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UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala Speaks to CNS:
"Can Counterproliferation Work?"

Jayantha Dhanapala speaking to CNS.

Emily Schroeder and Jean du Preez

On April 14, 2003, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala spoke on "Can Counterproliferation Work?" at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He presented a balanced perspective on the disarmament nonproliferation agenda, in particular on the issue of counterproliferation. He laid out the history leading to the current doctrine and argued that counterproliferation is not a sufficient strategy to address the proliferation threat. He also offered several long- and medium-term approaches for addressing proliferation in a wider context than that of counterproliferation.

In reflecting on how the doctrine of counterproliferation has developed as a concept, USG Dhanapala traced the origins from the 1981 destruction of the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear reactor by Israel to the current U.S. action in Iraq to disarm the Saddam Hussein regime of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He noted that the U.S. Department of Defense under the Clinton administration crafted this approach with several elements in mind: non-nuclear weapon states should be prevented from attaining WMD materials and should be convinced that with the revolution in military affairs, conventional weapons are sufficient; the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs developed projects including export controls and safeguards of WMD materials in the former Soviet Union; and the concept of national missile defense gained momentum.

USG Dhanapala pointed out that the events of 11 September 2001 were a watershed in adding momentum to the doctrine of counterproliferation. The current Bush administration produced two documents that articulated the new doctrine of the United States: the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in January 2002 and the National Security Strategy of September 2002. The NPR called for new types of nuclear weapons, proposed new roles for their use, and emphasized a strengthened commitment to building new nuclear weapons. The National Security Strategy emphasized "preemptive" and "unilateral" attacks against adversaries. Dhanapala emphasized that these documents present a significant challenge to the current nuclear nonproliferation regime and the international law that underpins it. In addition, he noted that the nonproliferation regime has seen a recent erosion of international norms through divisions in the UN Security Council and NATO, and that the threshold for the actual use of nuclear weapons has been lowered.

Thus, in examining the progression of the doctrine of counterproliferation, Dhanapala argued that counterproliferation on its own will not ensure the prevention of the spread of WMD or their related materials. Thus, the international legal regime is even more relevant now than it has been. The mere fact that there are proliferators is not a sufficient basis on which to question the validity of the regime itself. He presented the analogy of domestic crime -- the mere existence of criminals does not mean that there should be no national criminal law. Rather, collective diplomacy and action must be taken to enhance and strengthen the current international legal regime and the norms of nonproliferation to promote greater international peace and security.

Dhanapala summarized a number of medium- and long-term steps the international community could take to address proliferation in a wider context than that of counterproliferation:

Strengthen the existing international nonproliferation legal regime. This involves promoting universality and engaging the states which remain outside of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For example, India and Pakistan could be pressured to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The recent financial and political support the United States has given to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is welcome. In addition, the verification measures of challenge inspections provided for in the convention should be put to use. In this context, he referred to efforts by the OPCW Director-General Pfirter to remove the stigma of the term "challenge inspections," and to encourage volunteers to conduct mock "challenge inspections" of their chemical facilities.

Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The last BWC Review Conference in November 2002 produced a modest success with an agreement on a series of annual meetings of states parties leading to the 2006 Review Conference. These meetings will be held to promote common understandings and effective action on issues of concern to the states parties. This process should be encouraged to further the work on verification of the BWC. Civil society should also be encouraged to become further involved in this process.

Strengthen the NPT. There is currently no agency to oversee compliance issues within the NPT. It was suggested that a body such as an executive council or a board of governors would be useful in this regard.

Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol should be made mandatory for members of the NPT, which would encourage further verification of and compliance with the NPT. This could, however, become controversial given the rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy embedded in Article IV of the NPT.

Strengthen the safeguarding of WMD material. Two examples of promoting safeguards of WMD material include: (1) work in the IAEA, such as the Nuclear Safety Convention; and (2), the recent initiative of the G-7, the "Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," which commits the G-7 to raise up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects. Other international initiatives on safeguarding WMD should be encouraged.

Strengthen the nonproliferation legal regime by reinvigorating the other relevant UN bodies for disarmament. In particular, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been frozen for several years, and thus has been unable to establish subsidiary bodies to work on the issues of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, nuclear disarmament, or prevention of an arms race in outer space. The CD should be pressured to overcome the current deadlock so that the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament may continue its work.

Strengthen and support the continuation of UNMOVIC as a subsidiary body of the Security Council. UNMOVIC contains extensive expertise and experience in monitoring and verification of WMD. In the absence of an agency for the BWC, UNMOVIC could fill this void with its extensive expertise on biological weapons, complementing the work of the IAEA and the OPCW. This body could be called upon if or when accusations of non-compliance are mounted concerning WMD.

As a former Diplomat-in-Residence at CNS, Sri Lankan Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala was appointed United Nations USG for Disarmament Affairs in January 1998. He has been a tireless advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and chaired the widely acclaimed NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. As his term as UN Under-Secretary-General comes to an end next month, CNS honors his important role in the progression of nonproliferation and disarmament throughout his many years of public service.