![Visit MIIS [ Image: MIIS Logo ]](/_navimages/logos/miis_logo_white_260x55_80percent.png "Visit MIIS [ Image: MIIS Logo ]"){kind=logo}
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
|
| You are here: HOME > Publications > Report |
CNS ReportsUndiscussed Linkages: Implications of Taiwan Straits Security Activity on Global Arms Control and NonproliferationMonte R. Bullard, Senior Fellow East Asia Nonproliferation Program
This paper was prepared for a conference on 6-7 October 2000 at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign hosted by Professor George Yu, Director, Center of East Asian and Pacific Studies.
|
|
Date |
Congressional Action |
House Vote |
Senate Vote |
|
10 Apr 1979 |
Taiwan Relations Act |
339-50 |
85-4 |
|
2 May 1995 |
Congressional Vote to Issue Visa to Lee Teng-hui |
396-0 |
91-1 |
|
6 Nov 1997 |
US-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act |
301-116 |
in committee |
|
10 July 1998 |
Resolution Expressing the United States Continued Support for Taiwan |
n/a |
92-0 |
|
2000 |
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act |
341-70 |
in committee |
However, Chinese perceptions of the domestic political scene in America are incomplete. In addition to the Taiwan Relations Act, the other four actions, listed in the above table, by the House and Senate are important. While they are not laws like the TRA, they are significant not so much for what each of the titles describes, but as a general show of support for Taiwan. But what is especially important to note is that the votes of the House and Senate for each of the activities is very lop-sided. They cannot be construed as merely the result of domestic political competition. The congressional acts and resolutions are very strong statements about the US - Taiwan relationship and about the feeling by many Americans that there is an obligation to protect Taiwan from what they perceive is a menacing government on the Mainland. The clear image still in the minds of most Americans over 30 years of age is the Tiananmen debacle. The contrasting image is of a Taiwan that has truly democratized under US tutelage.
In addition to these five main congressional actions there are numerous other statements that are made on a regular basis by individual congressmen, or in congressional hearings, and are viewed as anti-PRC or pro-Taiwan. Many have had to do with the debates over normal trade relations or entry into the WTO.
What China sees from all this is a relatively "formal" political support base in the US for Taiwan that encourages Taiwan independence forces within Taiwan.
US Arms Sales to Taiwan: Politics in Command
Actual arms sales to Taiwan are viewed at an entirely different level, as an action that ultimately promotes Taiwan independence and that will not be tolerated by the Chinese leadership.
Support for Taiwan's security can be divided into two sub-categories: general arms sales and theater missile defense. Again the central concern by China's leaders is that either activity encourages the separatist movement.
The single most important principle to understand about security support for Taiwan is that China's concern is more about the political linkages between the US and Taiwan that are developed than about the actual military potential of the weapons systems. Many analysts narrowly focus their studies on the military "balance" and Normandy-type invasion scenarios across the Taiwan Strait and miss the essence of the problem.
An early lesson learned by some American observers was that American weapons, components or technology sales to Taiwan did not evoke a major response if the contract deal was for less than $50 million dollars. The concern was not in the military equipment or technology itself; the concern was when the amount exceeded $50 million and had to be made a matter of public record. That indicated to Chinese observers a formal political connection between the US and Taiwan, even if it was totally a private corporation sale.
There is no doubt that over the years the perceptions of a threat to Taiwan from the PRC have been strong and increasing in the minds of American defense planners and, of course, the corporations that would sell arms to Taiwan. China reinforced those perceptions by deploying M-9 missiles to Fujian province and by conducting missile and amphibious exercises in the Taiwan region in 1995 and 1996. The US displayed its concern that the Taiwan problem be settled peacefully when it deployed two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan region during the 1996 missile exercises. From an American point of view these exercises and launches indicated that China was not complying with the agreement in the communiqués to settle the issue peacefully.
All of this posturing by Chinese and US forces almost ignores the role of Taiwan's military forces. It certainly indicates that the whole notion of a China-Taiwan military balance is ludicrous or at least not paramount in the calculus. A determined China could certainly handle a Taiwan separatist movement if there were no involvement by the United States or the United Nations. Since China is a UN Security Council permanent five member it can effectively block by veto any UN involvement. So it is clear that the only obstacle to Chinese handling of Taiwan's splittist forces is the United States and its proclivity to intervene unilaterally in such situations.
Beijing views the United States as threatening to China's sovereignty through its role in the Taiwan issue. Indeed, sovereignty is considered by some Chinese leaders to be the paramount concern, even more important than the continuity of China's economic development. As a result the Chinese Military is totally preoccupied with how to prevent US interference. That means the thrust of China's military modernization process is focused on preventing US Navy and Air Force intervention in a Taiwan Strait crisis. It is not primarily focused on being able to defeat Taiwan's military. Willingness to accept a high cost for protecting China's sovereignty or willingness to destroy much of what they are trying to liberate would mean that China could subdue Taiwan if no outside power intervened although probably not by direct invasion.
The Chinese thought process is very simple and represents the first of three miscalculations that make this situation so dangerous. The PLA perception is that the primary task is to prevent the US from intervening and the best way to accomplish that is through the use of a deterrent strategy. At the strategic level that means doing everything to prevent the deployment of a National Missile Defense that could invalidate China's deterrent capability. At the tactical level it means changing the nature of warfare so that China does not have to meet strength with strength. If China were to meet American conventional force the strategy would be to do everything possible to inflict enough damage to US forces so the American public would not support the conflict. The PLA believes it could accomplish this through the use of modern high-tech warfare such as cyber war, anti-satellite warfare and cruise or ballistic missiles. They study the cases of Vietnam and Somalia to try to understand the limits of American public support for military action. Whether this strategy will be successful or not is not important. What is important is that there are some leaders who believe it will be successful and they are therefore more likely to take military action.
A second potential miscalculation is by the US leaders. The principal lesson of Kosovo for many US military leaders was that it is possible to have a non-casualty strategy and that war can be fought by stand-off warfare with cruise missiles and bombs. Further, the US military understands the tremendous gap in naval and air force capability between the US and China. If the President were to ask military leaders whether or not they could handle a Chinese invasion they would certainly say they could. They believe they can sink or keep the Chinese navy in port without difficulty and sustain little damage in the process. If there were ever a situation that lends itself to the current notions of non-casualty strategy it would be the defense of Taiwan. Again, it is not important whether these military judgments are right or wrong. The fact that they exist means a higher likelihood that action would be taken.
The third potential miscalculation would be by Taiwan's leaders. There are many who believe that the US would come to their aid in a military conflict no matter what the circumstances are. Again, whether they are correct or not is not important, the belief makes provocative action more likely.
Part of the Chinese reasoning process is that China must break down the American will to fight. That means China must do everything it can, and as early as possible, to drive a wedge between the US and Taiwan and between the US and its allies. And this is particularly important in the realm of arms sales and defense relationships. Every large sale that becomes a matter of public record is viewed as another indicator of American willingness to come to Taiwan's defense.
Part of China's strategy is to build separate and unique relationships with each country of the world. They learned that if the US punishes them by placing economic sanctions on them, they could successfully evade hardships by dealing with other countries. When the US refused to sell wheat to China, America's allies, Canada and Australia were unwilling to join the embargo. This concept of keeping all countries separate and applying different incentives or penalties spills over into international security matters.
The case of theater missile defense (TMD) to Taiwan is perhaps the most illustrative. The initial impetus for Taiwan to obtain a TMD capability came not from the military but from the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan. The question of whether or not Taiwan should seek TMD from the United States became a domestic political issue. It was simply a case of the then opposition party attempting to point out that the incumbent government was not doing all it could to protect the people of Taiwan. It therefore advocated the acquisition of TMD. In the meantime the government, then controlled by the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), was astute enough to recognize that by seeking to obtain TMD it could co-opt a domestic political issue. While the main debate of whether the government was protecting the people or not was going on, the military was wary of seeking TMD because it was too costly and had not been proven to work.
A second argument exerted a great deal of force on the debate. Since Taiwan's only serious defense was through direct support by the United States, working with the US to help pay for TMD and getting into a position where Taiwan becomes part of what Chinese leaders believe will be an East Asia missile defense architecture, became a powerful rationale. It is true that militarily Taiwan already receives the benefit of lower-tier TMD development in the Modified Air Defense System (MADS) which is similar to the PAC-2+ Patriot defense system. The question is whether Taiwan can participate in the upper-tier Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense or the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The important point though is not in the capability of the systems to counter Chinese missiles; the key concern is the integration into the American (and Japanese) air defense structure. That would mean the potential to integrate with US intelligence efforts and command and control systems to include satellite collection and sensor systems that detect launches early enough to provide warning for the TMD system. It is that military and political connection that concerns China, not the actual capabilities of the weapons themselves. It would be an alliance equivalent to Cold War alliances from a Chinese perspective.
Another point made by China's researchers is that American arms sales in general and TMD in particular represents hypocrisy at a strategic level as well as in the nonproliferation arena. General arms sales, such as F-16s, frigates, AWACS and other systems, especially as publicly rationalized, are extensions of the Cold War and represent a Cold War containment mentality. They point out that in some cases the transfer of technology that supports Taiwan to develop missile systems and that would constitute a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. They believe that for the US to condemn China for helping Pakistan with missile technology while assisting Taiwan with similar technology is a clear case of hypocrisy and should cause China to reevaluate its position on the MTCR.
In short, China's researchers believe there is an inherent contradiction between America's stated foreign policy of engagement with China and its continued arms sales to Taiwan. They believe arms sales upset regional stability by encouraging the Taiwanese to feel confident enough to move toward an independence that would not be tolerated by China. They point out that such a move would certainly result in military action by the PRC if necessary to protect their sovereignty.
PRC analysts are concerned that the perceptions within Taiwan that the US is committed to defend the island are becoming increasingly strong. They believe at some point Taiwanese leaders will rationalize a major step toward independence under the belief that no matter what action they take, including a formal declaration of independence, they will be able to marshal enough support in the United States for military protection. They too listen to the statements of Congress and read defense department documents. They also read America's history of protecting democracies or at least anti-Communist states around the world. They read the criteria for self-determination in international law and perhaps most important they are acutely aware that they are the first purely Chinese democracy. They have put to rest the criticism that Taiwan is not really a democracy because the opposition party has no chance of winning. They know Americans have a strong feeling for protecting such a country, especially against a country that they perceive to be an abuser of human rights.
The perception is, then, that arms sales to Taiwan not only is interference in China's internal affairs and that it violates the third US-China communiqué, which committed to reduce the quality and quantity of arms to Taiwan, it is also a significant stimulus to groups within Taiwan who would declare independence.
China's linking of the Taiwan Strait situation to global arms control and nonproliferation regimes and treaties comes in two forms: indirect and direct. The indirect linkages include critiques of American statements, policies and actions that have been described above. The critiques, in turn, contribute to a thought process or atmosphere that will allow Chinese leaders to justify changes in arms control and nonproliferation policies, but do not directly threaten any action. Direct linkages are statements by Chinese leaders that show a direct causal relationship between American actions and China's future arms control or nonproliferation policy.
The Chinese leadership, publicly and through diplomatic demarche, condemns most major congressional resolutions and actions that are anti-China in character. They are also carefully recorded and viewed as a general American bias, if not conspiracy, against China rather than as single efforts. While these statements often make the Western newspapers, more important is that they almost always make the internal Communist party information system (controlled mass media and party-led political education). They contribute significantly to public opinion about the United States. This preparation of public opinion, using incidents like the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, has been very successful at creating a receptive atmosphere for convincing official and unofficial Chinese opinion-formers that China occupies the moral high ground. They will find it easy to rally Chinese support for an arms control or nonproliferation policy that does not coincide with the US or even the UN. All they must do is show attempts by the West, and particularly America, to isolate or "blackmail" China into behavior that can be interpreted as against China's basic national interest.
The result of these indoctrination efforts is to create a fertile ground for changes in arms control and nonproliferation policies if deemed necessary. It will not be difficult for leaders to justify major changes in global arms control and nonproliferation regimes or treaties to Chinese citizens. There is no indication now that they will wish to withdraw from any treaty or regime, but there are indications that they will want to reevaluate the level of Chinese commitments to ongoing (not past) arms control dialogues and its current nonproliferation commitments While Chinese leaders have always favored an independent foreign policy, even with today's increased intellectual openness and critique, they will still be able to appeal to citizen and intellectual support because of this basic anti-American climate they have successfully created.
We can say then that the Chinese have laid sufficient groundwork to be able to make good on any threat to change arms control or nonproliferation policy and there have been direct threats to do so. Ambassador Sha Zukang at the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference made the most recent direct statement. After attacking the developing US National Missile Defense program as one that would upset global strategic stability, he said: "This and other profound changes that have taken place recently in the international security environment will inevitably affect China's arms control policy." In fact it is well known that the Chinese position at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva links America's attempts to alter the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and promote national missile defense (NMD) to any movement defining the Work Program for the CD. While the US promotes negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), China with Russia have stated that there must be parallel negotiations on an Outer Space Treaty aimed at stopping the development of NMD. As a result all constructive progress at the CD on treaty negotiation has ceased for the past two years.
In an informal setting Ambassador Sha is even more direct and articulate. He often makes the point that China, and he personally, have made major contributions to arms control and nonproliferation regimes and treaties in the past decade and that the US has ignored basic nonproliferation principles. He notes that China has made a number of concessions and even led in the development of some nonproliferation principles, but if the result is for the US to take advantage of China and refuse to cooperate on China's highest priority issue, Taiwan, he would have to ask Chinese leaders to reevaluate the role of China in various arms control and nonproliferation treaties and regimes.
How will Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policies change in the future? As with most nations, Chinese leaders focus on the relationship between arms control and national security. It is this calculus that will ultimately determine the degree of Chinese interest in and respect for global arms control and nonproliferation treaties and agreements. The Taiwan issue is a new and intervening variable in the arms control equation.
Chinese leaders believe arms control efforts should be multilateral and global in nature and that all the nuclear weapons states must participate fully. If one state, like the United States, is perceived to be taking actions that vary or contradict the general direction of arms control movement, such as the US attempt to withdraw from or modify the ABM Treaty, China would question the overall value of arms control. They would see that a solid missile defense would negate their deterrent capability and therefore subject them to nuclear blackmail. In a sense, this belief is also a form of Cold War thinking. The notion that China needs a deterrent capability automatically leads to a confrontational scenario. This is seen in the response to ABM. Rather than suggest political solutions to the problem, most suggested responses have been in the form of threats to build more missiles thus creating an arms race.
Historically, China's concern has been that arms control and nonproliferation treaties and regimes tend to freeze an inequality in military capability. Some leaders believe that the inequality could be used by any power to force its values on other countries through nuclear blackmail or intimidation. In the case of the US that possibility has been labeled "superpower hegemonism." Chinese leaders also believe that when the US proclivity to force values on other countries is combined with a preemptive military strategy, as in the cases of the bombing of Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan and Kosovo, it constitutes a major threat world security. This anti-hegemonism theme has been relatively successful in allowing China to build informal coalitions against what is perceived by many to be United States power abuses around the world. Already Russia, India, Indonesia and others have expressed some sympathy with this theme. We can imagine then, that when China feels threatened by US military power it will adjust is commitment to arms control norms.
One approach China could take is to appeal to unattainable principles in an attempt to obstruct the negotiations. China has, over the years, been very consistent in promoting general and complete disarmament (GCD) of nuclear weapons as an ultimate goal. It is likely to continue to promote this goal and to insist that participation be all-inclusive. But GCD is idealistic in nature and if Chinese policy were to adhere strictly to the principles of GCD it would mean that China would become obstructionist and the politics of compromise needed to manage the arms dilemma would be set back considerably. By refusing to concede in all matters except those that lead directly to GCD, as a nuclear weapons state, the Chinese could effectively halt the arms control process.
In the nonproliferation arena there are strong economic and political pressures to market Chinese weapons systems or nuclear technology outside of China. Further, as China has decentralized its economic system to a greater degree, government control mechanisms are less able to monitor exports by autonomous industries. Again, there is not even an incentive for China to monitor some exports like missiles when the leadership perceives the United States, their principal nonproliferation critic, to be committing a worse offense by selling similar items or technologies to Taiwan. China has been pressured to adhere to the MTCR by US high level visits and even by economic sanctions. Unless they can see a change in US arms sales to Taiwan they are unlikely to continue, much less strengthen their commitment to nonproliferation norms.
Although the situation in the Taiwan Strait is sui generis, it is increasingly central to broader arms control and nonproliferation efforts. This linkage stems from China's position as a nuclear weapons state with substantial influence on the global arms control and nonproliferation processes. From China's perspective any global arms control or nonproliferation agreement must take the Taiwan situation into account. Some Chinese analysts measure all global security efforts, first and foremost, by how the Taiwan Strait scenario might be affected.
We must conclude that the situation in the Taiwan Strait can have a direct and major effect on Chinese leaders thinking about participation in global arms control and nonproliferation regimes and treaties. We must therefore include that factor in efforts to understand and improve general approaches to arms control. The most important step in resolving this particular challenge to global arms control and nonproliferation regimes and treaties is to recognize that it is more a political problem than a military problem. This does not mean that we ignore the military factor. It does mean that we, as scholars and researchers, must pay more attention to integrating military and political factors. We must do better at identifying political variables that lead to military threat or action and we must do better at describing the relationships between the political and military realms. We should spend less time at describing the military hardware balance or invasion scenarios across the Taiwan Strait and more time describing the political rationale behind displays of military force or threats to use military force. While confidence-building-measures or mutual-reassurance-measures will help manage the problem, they will not solve it.
Most administrators, on all three sides of this problem, are generally unable to devote enough time to understanding the conceptual basis for solutions because of their requirements to handle day-to-day actions and crises. Most scholars have little appreciation for the real world obstacles to developing appropriate policies. The input of both officials and scholars is a sine qua non to the development of successful solutions. In most cases, individuals are limited in their ability to interact with persons on the other sides. This is especially true for officials who meet for "official" discussions. Most official discussions are severely limited by prepared positions and leave little room for creativity or flexibility. In some cases quasi-official contact is conducted by ex-officials or senior persons whose high visibility in the press often hampers successful discussions. The most useful forum for finding appropriate solutions should be a combination of scholars and officials. Both military and civilian should be included. The goal of such a forum should be to identify new options, not to repeat past allegations against one side or the other. The size of such meetings should be kept small, about four persons on each side. But several groups of different individuals should be sponsored at the same time. Meetings that include the same people all the time tend to bog down.
It has been conventional wisdom on all three sides in the past that the problem between Taiwan and China must be left for the Chinese to solve themselves. It is strange that the US would concede this understanding because this is the one world situation that could easily draw two nuclear weapons states into direct confrontation. Scholars must challenge this notion. An old Chinese saying notes (paraphrased) that whenever three people walk together, one is my teacher (san ren xing, bi you wo shi). Or it is possible to learn something from anyone. But the US role should not be to offer suggestions or solutions. The US role should be to offer "good offices" and help to clarify issues and concepts. It should be to introduce forms of value-free analysis and ways to cause each of the participants to view the issues through the eyes of the other participants. Most Chinese and American officials are so used to identifying a policy and then assembling data to support the position that they often miss the step of anticipating the reaction of the other sides. It is a skill that can be introduced.
We as scholars must do more than just study the problem. We must also offer a range of creative options. The conclusions to our paper should not be just that China, Taiwan or the US is doing something wrong. We should do more than point out the weaknesses or perceived bad behavior of the other sides. Condemning the US Congress or US arms sales to Taiwan, the PLA leaders threats in China or the DPP leaders movement toward independence in Taiwan are of little use. We should spend our time and effort in identifying positive steps that should be taken to help resolve the problem. Even if the suggestion is impractical it may contain ideas that could be used in some other combination of ideas.
For example, in the case of TMD it might be useful to offer a solution such as suggesting that China and the United States negotiate to trade the M-9 ballistic missiles deployed in Fujian province for a US commitment to prohibit TMD transfers to Taiwan. It would not be a simple negotiation. There are many complex sub issues related to either action. A case could be made though that since the M-9 missiles are mobile, China would loose nothing by moving them out of the area. In fact, they could gain the moral high ground by removing the missiles and at the same time initiating a major propaganda campaign that they are showing good will. The case for no commitment of TMD to Taiwan by the US could also be made, based partially on the cost, partially on the fact that there is no proven system and partially on the fact that it would cause an arms race that none of the three sides want. In any case, the rationale for such a recommendation would have to be developed in depth and articulated so that it could be used in sound bite form or as a justification before a congressional committee. The point is that these types of solutions should be offered on a regular basis. Our focus should be on solutions not just on identifying the problem.
Security in the Taiwan Strait is the central obstacle to regional peace in Asia. All other potential areas of conflict, including Korea, can be handled with relative ease if the US and China cooperate. Support for Taiwan is the only impediment to that cooperation. Security or stability in the Taiwan Strait will be determined by decisions and statements made by the United States, China and Taiwan. All three have the potential to make decisions or statements that would inflame the situation and could ultimately lead to military confrontation. All three have the potential to make decisions or statements that intensify the enmity between the three sides and cause major harm to global arms control and nonproliferation treaties and regimes. But, all three also have the potential to find amicable and effective solutions to the problems and create a stable and peaceful Asian region that would enhance rapid economic progress.
When the US chooses to flexibly interpret the 1982 communiqué to allow for more arms sales to Taiwan, China concludes that it has the right to flexibly interpret its commitments under the MTCR to allow certain exports to Pakistan and Iran. We must find solutions then in which the US takes into account Chinese security concerns when arms are exported to Taiwan so China will take into account US security concerns by stopping exports of missile technology to Pakistan and Iran.
We are at a crossroad. Peaceful cooperation or destructive conflicts are in the future. We have a choice. From an arms control and nonproliferation perspective the answer is clear. If our criteria are to promote global arms control and nonproliferation agreements and avoid costly arms races we must exert all our effort to find solutions to the Taiwan Strait issue that has so much influence on future direction. We must go beyond the military calculus and integrate political, and possibly economic, factors. We should go beyond condemning bad behavior and spend more time on identifying and finding workable solutions to the issues. We should pay attention to the process as well as the substance of finding solutions. We, as scholars and researchers, should work harder to identify creative options for policy-makers to consider.
Monte Bullard is Senior Fellow for the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif.
|
| Return to Top |
@CNS Updates