James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

CNS Reports

The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions Jonathan B. Tucker, Editor Download a free PDF viewer - Adobe Acrobat Reader

View the CWC Report. PDF format, 79 pages, 517k.

April 29, 2001 is the fourth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—a global treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons such as mustard gas and sarin.

In a 72-page report, the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) examines the strengths and weaknesses of the chemical disarmament regime and warns that unless current implementation trends are soon reversed, the international community could lose a critically important tool in eliminating these heinous weapons.

Edited by Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker, director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at CNS, the report includes essays on various aspects of CWC implementation by leading experts on chemical arms control.

As of early this year, 143 countries had joined the CWC and 31 countries had signed but not yet ratified. Among other important achievements, four countries (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea) have declared chemical weapons stockpiles, which have been slated for destruction. The treaty-implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, has also conducted hundreds of inspections of military and chemical industry sites. Nevertheless, the report notes several adverse trends:

• A severe budgetary shortfall at the OPCW threatens to cripple treaty implementation.
• The failure of the United States, which has accused Iran of violating the CWC, to call for a challenge inspection under the treaty to validate its allegation—inaction that has weakened the credibility and deterrent value of this key verification measure.
• The inability of the Russian Federation to begin destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile it inherited from the Soviet Union because of a severe lack of funds, bureaucratic infighting, and public concerns about environmental contamination.
• The failure of many member states to comply with CWC provisions such as submitting declarations, passing implementing legislation, and establishing a National Authority to serve as liaison with the OPCW.
• Efforts by several CWC member states to reinterpret the treaty provisions in ways that have eroded the effectiveness of inspections and hence their ability to build confidence in compliance.
• The refusal of several known and suspected chemical proliferators to join the treaty, including North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria.
• Rapid scientific and technological developments in industrial chemistry and related fields that could facilitate the development of novel chemical warfare agents and complicate the monitoring of treaty-relevant chemical facilities worldwide.

The report also notes that although the United States played a leadership role during the CWC negotiations, it has set a poor example during the implementation phase by including unilateral exemptions to treaty provisions in its domestic implementing legislation (including a provision enabling a U.S. president to refuse a challenge inspection on national security grounds), submitting its industry declaration three years late, and cutting off financial support for Russian chemical demilitarization.

To address the problems of CWC implementation, the authors recommend stripping the voting rights in the OPCW of all countries that are more than two years in arrears in paying their dues to the organization; preserving the integrity of the verification regime and launching a challenge inspection in the near future; restructuring the Russian chemical demilitarization program and increasing the level of foreign assistance; and urging the U.S. Congress to repeal or mitigate the three weakening exemptions in the U.S. implementing legislation.

The report concludes that, in conjunction with other measures such as chemical defense, the CWC is a vital policy tool for halting and ultimately reversing the spread of chemical weapons. To be effective, however, it must receive adequate financial and political support from member-states—factors that to date have been lacking.

Contributors to the report include: Richard Burgess, a private consultant to the chemical industry; Daniel Feakes, a researcher at the University of Sussex; Alexander Kelle, a research associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) in Germany; Michael Moodie, president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute; George Parshall, a chemist formerly with the DuPont Company; Alexander Pikayev, a scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow Center; Amy Sands, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute; and Amy Smithson, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center.