CNS Reports

Weapons Spreading

By William C. Potter and Jonathan B. Tucker

An Op-Ed for the Washington Post.

Friday, May 28, 1999; Page A35

The fabric of treaties, informal agreements and export-control measures designed to halt the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction is under siege. Recent assaults on the nonproliferation order come in many forms: the erosion of Russian-American cooperation on nonproliferation, the emerging Indo-Pakistani nuclear and missile arms races, Iraq's defiance of U.N. Security Council-mandated weapons inspections, North Korean nuclear and missile brinkmanship, the threat of a new U.S.-Russian tactical nuclear arms race, the prospect of a fractious year 2000 review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and increased risks of chemical and biological terrorism.

The United States is at least partly responsible for this dismal state of affairs. On several occasions, the Clinton administration has shown a disturbing tendency to emphasize short-term economic and political considerations over nonproliferation objectives -- an inclination only exacerbated by the lingering Cold War mind-set and partisan squabbling in the Republican-controlled Congress.

Recent U.S. decisions that have undermined the nuclear nonproliferation system include discounting the adverse effects of NATO enlargement on nonproliferation cooperation with Russia, waiving tough economic sanctions against India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests, postponing a Senate vote on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and ignoring the steps that must be taken immediately to prevent defections from a very fragile NPT.

The legal bulwarks against the spread of chemical and biological weapons also are at risk. Just over two years ago, on April 29, 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force, and it has been ratified to date by more than 120 countries. Today, however, the United States remains in technical violation because of congressional foot-dragging in passing implementing legislation, followed by interagency conflicts that have delayed approval of the regulations needed for international inspections of chemical industry sites.

Close allies such as Germany and Japan, fearing that U.S. chemical firms will obtain an unfair competitive advantage by remaining free of inspections, are balking at further verification of their own industries. The growing dissension between the United States and its allies could provide cover for would-be cheaters and proliferators, seriously weakening the treaty.

Similarly, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) banning the development, production and stockpiling of disease agents and natural toxins as weapons of war is at a crossroads from which it could emerge either strengthened or reduced to an irrelevancy. Because the convention lacks provisions for verification, it has been unable to address corrosive allegations of noncompliance by countries such as Russia and Iraq. To rectify this situation, an ad hoc group of member countries in Geneva is currently negotiating a protocol to the BWC that will provide for on-site inspections of biodefense labs, vaccine plants and other dual-use facilities. Because of a lack of high-level political attention, however, the talks have languished in recent months.

Failure to reach agreement on the protocol before the start of the U.S. and Russian presidential election cycles in early 2000 could deal a severe setback to BWC, possibly accelerating the spread of biological weapons to states and terrorist organizations.

Finally, at a time when the global nonproliferation system needs coordinated leadership from the world's two leading nuclear powers, historically partners in combating the diffusion of nuclear weapons, Russian-American relations have deteriorated over Moscow's nuclear and missile sales to Iran, NATO enlargement, U.S. plans to accelerate the development of ballistic missile defenses and the bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. The August 1998 Russian economic meltdown also has seriously impaired Moscow's ability to safeguard its vast arsenals of nuclear and chemical weapons and related materials, technology and know-how. Current U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia does not adequately address this challenge.

The United States must reduce the gap between its pronouncements about the dangers of the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and its investment of political capital in strengthening nonproliferation treaties, institutions and relationships. Washington should revive biannual nuclear nonproliferation consultations with Russia at the working level, ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, bring the U.S. chemical industry into compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and show constructive leadership in negotiating the compliance protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. Such steps would be in the enlightened self-interest of the United States, which of all nations has the most to lose from a breakdown of the nonproliferation system.

William C. Potter is director of the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Jonathan B. Tucker directs the center's chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation project.

© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company


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