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See a Russian-text diagram depicting the Russia-proposed European BMD here.

Strangely enough, the new Russian proposal for a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system , which Russian Minister of Defense Igor Sergeev gave to NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson on February 20, 2001, did not draw serious attention from the media. Reports about that meeting boiled down to claims that Russia admitted the presence of missile threats and interpreted the new proposal as evidence that the seemingly implacable foe of American plans to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) is changing position. U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), who visited Moscow immediately after Lord Robertson, called it a "bluff" designed "to drive a wedge between NATO allies and the U.S."[1]  Even more intriguing is that the diagram depicting the proposed defense system remains unknown.

To a large extent, the negative or, at best, indifferent response on the part of the West can be explained by a very simple fact: Russians have not yet learned to "sell" new initiatives. The document given to Robertson is as far from a good business plan as one can imagine. There have been precious few press conferences and interviews in the days following the Sergeev-Robertson meeting. Even the full text of the proposal was not made available. Only three weeks later, Russians went to NATO Headquarters in Brussels to explain the intent and the contents of their new proposal.

The vagueness of the expanded initiative should not discourage NATO. Rather, it should be treated as an opportunity because NATO can now fill the gaps and help shape Russian policy on this critical issue in ways that would be compatible with NATOs own interests and security needs.

A New Step in an Old Policy

The document Lord Robertson received in Moscowwe were able to obtain it from Russian sourcesrepresents a new development in an almost year-old policy.

The idea of a cooperative U.S.-Russian defense system was advanced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov on a trip to Washington in May 2000. Then, on June 4, 2000, at a U.S.-Russian summit meeting in Moscow, the two sides signed an agreement to establish a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches (Joint Data Exchange Center).[2]

Immediately following that agreement, on June 6, 2000, during a trip to Europe, President Vladimir Putin proposed a joint U.S.-NATO-Russian missile defense system to protect Europe. It became clear that instead of a "grand bargain" (an expected trade-off between START III, which Russia sought, and amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty, which were sought by the United States) the first place on the U.S.-Russian agenda now belonged to a "grand National Missile Defense game." (See CNS report A Grand NMD Game: The Challenge Of New Russian Initiatives.)

In the summer of 2000, however, little was known about the new initiative except vague generalities. Sergeevs subsequent visit to Brussels did not shed additional light: his comments were primarily limited to a proposal to conduct discussions. The new step, the document presented to Lord Robertson in February, finally added some "beef" to the Putins pronouncement.

Sabotage or Invitation?

The new document is far more interesting and complex than the media has portrayed it. Problems with interpreting it stem at least partially from the fact that it exists on several dimensions simultaneously.

On the surface, it might, indeed, look like a not-so-subtle attempt to derail U.S. NMD plans. As the George W. Bush Administration shifts emphasis from a purely national to a pan-NATO defense system and even drops the word "national" from its description, the Russian proposal can be seen to offer an alternative system. Such an alternative is likely to fail, however, because Europe is certain to choose the American offer.

Deeper down, the document conveys a different message: regardless of whether there is a missile threat and what kind of system is chosen for deployment, Russian opposition might weaken or even evaporate if it participates in R&D and deployment. Thus, the new initiative is not really about competition, but rather about cooperation. Moscow has, indeed, noticed the new U.S. Presidents cautious statements with regard to cooperation with Russia and is hurrying to capitalize on them without sacrificing its own interests. The fact that the invitation to tango is so well hidden might mean nothing more than a tactical mistake.

Yet another dimension of the proposal, reinforcing the previous one, is technical. The Russian defense industry seeks contracts (especially in the absence of its own government's funding) and views EuroBMD as an opportunity rather than a threat. Although the political-military establishment in Moscow continues to strongly oppose missile defense plans, it seems that it is prepared to make a concession to its own defense industry and, by implication, to NATO as well. Concession to NATO alone is most likely not in the cards.

The new line can be clearly seen in two recent events. First, on March 2, Igor Sergeev publicly disciplined Chief of the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Lt.-Gen. Vyacheslav Romanov for an excessively tough statement on U.S. NMD.[3] Ten days later, Chief of the Defense Ministrys International Cooperation Department Col.-Gen. Leonid Ivashov, well known for his belligerent statements, declared that if the United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty, Russia would rely on political means instead of an arms race.[4]

Is there a threat?

According to the proposal, the first stage of the EuroBMD will be devoted to exhaustive consultations among all interested countries. These consultations should cover, among other issues: the nature and scale of missile proliferation in regions that are potentially dangerous for Europe; the prospects of non-strategic missile capability development in these regions in the next 5, 10, and 15 years; characteristics of the existing and prospective non-strategic missiles in these regions; creation of a joint database on missile programs; assessment of political and diplomatic means to counter potential threats; and security consequences of a EuroBMD.

To a large extent, the proposal about consultations proceeds from the premise that the missile threat in reality does not exist today and maybe will not even emerge in the foreseeable future. In the eyes of the Russian military, such consultations, if conducted objectively, might demonstrate that there are not good reasons for a missile defense system in the first place.

On the other hand, consultations are a good fallback position if it is demonstrated to Russia that the threat does exist. In that case, it will be easy to pursue a cooperative defense system.

Consultations can also help avoid finger-pointing: Russia is developing relations with some states which the United States identifies as primary missile threats, in particular Iran. It would be much more convenient for Russia to pursue a "neutral" defense system against any future threat irrespective of its origin.

Consultations with NATO follow and somewhat expand the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative, which was adopted by Vladimir Putin and Bill Clinton on September 6, 2000. That initiative also provided for discussions on emerging ballistic threats and also for joint missile defense exercises.

Irrespective of the Russian militarys intentions, a substantive, in-depth discussion of potential missile threats seems advisable. The Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Andrei Nikolaev, recently complained that various seminars and roundtables between Russia and NATO only gloss over real problems and are increasingly turning into "political tourism."[5] A serious endeavor involving not only political, but also military and technical aspects, should give depth to a dialogue which so far has resembled a conversation of the deaf: "there is a threat" "there is no threat." The current format hardly leads anywhere and might ultimately result in a "quiet death" of contacts, including the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council, simply because there will be no interest in it. At this stage of NATO-Russian relations the form and the substance of the dialogue appear more important than its expected outcome.

Planning for a EuroBMD

The next stage of the process is envisioned as joint development of EuroBMDs concept and technical characteristics. The range of issues that have to be resolved includes the following: identification of the ballistic missiles that will have to be intercepted; areas that need defense; parameters of the joint "information field" necessary for effective operations of defense systems; required information and combat (interceptor) systems; command and control systems (including the joint command and control center, communication links, etc.); the architecture of the EuroBMD (the number of layers, the composition of the system, etc.); and others along the same lines.

The Russian proposal does not contain a description of how Russia itself envisions the future missile defense system capable of protecting Europe. This might seem a mistake, but the reason is clearly the unwillingness to pinpoint potential threats.

The principal scheme of the future system is illustrated in a diagram appended to the document that was given to Lord Robertson on February 20. The diagram reinforces one of the key points: EuroBMD is intended to be used against non-strategic missiles: intermediate-range and tactical, i.e., those subject to the U.S.-Soviet/Russian INF Treaty and those with shorter ranges. It is reasonable to hypothesize that it will be capable of intercepting cruise missiles as well.

It is not clear which of the existing Russian missile defense systems served as the basis for the proposal. Clearly, the S-300 family is expected to fit into the future architecture. The S-400 "Triumph" the development and testing of which is nearly complete and which is ready for deployment can be used as well, especially since it is reportedly capable of intercepting intermediate-range systems. According to Rep. Curt Weldon, his Russian interlocutors also raised the projected S-500 system, which so far exists only on paper. Russia does not have the money to develop it, but seems prepared to contribute what it has. Since interceptors for long-range missiles (the S-500, according to some reports, might even have capability against strategic missiles) do not really exist in any country and since Russia has extensive experience with two previous generations of missile defense systems, such a contribution seems reasonable.

The document itself contains only rather general provisions with regard to the proposed system.

• The choice of the systems will be determined collectively by the states-parties to the future system. Russia is prepared to contribute its own existing and future weapons systems as well as testing facilities. Joint multinational R&D programs are also possible.
• The future system will be mobile and function as a "rapid deployment" theater defense system. It should be deployable to any part of Europe and to any state-party to the EuroBMD that comes under ballistic missile threat.
• According to the diagram, the system will be multilayered. It will provide defense for rather large areas (the size of these areas was not specified) and additional "reinforced" defense for select smaller areas, apparently those of greatest value. It is possible that more than two layers can be created.
• Units of the system will be multinational and, at least at the first stage, might include weapons components from different nations as long as they are compatible.
• Initially, target tracking and acquisition systems will be primarily land-based and will include both national air-defense systems and new international assets. As necessary, new assets can be developed jointly.
• At a later stage, space-based missile launch tracking systems can be used as well. Judging by the diagram, the Russian proposal does not envision direct cueing from satellites to interceptors.
• The system will include a joint early warning data exchange center (probably fashioned along the lines of the analogous U.S.-Russian center). This center will be manned by international crews and will use data from both national and new international early warning systems.
• Units comprising the system will regularly engage in maneuvers and simulations.

Conclusion

A close reading of the February 20 proposal and the broader political context surrounding it lead to several tentative conclusions.

First, the proposal is more serious than it actually seems. The deficiencies can be attributed to two reasons.

• Russiansat least in the military establishmenthave not yet learned to "package" and "sell" new initiatives.

• Russians are afraid to antagonize a number of countries (Iran is the first candidate) and do not want to identify those against whom the future system is intended.

Second, regardless of whether NATO wants to engage Russia in the joint development of a defense system capable of protecting Europe from intermediate-range missiles, it should, at the very least, accept the proposal to participate in a substantive, detailed dialogue on ballistic missile threats and the political-military consequences of a theater missile defense. The outcome of that dialogue is less important than the process itself: NATO-Russian interaction consists of much talk yet little genuine cooperation, but the kind of discussion Russia envisions may revitalize that relationship.

Third, the vagueness of the proposal should be seen as an opportunity, not as a drawback. In its current shape, the Russian initiative allows NATO to fill in the blanks and to shape the possible cooperative venture in the way most acceptable to NATO. In effect, Russia is giving NATO a carte blanche: this opportunity should not be missed.

Fourth, joint development of missile defense systems can change the political landscape inside Russia itself. To repeat an earlier point, the Russian political-military establishment will hardly make a concession to the United States or NATO, but it will make a concession to its own defense-industrial complex. The prospect of contracts funded by NATO can introduce a new and powerful actor to the scene, which is currently monopolized by the military. Without this new actorand a potential allygenuine progress on defense issues cannot be achieved.

After several years of rather fruitless antagonism, the future is beginning to look brighter. It seems that both the new U.S. and the new Russian administrations are favorably disposed toward a renewed dialogue and can use the emerging opportunity.

[1] Jeff Bennett, Weldon: Time for U.S. to Call Russias Bluff on Missile Defense, Inside Missile Defense, March 7, 2001, p. 1.

[2] Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data From Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile launches, June 4, 2000 (available at http://usinfo.state.gov/homepage.htm).

[3] Oleg Odnokolenko, Kak Podstrigayut Topolya, Segodnya, March 2, 2001, p. 1; Ivan Safronov, Marshal Sergeev Nakazal Generala Romanova, Kommersant-Daily, March 2, 2001.

[4] Yuri Chernega, Rossiya Vspomnit o Raketakh Lish v Krainem Sluchae, Komersant-Daily, March 13, 2001.

[5] Vadim Markushin, Ot Razgovorov K Delu, Krasnaya Zvezda, March 12, 2001.

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