CNS Reports

A New Stage of the NMD Debate: A U.S. Proposal and a Russian Response

By Nikolai Sokov


According to a recent article in the New York Times, the George W. Bush administration is considering broad new proposals to induce Russia's acquiescence to its plan to deploy a national missile defense system (NMD). These ideas reportedly include purchase of Russian-made S-300 air defense and anti-missile systems for integration into a joint shield over Russia and Europe; joint exercises in anti-missile defense activities; upgrading Russian early warning radars; and exchange of early warning data on missile launches.[1]

Some of these proposals are not new: joint exercises were planned and even conducted under then-President Bill Clinton in 1996, 1998, and 2000; an upgrade of early warning radars was proposed and rejected as well (the radar reportedly mentioned in the U.S. proposal was clearly intended for use against China – something Russia hardly would have agreed to out of fear of antagonizing China). Exchange of early warning data should be conducted through a Joint Data Exchange Center to be created in accordance with a special agreement signed by Presidents Clinton and Putin in June 2000. Still, Bush’s new proposals go farther than many expected.

Russia should rejoice. After all, these proposals go a long way toward meeting Russia’s proposals made in February 2001 during a visit of NATO Secretary General George Lord Robertson (see CNS web report "Russian Missile Defense For Europe: The February 20 Proposal Is More Serious Than It Seems"). The Russian proposal included, among other elements, joint development of theater missile defense systems (both S-300 and more capable ones), as well as consultations on the existence and the nature of a missile threat, and what could be done about it. The New York Times article does not mention consultations, but they were discussed at a meeting between Secretary of State Powell and Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Budapest. "The United States is reviewing this proposal," according to Ivanov, "and the response is likely to be positive."[2]

The communiqué of the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Budapest endorsed alliance consultations on a missile threat in language that is remarkably close to the Russian proposals as well. These consultations "will include appropriate assessment of threats and address the full range of strategic issues affecting our common security, and the means to address them, including deterrence and offensive and defensive means, and enhancing the effectiveness of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation, as well as diplomatic and counter-proliferation measures."[3] In fact, this language gives an even greater weight to diplomacy and deterrence than the February 20 Russian document.

Instead of rejoicing, Russia's reaction was extremely cool. Igor Ivanov immediately reaffirmed the traditional Russian rejection of NMD and proposals to amend or abrogate the ABM Treaty.[4] Defense minister Sergei Ivanov, arguably the most influential person in Moscow in political-military affairs after Putin himself, stated that "Russia's position on anti-missile defense is unchanged."[5]

Such a sharp response may seem surprising and begs for an explanation. Why the rejection? Does this mean that no agreement is possible or is it worth it to keep trying? Of course, at this time little more than an informed guess can be offered since the "game" is at a very delicate stage and motivations are carefully hidden. Below are some plausible explanations; one of them or, more likely several simultaneously, might be the right ones, but all of them need to be considered as the U.S. counter-reaction is contemplated. Reasons for the rejection might include:

  1. A standard negotiating tactic is the most readily available explanation. According to time-honored Russian and Soviet negotiating style, the first response should never be positive: the other side might add something else. In addition, this is clearly an issue for the highest level. President Vladimir Putin himself will give a response at the summit (if, of course, President George W. Bush, indeed, makes the offer). Until then, a cold shoulder is more advantageous: if Putin agrees, his flexibility and constructive attitude will stand in contrast to the intransigence of his subordinates.

  2. Seeking a better package is another possibility. Without the "recycled" elements, the proposal is actually very modest, as has already been noted by some.[6] It might be the case that Russia is waiting for additional proposals: its position on the ABM Treaty is a "big-ticket" issue, so the "payment" should be equally big.

    Also, the volume of the deal the U.S. administration contemplates is unknown. The United States already has bought two earlier versions of the S-300, one from Russia and another from Belarus. To become an economic incentive, the order should be large; otherwise, it will be seen as just another attempt to study Russian technology.

    Furthermore, just selling weapons might not be enough: the February 20, 2001, Russian proposal envisioned something else: a joint R&D and a joint theater missile defense system because Russia needs one too, not a national (i.e., strategic) defense, but rather a defense against short- and medium-range missiles that might come from the south. The U.S. proposal does not give an answer to this rather carefully hidden concern.

  3. Seeking a different justification is another possibility. Russian opposition to NMD is principled: it is rooted in a theory of deterrence. Consequently, it would be unseemly to exchange it for "money." A concession is only possible if Russia is "convinced" by the United States that the theory does not apply any more, or that an exception can be made under particular conditions, or that the NMD will be limited and thus the theory will not be altered. Economic elements will always remain crucial (nothing can be done without them), but cannot stand alone.

    Interestingly, the "grand bargain" option – a START III treaty in exchange for amendments to the ABM Treaty – is apparently no longer in the cards. The Russian military seems to like the option of unilateral parallel reductions. START III remains the preferred route, but few expect that the United States would give Russia what it wants (in particular, the United States will hardly sacrifice the capability to upload delivery vehicles with nuclear warheads for the sake of a new treaty). Thus, the "Clinton plan" probably can no longer work.

  4. Waiting the United States out is another strategy. The future of NMD is still very uncertain: the shape of the system has not been chosen yet, technologies are unproven or absent, costs are high, etc. It might take a very long time until Russia loses its deterrence capability, so there is little reason to hurry and accept the first American proposal. In addition, the Europeans and the Chinese continue to oppose NMD, and the system might be further delayed by politics within the United States itself. Although NATO foreign ministers had to drop the mention of the ABM Treaty from their communiqué (contrary to some claims,[7] this happened only due to the very strong position of Colin Powell, not because European allies softened their opposition), only days earlier the European parliament had adopted a strong endorsement of the ABM Treaty. All in all, the example of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has taught the Russians a lesson: do not sacrifice substance to plans with an uncertain future.

That said, the Russian reaction is not totally negative. The idea of selling S-300 systems to the United States is certainly acceptable: Igor Ivanov emphasized simply that this issue and the ABM Treaty are not linked.[8] This proposition was laid down most clearly by a member of the Duma Defense Committee, Yevgeni Zelenov,[9] who strongly endorsed the sale of weapons to the United States, but equally strongly objected to any changes in the Russian position on the ABM Treaty.

The overall attitude of Russian officials seems quite positive and even benevolent. They expect consultations on strategic stability; a lucrative arms trade deal might also be in the cards. One can clearly feel readiness for a serious dialogue, but also an equal readiness for the absence of a deal. At the moment, negotiations would seem an achievement in and of themselves, particularly because the Putin government is more preoccupied with domestic economic reforms than with political-military issues.

The United States seems on the right track, but the ball is still in its court. It can go further toward a full-scale dialogue with Russia or decide that the tentative overture failed and nothing more should be done. The former seems a better choice: for the first time in months and probably even years one can finally detect some, albeit small, common ground in what seemed a hopeless and dangerous controversy. This common ground can be expanded, and even if the effort goes nowhere, nothing will be lost. There will be other contentious issues: next year's debate on NATO enlargement might precipitate a very real crisis. The calmer the debate on NMD, the less likely East-West relations will get out of hand in 2002.

[1] David Sanger and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Plans offer to Russia to End ABM Treaty Dispute," New York Times, May 28, 2001, p. 1.

[2] "Poslednii Raund Podgotovki Sammita Ivanov i Powell Zavershili v Budapeste," Strana.ru, May 30, 2001 (at www.strana.ru).

[3] William Drozdiak, "NATO divided on Missile Danger," Washington Post, May 30, 2001, p. 15.

[4] RosBusinessConsulting, May 28, 2001 (at http://www.rbc.ru); Dmitri Gornostaev, "Igor Ivanov: O Razmene S-300 na Pozitsiyu po PRO Ne Mozhet Byt i Rechi," Strana.ru, May 29, 2001 (at http://strana.ru/state/foreign/2001/05/29/991143592.html).

[5] Ivan Yegorov, "Sergei Ivanov; Otkaz ot Dogovora po PRO Budet Imet Nepredskazuemye Posledstviya," Strana.ru, May 28, 2001 (at http://strana.ru/state/foreign/2001/05/28/991051640.html).

[6] Michael Gordon, "Russia's Role In Missile Defense," New York Times, May 30, 2001.

[7] Ben Barber, "NATO Drops Its Support of ABM pact," Washington Times, May 30, 2001, p. 1.

[8] Anton Bilzho, "Predlozhenii, Uvyazyvayushchikh prodazhu S-200 I Pozitsiyu Rossii po PRO< Moskva ne poluchala," Strana.ru, May 28, 2001 (at http://strana.ru/state/foreign/2001/05/28/991055523.html).

[9] RosBusinessConsulting, May 28, 2001.

 

Author(s): Nikolai Sokov
Related Resources: NIS/Euro, Missiles, Web Reports
Date Created: 31 May 2001
Date Updated: -NA-
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