James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

By Nikolai Sokov

On May 14, 2003 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly (the Russian parliament), ratified the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as SORT or the Moscow Treaty) by 294 votes against 134 with 22 abstaining. Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin had signed the treaty on May 24, 2002. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the Moscow Treaty on March 6, 2003.

Formally, the Duma vote is only the first step: the upper chamber, the Federation Council, also needs to approve the treaty before it can enter into force. Still, the Duma is generally considered a more difficult barrier, and its stamp of approval virtually guarantees success in the Federation Council. Some have tentatively suggested that the exchange of instruments of ratification, i.e., the entry of the Moscow Treaty into force, could take place during the upcoming meeting between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg in late May.

The Difficult Road to Ratification

The road to ratification was not easy and sometimes brought to mind the fate of the treaty's predecessor, START II. Russia ratified START II only in April 2000, more than four years after the Senate ratification, but it has never entered into force. In June 2002, the next day after the U.S. formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced START II null and void.

The original draft ratification resolution (the Law on Ratification) for the Moscow Treaty submitted by the government was rejected by the Duma Defense Committee after extensive hearings in the late 2002 - early 2003. That draft effectively contained only two provisions: the first announced the treaty ratified while the other determined the entry of the ratification law into force upon publication.[1] Rather than adopt this resolution, the deputies came up with their own draft law, which they sent to the Kremlin asking that it be adopted as the official President's submission. Vladimir Putin submitted the new text in March 2003,[2] effectively ensuring the treaty's ratification. Duma action on SORT was scheduled for March 21.

Two days before the vote, however, the Duma decided to postpone ratification in protest against the war in Iraq,[3] bringing to mind several similar postponements of START II (in 1998 to register protest against the appointment of Sergei Kirienko as Prime Minister, which was unceremoniously pushed through the Duma by Boris Yeltsin; in December 1998 in protest against "Desert Fox," a large-scale bombing of Iraq; and in the spring of 1999 in protest against the war in Kosovo). Yet again the timing of U.S. military action was unfortunate -- literally days and hours before the scheduled Duma action on an important arms control treaty. Igor Ivanov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, endorsed the Duma's decision, saying that ratification would have been "inappropriate."[4] Interestingly, President Putin's attitude was apparently somewhat different. His representative to the Duma, Alexander Kotenkov, called the deputies' decision "a mistake."[5] Subsequently the President reiterated Russia's interest in ratification of the Moscow Treaty and said that while the continuing row between the United States and Russia over Iraq created "an unfavorable background for ratification," the government would continue to "work" with the Duma to ensure action at the earliest time.[6]

Ratification of the Moscow Treaty was tentatively rescheduled for May 16,[7] but unofficial sources talked even about June, probably reflecting Moscow's expectations for the duration of the military operation in Iraq. The early end of the war put SORT back on schedule, but only days before ratification, the Speaker of the Duma, Gyennadi Seleznev, said that the vote was going to be postponed from the 16th to the 21st of May due to the unusually late timing of Putin's State of the Nation address.[8] The Kremlin unexpectedly interfered, requesting a vote on May 14 in an apparent attempt to create a favorable background for the visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. The last-minute attempt by the Communist Party on the morning of May 14 to drop the Moscow Treaty from the agenda failed,[9] and the treaty was ratified during the afternoon session.

Ratification Package, Reporting and Withdrawal Provisions

The package approved by the Duma consists of three documents: the Law on Ratification and two statements, "On the Ensuring of the Maintenance of Combat Readiness and Development of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation" and "On the Position of the State Duma With Regard to Strategic Offensive Reductions and on the Measures for Coordination of Activities of State Agencies of the Russian Federation in the Area of Strategic Offensive Reductions."[10]

The law contains many provisions that are similar to those in the U.S. Senate resolution, in particular the reporting requirement: the President is requested to provide annual (no later than March 31 each year) reports to the Federal Assembly on the implementation of SORT by Russia and the United States. These reports should also include: new developments with regard to deployment of missile defense systems by other states (not just by the United States), progress in arms control negotiations with the United States and other countries, etc.

The law contains specific provisions on the withdrawal from SORT that are similar to analogous provisions in the START II ratification law. Specifically, it classifies as extraordinary circumstances that could trigger withdrawal from SORT the following:

• substantial violation of SORT by the United States (an obvious formality),
• deployment by another state or group of states of a missile defense system that could reduce the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and
• the buildup of strategic forces by another state or group of states or other decisions that could create a threat to Russia's supreme national interests.[11]

Unlike in the START II ratification law, the new document does not link threatening deployment of missile defenses or of strategic offensive arms exclusively to the United States. This demonstrates that the Duma is increasingly concerned about other countries, including probably China, which is engaged in modernization of its strategic capability. It is also interesting to note that deployment of non-strategic missile defenses around Russian territory could also affect its strategic forces (the law talks about missile defense in general instead of just defense against strategic missiles), and thus such deployment in countries adjacent to Russia (for example, South Korea or Japan) is classified in advance as a matter of concern.

Enhanced Role of the Parliament in Russia's Policy on Strategic Nuclear Weapons

The package of documents approved by the Duma centered on the state and the future of Russia's strategic arsenal instead of the treaty itself. SORT allows maximum flexibility to both sides. In a statement during the hearings on May 14, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov emphasized the intention of the military to fully utilize this feature of the treaty.[12] Russia's ability to fully utilize new opportunities is limited, however, by insufficient funding and the continuing intrigues inside the military establishment. In 2000, a series of decisions initiated by Chief of the General Staff Anatoli Kvashnin mandated fundamental changes in the composition of the Russian strategic triad, including radical reduction of the land-based "leg," ICBMs. (See CNS research reports "Denuclearization" of Russia's Defense Policy? and The Fate of Russian Nuclear Weapons: An Anticlimax on August 11.)

With that in mind, the Duma sought to use the ratification process to increase and firmly establish its role in future decisions on R&D and weapons acquisition. The law reiterates the parliament's "power of the purse" that will allow it a more direct impact on substantive decisions with regard to the composition of the strategic force, the choice of R&D programs, and reduction of the arsenal.

This element of the law and accompanying resolutions is especially significant since the Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Andrei Nikolaev, is known as a die-hard opponent of Kvashnin's line with regard to strategic weapons. And, indeed, in an interview shortly before ratification, Nikolaev emphasized that one of the central benefits of the Moscow Treaty is Russia's right to retain MIRVed ICBMs (he noted that heavy SS-18 ICBMs will be kept until 2015) and to deploy both mobile and silo versions of the new ICBM, Topol-M, as well as to equip these ICBMs with MIRVed warheads.[13] These steps stand in direct contrast to the 2000 decisions and reinforce the process, started in 2002, to modify the policy of deep and early reduction of the ICBM force.

In addition to the parliament's role in the budget process, the law requires the President to submit, no later than three months after the entry into force of SORT, a report on the government's plans with regard to development of strategic nuclear forces. One month after that report, the government is to submit a draft law "On the Financing of the State Order for Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation." This provision, coupled with annual reports on the implementation of the Moscow Treaty, will further institutionalize the ability of the parliament to affect decisions on the strategic arsenal. Reports of the executive branch will enable it to hold debates on the key aspects of the government's policy and, in particular, to exercise greater control over decisions made within the Ministry of Defense both with regard to R&D and acquisition and with regard to the manner and pace of reductions -- probably the most important tool for changing the composition of the triad.

The statement "On the Ensuring of the Maintenance of Combat Readiness and Development of Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation" further stipulates that reductions under SORT should be planned in such a way that "combat capabilities and the potential of strategic nuclear forces of the country be maintained at the level guaranteeing deterrence of aggression from any state or group of states and under any military-strategic conditions."[14]

The statement also asks the government to pay special attention to Russia's own missile defense capability as well as to the early warning system, including its space-based component. At the same time, Russian offensive weapons should be given enhanced ability to penetrate defense systems of other countries (probably referring, among other things, to MIRVing of the Topol-M).

Furthermore, the Duma wants the President and the government to find new ways of: supporting the defense industry, including protectionist measures to shield it from foreign competition; preventing or, apparently, even reversing bankruptcy of defense plans that support strategic nuclear forces; and ensuring that the defense industry enjoys more favorable prices on energy, transportation, and supplies.

Arms Control Agenda

The second of the two resolutions, "On the Position of the State Duma with Regard to Strategic Offensive Reductions and on the Measures for Coordination of Activities of State Agencies of the Russian Federation in the Area of Strategic Offensive Reductions," contains an impressive list of arms control measures that the government is asked to pursue in the near future. The central place is occupied by the agenda that directly follows from the Moscow Treaty, namely:

• an agreement on the pace of reductions (SORT does not provide for a staged, gradual process of reductions);
• an agreement on transparency of reductions (in essence, data exchange, which is already mandated, in an indirect and unilateral manner, by both the U.S. and the Russian ratification resolutions);
• an agreement on broad measures on transparency and predictability with regard to strategic forces, including not just exchange of data on reductions already implemented, but also on plans for future reductions (for example, this could mean that each side would share information on how many and which weapons would be reduced in the following year); and
• an agreement on confidence-building and transparency measures with regard to missile defense systems.

At a more general level, the Duma suggested the following multilateral arms control measures:

• a ban on deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories (in this regard, it classified as "unjustified" the presence of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe);
• a ban on production of new nuclear weapons (warheads); and
• multilateral transparency measures with regard to nuclear weapons, development of a joint strategy on nuclear nonproliferation, and reduction of nuclear weapons.

Finally, the Duma called on the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The arms control part of the ratification package requires that representatives of the legislature be included in all interagency groups within the government charged with planning of strategic weapons reductions, as well as Russia's arms control policy. This move is also designed to enhance the stature and the influence of the legislature, subjecting the Foreign and Defense Ministries to more intense scrutiny from parliament.

Conclusion

Ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Duma was widely expected and, in a sense, inevitable given the high interest of the government, including and especially President Putin, in that treaty. The President has demonstrated once again that he fully controls the arms control and, in a broader sense, international agenda and is able to make the parliament, when necessary, do his bidding.

Of greater interest is the contents of the documents approved by the Duma, in particular the greater role these documents accord to the legislature in the decisions on the future of the Russian nuclear forces and arms control policy. It is no secret that many parliamentarians, including and especially in key committees, are unhappy with Chief of the General Staff Anatoli Kvashnin and have long sought to limit his ability to control the shape and the capabilities of the nuclear arsenal. Ratification of the Moscow Treaty provided them with such an opportunity. It is even more interesting that Putin apparently does not object to a greater role for the parliament in Russia's nuclear policy: after all, he agreed to dump his own initial draft of the ratification law and submitted the Duma's version as his own, giving it his stamp of approval.

[1] Dmitri Litovkin, "Gosduma soglasitsya na sokrashchenie yadernykh arsenalov" (The State Duma Will Agree to the Reduction of Nuclear Arsenals), Izvestiya, March 14, 2003.
[2] "Vladimir Putin vnyos v Gosdumu v novoi redaktsii zakonoproekt o ratifikatsii rossiisko-amerikanskkogo Dogovora o SNP" (Vladimir Putin Introduced into the Duma a New Draft Law on the Ratification of the Russian-American SORT Treaty), Strana.ru, March 13, 2003.
[3] Andrei Lebedev, "Stepen' vliyania" (The Degree of Influence), Izvestiya, March 20, 2003.
[4] Yulia Petrovskaya "Ivanov perestal byt pokladistym" (Ivanov Is No Longer Agreeable), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 27, 2003.
[5] Andrei Lebedev, "S Stepen' vliyania"...
[6] "Vladimir Putin: RF zainteresovana v ratifikatsii Dogovora o sokrashchenii SNP" (Vladimir Putin" Russia Is Interested in Ratification of SORT), Strana.ru, April 5, 2003.
[7] "Gosduma mozhet ratifitsirovat dogovor ob SNP 16 maya" (The State Duma Might Ratify SORT on May 16), Strana.ru, April 16, 2003.
[8] Nikolai Poroskov, "Prezidentskoe slovo" (The Word of the President), Vremya Novostei, May 12, 2003, p. 4.
[9] Plenarnye zasedaniya Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, 14 maya 2003 goda, utrennee zasedania (Plenary Sessions of the State Duma, May 14, 2003, the morning session), available through http://www.integrum.com.
[10] The text of the Law on Ratification was not available at the time of this writing, but the draft text, which remained unchanged, was published earlier: Romashkin, "Novyi proekt federalnogo zakona o ratifikatsii dogovora SNP" (The New Draft Federal Law on Ratification of SORT), http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/exclusive/pbr031203.htm, March 12, 2003. The text of the statements can be found at http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/sort-z1.htm and http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/sort-z2.htm.
[11] Petr Romashkin, "Novyi proekt federalnogo zakona..."
[12] ITAR-TASS, May 14, 2003.
[13] Quoted at http://www.grani.ru, May13. 2003.
[14] ITAR-TASS, May 14, 2003.