CNS Reports

Should This Killer Be Put to Death?

By Jonathan B. Tucker

Published in the The Washington Post

November 30, 1998; Page A25.

The U.S. government is deciding whether to retain or destroy samples of the deadly smallpox virus, an issue with important implications for public health and national security.

In 1980 the eradication of smallpox, a highly contagious, disfiguring disease with a fatality rate of about 30 percent, was the result of a decade-long vaccination campaign employing the related but harmless cowpox virus. Coordinated by the World Health Organization (WHO), smallpox eradication was a major victory for international public health. In 1986 a WHO expert committee unanimously recommended the destruction of the last official laboratory stocks of smallpox virus, held at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta and the Russian "Vektor" virology laboratory near Novosibirsk. But WHO member states postponed a final decision until June 1999.

One issue complicating the decision is concern over the possible use of smallpox as a biological weapon. The smallpox virus is considered an "ideal" warfare agent because it is highly virulent, stable, relatively easy to grow and can be disseminated as an infectious aerosol. Before eradication, the use of smallpox as a weapon was unlikely because vaccination had made most populations immune to infection. Even if occasional outbreaks occurred, inoculation of immediate contacts could rapidly control the spread of the disease.

Ironically, the successful eradication of smallpox has increased its potential military use. Eradication brought routine vaccination to an end, avoiding the costs and occasional complications associated with it. But since immunity against smallpox lasts only about a decade and routine vaccination in the United States ended in 1972, the U.S. population has become susceptible to the virus.

The potential use of smallpox for warfare or terrorism is not merely an academic concern. Ken Alibek, a senior scientist in the Soviet biological weapons program, defected to the United States in 1992 and revealed that during the 1980s, Soviet microbiologists had produced several tons of smallpox virus. If World War III had materialized, the virus would have been loaded into aerial bombs and intercontinental ballistic missile warheads targeted on major American cities.

U.S. scientists are engaged in a heated debate over the wisdom of destroying the official laboratory stocks of smallpox. Opponents argue that destruction of the intact virus would preclude future research into the poorly understood mechanisms by which smallpox affects the human immune system and causes disease -- findings that may be relevant to AIDS and other viral infections. Developing improved antiviral drugs and vaccines also would require work with the intact virus.

Proponents of smallpox destruction counter that an accidental release of the smallpox virus or a security breach that allowed it to fall into the hands of terrorists could unleash catastrophic epidemics. Now that scientists have determined the entire genetic structure of the virus and cloned noninfectious DNA segments from several strains, smallpox research could proceed in safety without the need to preserve the intact, infectious virus. Some experts worry that destroying the two official repositories would not guarantee the eradication of the smallpox virus because undeclared specimens may exist in countries such as China, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Syria and North Korea. But scientists favoring destruction stress the normative significance of eliminating the declared stocks. Donald A. Henderson, a physician who directed the WHO's smallpox eradication program, argues that destruction would "send a clear signal to any group or nation contemplating the use of the virus that such action would be the most reprehensible of crimes."

Assuming that a compelling scientific case can be made for continued smallpox research, the Vektor laboratory's past involvement in the Soviet biological warfare program is troubling. Yet if the United States decides to retain its supply of the virus, the Russians almost certainly will insist on keeping theirs.

The best solution would be to transfer all known stocks to a secure laboratory, established in a neutral country under WHO auspices. All research on smallpox would be conducted by a multinational team and the results published in scientific journals. This approach would avoid the corrosive mutual suspicions that could trigger a dangerous biological arms race.


The writer directs the chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

© Copyright 1998 The Washington Post Company


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