| You are here: HOME > Publications > Report |
CNS ReportsAssessing the Threat of WMD TerrorismIntroduction Because of a number of developments over the past decade, the threat that terrorists might resort to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has received increased attention from U.S. policymakers, the news media, and academic analysts. These developments include:
At the same time, many analysts believe that there are significant technical hurdles to WMD acquisition and use, and that the Aum incident is the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, the lack of other major incidents of WMD terrorism in the years since the Aum attack suggests that the threat may be largely theoretical or at least is poorly understood. Assessing the Threat of WMD TerrorismJason Pate, Senior Research Associate and WMD Terrorism Database Manager
In March 1995, the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 and injuring over a thousand. This incident, perpetrated by an apocalyptic group seeking to inflict mass casualties, demonstrated that at least some terrorist groups are capable of acquiring and using chemical weapons. One month later, in April 1995, a truck bomb destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 and injuring more than 700. Perpetrated by a lone actor influenced by right-wing ideology, this unprecedented attack brought the threat of mass-casualty terrorism--albeit with conventional explosives--to the American heartland. In the aftermath of these events, some analysts declared that a new era of terrorism had emerged, one involving a sea change in terrorist tactics and goals. With religion arguably replacing politics as the primary motivation for terrorist groups in the 1980s and 1990s, it was possible to envision terrorist groups relatively unconstrained by societal norms and seeking to inflict higher levels of violence than more "traditional" terrorist organizations. For example, Usama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, openly declared an interest in acquiring WMD for attacks against American targets. At the same time, the spread of dual-use technologies and materials relevant to WMD to state-sponsors of terrorism, and the lack of controls on weapons materials and know-how in the former Soviet Union, suggested that the barriers to terrorist acquisition and use of WMD had eroded. Since 1995, the United States has allocated enormous resources to combating WMD terrorism. Numerous government programs have been created in an effort to prevent and deter terrorism or to mitigate the effects of a major attack should it occur. These efforts have focused largely on enhancing the ability of local first responders to decontaminate and treat survivors, augmented by additional capabilities at the state and federal levels. But analysts have criticized the significant overlap and redundancy among various federal counterterrorism programs, as well as the lack of a clear strategy for integrating these diverse elements into a coherent whole. U.S. counterterrorism efforts have also been developed in the absence of a realistic assessment of terrorist motivations and capabilities for using WMD. The Aum Shinrikyo experience, in particular, does not appear to be widely applicable. Aum certainly represents a threatening type of group, but one that is so rare that it cannot serve as a reliable indicator of things to come. Critics have also pointed out the significant technical hurdles to WMD acquisition and use. Despite Aum's vast financial resources and scientific expertise, it was unable to perpetrate true mass-casualty attacks with either chemical or biological weapons. This observation suggests that terrorist acquisition and delivery of WMD are difficult to carry out effectively. The threat of WMD terrorism remains poorly understood, however, suggesting the need for further empirical study based on the analysis of historical cases as well as an assessment of emerging threats. The following web-based resources offer insight into this ongoing debate. Related ResourcesArticles and Reports Amy Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism
Threat and the US Response, Stimson Center Report No. 35 (October 2000).
Jean Pascal Zanders, "Assessing the Risks of Chemical and Biological Weapons
Proliferation to Terrorists," The Nonproliferation Review 6 (Fall 1999),
pp. 17-34.
Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy (Fall 1998), pp. 110-124.
Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses," The Nonproliferation
Review 4 (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 45-53.
Chronologies and Charts 2000 WMD Terrorism Chronology: Incidents Involving Sub-National Actors
and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Materials, Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (April 2001).
Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo's CBW Activities, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (March 2001).
Resource Page for Agricultural Terrorism, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (September 2000).
Organizational Chart of US Terrorism Response, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (July 2000).
Op-Eds and Opinion Pieces Jason Pate, "Better Plan Needed to Curb Epidemics," Newsday, November
29, 2000, p. A43.
Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, "An Unlikely Threat," The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists Vol. 55 (July/August 1999), pp. 46-52.
Ehud Sprinzak, "What Is The Real Threat, WMD or Car Bombs? Terrorism, Real and
Imagined," Washington Post, August 19, 1998, p. A21.
Jessica Stern, "Taking the Terror Out of Bioterrorism," New York Times,
April 8, 1998.
Official Documents and Reports U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism
Leadership and National Strategy, testimony document no. [GAO-01-556T],
March 27, 2001.
Assessing the Threat, First Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, [Gilmore Commission Report], December 15, 1999.
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attacks, report to U.S. General Accounting Office
[NSIAD-99-163] (September 1999).
Congressional Testimony U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Combating Terrorism: Federal
Response to a Biological Weapons Attack, July 23, 2001.
U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations and the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and
Emergency Management, Testimony of James Clapper, Jr., April 24, 2001.
U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, Transportation and Infrastructure,
The Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest Joint Hearing Testimony, April 24, 2001.
U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Combating Terrorism: In Search
of a National Strategy, March 27, 2001.
U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and International
Relations, Combating Terrorism: Assessing Threats, Risk Management, and Establishing
Priorities by John Parachini, July 26,2000.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Combating
Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs by Norman J. Rabkin,
April 6, 2000.
U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and International
Relations, Assessing the Threat of Bioterrorism by Ray Zilinskas, October
20, 1999.
Court Documents Center for Nonproliferation Studies, WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden, March 7, 2001.
Books and Print Material Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (MIT Press, 2000). Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Harvard University Press, 2000). National Research Council, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response (National Research Council, National Academy Press, 2000). Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1999). Ian O. Lesser, et al, Countering the New Terrorism (RAND Corporation, 1999). Simon Reeve The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism, (Northeastern University Press, 1999).
Richard A. Falkenrath, et al., America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (MIT Press, 1998).
|
| Return to Top |