CNS Reports

The Military Coup in Pakistan: Implications for Nuclear Stability in South Asia

Gaurav Kampani, CNS Research Associate, October 1999.

On 12 October 1999, the Pakistani army led by General Pervez Musharraf ousted the civilian government headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a coup.(1) The overthrow of a legitimately constituted civilian government by the army for the fourth time in Pakistan's 52-year history has underscored the question of political stability and viability of democracy in the country.

From an arms control and nonproliferation perspective, the military takeover raises significant questions about nuclear stability in South Asia. Concerns within the arms control community have centered around five issues: (1) the removal of civilian filters in the nuclear decision-making process; (2) reported divisions within the higher echelons of Pakistan's armed forces that may impact on the custody of nuclear weapons; (3) whether the replacement of a civilian government with military hardliners will result in the intensification of the sub-conventional war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir with risks of escalation to the conventional and nuclear levels and nuclear crisis stability; (4) whether the imposition of additional economic sanctions on Pakistan by the United States and international financial institutions will weaken the Pakistani government's commitment to export controls on nuclear, missile, and other dual-use technologies; and finally (5) Pakistan's commitment to arms control measures such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).(2)

Civilian Filters and Nuclear Decision-Making

Fears that the coup could leave Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the military's hands, unfettered by civilian control, are largely unfounded. The degree of actual civilian participation in Pakistan's nuclear decision-making has always been limited. In Pakistan, the military has been responsible for major decisions on defense, security, and nuclear issues. The civilian governments have participated in the process, but only in a supportive role. Pakistani observers also doubt whether any civilian government would have had access to such information as the precise number of nuclear warheads that Pakistan has in its inventory, nuclear storage sites, number of delivery vehicles, operational readiness, existing fissile material stocks, future production rates, command and control chain, future plans on the architecture of the nuclear deterrent, and so forth. (3)

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has claimed that she was never privy to the more sensitive nuclear secrets and was kept at the margins of the nuclear decision-making process by the military.(4) The recently-deposed premier, Nawaz Sharif, might have had access to more information because of his better relations with the military at one juncture. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests conducted in May 1998, the Sharif government sought to assure its interlocutors that although the military in Pakistan retained custody of the nuclear forces, final release authority rested with the civilians. Newspaper reports in May 1999 suggested that Nawaz Sharif had authorized creation of a national command authority to manage Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The proposed national body would comprise some ministers and the three military chiefs; but the final political authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would reportedly rest with the premier. (5)

Nonetheless, it is doubtful if the civilian government in Pakistan ever controlled the nuclear button. Although the military takeover has stripped Pakistan of its civilian nuclear filter, it has probably made an existing reality more salient.

Custodial Control of Nuclear Forces

Reports of policy differences within the higher echelons of Pakistan's army have raised other grounds for concern. Pakistan's army remains the last viable institution of state; it also has custodial control over the country's nuclear arsenal. Divisions within the military command over policy could have potentially dangerous implications for the custody and security of nuclear warheads, delivery systems, nuclear materials, and export controls.

The divisions within the higher military command were highlighted when General Musharraf retired his Quetta Corps Commander, Lt. General Tariq Perwaiz on charges of holding an unauthorized meeting with Nawaz Sharif a week before the coup.(6) Similarly, Lt. General Saleem Haider, Corps Commander, Mangla, was transferred for leaking information about a Corps Commanders conference to the political leadership.(7) Following the coup, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told CNN that Pakistan was in the midst of a “civil war” as armed units loyal to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif were resisting coup orders.(8) The manner in which Sharif fired Musharraf and tried to foist the head of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate, Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin, on the army hints of cracks in the military command.(9) Addressing the nation soon after deposing Nawaz Sharif, the coup leader, and now Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Musharraf, cited Sharif's attempts to divide the army as one of the chief reasons that led it to stage a coup.(10)

Despite several indicators of differences within the army, the smoothness of the army takeover suggests that the unity of the Pakistani army as an institution remains intact. The majority of the Corps Commanders and the junior services (air force and navy) sided with General Musharraf to depose the civilian government. Although internal differences may have existed over policy, these do not necessarily extend to the nuclear realm. The army retains custodial control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and that custody remains robust. In the United States, the Clinton administration has expressed confidence that General Musharraf would have complete control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.(11)

Intensification of the low-intensity war in Kashmir

The ascendancy of the military in Islamabad could lead to a stepping up of the low-intensity war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Pakistan's new Chief Executive, General Musharraf, is rumored to be an anti-India hardliner. He is also believed to be the key instigator behind the Pakistan army and Mujahideen's spring 1999 intrusion and seizure of the Kargil heights on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.(12) The Pakistani intrusion led to some of the worst fighting between regular Indian and Pakistani armed forces since the 1971 Bangladesh war. India also responded by deploying air power, albeit on the Indian side of the LoC.(13)

During the Kargil crisis, there was enormous pressure on the Indian government to escalate the war and cross the LoC to attack the Pakistan army's logistics support and surround and isolate armed units that had intruded into Indian territory.(14) Indian and Pakistani armed forces were placed on high alert along the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan. New Delhi also implicitly threatened escalation by deploying the Indian navy's eastern and western fleets in an offensive posture off Pakistan's Makran coast.(15)

Anticipating escalation, Islamabad warned New Delhi that expansion of the conflict could result in a nuclear exchange.(16) The Indian government led by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, realizing the inherent risks of a full-scale war, and fearing great power -- especially US intervention -- over Kashmir and the nuclear issue, made the decision not to cross the LoC.(17) A deliberate decision was also made to avoid all references to nuclear weapons in an attempt to portray India as a responsible nuclear power.(18)

The Kargil crisis was eventually resolved in July 1999. Confronted with a strategic impasse, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights.(19)

The decision to withdraw from Kargil apparently did not have the support of the Pakistani army.(20) Several Indian national security decision-makers, including defense minister George Fernandes believe that the Kargil operation was exclusively a Pakistani army operation that was launched and executed without the civilian government's express approval.(21) One of the theories making the rounds in New Delhi is that policy differences on Kashmir between the civilian and military arms of the Pakistani government was one of the prime reasons behind Nawaz Sharif's ouster.(22)

As a result, the Lahore peace process, which Vajpayee and Sharif launched with much aplomb in February 1999, is now virtually dead.(23) New Delhi is braced for increased tensions with Pakistan over Kashmir and India's armed forces have been placed on high alert along the international border with Pakistan.(24)

Musharraf has sought to allay Indian and US concerns of renewed border tensions and crisis escalation by ordering a unilateral withdrawal of the Pakistani army units along the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan.(25) However, he has ruled out any reductions along the LoC in Kashmir.(26) The Indian foreign and military establishment does not regard Pakistan's unilateral withdrawal as a meaningful confidence building measure (CBM) so long as Pakistan continues to support the militants in Kashmir.(27) India has also made the resumption of any negotiations with Pakistan contingent on what New Delhi describes as a reduction in Pakistani support for “cross-border terrorism.”(28)

Hence, the military coup in Pakistan has raised the likelihood of greater tensions between the South Asian rivals over Kashmir. Indian counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir and Pakistani-backed infiltration and exfiltration operations along the LoC have the potential to escalate to a larger conventional war and possibly a nuclear exchange. India could also respond by extending military support to disgruntled ethnic and sectarian groups within Pakistan. This could add to Pakistan's internal political fragmentation and in the long-term even threaten the very existence of the Pakistani state.

Commitments on Nuclear/Missile Export Controls and Nonproliferation Objectives

Finally, there are concerns that economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community in the wake of the military coup could worsen Pakistan's macro-economic crisis. Sanctions will invariably reduce Washington's leverage in Islamabad and might force a bankrupt Pakistani government to sell its nuclear and missile technologies abroad. Further, sanctions could also detract from the goal of securing Pakistani cooperation on critical multilateral arms control agreements such as the CTBT.

These concerns need to be tempered with a dose of realism. Although the United States is opposed to the overthrow of democracy in Pakistan, there is a growing realization in Washington that the United States has very little direct influence with the Pakistani army. Pakistan was already severely sanctioned as a consequence of its May 1998 nuclear tests. Washington has therefore indicated that it is prepared to deal with the new military regime in Islamabad. The Clinton administration is no longer insisting on the immediate restoration of a civilian government to power. Instead, Washington has demanded a timetable for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.(29)

Pakistan currently owes nearly $30 billion in external debts. Its hard currency reserves of little over $1 billion are barely sufficient to cover a few weeks of imports and are rapidly dwindling. It is thus critically dependent on the Paris Club for debt restructuring and continued international institutional lending to keep its external sector solvent.(30) In light of the high possibility of sanctions-induced economic and political instability in Pakistan, the Clinton administration is unlikely to go beyond imposing the very limited sanctions that are mandated under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act or to lean on international financial institutions to terminate support for Pakistan's economy.(31)

The erstwhile civilian government in Pakistan had made the signing of the CTBT contingent on two conditions: (1) an easing of the coercive atmosphere (read US economic and technological sanctions regime that was constituted to punish Pakistan for its May 1998 nuclear tests); and (2) India's signature of the CTBT.(32)

In early October 1999, the US Senate-House Conference finally agreed to give the president authority to waive for an indefinite period the military and economic sanctions imposed under the Pressler and Glenn amendments on Pakistan in the wake of its May 1998 nuclear tests. It was hoped that US President Bill Clinton would use this authority to extend sanctions relief to both India and Pakistan to secure their signature on the CTBT.(33) The coup in Pakistan has obviously put a brake on the momentum of events.

However, the new military regime in Pakistan has indicated that it will not dilute its commitments on nonproliferation and arms control. Economic revival, tax reforms, and restoring domestic and foreign investor confidence in the Pakistani economy remain high on the army's agenda. Should Pakistan's economy improve as a result of a new wave of reforms, then there would be less pressure on the present or any future Pakistani government to contemplate nuclear and missile sales to bolster a precarious economic situation.

In his 17 October speech, Musharraf also reassured the international community that Pakistan “remains alive to international nonproliferation concerns.” Musharraf reiterated Pakistan's commitment to a “nuclear and missile restraint” regime in South Asia and “sensitivity to global nonproliferation and disarmament objectives.”(34)

Conclusion

The military coup has provided a setback to the prospects of some form of formal civilian control over Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Although the armed forces would have retained operational control under any civilian disposition, a formalized civilian institutional setting would have provided more room for caution, deliberation, and crisis stability. The coup brought to light sharp divisions within the military at the Corps Commander level; it highlighted the institutional schism between the ISI and the army. However, there is no evidence of vertical divisions within the army and the military as an institution. The cracks that were visible just before the coup appear to have been papered over. However, if the political impasse continues, economic pressures mount, and sectarian violence worsens further, those cracks could reappear.

A more serious cause for concern is the possibility of greater armed support by the Pakistani military to the militants fighting the Indian government in Kashmir. Such a policy would invariably lead to a state of permanent tension between New Delhi and Islamabad. A repeat of Kargil-type operations in the future could also increase the chances for an expanded conventional war and nuclear exchange in the region.

The Indian government could also respond by encouraging and arming disgruntled ethnic and sectarian groups within Pakistan. Another option often debated in New Delhi is to drive Pakistan into bankruptcy by forcing it into an expensive conventional and nuclear arms race. In the medium- and long-term, both options might threaten the existence of the Pakistani state, with extremely dangerous implications for nuclear command and control, secure custody of nuclear weapons and materials, export controls on weapons of mass destruction technologies, and nuclear terrorism.

At present, Pakistan remains committed to export controls on sensitive nuclear technologies. Following the nuclear tests in May 1998, the Pakistani government agreed to tighten its export control laws.(35) In January 1999, then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif approved the creation of a Nuclear Regulatory Authority to minimize the chances of the export of Pakistan's nuclear expertise.(36) Following his approval, in March 1999, the Pakistani Commerce Division issued a statutory regulatory order to control the export of nuclear technology to foreign countries.(37) As of yet, there is no evidence to suggest that Pakistan has diluted this commitment. However, continuing structural economic difficulties and the prospects of becoming a failed state might reduce the willingness of future Pakistani governments to comply with export control norms and regimes.

There are also indications of Pakistan's willingness to sign the CTBT if the United States were to extend long-term sanctions relief. Pakistan's military regime might also sign the CTBT as a means of securing greater acceptability and legitimacy in Washington. However, Pakistan's ratification decision will be closely tied to the CTBT-debate in New Delhi and the ratification decisions of other nuclear weapon states.

Given the complexity of the above scenario, the United States must avoid sanctioning Pakistan any further. Political engagement and continued external financial lending would better serve to support the goals of restoring a viable system of democratic governance in the country. Engagement is also vital to secure the military regime's continued commitment to export controls and multilateral arms control agreements. The United States must also continue to support CBMs between India and Pakistan, discourage any Kargil-type military operations, and encourage the resumption of the Lahore peace process.

Although the international community cannot condone the removal of a democratically elected government through armed force, in Pakistan the existence of elected governments has never really translated into democratic governance. The supposedly democratic governments have epitomized tyranny, corruption, and misgovernance. The ambitious reforms outlined by Pakistan's army, therefore, provide some hope for social, economic, and political stability, and an eventual return to a more viable democracy in the near future.

Notes

(1) “Pakistan army moves against prime minister after military chief sacked,” CNN, 12 October 1999, <http://www.cnn.com>.

(2) Pamela Constable, “Regional Stability Casualty of Coup,” Washington Post, 13 October 1999, p.21; Jonathan S. Landay, “Pakistan Coup Poses Danger, But U.S. Has Little Leverage,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 October 1999.

(3) Pervez Hoodboy, “Why a civilian set-up won't work,” Dawn, 16 October 1999, http://www.dawn.com.

(4) “Pakistan Said to Have Seven Nuclear Bombs,” Washington Times, 2 December 1992, p.A6.

(5) “Pak military meet on N-arms control system,” Hindustan Times, 7 May 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(6) Amit Baruah, “Top Pak. Army commander forced to retire,” The Hindu, 10 October 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(7) B.M. Chengappa, “Pakistan's fourth coup,” Hindustan Times, 21 October 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(8) “Bhutto says Pakistan appears in ‘Civil War',” CNN, 13 October 1999, http://www.cnn.com.

(9) Jason Burke, “Marching to the Brink,” India Today, 25 October 1999, http://www.india-today.com.

(10) “Transcript of address to the nation in English by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf,” Pakistan News Service, 12 October 1999, http://www.paknews.org.

(11) “U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, DPB # 129,” 12 October 1999, http://www.secretary.state.gov.

(12) “Pakistan coup leader known as hawk on India relations,” CNN, 13 October 1999, http://www.cnn.com.

(13) “Understanding Air Operations in Kargil,” Indian Airforce Briefing on Operation Safed Sagar, http://www.armedforces.nic.in.

(14) George Iype, “Army brass seek permission to cross LoC,” Rediff on the Net, 23 June 1999, http://www.rediff.com.

(15) “India says it threatened sea blockade,” Dawn, 27 July 1999, http://www.dawn.com.

(16) Amit Baruah, “Any weapon will be used, threatens Pak,” Hindu, 31 May 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(17) “Indian envoy rules out full-scale war,” Dawn, 18 May 1999, http://www.dawn.com.

(18) Seema Guha, “India's Mantra: Restraint,” Times of India, 28 May 1999, http://www.timesoindia.com; Kanti Bajpai, “Testing the Limits: Indian Restraint vs Pak Brinkmanship,” Times of India, 6 July 1999; Speech by Indian External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, “Kargil and Beyond,” India International Center, 20 July 1999.

(19) “Text of Clinton-Sharif statement,” Hindu, 6 July 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(20) Seema Guha, “India alarmed at events in Pakistan,” Times of India, 13 October 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com.

(21) Seema Guha, “Fernandes gives clean chit to Sharif,” Times of India, 29 May 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com.

(22) Ashok K. Mehta, “History repeated in Pakistan,” Hindustan Times, 19 October 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; Kuldip Nayar, “The chances of reconciliation between New Delhi and Islamabad have receded,” Rediff on the Net, 18 October 1999, http://www.rediff.com.

(23) Anita Kanungo, “The nukes are leashed, but Lahore's over,” Hindustan Times, 17 October 1999; “The Rediff Interview/Inder Kumar Gujral,” Rediff on the Net, 20 October 1999, http://www.rediff.com; “India will not rush into talks with Pak,” Hindu, 18 October 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(24) Seema Guha, “India alarmed at events in Pakistan;” “Internal security being beefed up after Pak coup,” Times of India, 17 October 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com;

(25) “Speech of the Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf,” News International, 17 October 1999, http://www.jang.com.pk.

(26) “Pak rules out troop pull-back from LoC,” 19 October 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; “New set-up to be primarily civilian, says Shamshad,” News International, 20 October 1999, http://www.jang.com.pk.

(27) “Pakistan's offer does not mean much: Malik,” Times of India, 19 October 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com.

(28) “India reiterates pre-conditions for resuming talks with Pakistan,” Hindustan Times, 14 October 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(29) “Testimony by Assistant Secretary Karl F. Inderfurth,” House International Relations Committee, Asia Pacific Subcommittee, 20 October 1999, http://www.usia.gov.

(30) Clifton and John Barry, “Bittersweet Revenge,” Newsweek, 25 October 1999, http://www.newsweek.com; “Pakistan's new old rulers,” The Economist, 16 October 1999, pp. 39-40.

(31) Sridhar Krishnaswami, “ Will the U.S. go all the way of sanctions?” Hindu, 17 October 1999, http://www.hinduonline.com.

(32) “Sartaj hints at CTBT signing by September,” Dawn, 18 March 1999, http://www.dawn.com; Nasir Malick, “No Giving Up of N-Capability: Pakistan May Sign CTBT if Curbs Lifted,” Dawn, 26 August 1998, http://www.dawn.com.

(33) Amir Mateen, “Clinton given powers to waive sanctions,” News International, 8 October 1999, http://www.jang.com.pk.

(34) “Speech of the Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf,” News International, 17 October 1999, http://www.jang.com.pk.

(35) “Pak-US to Discuss 5-Point Nonproliferation Agenda: Sartaj,” Pakistan Link, 5 January 1999, http://www.pakistanlink.com.headlines.

(36) “Establishment of Nuclear Regulatory Authority Approved,” FBIS-TAC-99-012, 12 January 1999.

(37) Ansar Abbasi, “Pakistan Puts Curbs on Export Control Material,” Dawn, 11 March 1999, http://www.dawn.com.


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