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CNS Reports

By Amin Tarzi

On Saturday July 15th, the Islamic Republic of Iran carried out the anticipated second test firing of the 1,350 km-range ballistic missile named Shehab-3. This missile represents the most potent hardware in Iran’s growing missile force. The first test of Shehab-3 took place in July 1998 with the missile exploding in mid-flight. Iranian sources have declared the second test of the missile a success. While most observers have agreed, there is no readily available data to confirm this.

The test is emblematic of Iran’s aspiration to be a regional military power in the Persian Gulf and in the Caspian region and to be able to defend itself against potential enemies. It can only achieve such status through production of ballistic missiles and possibly nuclear weapons. As such Iran flaunts its accomplishments in the missile development field – Tehran has maintained that the first test of Shehab-3 was also successful – and exaggerates the potency of its weapons. The missiles are important to Iran since they serve a multitude of purposes for the country:

• Most importantly, the memories of the eight-year war with Iraq are still vivid in the minds of Iranians and Tehran is very concerned about the re-emergence of Iraq as a rival military power in the region and sees itself as Baghdad’s main target.
• Given its weak economic situation and growing population, Iran is not able to modernize its depleted and ageing conventional forces.
• Certainly Iran cannot compete, at least in number and quality, with the air-forces of even small Arab Gulf states. A good example in this discrepancy would be the United Arab Emirates with which Iran has a territorial dispute and which, among other sophisticated military equipment, recently has ordered eighty F-16s with the most advanced equipment.
• Iran’s relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated both because of the anti-Shiite activities in Pakistan, but most importantly, over Islamabad’s policies in Afghanistan. As a result, relations between the two countries are unstable. Tehran is also sensitive to Pakistan’s military power, especially its nuclear weapons.
• Turkey’s NATO membership and its close strategic alliance with Israel are interpreted by Tehran as potential threats.
• Possession of missiles has become a source of prestige for many states and some have used the promise of eliminating some of their missile programs as political bargaining chips.

Interestingly, other than Turkey, none of the potential regional targets of Shehab-3 have said much about the recent test. Official Iranian sources have described the missile as a defensive weapon, and have pointed out that other than the United States and Israel no other country has been alarmed by the second test of Shehab-3. They maintain that Iran is a danger only to “oppressors and occupiers” – terms referring to the United States and Israel.

The reaction from Israel has been cautious, but not alarmist. Israel does not believe that it is the main target of Iran’s missiles. Most Israelis also have come to accept that Iran has legitimate defense requirements that may include the development of ballistic missiles out to – but not beyond – the range of potential regional enemies. However, given the overt hostility of Tehran towards the Jewish State, and in view of the messages that have been written on the Shehab-3 in military parades calling for the destruction of Israel, Israel cannot be assumed to remain indifferent to the Shehab-3.

The reaction from the United States has basically been nonchalant. U.S. officials have given the impression that the Shehab-3 test was expected and that Iran will develop missiles with longer ranges thereby justifying the development of its own National Missile Defense (NMD). Whether by coincidence or by design the Iranian test of Shehab-3 has given renewed impetus to NMD.

Authorities in Tehran have consistently criticized U.S. plans to deploy a NMD system. However, they paraded the same Shehab-3 missile in September of 1999 with a message on it in English reading “We will trample upon the USA.” Moreover, Iran has so far refused to open official dialogue with the current U.S. administration. Recent comments from American officials have reiterated the call on Iran to open such a dialogue that would include the issue of Iran’s weapons development. In the absence of such a dialogue, no American administration can afford to be indifferent to explicit threats against it, whether those threats are real or purely rhetorical. This situation could potentially result in new actions by Washington that may lead to a renewed global arms race and heightened tension.

The Iranian missile program may well be a defensive measure, but when instead of improvements in the accuracy and quantity of its missiles, Iran works to increase their range, and showcases these missiles with polemical messages printed on them, Tehran becomes a partner—perhaps unwillingly—in promoting the NMD program.