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CNS Reports

May 22, 2000

At their summit next month, President Bill Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin will try to reach a "grand bargain" on nuclear arms control. Specifically, they will try to work out a deal to move ahead on a START III treaty, which Russia wants and the United States favors (a subtle, but important difference).

In exchange for Russian acquiescence to amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty, the deal would allow the deployment of a limited national missile defense by the United States. The chances for a deal are slim. A US decision to begin deployment of a limited national missile defense is almost a foregone conclusion, and President Clinton's ability to negotiate is questionable in the aftermath of congressional Republicans' promise to defeat any arms control deal he makes.

Russia takes a dim view of any ABM amendments and might retaliate through a new arms buildup or withdrawal from existing arms control treaties.

The missile defense discussions lack two key requirements of success: patience and clear understanding of the time frame. It will take about 10 years to deploy the limited missile defense foreseen by the Clinton administration and most likely even longer for a larger-scale defense.

It is not even clear whether a national missile defense is technologically feasible and whether it adequately addresses perceived threats.

Consequently, both a US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the likely Russian response will wreak needless havoc on the arms control regimes. A better short-term policy for both sides would be to minimize immediate damage to arms control.

From this perspective, the Clinton administration's approach makes sense. In effect, the president is trying to obtain Russian agreement to very limited amendments necessary to launch construction of a national missile defense site in Alaska in early 2001.

In this way, he can give the go-ahead for the defense while also giving the next president an opportunity to return to the status quo if in the future it turns out that the system does not work or is unnecessary.

If Clinton's "go slow" approach does not work, in the interests of avoiding major damage to arms control regimes, Putin should refrain from hastily abrogating existing agreements. He can decide, for example, that U.S. moving earth in Alaska does not violate the ABM Treaty in and of itself.

Patience can yield benefits for each side without tangible losses. For Russia, it does not make much sense to wreck useful arms control agreements in response to a system that will not exist for a long time, will hardly affect its retaliatory capability for many years, and might fail altogether.

In a few years Russia might be able to fashion a better deal or, if necessary, field a precisely targeted response to whatever defense will emerge.

The United States might acquire a national missile defense in 10 years or so, but will lose data exchange and inspection rights immediately if Russia withdraws from START I. Furthermore, much of current U.S. planning is predicated on the assumption that the Russian economy will remain in a sorry state. But what if it improves? What if in response to the perceived US threat Russia decides to align itself with China?

Finally, what if the nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes collapse under the weight of US-Russian and US-Chinese confrontation?

The threats that stimulated the proposed defense in the first place will multiply on a scale that no national missile defense will be able to withstand. The price of hasty decisions might be too high.

In the future the United States still might deploy a defense system and Russia might respond in some fashion. But this would be done under less stressful conditions and with a clearer idea of the costs and benefits. By acting now both sides risk incurring costs without guaranteed benefits.

Unfortunately, prudence is sidelined by politics of patriotism. Those who perceive the greatest threat or advocate the most radical action are hailed as patriots, while those who promote caution and avoid destruction of existing arms control regimes are vulnerable to accusations of being unpatriotic.

This trend can be seen in the US and if Putin decides to proceed cautiously he too might be branded a traitor. But genuine patriotism presupposes prudence, cool-headed calculation, and calibrated response.

Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif.