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CNS Reports

By Nikolai Sokov

Russian President Vladimir Putin dramatically proposed on 6 June 2000 that the United States, Russia, and NATO jointly establish a pan-European non-strategic missile defense system.[1] This new initiative, announced during Putin's visit to Rome, stands in stark contrast to the rather uneventful US-Russian summit in Moscow just a few days earlier. The Moscow summit failed to produce a "grand bargain" that would have traded amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty for lower overall warhead ceilings in START III. Putin's unexpected initiative in Rome redefined what had seemed a stable framework of international interactions around US plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) system. Instead of a "grand bargain," we might be entering a period of a "grand NMD game."

On its surface, the new Russian move seeks to exploit the growing differences between the United States and Europe over US NMD plans. From this point of view, Russia has two goals: first, to derail NMD deployment and, second, to split or at least weaken NATO. Barely concealed US displeasure with the new Russian initiative probably stems from this type of analysis of Putin's motives. However, while the new initiative is clearly anti-NMD, the assumption that it is also "anti-NATO" may well be incorrect. A number of rather subtle, but nevertheless telling elements in the new Russian approach suggest that the thrust is different: it may represent an attempt to accelerate a rapprochement with NATO and maybe ultimately Russian integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. At a minimum, Putin is probably aiming at establishing an equidistant relationship between NATO and China.

Constant and Variable Elements of the Russian Approach.

Opposition to US NMD plans remains a permanent fixture of Russian national security policy. This position will hardly change any time soon, if ever. But in the last few months there have been fewer public threats that Russia would withdraw from arms control agreements, modernize its nuclear forces, and make additional deployments if the United States pushes ahead with its NMD plans despite Russian opposition.

Instead, during Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to Washington in May and then in Putin's interview on the eve of the Moscow summit, Russia has proposed a joint US-Russian non-strategic missile defense system that is intended to address US concerns with about the missile programs of North Korea, Iran, and other states. This proposal may indicate that a choice has been made to seek alternative, non-confrontational ways of preventing possible US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty. If so, it would represent a significant departure from the traditional balancing behavior that has characterized Russian foreign policy for more than a century.

It is also worth recalling that even before he was elected president, Putin unexpectedly declared that it is not inconceivable that Russia could join NATO in the future. After that, he presided over a gradual restoration of the Russian-NATO relationship, which had been all but frozen in response to last year's war in the Balkans. Of course, these developments could be--and largely have been--simply dismissed as tactics aimed at undermining US NMD policy. The Moscow summit and the Rome initiative, however, produced some tangible evidence that Russian policy may be changing in earnest.

First, the agreement reached at the Moscow summit to create a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches (Joint Data Exchange Center) represented a genuine concession by Russia designed to meet some American concerns.[2] Russia estimates that its assets to monitor launches to the south of its territory are more extensive than those of the United States. Thus the US will gain useful information from sharing the information from these assets through the center. At the same time, Russia gains relatively little, because information about US and other missile launches will not be provided in real time. As a result, the center cannot substitute for an early warning system. This perceived asymmetry of explains why Russia rejected a similar US proposal at the September 1998 summit. In addition, by agreeing to share data from its radars with the United States, Russia also risks antagonizing a number of potential allies, such as China, India, and Iran. Seen from this point of view, the Memorandum of Agreement establishing the center may represent a sign that earlier Russian gestures signaling a willingness to find cooperative ways to address the missile threat were genuine.

The proposal for a pan-European missile defense system has similar aspects. Putin's initiative immediately caused displeasure in Beijing.[3] The potential disagreement can be resolved (after all, Russia has not agreed to ABM Treaty modifications, which is China's greatest concern), but the Rome initiative suggests that Putin is prepared to stop Russia's drift toward China.

Russia can offer off-the-shelf non-strategic missile defense systems: the S-300 which was earlier sold to Cyprus and is currently marketed to South Korea, India, China, and a number of other countries, and a more advanced S-400 whose testing has recently been completed. These can be used as the basis of a future continent-wide defense system; Russia also proposes to expand the bilateral Joint Data Exchange Center to Europe.

Recently, the United States has also begun to talk about creating a defense system for Europe (reportedly, it might be centered in the Czech Republic).[5] Thus, in principle there is common ground, although whether domestic politics in all the potential participants will allow these initiatives to move forward remains to be seen.

Opportunities and Problems

Interestingly, the new Russian policy is underspecified: Putin's own statement consisted only of a few sentences. Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, at a meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, listed seven proposed areas of cooperation, but they, too, were formulated in very broad terms.[6] This vagueness could have two different causes.

First, it might be a reflection of a traditional Russian style in foreign policy making: historically Russia (and the Soviet Union, for that matter) has rarely conducted in-depth development of new initiatives in advance. Attention was devoted instead to inventing a politically attractive proposal that the head of state would publicly announce with great fanfare. Details would be added later as necessary at high-level meetings. The first week after Putin's statement in Rome seems to follow this pattern. On the other hand, the vagueness might be intentional: it is possible that the plan is to gauge reactions to the new proposal, and then determine its final shape to allow for maximum effect. So far, this has been Putin's preferred modus operandi in domestic politics.

Either way, NATO now has an opportunity to modify the Russian proposal so that it is more acceptable. Instead of the familiar Soviet rigidity, there is considerable flexibility. On the other hand, Putin's initiative presents a challenge. He is on the offensive. He did not wait for the United States to define the terms, forms, and substance of cooperation: instead, he took the initiative himself. Rejecting Putin's proposals will not be cost-free for the United States. It will antagonize Russia and possibly Europe. After all, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both proposed a system that would defend Europe. Russia wants to cooperate, not replace the United States, and a simple rejection is bound to cast current US NMD plans as an anti-Russian endeavor and to demonstrate that NATO-Russian cooperation is nothing but rhetoric.

Putin's "cooperative offensive" is also shaped in such a way that all his advances to the West are so far retractable: START II is ratified, but its entry into force is conditional; CTBT has also been ratified, but it will hardly enter into force in the foreseeable future; the joint US-Russian and European non-strategic defense initiatives are conditional on a cooperative US stance. Until Russian proposals are accepted, they will not go into effect, and if they are rejected, Russia can always say, "we did what we could," and then lay the blame for whatever actions it takes in response at the other side's doorstep.

The most intriguing element of the situation is that the offer to cooperate might be genuine: for economic and political reasons Russia is interested in integrating into the Euro-Atlantic community. But Putin is clearly not interested in cooperation on just any terms: he wants Russia to be a partner, not a follower.

Long- vs. Short-Term "Game."

The greatest difference between the US and the Russian approaches to NMD seems to be the way the time frame is conceptualized. An unspoken assumption of many NMD proponents in the United States is that and NMD system is technologically feasible and will be deployed very soon. This creates a sense of urgency and fear that the plan might be derailed. A similar sense of urgency was until only recently characteristic for most Russian pronouncements: there existed a fear in Moscow that very soon the proposed US NMD system would alter the strategic balance.

The current Russian approach appears to be built around different notions: the technological feasibility of all NMD plans is viewed as questionable and deployment of any NMD system will take a long time. As a result Russia will have several years before it must react. These years can be used productively: for example, to revive and improve the relationship with NATO and with the European Union, achieve stable economic growth, increase Russia's attractiveness to investors, and export its own tactical missile defense systems (S-300 and S-400), etc.

The calculation seems to be that Russia has very little to lose no matter how the "game" develops in the future. Putin gains if the European defense system materializes because Russia will benefit both politically and economically. He gains if the NMD proves to be technologically or politically unfeasible: in this case, he will be able to say that he had been right all along. He even gains if his initiative is rejected and a US NMD is deployed, since then Russia will hold the political and moral high ground and will be freer to react as it chooses. Taking this longer-term view means that steps such as Russian withdrawal from arms control treaties, rapprochement with China (including joint development of defense systems), or giving Russian (and possibly Chinese) strategic weapons greater ability to penetrate defenses remain as fallback options. But in the meantime Putin can afford to try alternative approaches.

At the same time, Putin's new initiative presents the United States with difficult choices. In a presidential election year, it could be politically risky to respond positively to bold new Russian initiatives. On the other hand, it is also risky, especially in the longer term, to put all bets on a system which is technologically unproven and creates conflict with allies. Unlike the "win-win" Putin's situation, American domestic politics seems to gravitate toward a "lose-lose" option primarily because the dominant "game" today is determined by short-term goals.

[1] Marina Volkova and Sergei Startsev, Putin Predlozhil Sozdat Obshcheevropeiskuyu Sistemy PRO, Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 7, 2000, 1; Alessandra Stanley, Putin Goes To Rome To Promote Russian Arms Control Alternative, New York Times, June 6, 2000, 1.

[2] Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data From Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile launches, June 4, 2000 (available at http://usinfo.state.gov/homepage.htm).

[3] Beijing Hints Opposition to a Russian-European Anti-Missile system, Agence France Presse, June 6, 2000.

[4] Vladimir Yermolin, Sistemy PRO Rossii i SShA Sovmestimy, Izvestiya, June 9, 2000.

[5] Kevin Whitelaw and Richard Newman, Pentagon Envisions a Missile Shield for Wary Allies, US News & World Report, June 12, 2000, 34.

[6] Igor Korotchenko, Sergeev Konkretiziroval Initsiativy Putina v Oblasti PRO, Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 10, 2000.

Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif.