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CNS Reports

Canadians should be horrified at the prospect that our government might soon enlist as a junior partner in the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) project. Not only does NMD threaten to trigger a new global arms race, but it is unlikely to deliver on its promise to protect North Americans from a limited nuclear attack. As currently envisioned, NMD would consist of about 100 interceptor missiles linked to a global network of ground-based radar stations and satellites. This is supposed to intercept up to a dozen or so incoming ballistic missiles. So far, much of the debate has focussed on the technical merits of the missile project. Advocates and opponents alike pick apart the details of each test, most of which have so far failed. However, the reality is that even if the missile project were to be 100 percent effective — something that not even its designers dare claim — the whole system is doomed to be the 21st century equivalent of the Maginot Line. The line of fortifications built by France in the 1930s to defend against attack by Germany was an impressive technological accomplishment in its day and it functioned just as its designers hoped it would. Unfortunately for the French, the Germans discovered the trick of driving around fixed defences. Surely any future adversary of the United States smart enough to build an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) would also be smart enough to devise a way of sidestepping the National Missile Defense system. This could be done by building low-flying cruise missiles, which the system is not designed to protect against. It could also be done simply by loading a nuclear weapon onto a container ship or sending a small airplane or truck with chemical or biological weapons across the border on a suicide mission.

Senior defense officials in Ottawa have already approved spending C$637 million on the Canadian Forces Joint Space Project as a sop to the National Missile Defense project, which may cost the U.S. over US$20 billion by the time it is operational in 2005. Expending scarce resources on such dubious projects endangers existing Canadian military commitments. Canadian troops are already pushed to the limit in U.N. peacekeeping operations because they lack the personnel and basic equipment to sustain them in the field. For example, Canadian troops are obliged to fly to the world's trouble spots in antiquated and slow C-130 Hercules aircraft. The proverbial chickens came home to roost last year when Canadian peacekeepers sent to help restore order in East Timor were delayed by a series of C-130 breakdowns. However, rather than buy modern strategic lift aircraft, either on its own or in multinational co-operation like the Europeans are doing, Ottawa's answer is to keep costs down by buying new slightly faster C-130s.

In the absence of any serious threat to U.S. national security, National Missile Defense proponents exaggerate the threat posed by a tiny handful of so-called "rogue states", chiefly North Korea. Following the sole — failed — test of its Taep'o-dong rocket in 1998, the North Koreans succumbed to international pressure and agreed to a moratorium on missile tests in exchange for food aid. Even the wary South Koreans have a more-restrained perspective on the missile activities of their hostile neighbour. The government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) in Seoul reported in March that North Korea's exports of ballistic missiles have fallen to less than US$100 million per year, a dramatic decline from the US$500 million to US$1 billion Western intelligence agencies reported during the 1980s.

Last, the National Missile Defense project undermines the interlocking network of arms-control treaties built up over the last 40 years. So far, only the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which prohibits the United States and Russia from deploying a NMD system has attracted very much attention. Although the Americans argue that NMD does not diminish the value of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent, the Russians oppose it and have threatened to work with China to develop their own system. China, which possesses a miniscule nuclear arsenal compared to Russia or the United States may elect to expand the number of ICBMs at its disposal in order to restore the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. If the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is scrapped or rendered impotent there are powerful lobbies in Moscow and Washington eagerly waiting to do likewise to the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The United States has already declared its intention to proceed alone with NMD if it has to, but it needs the support of key allies such as Canada and the United Kingdom to give the project political credibility. Rather than allow themselves to be coerced into joining a futile and wasteful missile project, Canadians must speak now to preserve their international reputation as peacemakers.