharing among members.

The Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, initially agreed upon by supplier states in 1977 and transmitted to the IAEA Director General in January 1978, envisage additional export control restraints beyond those provided for in the NPT: use of exports should not result in any nuclear explosive device; restraint in the transfer of facilities and technologies used for reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and heavy water production; physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities; control of retransfer of transferred items; and acceptance of the Zangger Committee Trigger List.

At its 1992 Warsaw meeting, the NSG agreed on the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology and the List of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment and Materials and Related Technology, which includes some 65 dual-use items.

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the IAEA is the Point-of-Contact for the dual-use arrangement.

Address: Prinz-Eugen Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, AUSTRIA. Tel: 43 222 505 54 67, FAX: 43 222 505 37 40, Telex: 111542.

The 1992 Warsaw NSG meeting also adopted the Statement on Full-Scope Safeguards, requiring the application of IAEA safeguards on all source and special fissionable materials in recipient states' current and future nuclear activities.

The 1993 Lucerne NSG meeting endorsed an amendment to the NSG Guidelines that requires IAEA safeguards on all current and future nuclear activities as a condition for any significant new supply commitments to NNWSs. Transfers to NNWSs without a full-scope safeguards agreement shall be authorized only in exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities, and only if safeguards are applied to those facilities. This policy does not apply to agreements or contracts drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992. The updated NSG Guidelines are published as IAEA document INFCIRC/254/Rev 1, Parts 1 and 2.

The Group called on nuclear supplier countries which have not yet adopted the full-scope safeguards policy to do so as soon as possible, and said it would try to ensure that indirect supply through third countries does not undermine this policy.

The meeting adopted a procedural arrangement, which established the procedure for joining the regime. The procedure calls for the NSG members to reach a consensus about the invitation of a new state and requires the new state to accept the NSG Guidelines in their entirety (i.e., both Parts 1 and 2 of INFCIRC/254/Rev 1). Countries adhering only to Part 1 may be granted the right to attend the meetings, although they may not participate fully before their adherence to Part 2. The invitation of observers, whether they are countries or international organizations, requires the members' consensus.

On the basis of recommendations by the Working group on conditions of supply, the NSG reviewed the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Mod. 1, Part 1) and adopted several changes in order to respond to new concerns in the field of nuclear proliferation. The Group agreed to strengthen the retransfer provisions of the Guidelines and to incorporate a new provision underlining the importance of members' satisfying themselves that their transfers would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The Technical Working Group was mandated to continue reviewing the nuclear-related items included in the Annex to Part 1 of the Guidelines. A new Technical Working Group was created to review the Annex to Part 2 of the Guidelines.

The Group decided to restructure its arrangements for exchanging information on proliferation threats with the objective of further enhancing the members' ability to respond to these threats. The Group affirmed the principle of transparency and agreed that members should continue their efforts to brief non-members on the aims and activities of the Group.

At the 1994 meeting of the NSG in Madrid in April, Argentina joined the Group as a new member. New Zealand, South Africa, and the European Commission attended as observers. Since then, in October 1994, New Zealand became a member of the Group, thus bringing its total membership to 30.

The next plenary will be held in Helsinki April 5-7, 1995.

The current Chairman of the NSG ­ Ambassador Jos‚ Antonio de Yturriaga, Permanent Mission of Spain, Gonzagagasse 15, A-1010 Vienna, AUSTRIA. Tel: (43-1) 535-9889; Fax: (43-1) 535-9887.

The Committee was formed in 1971, under the chairmanship of Claude Zangger (Switzerland), to draft a "trigger list" of (a) source or special fissionable materials, and (b) equipment or materials especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials, which under Art. III.2 of the NPT should be subject to IAEA safeguards if supplied by NPT parties to any NNWS.

Membership: 29 States ­ Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. South Korea has observer status in the Committee.

The Committee decided that its status was informal and that its decisions would not be legally binding upon its members.

By 1974, the Zangger Committee arrived at a consensus on the basic guidelines, which were set out in two separate memoranda dated August 14, 1974. The first defined the list of source and special fissionable material, and the second defined exports of equipment and non-nuclear material. These are commonly known as the Trigger List, and were published as IAEA document INFCIRC/209, of September 3, 1974. Attached to the original Trigger List was an annex clarifying the items I described in the list in some detail. Since then, additional clarification exercises, conducted on the basis of consensus and then transmitted to the IAEA, have taken place. They contained new items on plants for the production of heavy water, technological development in the field of isotope separation by the gas centrifuge process, and fuel reprocessing plants.

The Committee meets in Vienna twice a year, in May and in October. These meetings are informal and confidential. The members also exchange confidential annual reports in April detailing actual exports and the issuance of any export licenses to any NNWS not party to the NPT. The term of office of the Chairman of the Committee is indefinite. Three chairmen have held the office thus far: Professor Claude Zangger of Switzerland from 1971 until 1989, Mr. Ilkka Makipentti of Finland from 1989 to 1993, and Dr. Fritz Schmidt from 1993 to present.

Chairman of the Zangger Committee ­ Dr. Fritz W. Schmidt, Federal Chancellery, Renngasse 5, A-1014 Vienna, AUSTRIA. Tel. 43 1 53115-2924, Fax: 43 1 53115-2935, Telex: 113689.

Established: 1987.

Membership: 25 states.

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, UK, and US. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached, which became formal in 1987. Since then, membership has expanded to the present 25 states, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Some other states, including Brazil, China, Israel, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, and Ukraine, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

MTCR is an informal non-treaty association of governments sharing common interests in the nonproliferation of missile development. The regime consists of the Guidelines and an Equipment and Technology Annex.

Regime goal: to limit the spread of WMD by controlling the delivery systems, especially rockets (ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets) and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems (cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km.

Regime Guidelines: national control laws and procedures; two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; significance of any transfers in terms of potential nuclear weapons delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex: Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as materials. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate.

In January 1993, MTCR adopted revised guidelines to extend the scope of the regime to include missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons, as well as nuclear weapons.

At the plenary held in Canberra in March 1993, it was agreed that MTCR Guidelines for missile-related transfers remain an essential mechanism for the prevention of the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

In July 1993, members implemented two new annex items: item 19 (complete rocket systems not covered in item 1, capable of a range greater or equal to 300 km), and item 20 (complete subsystems usable in item 19, but not in item 1, and production facilities and equipment for individual rocket stages and solid/liquid propellant rocket engines). This was the second update of the annex. The annex was first amended in November 1991, with the addition of items 17 (materials, devices, and specially-designed software for reduced observables) and 18 (devices to protect rocket systems against nuclear effects), new definitions, and supplementary terminology.

The plenary held in Interlaken, Switzerland, in November ­ December 1993, was devoted to planning the future of the regime. It was agreed to redouble efforts to persuade potential exporters outside the regime to abide by MTCR guidelines. The third update to the Annex was agreed upon there and it became effective in July 1994.

At the plenary held in Stockholm in October 1994, partners pledged to intensify their contacts and cooperation with non-partners in order to foster understanding of the purposes and goals of the MTCR. They reacted favorably to Russia's application for full membership. Also in October 1994, the US and South Africa signed a bilateral missile-related export-import agreement as well as an accompanying joint statement on steps South Africa will take to terminate its Category I missile program. Under this agreement, South Africa undertook to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

The next MTCR plenary will be convened in Bonn in October 1995.

France is the permanent administrative point-of-contact for MTCR affairs. Address: c/o Daniel Parfait, Direction des Affaires Politiques, Sous-Direction des Questiones Atomiques et Spatiales, 37, Quai d'Orsay, Paris 75007, FRANCE. FAX: 33 1 4753 5410.

Established: 1985.

Membership: 28 states ­ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and US. The EU Commission participates in AG meetings.

AG is an informal association which works on the basis of consensus.

Regime goal: to limit the spread of CBWNP through the control of chemical precursors, CBWNP equipment, and BW agents and organisms.

Regime procedures: national control laws and procedures; common control list (precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms); guidelines for the industry to assist in identifying potential chemical weapon equipment transactions; and information-sharing among members when suspicious inquiries are received, cases are denied, or information suggests possible international procurement for untoward purposes.

In 1989, 50 dual-use chemicals appeared on the AG "warning list" with a suggestion that AG members place controls on them. In 1991, AG agreed on additional control lists of (1) equipment related to the manufacture of chemical weapons precursors, and (2) biological organisms and equipment. AG members have agreed to control all 50 precursor chemicals on a worldwide basis. AG is considering imposing controls on BW-related dual-use equipment and microorganisms having BW applications. At the May 1991 meeting, Group members developed a dual-use CBWNP equipment list, which was adopted during the December 1991 meeting.

AG meets twice a year in Paris under the chairmanship of Australia.

AG conducts yearly seminars. A seminar was held in Budapest in December 1992, with 12 cooperating countries participating. In 1993, seminars were held in Tokyo (October), and in Oslo (December).

The June 1993 meeting, held at the Australian Embassy in Paris, focused primarily on technical aspects of the AG's work, as well as considering how to make this work better known and understood among countries not participating in the Group. Consolidation of the Group's common export control lists was achieved as a result of three subsidiary experts' meetings, which covered BW issues, CW dual-use equipment, and CW precursor chemicals.

At the AG meeting in Paris in December 1993, the experts discussed ways of implementing CBWNP export controls more efficiently. In particular, the Group considered streamlining licensing procedures, with a view to facilitating legitimate trade without increasing the risk of contributing to potential weapons production.

The Group met in Paris in May 1994. Discussions centered on the Group's increased focus on activities in support of the coming into force of the CWC.

A group of technical experts considered the interaction between the AG's list of chemicals, the export of which should be monitored, and the CWC chemical schedules. All AG members will be reviewing their export licensing procedures to ensure consistency with the CWC.

The AG finalized a common approach to licensing of chemical mixtures and agreed on the need for a more active dialogue with non-members on the role of export licensing measures in preventing the proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project.

At this session, the Czech Republic was admitted to the group.

At the meeting of the Group in Paris from November 29 to December 1, 1994, participating countries discussed national export licensing systems aimed at preventing any inadvertent assistance to the production of CBWNP. They agreed to continue working to focus national measures efficiently and exclusively on preventing association with CBWNP programs; agreed to continue with a wide range of contacts, including a further active program of detailed bilateral briefings for non-participating countries; and welcomed the Latin American regional seminar held in Buenos Aires on November 15-16, 1994. Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1995.

Seat of AG Meetings ­ Embassy of Australia, 4, Rue Jean Rey, 75724 Paris, CEDEX 15, FRANCE. Tel: 33 1 405 933 00, FAX: 33 1 405 033 10.

Point-of-Contact for the AG ­ Director, Chemical and Biological Disarmament Section, Peace, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, ACT, AUSTRALIA. Tel: 61 62 261 2399, FAX: 61 62 261 2151.

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) which had existed from 1950 to March 31, 1994, and consisted of 17 states (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, UK, and US) was a non-treaty, non-chartered organization whose goal was to restrict the export of sensitive items that, if diverted, could contribute significantly to military potential and the proliferation of weapon systems, creating instability and international tension. Historically, targets of constraints were communist states.

In 1990, COCOM began helping East European states adopt controls to stem the proliferation of military technology. COCOM also played a role in coordinating efforts to prevent "brain-drain," particularly in the review of projects supported by any member government.

Secretariat was comprised of about 30 persons; headquartered in an annex of the US Embassy, Paris. Address: 2 Avenue Gabriel, F-75008 Paris, FRANCE. Tel: 33 1 42 96 12 02, FAX: 33 1 42 60 48 27, Telex: 650221.

The COCOM Cooperation Forum was established in 1992, with the goal of progressive relaxation and elimination of export restrictions, and had its first meeting in Paris in November 1992. 42 countries participate in the Forum.

At the US-Russian Summit in Vancouver on April 4, 1993, the Presidents of Russia and the US agreed that it was necessary to achieve the earliest possible resolution of questions about cooperation in the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technology, in accordance with the principles of existing international agreements. They decided to work together to remove obstacles impeding Russia's access to the global market in high technology and related services.

In November 1993, negotiations among the 17 COCOM member states began on the structure and objectives of Cocom's successor organization. Its members agreed to continue implementing technology transfer restrictions pending agreement on the successor organization.

COCOM's successor is likely to have a broader membership than its predecessor. In the first instance, the new grouping is designed to integrate the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the old COCOM core group. Rather than administering a strategic embargo against a specific country, the new organization (as yet unnamed), will focus on a short list of "target" states. The group will adopt an overt nonproliferation function, aiming to prevent the diffusion of dual-use technologies relating to weapons of mass destruction to states of proliferation concern. The organization will also seek to restrict the spread of conventional arms to these countries.

COCOM's proscribed items lists will be altered, with the old Atomic Energy Control List to be transferred to the NSG for administration. In turn, the International Industrial List is to be replaced by a narrowly focused dual-use technology "core list", itself subdivided into "basic", "intermediate", and "sensitive" categories. Unique information sharing (among group members), and end-use certification requirements will be required for each category of technology, with the most sensitive items subject to presumptive denial of transfer requests.

An additional difference between COCOM's likely successor and COCOM is the absence of a veto over items' list revisions. Where under COCOM any member could veto the relaxation (or inclusion) of new technologies on the industrial or munitions control lists, under the new system national governments would enjoy discretion on whether to adhere to the consensus on transfer restrictions. This fact would create the potential for increasing variation in controls implementation throughout the groups members.

The COCOM International Munitions List would be transferred, albeit in slightly different form, to the follow-on organization. In addition, however, a system of pre-delivery consultations would be implemented, through which weapons exporters would liaise with one another on the transfer of arms into regions of high tension or ongoing conflict. This consultative mechanism would be designed to increase the transparency of arms and dual-use trade among members, thus reducing suspicions among suppliers who are also trade competitors that restrictions are being used for protectionist reasons. Members of the new organization would be obligated to maintain rigorous national export control systems analogous to those of the old COCOM countries. In turn, participating states would have to be members ­ - or be acting in accordance with ­ - the NPT, MTCR, CWC, and the UN Arms Register. A related obligation of the new regime's membership would be to implement a comprehensive technological, munitions and financial embargo against states determined to be "rogue" international actors. This last requirement is reported to be controversial, and chiefly responsible for the lack of agreement on the starting date for the post-COCOM organization's operations. As of January 1995, participating states were continuing discussions on technology transfer restrictions under the new system, but no projected date for final talks had been set.

Signed: July 1, 1968. Entered into force: March 5, 1970.

Membership: 171 states.

Obligations: for NWSs ­ not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWSs to manufacture or otherwise acquire them; for NNWSs ­ not to receive the transfer from any transferor of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to manufacture or acquire them; for all parties ­ to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; for all parties ­ to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Verification: NNWSs are to conclude agreements with the IAEA for safeguards to be applied on all source or special fissionable materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such states. Such agreements are to be concluded with the IAEA, individually or together with other states, within 18 months after their accession to the Treaty.

Other major provisions: the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties to assure the absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories; the convening of review conferences every five years (four review conferences have been held: in 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990).

Duration: Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference is to be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods, such decision to be taken by a majority of the parties to the Treaty. The conference is to take place in 1995.

Depositaries: Russia, UK, and US.

NPT was accompanied by UNSC resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances to NNWS.

The DPRK and the NPT. On March 12, 1993, the DPRK informed the UNSC of its decision to withdraw from the NPT, pursuant to Article X.1, due to the prevailing extraordinary situation which jeopardized the DPRK's supreme interests. The DPRK's letter to the Security Council referred to the "Team Spirit" military exercises conducted by the US and the Republic of Korea, and the IAEA Secretariat and certain member states adopting an "unjust 'resolution' at the meeting of the Board of Governors on February 25, 1993, demanding (DPRK) to open (its) military sites that have no relevance at all to the nuclear activities, in violation of the IAEA Statute, the Safeguards Agreement and the agreement the IAEA had reached with the DPRK." On April 8, 1993, the President of the Security Council made a statement, in which members of the Council expressed concern about the situation which had arisen, and reaffirmed the importance of the NPT and of the parties adhering to it. They welcomed all efforts aimed at resolving this situation and, in particular, encouraged the IAEA to continue its consultations with the DPRK and its constructive endeavors for a proper settlement of the nuclear verification issue in the DPRK. On May 11, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 825 (1993), in which it called upon the DPRK to reconsider its announcement of March 12, 1993, and thus reaffirm its commitment to the Treaty; called upon the DPRK to honor its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and to comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of February 25, 1993; and requested the Director General of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the issues. On June 11, 1993, a joint statement of the DPRK and the US was issued in New York, in which both parties agreed to principles of: assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons; peace and security in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, including impartial application of full-scope safeguards, mutual respect for each others' sovereignty, and non-interference in each others' internal affairs; and support for the peaceful reunification of Korea. The two governments agreed to continue dialogue. The government of the DPRK "has decided unilaterally, to suspend as long as it considers necessary, the effectuation of its withdrawal" from the NPT. In the Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK of October 21, 1994, the DPRK stated that it would remain a party to the NPT and would allow implementation of its safeguards agreement under the Treaty.

Preparation for the NPT Review and Extension Conference. At its 1992 regular session, the UNGA adopted a resolution which noted the decision of the NPT parties to form a Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and to decide on its extension. The PrepCom held its first meeting in New York, on May 10-14, 1993, second meeting in New York on January 17-21, 1994, third meeting in Geneva on September 12-16, 1994, and fourth and last meeting in New York on January 23-27, 1995. The PrepCom decided to convene the Conference of the Parties to the NPT in New York, April 17-May 12, 1995. At its second session, held in New York January 17-21, 1994, the PrepCom decided that it will make every effort to adopt decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus cannot be reached, the Committee will then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Fourth NPT Review Conference. It also decided that representatives of states non-parties to the NPT shall be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee, other than those designated as closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates, and to receive documents of the Committee. They shall also be entitled, at their own expense, to submit documents to the participants of the Committee. Representatives of NGOs shall be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee, other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the public gallery, to receive documents of the Committee, and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants. They shall also be given an opportunity, during the third session of the PrepCom, to hold a briefing on the margins of the Committee's deliberations.

The PrepCom invited UN, IAEA, OPANAL, and South Pacific Forum to prepare background papers dealing with their respective activities for the Conference.

154 states party participated in one or more sessions of the PrepCom. Representatives of the following states not parties attended meetings as observers: Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Brazil, Israel, Oman, Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates. The following intergovernmental organizations were represented as observers: OPANAL, European Community, League of Arab States. Representatives of 91 non-governmental organizations attended meetings of the PrepCom.

The PrepCom adopted the provisional agenda of the Conference; recommended to the Conference allocation of agenda items to the three Main Committees of the Conference; accepted estimated costs of the Conference, and agreed to the division of costs among the Conference participants. The PrepCom endorsed the candidacy of Amb. Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the Presidency of the Conference. The Committee also agreed to recommend as Chairmen of Main Committee I ­ Amb. Ayewah (Nigeria), Main Committee II ­ Amb. Erdüs (Hungary), Main Committee III ­ Amb. Ramaker (Netherlands), and as Chairman of the Drafting Committee ­ Amb. Strulak (Poland).

The PrepCom also took note of the UN Secretary-General's decision, following consultations with the members of the PrepCom, to nominate Prvoslav Davinic as provisional Secretary-General of the Conference.

The Committee considered the rules of procedure of the Conference and agreed on the rules with the exception of rule 28.3 (c) which would set the order of adopting decisions on the extension of the treaty. The PrepCom agreed to conduct consultations on April 14-15, 1995, with a view to reaching final agreement on the rules of procedure.

Membership: 121 states.

Treaty obligations: to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, or under water, or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state which conducts an explosion; and to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the above-described environments.

PTBT does not provide for international verification; however, it is understood that each party may do so by its national technical means.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration.

Depositories: Russia, UK and US.

Proposal to amend the PTBT. At the request of a number of states party, an Amendment Conference was held in New York January 7-18, 1991, to consider an amendment that would convert the PTBT into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On August 10, 1993 a special meeting of the states parties to the PTBT was held. Broad agreement was found for pursuing work on a CTB in the Amendment Conference and the CD "in a mutually supportive and mutually complimentary manner" for holding another special meeting early in 1994; and for promoting universality of a CTB, by having the President of the Amendment Conference liaise with the CD and the five NWSs. The 1994 regular session of the UNGA noted that the CD initiated the multilateral negotiation of a universal and effectively verifiable CTBT; took note of the intention of the President of the Amendment Conference to convene, after appropriate consultations, and in the light of the work carried out by the CD, another special meeting of the states party to the PTBT, to review developments and assess the situation regarding a CTBT and to examine the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference (49/69).

Signed: January 27, 1967. Entered into force: October 10, 1967.

Membership: 99 states.

Depositories: Russia, UK, and US.

Treaty obligations: exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, and it shall be the province of mankind; not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction; not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station them in outer space in any other manner; the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.

Verification: all stations, installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other states parties on a basis of reciprocity; such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of their projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be held, and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations of the facility to be visited.

Consideration by the UNGA of further measures for preventing an arms race in outer space. In 1993, a UN study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space was concluded and submitted to the UNGA (48/305), pursuant to its resolution of December 1990. The group of governmental experts commissioned to prepare the study concluded that since the Outer Space Treaty was adopted in 1967, "legal norms may have to be developed further, whenever appropriate, to address new developments in space technology and increasing universal interest in its application." In this context, the need to formulate a framework for the enhancement of cooperation and confidence-building among states was expressed. The 1993 regular session of the UNGA commended this study to the attention of all UN members (48/74B). The 1994 regular session of the UNGA reaffirmed that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce the legal regime applicable to outer space; emphasized the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification; and requested the CD to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects (49/74).

Signed: February 11, 1971. Entered into force: May 18, 1972.

Membership: 94 states.

Treaty obligations: not to implant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, beyond a 12-mile territorial zone, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations, or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons.

Verification: through observation by the states parties of the activities of other states parties, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain, further procedures for verification may be agreed upon, including inspections.

Depositaries: Russia, UK, and US.

Signed: April 10, 1972. Entered into force: March 26, 1975.

Membership: 124 states.

Treaty obligations: not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or obtain microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes; not to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or obtain weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict; to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes (not later than nine months after the entry into force of the convention) all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery; not to transfer to any recipient, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery; to take necessary measures to prohibit the above within their own territories.

Treaty is of unlimited duration.

Depositaries: Russia, UK, and US.

At the third Review Conference, held in 1991, it was decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint.

VEREX held four sessions in 1992 and 1993, identified 21 potential verification measures, and concluded in its report that some of the potential measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and would improve the implementation of the Convention. As was decided by the third Review Conference, if a majority of states parties asked for the convening of a conference to examine the report, such a conference would be convened, and it would be preceded by a preparatory committee.

On September 23, 1994, the Special Conference to consider verification measures for the BWC was held in Geneva. The Conference decided to establish an Ad Hoc group, open to all states party. The objective of the Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the BWC, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the states parties. The Conference expressed the hope that the proposals will be ready for the next BWC Review Conference which is to be held in 1996.

The Ad Hoc Group held an organizational meeting in Geneva on January 4-6, 1995.

In 1992, an agreement was reached between Russia, UK, and US, giving parties access to their biological research facilities to check compliance with the BWC. Under this agreement, reciprocal visits took place in 1993 and 1994.

Entered into force: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Membership: 141 states.

Protocol obligations: prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.

Most of the parties in joining the Geneva Protocol made reservations to the effect that they would abide by the terms of the Protocol as long as other states did not resort to the use of CW.

Depositary: France.

Opened for signature: January 13, 1993. Signatories: 159 states. Ratifications: 24.

Entry into force: 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but in no case earlier than two years after it was opened for signature.

Convention obligations: not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; not to use chemical weapons; not to engage in military preparations for use of chemical weapons; not to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the Convention. Each State Party is required to destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well any chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party. The Convention contains an Annex on Chemicals listing three separate schedules of chemicals addressed under the Convention. These schedules form the basis for three destruction categories of chemical weapons. Destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons must begin not later than two years after the Convention enters into force and shall be completed not later than ten years after entry into force of the Convention. Destruction of Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons must begin not later than one year after the Convention enters into force and must be completed not later than five years after entry into force of the Convention. A State Party may request the Executive Council for an extension of the deadline for the completion of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons. The extension would be the minimum necessary, but in no case beyond 15 years after entry into force of the Convention.

Verification: shall be conducted through a combination of reporting of data, routine on-site inspections of declared sites, and challenge inspections. To ensure the implementation of the Convention's provisions, including those on verification and compliance, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will be established upon the entry into force of the Convention. In addition to routine verification and recourse to a procedure for consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding, each state party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director General of the OPCW.

Other main provisions: the Convention provides for the rendering of assistance and protection to States Parties against chemical weapons. States Parties have undertaken to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. States Parties are obliged to provide data on the import and export of the scheduled chemicals, as well as data on facilities and production. Certain restrictions will be progressively imposed on trade of the scheduled chemicals with states not party to the Convention. Each State Party is required to pass national implementing legislation, in particular, prohibiting individuals under its jurisdiction or control to engage in activities prohibited by the Convention. Each signatory state is under the obligation to designate a national authority in order to fulfill its obligations under the Convention. In addition, the national authority will serve as the focal point for liaison with the OPCW and with other States Parties.

The Convention is of unlimited duration.

Depositary: UN Secretary-General.

The OPCW comes into being when the CWC enters into force.

Headquarters: The Hague.

Principal organs:

Conference of the States Parties ­ composed of all members of the Organisation, to be convened not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention. It is the OPCW's principal organ, and is to meet annually and in special sessions when necessary. The Conference can take decisions on any questions raised by the Executive Council, or any of the States Parties. It elects members of the Executive Council and appoints the Director General. The Conference has the responsibility for taking the necessary measures to ensure compliance, and for redressing situations of non-compliance, and has the power to suspend a violator's rights and privileges or to recommend collective measures such as sanctions. In cases of particular gravity, the Conference must inform the UNSC and the UNGA.

Executive Council ­ consists of 41 rotating members, each for a two year term, representing the five regional groupings. It has the executive responsibilities of the OPCW. The presence of a significant chemical industry will be a major factor in the election of the Executive Council. The Council can consider compliance concerns and cases of possible non-compliance. If the country concerned fails to redress the situation, the Council is to inform the States Parties and make recommendations to the Conference. In cases of particular gravity and urgency, the Council can directly bring the matter to the attention of the UNGA UNSC. The Council also has important powers in the conduct of challenge inspections.

Technical Secretariat ­ carries out the practical work of the OPCW, in particular the area of verification. It is comprised of the Director General, who is its head and chief administrative officer; an inspectorate responsible for the verification activities; and scientific, technical, administrative, and other support personnel, responsible for the associated activities of the OPCW.

Scientific Advisory Board ­ composed of independent experts, to be established by the Director General in order to enable him to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention, to the Conference, to the Executive Council, or to States Parties.

Financing: All States Parties will pay for the costs of activities of the OPCW, based on the UN scale of assessment.

Seat of the Commission: The Hague.

The Commission was convened by the UN Secretary-General on February 8, 1993, and held its first plenary session February 8-12 to lay the foundations of the Organisation. The Commission established a Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), and appointed Ian R. Kenyon (UK) to the post of Executive Secretary. The PTS assists the Plenary and other meetings of the Preparatory Commission, helps to build up the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat, and disseminates information to Member States on all matters relevant to the implementation of the Convention.

The Preparatory Commission holds Plenary sessions, at approximately three months intervals. Nine sessions have been held by the end of 1994. More specific issues are considered in Working Groups, which meet concurrently with the Plenary sessions. A third level of meetings is constituted by Experts Groups on specific subjects which meet in between Plenary sessions.

The Commission has achieved substantial progress in elaborating a number of detailed verification procedures, declaration formats, model facility agreements, formats for inspection reports, design and equipment for the OPCW laboratory, and agreeing on specific types of verification equipment to be used by inspection teams. Based on inputs from Member States and decisions by the Commission, the PTS is continuously updating the detailed verification procedures, inspection manuals and declaration requirements. Meetings of industry representatives with the relevant Expert group are organized occasionally in The Hague and an industry outreach group has been set up to take care of particular concerns of the industry which would be affected by the Convention. The process of elaboration of policies on protecting confidential information as well as on relations with the news media is considerably advanced. A General Training scheme for inspectors has been agreed upon and will be launched once 65 ratifications have been deposited. Applications of inspector trainee candidates are being screened. A number of countries have announced training programs to supplement the efforts of the PTS.

As far as the task of institution building is concerned, the core staff of the Secretariat has been recruited, and staff requirements for the build-up phase prior to entry into force of the Convention have been identified. The staff strength upon entry into force of the Convention will reach 370 from the present authorized strength of 120. Preliminary estimates for the OPCW suggest that the staff strength will level off in the region of about 450 approximately six months after entry into force of the Convention. The rules of procedure, staff rules and financial rules for the PTS have been elaborated and a Headquarters Agreement with the Host State has been signed. Work is presently underway on the elaboration of staff and financial rules and regulations for the OPCW and the Headquarters Agreement for the OPCW with the Host State. A decision on the long-term accommodation of the OPCW will be finalized in January 1995.

The PTS also helps Member States in their national preparations towards implementation and ratification of the Convention. Seminars on national implementation are organized in The Hague and in various regions of the world, and direct contracts are being made with industry world-wide. In 1994 a course for national authority personnel from developing countries was organized in collaboration with the government of The Netherlands. The Secretariat also disseminates information about the Convention and the Preparatory Commission through occasional publications like the Newsletter, information sheets and proceedings of seminars.

Budget: in 1993, the Commission adopted a budget of US$8.84 million. Since 1994, the Commission has adopted its budget in two parts and in Dutch guilders. For 1995, a total budget of Dfl 56.82 million has been recommended (1994 Budget: Dfl 56.46 million). Part I ­ Dfl 27.25 million (1994 Budget: Dfl 34.46 million) is for continuing work of the Commission, with the Secretariat remaining at roughly its current establishment of 120 staff. Part II becomes available only after 65 ratifications and covers the additional costs of the six months immediately prior to entry into force of the Convention, including training inspectors and increasing the Secretariat staff to 370.

Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission ­ Ian R. Kenyon (UK), Laan van Meerdervoort 51, 2517 AE The Hague, NETHERLANDS. Tel: (31-70) 376-1700, FAX: (31-70) 360-0944.

Entered into force: December 2, 1983.

Membership: 41 states.

Convention obligations: (PROTOCOL I) not to use weapons that create non-detectable fragments. (PROTOCOL II) regarding mines and booby-traps: not to direct against civilians or the civilian population; not to use indiscriminately, i.e. ­ to place on or direct at only military objectives, employ only those means of delivery which can be directed at a military objective, and avoid placement which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects which is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated; not to use in populated areas unless specific conditions are met; not to use booby-traps which are in the form of an apparently harmless, portable object or associated with specified categories of objects; to record their locations; to protect UN forces by providing information or escort; to cooperate in their removal after a conflict. (PROTOCOL III) not to use incendiary weapons against civilian populations; not to use air-delivered incendiaries against military objectives located within concentrations of civilians.

Verification: The convention contains no verification provisions.

The Review Conference, to be held in Geneva from September 25 to October 13, 1995 will consider three proposed articles dealing with verification. A Group of Governmental Experts held four sessions to prepare for the Conference. The fourth session of the Group, held from 9 to 20 January 1995, concentrated on proposals for amendments to Protocol II on landmines. Five specific areas to be addressed are: scope of application; material restrictions and prohibitions; transfers, assistance and technology transfer; and verification. The latter three are areas not presently covered by the Convention.

In his speech to the UNGA First Committee on 3 November 1994, the Chairman of the Expert Group stated that as he understood Brazil, South Africa, the UK and US, among others, were in the process of ratification of the Inhumane Weapons Convention.

Entered into force: February 8, 1987.

Membership: 48 states and EURATOM.

Provisions of the Convention oblige parties to ensure that during international transport across their territory or on ships or aircraft under their jurisdiction, nuclear materials for peaceful purposes (plutonium, uranium-235, uranium-233 and irradiated fuel) are protected at the agreed levels, as categorized in Annexes I and II.

Under certain conditions, the Convention shall also apply to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use, storage, and transport.

Parties undertake not to export or import nuclear materials or to allow their transit through their territory unless they have received assurances that these materials will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention. Parties agree to share information on missing nuclear materials to facilitate recovery operations.

Robbery, embezzlement, or extortion in relation to nuclear materials, and acts without lawful authority involving nuclear materials, which cause or are likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property, are to be treated by states parties as punishable offenses. These offenses shall be deemed to be extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between states parties. States parties undertake to include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

The Convention does not set any limits on its duration.

Depositary: IAEA Director General.

The Convention provides for its periodic review by states parties. The first Review Conference, attended by 35 states parties, was held from September 29 to October 1, 1992, in Vienna. The conference reaffirmed that the Convention provides a sound basis for the physical protection of the transport of nuclear material, the recovery and return of any stolen material, and the application of sanctions against any person who may commit criminal acts involving nuclear material; and concluded that no changes were needed in the Convention.

Signatories: 54 states. Ratifications: 1 (Norway).

Entry into force: upon the 19th day after the deposit of the 22nd instrument of ratification, including those of at least 17 States, each having at least one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core.

Convention obligations: to take, within the framework of national laws, the legislative, regulatory, and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing obligations under the Convention; to take steps to ensure that a review of all of the safety of its existing nuclear facilities takes place as soon as possible after entry into force of the Convention; when necessary, to ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the installation's safety; if such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut down the installation as soon as practically possible; the timing of the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact. Establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern of safety of installations. Establish a regulatory body with adequate authority, competence and resources to implement the framework. Provide sufficient financial and human resources to support the safety of each installation throughout its life.

Parties are to ensure that comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction and commissioning of the installation and throughout its life, including verification by testing and inspection to ensure the physical state and operation of the installation continue in accordance with requirements. Ensure radiation exposure by the installation is kept as low as reasonably achievable and within national dose limits for individuals. Establish and routinely test on-site and off-site emergency plans for installations; provide its own population and the competent authorities of States close to the installation with appropriate information for emergency planning and response.

Additional provisions detail obligations for siting, designing, construction and operation of nuclear installations.

Parties shall hold review meetings for the purpose of reviewing the reports submitted by states party. The interval between meetings shall not exceed three years.

The Convention does not set any limits on its duration.

Depositary: IAEA Director General

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was convened on July 3, 1973, in Helsinki. The Helsinki Final Act was signed by 35 states on August 1, 1975. It was renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994. Participating states: 53. (Participation of Yugoslavia is suspended.) The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia participates as an observer.

Major agreements and documents in an OSCE context: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), November 19, 1990; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted November 21, 1990; Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, March 4, 1992; Declaration on the Treaty on Open Skies, March 24, 1992; Helsinki Summit Document "The Challenges of Change," July 10, 1992; Budapest Summit Document "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era," December 6, 1994.

Major objectives with respect to arms control and nonproliferation as spelled out in the Helsinki Summit Document of 1992: to give impetus to the process of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, to the enhancement of consultation and cooperation on security matters and to the furtherance of the process of reducing the risk of conflict; to take further steps to stop the proliferation of weapons; to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and relevant technology and expertise; and to intensify cooperation in the field of effective export controls applicable to nuclear materials, conventional weapons, and other sensitive goods and technologies.

The Budapest Summit Document of 1994 stated that, in view of the new threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction the Heads of State or Government agreed on basic principles to guide their national policies in support of common non-proliferation objectives and stated that they are strongly committed to the full implementation and indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. The participants stated that the Organization will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management in the region. They may in exceptional circumstances jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the UN Security Council on behalf of the OSCE.

The participating States renamed the CSCE the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to reflect the changes in the security situation in Europe. In recognition of this change, the role of the CSCE evolved from that of a conference to a structured instrument for early warning, conflict management and crisis management in the region. The Budapest Summit called for strengthening the Chairman-in-Office, High Commissioner on National Minorities, and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The Document also called for a discussion within OSCE of a model of common and comprehensive security based on CSCE principles and commitments, the results for which will be submitted to the next summit meeting in 1996.

Structure and Institutions:

Summits ­ Summits of Heads of States or Governments ­ take place, as a rule, every two years and set priorities and provide orientation for OSCE work at the highest level. The next summit is scheduled for Lisbon in 1996 and will decide on the frequency of future meetings.

Ministerial Council (formerly the CSCE Council) members are the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE member States. It is the central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE. It holds meetings at least once a year.

Senior Council (which replaced the Committee of Senior Officials) ­ is responsible for overview, management, and coordination of OSCE activities. It is the central body for consultation on current political issues, and OSCE members are encouraged to be represented at the level of political directors. It meets twice a year in Prague and once a year as the Economic Forum. Chairman ­ István Gyarmati, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bem rkp. 47. 1027, Budapest II, HUNGARY.

Permanent Council (formerly the Permanent Committee) ­ is responsible for the day-to-day operational tasks of the OSCE. Its members are permanent representatives of OSCE member states. The Permanent Council takes decisions on all issues pertinent to the OSCE. It holds weekly meetings and is based in Vienna.

Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) ­ meets weekly in Vienna and negotiates and consults on concrete measures aimed at strengthening security and stability throughout Europe. Its main objectives are: a) negotiations on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building; b) regular consultations and intensive cooperation on matters related to security; c) the further reduction of the risks of conflict. It is also responsible for the implementation of CSBMs, the preparation of seminars on military doctrine, the holding of annual implementation assessment meetings, and for the provision of a forum for discussion and clarification of information exchanged under agreed CSBMs.

Chairman-in-Office (CIO) ­ is responsible for executive action. This function is performed by the Foreign Minister of the State that hosted the last meeting of the Ministerial Council. The current CIO is Laszlo Kovacs, Foreign Minister of Hungary. The CIO is assisted by: