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Preventing the Next Chernobyl: The Item Missing from the St. Petersburg Summit

By William C. Potter

When the leaders of the G-8 met this past weekend in St. Petersburg, Russia they were reminded by their hosts of the city's remarkable heritage--its creation by Peter the Great as a "window on the West," its pivotal role in the Bolshevik revolution, and its heroic resistance during the most grueling siege of World War II. What they almost certainly were not told is that 50 miles to the west is another monument to Russia's past--the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, a complex of four aging Chernobyl-type nuclear reactors with a less than sterling record of reliability and safety.

Omission of this information was unfortunate as Russia recently has announced plans to double nuclear energy capabilities in the next 25 years, and President Putin has heralded nuclear power expansion as the promise of the future. Although nuclear power and energy security figured prominently on the summit agenda, it was not apparent that the Russian president or his fellow world leaders devoted any appreciable time to the serious safety and security issues posed by the rapid expansion of nuclear power?

Today the buzz words in the nuclear industry are "inherently safe reactors." Although important design improvements have been made in Russian reactors since a misguided safety experiment at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station 20 years ago paralyzed the Soviet nuclear establishment and led to an actual decline in operating reactors, Chernobyl-type power reactors continue to operate, some well past their original engineered lifespan. An example are Units 1 and 2 of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Station, which began commercial operation in 1974 and 1976, respectively, with a projected operating life of 30 years. Although plagued by accidents and lacking any containment structure, Unit 1 recently was refurbished and granted a 15-year extension by the Russian State nuclear plant building monopoly Rosenergoatom, and a similar extension is expected shortly for Unit 2. .

The requirements for nuclear safety are not exclusively--or even primarily--a function of reactor design. Also of vital importance is the "human factor," or what is sometimes called a "safety culture". This less tangible but key dimension of power plant safety finds expression in the work and management practices of individuals in the nuclear industry. Although there are some indications that a safety culture is gradually developing in Russia, it has long been stunted. This deficiency--a remnant of the Soviet economic and bureaucratic system that discouraged individual responsibility--is manifest in imprudent plant siting decisions, shoddy construction practices, the flagrant disregard for operating procedures, and the lack of what in the West would be regarded as standard, in-depth prevention and defense measures. Problems associated with an underdeveloped safety culture in Russia are compounded by a weak nuclear regulatory body, whose inspectors often are underpaid and dependent for their well-being on the largesse of the nuclear power plant directors over whom they nominally exercise oversight.

In addition to the nuclear safety risks associated with their routine operation, one also must be increasingly concerned about the dangers posed by potential terrorist attacks on or sabotage of nuclear power facilities. These are not merely hypothetical threats. Chechen terrorists are known to have considered nuclear power and research sites as targets, including the Kurchatov Institute in downtown Moscow. At least one power facility in the former Soviet Union--the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station in Lithuania--was plagued by a series of threats in the 1990s, one of which led to it being shut down temporarily.

In light of the size and sophistication of past terrorist attacks in Russia, one must take seriously the potential for a successful seizure or sabotage by a terrorist group of a nuclear power station such as the one near St. Petersburg. Indeed, a concern with this threat reportedly led Russian authorities to introduce additional security measures, including tightened restrictions on private vehicle traffic in the vicinity of the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant during the July summit.

There were good reasons for the G-8 leaders to explore a wide range of energy options, including those in the nuclear sector, as part of their focus on international energy security. It was imprudent of them, however, to ignore the legacy of Chernobyl in their enthusiasm to expand nuclear power. Although popular antinuclear sentiment has greatly diminished within Russia in the past decade, not all of the prior problems that plagued the Russian nuclear industry have been resolved. An underdeveloped safety culture, insufficient regulatory oversight, and vulnerability to terrorist attacks remain serious impediments to the expansion and long-term health of nuclear energy. They are problems with the potential to impact severely on Russia's G-8 neighbors as well as Russia itself. Unless and until they are solved, the promise of a nuclear revival will remain more rhetoric than reality.

Dr. William Potter is Institute Professor and Director of the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He is co-author of the recent book The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Routledge, 2005).