CNS Reports

START II Ratification: More Than Meets the Eye

On April 14, 2000 the Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, finally ratified START II (the second treaty on reductions of strategic offensive arms), a treaty that was signed on January 3, 1993 and remained in limbo for more than four years after the US Senate ratified it in January 1996. On two previous occasions, international crises not linked directly to START II derailed ratification attempts: the December 1998 bombing of Iraq by the United States, and the March 1999 conflict around Kosovo.

Ratification of START II attests to the political capacity of President-elect Vladimir Putin, who was able to muster the necessary votes despite anti-Western sentiment in the Duma generated by strong Western criticism of the war in Chechnya. Two hundred eighty-eight deputies voted in favor of START II, 131 voted against it, and four abstained.

The central importance about START II ratification is that it opens the gates for negotiations on START III, a new treaty which would entail even deeper reductions. A subsidiary purpose of ratification is to prevent the United States from withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of a national missile defense.

START II has been severely criticized in Russia since it was signed in 1993, primarily because it entails deep restructuring of the strategic triad, which Russia simply cannot afford. Very few politically relevant groups in Russia supported the treaty. The opposition concentrated on two options. One option entailed abandonment of START II and a return to START I conditions, which provided for ceilings on strategic weapons twice as high as those in START II. The other option was to "leap" over START II toward a START III, a new treaty that would set significantly lower limits and thus be more affordable. Since the United States firmly insisted that START III talks could only begin after START II was ratified, the Duma’s action became necessary.

At the same time, the Duma, creatively utilizing lessons learned from watching the US Senate, included a "killer provision" that highly conditions the Treaty’s entry into force until the U.S. Senate ratifies the ABM demarcation agreements and protocols signed in September 1997. These agreements drew a distinction between strategic (i.e., banned by the ABM Treaty) and tactical (i.e., allowed under the ABM Treaty) defense systems and also converted it from a bilateral US-Soviet into a five-side treaty, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. This package was almost unanimously ratified by the Duma simultaneously with START II: 413 for, eight against, and one abstention.

The Duma has also established a deadline of sorts for START III: December 31, 2003. If the new treaty is not concluded by that date, the Duma will review the situation in the arms control arena and decide on Russia's future course. By that time, the Duma will need to know which future nuclear arsenal it should fund: a large one which is START I-compliant, or a small one which is START III-compliant.

The Duma reaffirmed the traditional Russian position, which closely links the ABM Treaty and continuation of the START process. This linkage is, however, surprisingly flexible. The resolution provides that should the United States withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the executive and legislative branch shall conduct consultations about appropriate responses. This provision grants the Russian government a degree of flexibility, enabling it to more effectively negotiate with the United States in the future.

To summarize the essence of what transpired on April 14, the ratification of START II is not the end of a four-year-long road toward a new stage in nuclear arms reductions. Instead, it is the beginning of a new round of negotiations, that should culminate in lower ceilings in START III than those stipulated by START II. With the politically charged and controversial issue out of the way, the United States and Russia are entering a new, but more complex set of negotiations which will cover all aspects of nuclear arms control: strategic, tactical, and defensive weapons. The question is, will the new leaders of both countries be up to this test?


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Author(s): Nikolai Sokov
Related Resources: NIS, Nuclear, Missile, Reports
Date Created: 14 April 2000
Date Updated: 17 April 2000
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