James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

Biographical Sketches

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Russian Federation faces enormous financial, political, and environmental problems in eliminating the vast stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) inherited from the Soviet Union. Disarray in the Russian economy and serious shortfalls in the federal budget mean that significant foreign assistance will be essential if the CW destruction program—costing an estimated $5.7 billion—is to be implemented on schedule.

The Russian public’s legitimate concerns about the health and environmental consequences of CW destruction have complicated the planning process and increased costs. In addition, the six regions of the Russian Federation where CW are stockpiled and will have to be destroyed have grown more independent of Moscow and are bargaining with federal authorities for investments in socioeconomic infrastructure projects in exchange for accepting CW destruction facilities. These political difficulties, exacerbated by bureaucratic infighting within the Russian government, have slowed planning and implementation of the CW destruction program. Yet now that Moscow has ratified the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), timely implementation of the Russian CW destruction program has become all the more crucial. The CWC mandates the destruction of the entire CW stockpile of more than 40,000 tons of agent within 10 years, with the possibility of a five-year extension.

In order to examine the obstacles facing Russian chemical disarmament and to develop some practical suggestions for overcoming them, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, and the Center for Critical Technologies and Nonproliferation in Moscow decided in the summer of 1996 to establish a study group of leading CW experts from Russia, Europe, and the United States. Named the "Monterey-Moscow Study Group on Russian Chemical Disarmament," this expert panel met twice during 1997, first in Monterey on February 24-25 and then in Moscow on October 24-25, only a few days before the successful CWC ratification vote in the Russian State Duma. Although some members of the Study Group work for the legislative or executive branches of the Russian government, they served in the group in an unofficial capacity. Thus, the Study Group report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Russian or any other government.

The attached report summarizes the Study Group’s conclusions, which were reached by consensus. The group’s key findings are as follows:

1. A key prerequisite for the timely destruction of the Russian CW stockpile will be the achievement of adequate funding levels for this purpose in the Russian federal budget.

2. Now that Russia has both ratified the CWC and begun to implement its treaty obligations, Western governments should give serious consideration to increasing significantly their contributions to Russia’s CW destruction program, and additional countries should initiate assistance programs.

3. At the same time, expanded Western assistance may be contingent on resolving persistent concerns about the development and production of novel CW agents by the Soviet Union and later Russia. These concerns could be resolved through greater transparency and Moscow’s full and effective implementation of the CWC.

4. In view of the beneficial effects of oversight of the U.S. chemical demilitarization program by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the Study Group proposes the establishment of a Russian national commission on chemical disarmament to oversee CWC implementation in Russia. Two technical oversight committees reporting to this Commission could monitor the destruction of the chemical stockpile and the conversion of former CW production facilities.

5. Despite excellent outreach work by non-governmental organizations such as Green Cross Russia, the federal authorities bear the primary responsibility for educating Russian citizens about the health and environmental safeguards involved in the CW destruction program. Such outreach programs should be tailored to the specific needs of each community.

6. The implementation of "compensatory" socioeconomic infrastructure projects in the affected regions will be essential for the expeditious destruction of the Russian CW stockpile. Although the European Community may provide funding for infrastructure projects through the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) program, most countries providing assistance for Russian chemical demilitarization consider such projects beyond the scope of their aid programs. Thus, creative fundraising approaches will be required to ensure that these politically important projects are carried out.

7. Possible strategies for financing compensatory socioeconomic infrastructure projects in the affected regions include: (a) negotiating a division of financial responsibility among the Russian government and Western countries; (b) managing infrastructure assistance through international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and (c) rescheduling some of the debt that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union, with the understanding that the money saved on interest payments would be devoted to funding infrastructure projects.

8. Countries providing financial assistance to regions where CW are to be destroyed should take measures to ensure that their financial contributions actually reach the affected localities.

9. Western concerns over the status of former Soviet CW production facilities converted to nonprohibited purposes prior to CWC’s entry into force would be alleviated if Russia were to comply fully with the treaty provisions at these sites.

10. To facilitate the conversion of existing former CW production facilities (CWPFs), Western and Russian companies should launch commercial ventures at undeveloped locations adjacent to former CWPFs that have access to industrial infrastructure such as roads and electric power.

The Study Group hopes that these ideas will make a positive contribution to the process of Russian chemical disarmament. Panel members have also prepared a set of nine background papers that address in more detail many of the issues touched on briefly in this report. The background papers will be edited in a separate volume and published in Russian in August 1998.

Jonathan B. Tucker and Alexander A. Pikayev

Co-Directors, Monterey-Moscow Study Group

January 1998

CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE MONTEREY-MOSCOW STUDY GROUP

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a landmark treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). To date, more than 110 countries—including Russia and the United States—have ratified or acceded to the treaty, and more than 55 additional countries have signed but not ratified. Since the Russian Federation is the world’s largest declared possessor of CW, its successful implementation of the CWC will be particularly important if the treaty is to achieve its full potential as both a disarmament and a nonproliferation regime.

Russia has declared more than 40,000 tons of lethal chemical-warfare agents (mainly nerve and blister agents), which it inherited from the Soviet Union. The vast majority of the mainstream political forces in Russia support the prompt elimination of the CW stockpile and accept the international norm against chemical warfare embodied in the CWC. Even hard-line communists and nationalists recognize the dubious military utility of these weapons and do not make the Russian government’s chemical demilitarization policy a major political issue. Colonel-General Stanislav Petrov, commander of the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops, has ruled out any future military use of CW and warned that their continued existence makes them a temptation for "madmen" and "terrorists."[1] Thus, the sooner Russia’s vast chemical arsenal is destroyed, the better.

Although the CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, the Russian State Duma (lower house of Parliament) delayed consideration of the treaty until fall, when the funding picture would presumably become clearer. On October 31, 1997, even though the availability of more foreign assistance was still uncertain, the State Duma consented to CWC ratification by a vote of 288 to 75. The Federation Council (upper house of Parliament) followed suit with a unanimous vote on November 5.

By ratifying the CWC, Moscow has committed itself to destroying the entire chemical stockpile in 10 years, with the possibility of a five-year extension. Yet, Russia’s economic difficulties place significant obstacles in the path of carrying out its treaty obligations. For this reason, expanded international assistance will be crucial to Russia's ability to eliminate its CW stockpile within the time-frame specified by the CWC.

Russian federal authorities are also concerned about how a number of unresolved issues related to CWC implementation will be decided by the treaty's administrative body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the Netherlands. Issues of particular importance to Moscow are the possible granting of a five-year extension to the normal 10-year CW destruction deadline, the elaboration of detailed procedures for converting former CW production facilities to nonprohibited purposes, and a decision on which costs of on-site facility inspections must be borne by the inspected state party. More generally, the Russian government is concerned about the amount of influence it will be able to exercise within the decision-making councils of the OPCW.

The legal and organizational framework for Russia’s chemical disarmament program has already been established. A bill titled "On the Destruction of Chemical Weapons" was approved by both houses of the Russian Parliament and signed into law by President Boris Yeltsin on May 2, 1997. This law provides the basis for the destruction of CW stored on Russian territory. A second key document, Governmental Order No. 305 of March 21, 1996, stipulates the timetable and administrative framework for the Russian CW destruction program.

Order No. 305 sets priorities for destroying the CW stockpiled at seven sites in the Russian Federation. The first weapons to be destroyed are blister agents--mustard, lewisite, and mixtures of the two--stored in bulk tanks at Gorny in the Saratov Region, and Kambarka in the Republic of Udmurtia. These agents will be destroyed first because bulk chemicals are easier to process than those in munitions, and because the storage tanks are deteriorating and pose the greatest threat to public health and the environment. A pilot blister-agent destruction plant is under construction at Gorny, with scheduled completion in 1998.

The second phase of the Russian plan involves the destruction of chemical munitions stockpiled at five other locations. Storage sites at Shchuchye in the Kurgan region and Kizner in the Republic of Udmurtia contain rockets and artillery shells filled with nerve agents, and there are munitions containing phosgene at Shchuchye and thickened lewisite at Kizner. Storage sites at Leonidovka in the Penza Region, Maradykovsky in the Kirov Region, and Pochep in the Bryansk Region contain aircraft munitions filled mainly with nerve agents. Construction of a pilot nerve agent destruction plant at Shchuchye is scheduled to begin in the year 2000.

In making the transition to democracy, Russia faces an economic and budgetary crisis of major proportions. A number of vital government programs, including health, education, and defense, compete for limited funds, forcing federal authorities to make hard choices about the allocation of scarce budgetary resources. This situation has placed financial constraints on Russia’s CW destruction program.

The current official cost estimate for destroying the Russian CW stockpile is 34,354.3 million "new" rubles in revalued 1998 currency (about $5.7 billion) over a period of 10 to 15 years.[2] Russian authorities also estimate that CWC implementation will require an additional $330 million over a 10-year period to cover annual dues to the OPCW, costs associated with on-site facility inspections, and the in-country expenses of OPCW inspection teams (which must be borne by the inspected state party). These estimates do not include the costs of socioeconomic infrastructure projects in communities near CW destruction sites, which have been estimated at more than $1 billion. Funds will also be needed for physical security at CW storage facilities and for the conversion of former CW production facilities. Finally, if Russia’s CW destruction program is to meet the standards for protecting human health and the environment required by the CWC, Russia will have to spend more on monitoring and remediation of toxic hazards than it has in the past.

The CW destruction process is unlikely to generate any net economic benefits. Russia plans to process its stockpile of lewisite into some 7,000 tons of purified arsenic for use by the microelectronics industry. However, this activity will probably not generate significant revenues because of the high cost of the conversion process and the limited size of the foreign market for arsenic.

In recent years, the Russian government has not even spent the modest amounts that the Russian Parliament has appropriated for CW destruction. According to official data, in 1995 through 1997, the government spent 56.6 billion old rubles for CW destruction (less than $10 million); this amount was only 14% of what had been approved by the Parliament [3]. Before Russia ratified the CWC, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin told the Russian Parliament that his government was prepared to earmark the equivalent of $86 million for CW destruction in 1998, up from the $13 million previously envisioned, but this change was not reflected in the 1998 Federal Budget Bill.[4]. A key prerequisite for the timely destruction of the Russian CW stockpile will be the achievement of adequate funding levels for this purpose in the Russian federal budget.

With respect to international assistance for Russian chemical disarmament, an informal division of labor has emerged, with the United States and Western Europe providing aid for the destruction of nerve agents and blister agents, respectively. Under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, the United States has already provided a total of $136.5 million for Russian CW destruction. In the federal budget for fiscal year 1997, the U.S. Congress set aside $78.5 million in CTR funds for the partial funding of a pilot nerve-agent destruction facility at Shchuchye. An additional $35.4 million was appropriated for the Shchuchye facility in fiscal year 1998, along with $20 million to dismantle chemical and biological weapons facilities in the former Soviet Union.

As the CTR program has matured, early implementation difficulties have been ameliorated. Initially, the U.S. Department of Defense faced serious bureaucratic hurdles in disbursing funds from military accounts and in hiring contractors—problems exacerbated by an inadequate legal infrastructure in Russia. Recently, however, CTR assistance has been delivered more smoothly. The hiring of Russian subcontractors has also alleviated Moscow’s concern that only U.S. companies would carry out program tasks.

The United States and Russia have conducted a joint research program to evaluate and refine Russia’s two-step approach to CW destruction, which involves chemical neutralization followed by bitumenization—the immobilization of neutralization byproducts in an asphalt-like material, suitable for disposal in landfills. The effectiveness of the Russian neutralization-bitumenization process has been demonstrated in laboratory testing. However, several technical questions still remain regarding both the feasibility of implementing this process on an industrial scale and its long-term environmental consequences, such as whether harmful chemical byproducts could leach from bituminized material into ground water. The joint Russian-U.S. evaluation program should move forward on a priority basis to address the unresolved technical issues related to the Russian CW destruction process.

To date, Western European assistance for Russian destruction of blister agents has taken the form of bilateral aid projects arranged between Russia and individual countries (Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland). Such bilateral assistance currently totals $31 million. In addition, now that Russia has ratified the CWC, the European Union (EU) has collectively agreed to provide technical and financial assistance for CW destruction through the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) program. The initial assistance envisaged by the EU is on the order of $15 million for the period through 1999, but additional aid may be forthcoming. Now that Russia has taken the important step of ratifying the CWC and has begun to implement its treaty obligations, Western governments should give serious consideration to increasing significantly their contributions to Russia's CW destruction program. Additional countries should also initiate assistance programs.

Expanded Western assistance for Russian chemical disarmament faces some political hurdles, however. In 1995, the U.S. Congress placed conditions on CTR assistance by linking it to other issues, such as Presidential certification that Russia was in compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Policy-makers in many Western countries are also aware of reports about the development and experimental production of novel CW agents by the Soviet Union and later by Russia. Although Russian officials have denied these reports, expanded Western assistance may be contingent on resolving such ongoing concerns through greater transparency and Russia’s full and effective implementation of the CWC.

Improved decision-making processes within the Russian federal government would facilitate effective planning and implementation of the CW destruction effort. Russia’s transition from communism to democracy caused upheaval in the federal bureaucracy just as planning for chemical disarmament was getting underway, and disputes arose among government agencies over their roles in managing various aspects of the CW destruction program. Russian Presidential Decree No. 314 of March 1995 partially resolved these bureaucratic tensions by creating a high-ranking interagency decision-making body for issues of chemical disarmament. Even so, no government organization in the CW field plays a preeminent role in resolving policy disputes comparable to that played by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) in the nuclear field. Accordingly, there is still room for improvement in the Russian government’s decision-making process on issues of chemical demilitarization, including better enforcement of decisions and coordination among participating federal agencies.

The United States faced similar bureaucratic problems during the early stages of its chemical demilitarization effort, when conflicting agency interests and a lack of interdepartmental coordination tended to frustrate progress. These conditions began to improve when the National Research Council (NRC), the operating arm of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, was assigned responsibility for external oversight of the CW destruction program. Eminent scientists and engineers serve on NRC committees on a voluntary, unpaid basis and provide independent and objective assessments and advice on technical issues to U.S. government agencies. While NRC recommendations are not binding, they are usually accepted by government officials.

In the area of chemical demilitarization, oversight by the NRC’s "Stockpile Committee" has greatly enhanced the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. program. The policy recommendations offered by the NRC have also helped to resolve interagency disputes and to allay the concerns of local citizens about the health and environmental effects of the CW destruction program.

In view of the beneficial effects of NRC oversight of the U.S. chemical demilitarization program, the Study Group proposes the establishment of a Russian national commission on chemical disarmament, comprised of federal government officials, members of the Russian Parliament, local administrators, business executives, and academicians. These individuals would serve on a voluntary basis without compensation and would provide oversight of CWC implementation in Russia, particularly CW destruction and conversion activities. The participation of Nobel laureates and other eminent citizens would make it difficult to challenge the commission’s integrity or impartiality. If properly selected, this group could provide an effective counterweight to entrenched bureaucratic interests, draw public attention to the CW destruction issue, and make it more difficult for federal officials to divert funding away from this important program.

The proposed Russian national commission might have two subordinate committees. A technical oversight committee, similar to the NRC’s Stockpile Committee, would monitor the Russian CW destruction process and provide policy advice to the federal authorities. This committee might consist of nongovernmental experts, both from Russia and from other countries, providing assistance in chemical engineering, environmental science, law, risk assessment, and community relations. Such independent oversight would help to build public confidence in the safety and effectiveness of the CW destruction program. A second oversight committee, composed of officials from relevant Russian government agencies and business executives from Russia and abroad, might evaluate proposals for the conversion of former CW production facilities to peaceful purposes.

Moscow faces complex political problems in the economically depressed regions of the Russian Federation where CW are stockpiled and will have to be destroyed. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the key challenge was to develop support for CW destruction among the citizens of the affected regions. The environmental disasters of the Soviet period—in particular, the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986—made Russian citizens suspicious of the central government and increasingly concerned and vocal about environmental and public health threats. In 1989, when the Soviet Union completed its first CW destruction plant near the city of Chapayevsk, grass-roots opposition was so intense that the plant never began operation. Since then, it has been used only to train technicians in CW destruction techniques.

Local Russian authorities have a legitimate right to ensure that the CW destruction process is carried out in a manner that is safe for local populations and the environment. In other countries that have decided to eliminate their CW stockpiles, such as Canada and the United States, local communities have pressured the federal government to address health, safety, and environmental issues. The Canadian government responded effectively to these concerns by mounting an intensive campaign to inform and consult with people living near the CW destruction sites. As a result of this outreach effort, local citizen groups were able to bring about a significant improvement in environmental monitoring.

Russian federal authorities should conduct a similar educational outreach campaign to address the legitimate concerns of local communities about the environmental and health effects of CW destruction. Such an effort would facilitate communication between the federal authorities and the affected regions and smooth the way for timely implementation of the CW destruction program. Nongovernmental organizations such as Green Cross Russia are already playing a constructive role by holding public hearings on the environmental and health aspects of chemical demilitarization.[5] Nevertheless, the federal authorities bear the primary responsibility for educating Russian citizens about these issues. Such outreach and education programs should be tailored to the specific needs and concerns of each affected community.

A second major political obstacle to Russian chemical disarmament is the controversy over the allocation of limited budgetary resources between the federal government and the affected regions. Since these regions are currently suffering serious economic hardships, the local authorities continue to press Moscow for greater financial benefits in return for accepting the construction and operation of CW destruction facilities.

To gain the political support of the affected Russian regions, the federal CW destruction plan provides for socioeconomic infrastructure projects. Some of the proposed projects are "auxiliary" improvements directly related to the construction and operation of CW destruction facilities, such as roads, electric power supplies, water and sewer systems, and housing for construction workers. Yet other proposed projects are located "outside the fence" of the CW destruction facilities and include medical clinics, water and sewage lines, and recreational facilities to benefit the local population. These projects are thus of a "compensatory" nature to offset the health and environmental burdens to the community of the past production and future destruction of CW. From the viewpoint of local political authorities, the compensatory projects are most important, yet financing them poses serious difficulties for the Russian federal government, local officials, and foreign countries providing assistance.

Although the financing of socioeconomic infrastructure projects in the affected regions will be crucial to the political viability of the Russian CW destruction program, funding these projects will not be easy. While infrastructure projects directly supporting CW destruction facilities will probably be eligible for foreign government assistance, many Western countries view compensatory infrastructure projects as beyond the scope of their cooperative disarmament programs. Indeed, the U.S. Congress has expressly forbidden the expenditure of CTR program funds for defense conversion or other activities not directly related to the destruction of CW stockpiles and former CW production facilities. However, the TACIS framework that the EU has proposed for assistance to Russian chemical disarmament is more flexible and could potentially include support for socioeconomic infrastructure projects in the affected regions. In addition to EU funds that may be provided through TACIS, creative fundraising approaches will be needed to ensure that politically important socioeconomic infrastructure projects are carried out. The Study Group suggests four possible financing strategies.

First, the Russian government and Western countries might negotiate a division of financial responsibility. For example, Russia might pay for the construction of buildings for the infrastructure projects, generating employment and stimulating the local economy, while Western countries would donate imported equipment such as computers, furniture, and recreational equipment.

Second, countries providing assistance might arrange for an international financial institution such as the World Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to manage assistance to the socioeconomic infrastructure projects associated with Russia's CW destruction program. This approach would create a multilateral framework for cooperation that is less exposed to domestic political pressures in the countries providing assistance.

Third, Western creditor nations should give serious consideration to rescheduling in a targeted manner some of the debt that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. Financing the interest on the debt drains approximately $4 billion annually from the Russian federal budget. Rescheduling a portion of this debt might be undertaken with the specific understanding that Moscow would earmark all of the money saved on interest payments for socioeconomic infrastructure projects associated with the CW destruction program.

Finally, countries providing assistance to the regions should take measures to ensure that their contributions actually reach the affected localities. To the extent possible, revenues should flow not to the regional level but to local districts such as Kizner, Kambarka, and Pochep. Since Pochep has only 35,000 inhabitants, it would be relatively inexpensive to finance infrastructure projects there. For this reason, participating foreign governments should propose to sign cooperation agreements for funding socioeconomic infrastructure projects directly with district administrators.

In addition to the destruction of CW stockpiles, the CWC requires the elimination of all CW production facilities (CWPFs) that were designed, constructed, or used at any time since January 1, 1946. The CWC provides for two exceptions to this rule, however. First, former CWPFs may be converted temporarily to facilities for the destruction of CW, although they must be destroyed after the 10-year destruction period is over. Second, in "exceptional cases of compelling need," former CWPFs may be converted permanently to facilities engaged in nonprohibited activities, such as the production of commercial chemicals. Since most of the former Russian CWPFs were integrated into large chemical production complexes, Moscow believes that razing all of the facilities formerly involved in CW production would be an unacceptable waste of economic resources. Accordingly, conversion to peaceful purposes is viewed as the preferred option.[6]

Soon after the CWC entered into force in April 1997, the United States requested permission from the OPCW in The Hague to convert a former CWPF in southern California to peaceful use as a sound stage.[7] This conversion request constitutes a useful precedent for Russia and other countries. Nevertheless, conversion under the CWC is an option, not a right. The conversion plan must first be recommended by the OPCW’s Executive Council and then approved by the Conference of States Parties. Conversion projects must also be implemented within six years after the CWC’s entry into force (that is, prior to April 29, 2003), regardless of when a given country accedes to the treaty. Thus, the CWC permits conversion only within a time-limited window of opportunity.

Furthermore, Article V of the CWC states that CWPFs "shall be converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons production facility than any other facility used for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes." To this end, Part V, Section D, of the CWC’s Annex on Implementation and Verification specifies stringent rules for CWPF conversion. These rules include the destruction of specialized features of buildings and structures and specialized equipment that were involved in the "final technological stage" of supertoxic CW agent production. The CWC also stipulates that for 10 years after a former CWPF has been converted, it shall be subjected to systematic verification through inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

The Russian government has stated that prior to the entry into force of the CWC, the Soviet Union, and later Russia, unilaterally converted several former CWPFs to legitimate commercial production. At some or all of these facilities, specialized CW production equipment reportedly remains in storage. Given Russia’s financial constraints, Moscow has expressed the desire to streamline the conversion rules in the CWC and to waive systematic inspections of all CWPFs that were converted prior to entry into force—although these facilities would be subject to challenge inspections at the request of another state party. Western countries insist, however, that additional measures consistent with the CWC will be required to build confidence that the unilateral conversion of former Soviet CWPFs is irreversible. Western concerns over the status of former Soviet CWPFs converted prior to the entry into force of the CWC would be alleviated if Russia were to comply fully with the Convention at these sites. [8]

Russia seeks to undertake joint ventures with Western companies at former CWPFs to manufacture commercial chemicals and pharmaceuticals for the domestic market and for export. In addition to generating revenues, such joint ventures would enhance transparency and would largely prevent the reconversion of these facilities to CW production.

Western governments are encouraging their chemical industries to consider entering into joint ventures at Russian industrial sites incorporating former CWPFs, such as the sprawling chemical industry complex at Volgograd. Yet company executives are concerned about the political risks, the possibility of toxic hazards, and the lack of favorable market opportunities. While some of the newer chemical plants at the Volgograd site may be attractive to Western industry, the Khimprom plant used for CW agent production at this location has some equipment dating back to 1931 and serious soil contamination problems.

Recently, however, the E.I. du Pont de Nemours Company (DuPont) agreed to invest $10 million in a joint venture with the Russian company A.O. Khimprom at Novocheboksarsk, about 640 kilometers east of Moscow. During the Soviet era, Novocheboksarsk was a multiple-use industrial complex including both commercial chemical plants and a CW production facility, situated in a highly secured area of the complex.[9] The U.S.-Russian joint venture will construct a new plant in an undeveloped portion of the site without chemical production facilities or any known history of CW agent production, but in proximity to industrial infrastructure such as electrical power and water. Initially, DuPont will employ the new plant to package a herbicide mixture for the Russian grain and sugar-beet crops.[10] This mixture will contain an imported DuPont herbicide, which will be combined with a second herbicide manufactured on site by A.O. Khimprom. Eventually, DuPont plans to manufacture its herbicide in the new plant at Novocheboksarsk.

To facilitate progress toward the conversion of former Soviet CWPFs, Western and Russian companies should initially launch joint commercial ventures at undeveloped sites adjacent to former CWPFs, where there is access to industrial infrastructure such as roads and electric power. The Russian partner firms would make use of their existing commercial production capacity and scientific and technical workforce, and the Western partner firms would provide assistance with marketing and business strategy. If successful, these initial joint ventures could pave the way for more direct conversion projects involving former Soviet CWPFs.

The Monterey-Moscow Study Group believes that the legal foundations for significant progress in Russia’s CW destruction program are now in place. Moscow’s ratification and implementation of the CWC will greatly enhance the likelihood of expanded Western assistance. Nevertheless, the keys to expeditious destruction of the Russian chemical stockpile will be the achievement of adequate funding levels in the Russian federal budget and the financing and implementation of compensatory socioeconomic infrastructure projects in the affected regions.

1. Andrei Ivanov and Judith Perera, "Ridding Russia of the Chemical Weapons Threat," InterPress Service, July 29, 1997.

2. In newly denominated rubles, 1 new ruble equals 1,000 old rubles, and 1 U.S. dollar equals approximately 6 new rubles.

3. "On the Economic Justification Of the Budgetary Expenses Related to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention," letter from Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin to Chairman of the State Duma G.N. Seleznyov, dated May 14, 1997, p. 2.

4. "On Financing Activities In the Area of Chemical Disarmament," letter from Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin to Chairman of the State Duma G.N. Seleznyov, dated October 27, 1997; Associated Press, "Russian Lawmakers Ratify Global Chemical Weapons Ban," The Boston Globe, November 1, 1997, p. A4.

5. Green Cross Russia, The First Public Hearing on the Problem of Chemical Weapons Destruction, October 17-19, 1995, Saratov; and The Second Public Hearing on the Problems of Chemical Weapons Destruction, May 13-17, 1996, Izhevsk.

6. Jonathan B. Tucker, "Converting Former Soviet Chemical Weapon Plants," The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 4, no. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 78-89.

7. The former CWPF proposed for conversion is in Van Nuys, California, a suburb of Los Angeles. It was operated under contract to the U.S. Army by the Marquardt Company, which obtained commercially available industrial chemicals (such as isopropyl alcohol and isopropylamine) and used them to fill components of the Bigeye binary bomb and binary artillery shells.

8. Relevant provisions of the CWC include accounting for and destroying all specialized "final technological stage" production equipment in the presence of international inspectors.

9. Lois Ember, "Converting Chemical Arms Plants to Peaceful Purposes," Chemical and Engineering News, September 22, 1997, p. 10.

10. John J. Fialka and Carla Anne Robbins, "DuPont Plans Russian Venture at Weapons Site," The Wall Street Journal, September 12, 1997, p. 4.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Alexander N. Kalyadin is a senior researcher and deputy director of the Department of Disarmament Research at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. He is also a corresponding member of the Russian Military Sciences Academy. A Ph.D. in history, Dr. Kalyadin directs a research project at IMEMO on problems of chemical demilitarization in Russia. He is the author of two monographs on weapons of mass destruction and co-author of over 40 books on arms control issues.

Natalia I. Kalinina is a consultant on chemical weapons issues to the Administrative Department of the Russian Government. She holds a doctorate in toxicology and did research from 1971 to 1993 at the Research Institute of Hygiene, Toxicology, and Professional Pathology in the Ministry of Health in Volgograd. In 1990-92, she was an expert on the Soviet/Russian delegation to the bilateral talks with the United States on eliminating chemical weapons, and in 1993-94 she was a senior expert on the Russian President’s Committee on Problems of the CBW Conventions. From 1994 to 1997, she was an advisor to the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma on the CWC ratification process.

Nikolai N. Kovalev is director and chief specialist at Roskomneftekhimprom, a state-owned chemical and petrochemical company in Moscow. A chemical engineer by training, he worked from 1986 to 1991 as the head of a department in the Military Industrial Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. From 1975 to 1986, he was deputy head of the Chemical Industry Department in the State Planning Authority of the USSR (Gosplan).

George W. Parshall was director of chemical science in the Central Research and Development Department of the DuPont Company from 1979 until his retirement in late 1992. He received his Ph.D. in organic chemistry from the University of Illinois in 1954, when he joined the DuPont research staff. Dr. Parshall is one of the few industrial chemists elected to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Since his retirement, he has consulted for DuPont and has been involved in a number of advisory activities through the NAS’s National Research Council, including a study of alternatives to incineration as a means to dispose of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons.

Alexander A. Pikayev is director of the Section for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation at IMEMO and director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Control and Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. From 1994 to 1997 he was chief counselor to Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma, and was involved in legislation in the areas of arms control, nonproliferation, and Russian military reform. A 1992 Ph.D. in political science, Dr. Pikayev has written and edited numerous articles and books on problems of arms control and nonproliferation.

Julian P. Perry Robinson, a chemist and lawyer by training, is a senior fellow of the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom. He previously held research appointments at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Free University of Berlin, and the Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs. Together with Professor Matthew Meselson of Harvard University, he directs the Harvard-Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation and co-edits the program’s quarterly journal, The CBW Conventions Bulletin. Mr. Robinson is also a member of the UK National Authority Advisory Committee for the CWC.

Amy E. Smithson is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., where she directs the Center’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project. Before jointing the Stimson Center in 1990, she worked as a national security analyst at the Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation and the Center for Naval Analyses. Dr. Smithson received a Ph.D. in political science from George Washington University in 1996. She has testified before the U.S. Congress and published widely on a variety of topics related to the control and elimination of chemical and biological weapons.

Thomas Stock is product manager at Lobbe Xenex GmbH in Iserlohn, Germany. From 1988 to 1996, he was a member and then leader of the CBW Project at SIPRI, where he did research on old and abandoned CW, toxic armament wastes, CW destruction technologies, national implementation of the CWC, and chemical terrorism. Dr. Stock received his Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of Leipzig in 1981 and did research on toxicology at the Academy of Sciences in Leipzig, German Democratic Republic.

Alexander A. Tarasov is a staff member with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian State Duma and played an important role in the CWC ratification process. Previously he was a researcher with the Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Jonathan B. Tucker directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. He received a B.S. in biology from Yale University in 1975 and a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1990. Before joining CNS in March 1996, Dr. Tucker worked at the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment, and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons in The Hague, and served on a biological weapons inspection team in Iraq with the United Nations Special Commission.