MOUNTBATTEN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

“Challenges Facing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime”

a workshop hosted by the

CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,
MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
and
MOUNTBATTEN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH HAMPTON

Annecy, France
14 and 15 March 2003

INTRODUCTION

On 14-15 March 2003, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, co-hosted with Mountbatten Centre for International Studies a workshop on “Challenges Facing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime” in Annecy, France. Objectives of this workshop included helping delegates to the Conference on Disarmament and other relevant national officials identify specific nonproliferation and disarmament issues that may be central to the 2003 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) session and ways that this session might strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The workshop provided an opportunity for an informal exchange of views between participants on practical options to confront the current challenges facing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This report provides an indication of the range of issues discussed at the workshop and the flavor of those discussions.

The following seven topics were addressed at this workshop: 1) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK’s) withdrawal from the NPT; 2) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, physical protection, and nuclear terrorism; 3) security assurances and nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ); 4) the nuclear disarmament agenda priorities for 2005; 5) inspection mechanisms and the enforcement of nonproliferation commitments; 6) practical mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability; and 7) the evolving geopolitical environment and the relevance and reliability of the NPT. Each session began with introductory remarks from panelists and was followed by substantive discussions by participants. In addition, the chairman-elect for the 2003 NPT PrepCom, Ambassador László Molnar, shared views and progress on consultations with delegations leading up to the PrepCom.

The workshop was held under “Chatham House rules,” and as a result statements and comments made during each session have not been attributed to specific individuals or to the organizations that they represent. This report was prepared by Dr. Tanya Ogilvie-White (MCIS research fellow and workshop rapporteur), Jean du Preez (CNS IONP Director), and Emily Schroeder (CNS/MIIS graduate research assistant) who bear sole responsibility for the its contents.

The workshop hosts wish to thank the Ploughshares Fund and the governments of Norway, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Finland, the United States, and Canada for their support for the meeting.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The workshop “Challenges Facing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime” covered a wealth of issues, identifying several challenges and offering a variety of recommendations.

DPRK Withdrawal from the NPT: Motivations for the DPRK’s nuclear decision-making was examined and approaches to resolve the DPRK crisis were offered. The potential damage to the NPT by the DPRK’s withdrawal was also assessed. Ways in which the DPRK withdrawal should be addressed at the 2003 PrepCom were discussed, emphasizing that the PrepCom should not send a negative message about the future of the NPT to the world. Four possible approaches included: 1) not specifically addressing North Korea’s withdrawal, 2) arriving at a consensus statement on the issue with the depositary states issuing a statement on the DPRK before the 2003 session begins, 3) noting the DPRK issue in a factual summary by the Chairman at the end of the PrepCom, or 4) attempting to agree on a “discrete statement” on the DPRK to be annexed to the Chairman’s factual summary.

IAEA Safeguards, Physical Protection, and Nuclear Terrorism: This session addressed the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Steps were offered to strengthen the IAEA program including transport of nuclear material, a convention on nuclear terrorism, and terrorist threat assessment. The lack of progress in the implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol was addressed, as only 29 countries have implemented the Additional Protocol despite the fact that it has been in force for six years. It is important that the nuclear weapons states (NWS) set an example to others to encourage them to implement INFCIRC/540. Only two states, Australia and Norway, have implemented the new integrated safeguards system so far. This system could be useful in detecting clandestine activities under existing safeguards agreements.

Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: As security assurances are currently qualified rather than absolute, they are seen as virtually meaningless by some non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Security assurances are also not legally binding, and it was noted that little progress has been made on this issue. In light of the current international political context, the recent adoption of new doctrines by some NWS regarding the use of nuclear weapons has weakened their negative security assurances (NSAs) to NPT parties. Various suggestions on NSAs were made:

NSAs should be conditional upon states pursuing “good faith adherence to the NPT” and to nonproliferation treaties in general.
NSAs could address the genuine insecurities of some non-compliant states as well as the de facto NWS, who could be offered absolute NSAs by the NWS if they adhere to the NPT.
A draft protocol could be negotiated at the NPT PrepCom on security assurances.
The UN Security Council could introduce enforcement mechanisms to give greater confidence to the NNWS.

With regard to the potential creation of additional NWFZs, it was noted that the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) is moving forward but that some outstanding issues need to be resolved between the NWS and the five Central Asian States. Once this has been established, it will probably be some time before positive progress is made towards the establishment of further NWFZs (such as a NWFZ in the Middle East), as serious obstacles stand in the way.

The Nuclear Disarmament Agenda: Priorities for 2005. In light of new doctrines based on counter-proliferation and pre-emption, some felt that disarmament has fallen off the international agenda. Lack of progress on the 13 practical steps outlined in the NPT 2000 Review Conference Final Document, plus backtracking on these commitments, is undermining the credibility of the Treaty and even has the potential to cause permanent damage. In contrast, others expressed the view that nuclear disarmament has not completely fallen off the international agenda, for instance major changes in thinking in the United States have led to significant progress in nuclear disarmament, reduced alert levels, and a diminished role for nuclear weapons. Several disarmament priorities were outlined looking towards the 2005 NPT Review Conference:

The NWS should make an extra effort to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty addressing the issue of fissile material for military use.
Negotiations should progress on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons--the “disconnect” between concerns about the threat of nuclear terrorism and the lack of willingness to confront the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons needs to be addressed.
Work should be done to arrive at a treaty or informal arrangement setting up centralized storage of U.S. and Russian non-deployed nuclear weapons.
A verification program is needed to allow transparency of the NWS nuclear programs (the United Kingdom will present a paper on its verification program at the 2003 PrepCom).
Progress should be made on strengthening export controls.
There should be an interactive dialogue among the NWS over their disarmament commitments and reporting obligations. It would be useful if the NWS came to the PrepCom with extra talking points for an active debate, including questions and answers.

Inspection Mechanisms and the Enforcement of Nonproliferation Commitments: Lessons from the Iraq Experience: In looking at serious challenges to the inspections regime, Iraq was the main focus of discussion. Key suggestions for international response were offered:

Inspection regimes need to be reassessed in cooperation with and among the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Motivating factors for states to acquire WMD should be examined.
The links between all forms of WMD proliferation, vertical and horizontal, are clear, but the underlying drivers in the current international political environment require more study.
A further topic for study is that of export controls.
Questions that need to be addressed are how Iraq acquired its missile and WMD capabilities, and which states supplied the necessary materials.

Practical Mechanisms to Enhance Transparency and Accountability:
The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was part of a broader package of commitments, which included a strengthened review process to implement permanence with accountability. In addition to reporting on progress on Article VI, reporting on implementation of the Middle East Resolution was also agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Several proposals were put forward on means to encourage reporting:

Reporting should be viewed in a positive light by the NWS as a form of deterrence.
Reporting should be “demand driven.” The reports submitted to the 2002 PrepCom need to be read and quoted in order to increase the demand for future reports and to give them a purpose. It was noted that prospects for a meaningful reporting session are far better in 2003 than they were in 2002.
There are many ways other than reporting to ensure accountability: the implementation of safeguards, open discussion, and the fulfillment of Treaty commitments.
Reporting is an important confidence-building measure and can help facilitate interaction to show that the regime is fit and well.

Sustaining the Relevance and Reliability of the NPT in the Evolving Geopolitical Environment: Efforts to promote nuclear disarmament as a security enhancing opportunity seem to be diminishing. The Treaty needs to be given new tools to be able to do so, including:

incentives for the NNWS to fulfill their commitments;
compulsory conditions for NPT membership, such as mandatory rather than voluntary implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol;
initiatives to ensure that export controls are not misused and do not contradict Article IV;
incentives to induce holdouts to join the NPT (These might include technology assistance, the provision of health and environmental assistance, and a commitment to address the genuine security concerns of the holdouts.); and
a permanent mechanism to address non-compliance issues and to oversee the implementation of the NPT.

The outcome of the next PrepCom is likely to be determined by geopolitical developments. The issue of resolving outstanding problems and upholding the Treaty in the long term will have to be addressed at this PrepCom, especially if the NPT is seen to be failing to fulfill the needs of the international community. This should include measures that could be taken outside the Treaty context (e.g., bilateral talks between the United States and the DPRK).

Session 1

THE DPRK’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NPT: WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO LIMIT ITS PROBABLE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REGIME?

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Ambassador Sha Zhukang of China and Mr. Sherwood McGinnis of the United States.

Motivations for the DPRK’s Nuclear Decision-Making:
It was noted that the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT is motivated by the North Korean government’s desire for bilateral negotiations with the United States to resolve outstanding issues. This is not a new tactic for the DPRK, which also threatened to withdraw from the Treaty in 1994. The DPRK’s severe economic crisis and the slow implementation of the Agreed Framework are important drivers of the DPRK’s behavior; it is displaying another round of nuclear bargaining. It has developed a pattern of desperate action that is likely to continue until its insecurities are resolved.

Embedded in the NPT is the clause that withdrawal is considered legitimate if “extraordinary events” jeopardize the national security of the state in question. Many argued that the DPRK does have genuine, legitimate security concerns, and feels particularly insecure after being listed as part of the “Axis of Evil.” The DPRK leadership fears that it may be subject to a pre-emptive strike by the world’s only superpower. The relationship between the United States and the DPRK lies at the heart of the current crisis. However, it was also argued that the significance of the U.S.-DPRK relationship has been exaggerated and that evidence suggests the DPRK’s nuclear enrichment program began before President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech.

Approaches to Resolving the DPRK Crisis:
It was stressed that the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities should not be exaggerated as this would serve to escalate the situation. The DPRK, it was argued, is still at least two years away from developing a genuine nuclear capability. It was suggested that some states have been exaggerating the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities for their own ends, and that this is not helping the situation. There was general agreement that the DPRK should dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance with the NPT. How this is to be achieved, however, was the subject of disagreement. There were four approaches to the resolution of the crisis: dialogue, military action, sanctions, and the UN Security Council. Some saw the resolution of the crisis as dependent on dialogue, and particularly on direct bilateral dialogue between the DPRK and the United States. Others argued that all states, particularly regional actors, had a duty to work multilaterally towards the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and that the emphasis should not only be placed on U.S.-DPRK negotiations. A strong message should be sent to all states making it clear that withdrawal from the NPT cannot be used as a bargaining tool to gain recognition and assistance. Given the DPRK’s insecurities, talk of military action and regime change should be avoided as this would probably lead to an escalation of the crisis and serious tit-for-tat consequences. Quiet diplomacy should be pursued, and it should be clear that the door is being kept open for the DPRK to return to the Treaty. It was noted that sanctions would be counterproductive. Rather, the DPRK should be given security assurances in the form of a non-aggression treaty and also economic assistance, from the United States as well as all countries which have a responsibility to help. While some argued that the UN Security Council should find a peaceful solution to the DPRK crisis, it was pointed out that it faced a difficult task as the DPRK has indicated that the imposition of sanctions would constitute a declaration of war.

Potential Damage to the NPT by the DPRK’s Withdrawal:
The strength of the Treaty was acknowledged, as the reaction of the international community (including all members of the NWS) towards the DPRK’s withdrawal has been negative. In addition, states in the region have declared that the DPRK’s action was unacceptable, and have emphasized that upholding the NPT is vital to regional stability. It is significant that regional states have not threatened to follow North Korea’s example. It was suggested that this could be seen as evidence that the NPT has not been seriously damaged, at least in the short-term.

One issue raised in this regard was whether the problem posed by the DPRK’s withdrawal from the Treaty should be defined as a non-compliance issue or a universality issue. One view was that the DPRK should be regarded as a special case, since it has not fully complied with the Treaty. This raises different problems from a case in which a state in good standing with the NPT and IAEA, and with extensive nuclear capabilities, withdraws from the Treaty.

Approaches to the DPRK Crisis at the 2003 PrepCom:
The DPRK’s NPT status was discussed. While there were differing views on whether the DPRK will be legally in or out of the Treaty after 10 April (when its three-month notice of withdrawal expires), it was suggested that the DPRK should not have a nameplate at the 2003 PrepCom. The DPRK should only be designated as an observer in the unlikely event of it requesting such status. Ways in which the DPRK’s withdrawal could be addressed at the 2003 PrepCom were discussed:

It was emphasized that the PrepCom should not send a negative message about the future of the NPT to the world. The NPT is still very relevant despite the current state of affairs – it is a strong instrument that needs to be enhanced. The DPRK issue needs to be kept in perspective at the 2003 session, and care should be taken that it is not allowed to dominate debate. While some suggested the DPRK issue should not be addressed at all, others strongly disagreed.
An additional approach was a consensus statement from the 2003 PrepCom on the matter. Alternatively, a carefully drafted position could be included in the factual summary.
It was argued that the 2003 session of the PrepCom should not specifically address North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty as there are too many differences between the positions of states parties on this matter. In addition, “finger-pointing” at the meeting may make it much more difficult to bring the DPRK back into the Treaty. A non-confrontational approach will be more likely to keep the door open.
Alternatively, others felt that the PrepCom should not shirk from confronting the issue of the DPRK’s withdrawal from the Treaty. Avoiding the issue would undermine the NPT. The credibility of the review process would be undermined unless difficult issues such as this are addressed. The meeting should send a powerful message to the DPRK so that other states understand that the international community will not stand by while states parties challenge global peace and stability.
One suggestion raised was a consensus statement on the DPRK issue at the PrepCom. Those favoring this proposal took different approaches to it. First, the lead of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit could be followed by merely “noting” the situation. Second, a much stronger statement could be made on the DPRK’s withdrawal and on its non-compliance with IAEA safeguards. Third, the PrepCom could recommend a course of action in relation to the DPRK. Finally, incentives could be offered to encourage an early return to the Treaty by the DPRK.

In addition to the previous ideas on a consensus statement at the PrepCom, some alternative suggestions, widely considered unrealistic, were put forward. One was that the depositaries should issue a statement on the DPRK before the 2003 session begins. The statement should clarify the situation, making it clear that the DPRK has withdrawn from the Treaty. An additional proposal was rather than trying to achieve a consensus statement, the PrepCom’s discussions of the DPRK issue should be reflected in a factual summary by the Chairman at the end of the PrepCom. Another suggestion was that the PrepCom could attempt to agree to a “discrete statement” on the DPRK, which would be annexed to the Chairman’s factual summary.

Session 2

IAEA SAFEGUARDS, PHYSICAL PROTECTION, AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Mr. Tariq Rauf of the IAEA and Dr. Linda Gallini of the United States.

Addressing the Threat of Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism:
Following the events of 11 September 2001, it was noted that safeguards were held up as the first line of defense against nuclear terrorism. However, confidence in this approach is now in doubt, as the implementation of safeguards agreements has been slow and a worrying number of states still lack adequate physical protection measures. Since 11 September, therefore, these tools are increasingly seen as a “starting point” in need of additional measures.

While the IAEA is trying to improve material security through a new three-year program, it does not have sufficient resources even to fully implement the first year. Contributions to the program are voluntary, hence there are widespread concerns over future under-funding. This is a chronic problem for the existing safeguards system and for all the other measures being introduced. Several important steps were offered that member states could take to ensure that the IAEA’s program works and continues. These steps include transport of nuclear material, a convention on nuclear terrorism, and terrorist threat assessments. The general feeling was that positive steps are being taken to deal with these problems, but that it is urgent that the momentum continues:

A particular focus ought to be the transport of nuclear materials. States need to be able to identify what materials are coming through their borders, and whether materials being transported have adequate safety procedures in place.
A convention on nuclear terrorism could help to enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime, making it better equipped to address the terrorist threat. New ideas are needed to overcome the disagreements that are currently blocking progress on this issue.
Studies are underway to assess different types of terrorist threats, partly to help prioritize the allocation of scarce funds. The International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources in Vienna, held from 10 to 13 March 2003, concluded that there is a definite hierarchy of risks – terrorist groups are more likely to get access to radiation sources than other types of materials. Vulnerable sources of radiation must therefore be located, and the question of what steps should be taken globally to ensure security of these materials must be addressed. Terrorist access to nuclear weapons is still rated as a low probability, although there are concerns over weapons that were produced in the former Soviet Union. A number of programs exist to deal with this, including the Nuclear Threat Reduction program.

Addressing the Lack of Progress in the Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol:
Only 29 countries have implemented the Additional Protocol despite the fact that it has been in force for six years. Some raised the question of what could be done to speed up implementation given that countries cannot currently be forced to do so. One suggestion was to make implementation of INFCIRC/540 mandatory, and in doing so create a new norm.

Many intricacies of this issue surfaced during discussions. It was noted that the NWS have made many positive statements on the subject of the Additional Protocol, but have failed to back these up with actions. It is important that the NWS set an example to others to encourage them to implement INFCIRC/540. In response, it was pointed out that the United States has submitted its Additional Protocol to the Senate for ratification and that other countries should take their own steps to ratify the agreement, rather than wait for the U.S. ratification. Thirteen of the 15 European Union (EU) countries have ratified the Additional Protocol, but none of these agreements can come into force until all 15 states have ratified. France may need more time for domestic legal reasons and is in informal discussion with the IAEA over this issue. The United Kingdom enacted its legislation in 2000, but is waiting for the agreement between the IAEA and the EU to come before the UK parliament. In the meantime, the United Kingdom is implementing voluntary measures.

Addressing Progress on the Evolution of the Integrated Safeguards System:
So far, only two states, Australia and Norway, have implemented the integrated safeguards system (INFCIRC/153 plus INFCIRC/540). While other countries are also pushing for integrated safeguards, it is a long process before these can be implemented. This is especially true for countries that have a long history of nuclear development, as all the details of the history of their programs first need to be known.

Detection of Clandestine Activities under Existing Safeguards Agreements:
Although the IAEA is working to improve detection techniques under the new integrated safeguards system, detection of clandestine activities cannot be guaranteed. Under this new system, each country must be reassessed annually to prevent countries from going back on their commitments. An additional vital measure is that of improving detection levels. The IAEA can and does use satellite imagery, national intelligence, and open sources to compile its country profiles. These reports are updated on a regular basis. The information is confidential and is not disclosed by the IAEA.

Session 3

SECURITY ASSURANCES AND NWFZS: IS PROGRESS POSSIBLE?

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Mr. Jean du Preez of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Mr. Alaa Issa of Egypt.

Dissatisfaction of NNWS with Current Security Assurances:
It was noted that security assurances are currently qualified rather than absolute and are therefore seen as virtually meaningless by some NNWS. Security assurances are also not legally binding. NNWS believe that the provision of negative security assurances (NSAs) should be seen as a fulfillment of the obligations and responsibilities of the NWS that were agreed in 1968. The 2000 NPT Review Conference included specific paragraphs on security assurances, and requested the PrepCom to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference. Despite the calls for legally binding security assurances at NPT Review Conferences, it was noted that little progress has been made on this issue. It was recalled that specific proposals to this end had been made at the 1999 PrepCom for the 2000 Review Conference, including proposals by South Africa and Myanmar on a legally binding protocol to the Treaty.

The Current International Political Context and Perceptions of Security Assurances:
It was suggested that the 2003 session of the PrepCom address this issue since many NNWS believe that the recent adoption of new doctrines by some NWS regarding the use of nuclear weapons has weakened their NSAs to NPT Parties. As they currently stand, security assurances are seen to be of diminishing value due to the qualifications that are applied. There is also a strong perception among some NNWS that security assurances provided to them under the NWFZ agreements are inadequate, since many of the assurances given have been heavily qualified by the NWS.

The view was also expressed that the issue of security assurances is no longer as cut and dry as it used to be. It was suggested that NSAs should be conditional upon states’ pursuing “good faith adherence to the NPT” and to the nonproliferation treaties in general, especially the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It was argued that since biological weapons present such a major threat, NSAs should not be operative for states that are known to be developing biological weapons or are suspected of doing so. However, this proved to be a controversial idea, and the point was made that the NNWS should be entitled to unqualified security assurances from the NWS under the NPT.

Various questions arose from this discussion. Could the provision of unqualified NSAs be used as an incentive for the NNWS to abide by their NPT commitments? Could they be withheld from those states suspected of pursuing clandestine nuclear weapons programs? It was suggested that this might be one way of addressing the genuine insecurities of some non-compliant states and also the de facto NWS, who could be offered absolute NSAs by the NWS if they adhere to the NPT. The offer of unqualified security assurances could also be used to encourage the DPRK to roll back it nuclear program and adhere to the NPT.

One suggestion for progress on the topic of security assurances was to negotiate a draft protocol to the NPT dealing with this issue. Another idea was for the UN Security Council to introduce enforcement mechanisms to give greater confidence to the NNWS.

The Potential Creation of Additional NWFZs:
Two potential NWFZs were discussed. It was noted that progress has been made towards a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ), but that some outstanding issues still need to be resolved between the NWS and the five Central Asian States. Once this zone has been established, it will probably be some time before positive progress is made towards the establishment of further NWFZs, as serious obstacles stand in the way. The UNSC Resolution 687, paragraph 14 on Iraq, refers to the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. As this is a difficult political issue, two questions arose: What could be done to encourage progress on this matter and what action should the UN Security Council take in this respect?

Session 4

THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AGENDA: PRIORITIES FOR 2005

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Dr. Lewis Dunn of the United States and Ambassador Volker Heinsberg of Germany.

Will Disarmament Remain on the International Agenda Given the New Doctrines Based on Counter-Proliferation and Pre-Emption:
Some felt nuclear disarmament has indeed fallen off the agenda and noted that there has been a lack of balance between nonproliferation concerns and disarmament by the NWS. The “13 practical steps” outlined in the NPT 2000 Review Conference Final Document are a benchmark for measuring the implementation of Article VI. Lack of progress, plus backtracking on these commitments, especially by the United States, is undermining the credibility of the Treaty, and even has the potential to cause permanent damage. Although the United States holds up the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) as a major achievement or benchmark, many states believe that it erodes major achievements in irreversibility and transparency, and that it is meaningless in disarmament terms. SORT, combined with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), represents a change from an emphasis on numbers of nuclear weapons to an emphasis on an enhanced role and new uses for nuclear weapons.

In contrast, others expressed the view that nuclear disarmament has not completely fallen off the international agenda. Major changes in thinking in the United States have led to significant progress in nuclear disarmament, reduced alert levels, and a diminished role for nuclear weapons. The belief in deterrence that drove the nuclear arms race during the Cold War no longer dominates strategic thinking in the United States. The U.S. NPR does not emphasize nuclear weapons, but advanced conventional weapons and network-centric warfare. This is a major change in thinking. The NPR makes it clear that nuclear weapons only have a role in extreme situations, which does not include pre-emption against states developing biological weapons but does apply to states that launch attacks using such weapons.

The Most Serious Challenges Confronting the NPT:
In addition to the apparent lack of commitment to nuclear disarmament by the United States and other NWS, the other serious challenges to the NPT were identified as: acquisition of WMD and North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT. In this regard, participants discussed how emerging threats from states and non-state actors armed with WMD present a serious challenge to the future of nonproliferation and disarmament. The threat posed by biological weapons, in particular, is a major obstacle to nuclear disarmament by the NWS. Some expressed the view that the United States no longer sees nuclear disarmament as an obligation. Although U.S. missile defense is presented as a way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, most states regard it as part of a U.S. strategy to reduce the risks associated with its new doctrine of nuclear use. In addition, the U.S. NPR is perceived as having seriously undermined Article VI of the Treaty, as it provides new rationales for retaining nuclear weapons and using them. The NPR and U.S. National Security Strategy deny the national security interests of other countries and reinforce the rationale for states to acquire nuclear weapons. Additional breakouts from the NPT may result from this. The consequences of North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT could be very serious, as this and other non-compliance problems may be used by some states to legitimize slow progress or backtracking on nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Disarmament Priorities for 2005:
Several disarmament priorities were outlined in looking towards the 2005 NPT Review Conference:

The NWS should make an extra effort to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty addressing the issue of fissile material for military use.
Negotiations should progress on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons – the “disconnect” between concerns about the threat of nuclear terrorism and the lack of willingness to seriously address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons needs to be addressed.
Work should be done to arrive at a treaty or informal arrangement setting up centralized storage of U.S. and Russian non-deployed nuclear weapons.
A verification program is needed to allow transparency of the NWS’s nuclear programs (the United Kingdom will present a paper on its verification program at the 2003 PrepCom).
Progress should be made on strengthening export controls.

Addressing These Issues at the 2003 PrepCom:
It was recommended that there should be a dialogue among the NWS about their disarmament commitments and reporting obligations. It would be useful if the NWS came to the PrepCom with extra talking points for an interactive debate, including questions and answers.

Session 5

INSPECTION MECHANISMS AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF NONPROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS: LESSONS DRAWN
FROM THE IRAQ EXPERIENCE

* The situation in Iraq changed dramatically in the days immediately following the meeting, but despite this, much of the debate at the workshop remains relevant, as detailed below.

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Mr. Camille Grand of France, and Dr. Patricia Lewis of UNIDIR.

Serious Challenges to the Inspections Regime:
In reflecting on the inspections regime, Iraq was the main focus of discussion. It was noted that the Iraqi regime fundamentally believes its survival depends on the development of WMD. In this case, it is inevitable that inspections will not work. It has been seen that Iraq never fully cooperated with the inspectors during the UNSCOM period – Saddam Hussein deliberately tried to block and deceive and clearly intended to remain in non-compliance. It was put forward that the question is whether cooperation can ever realistically be expected under forced inspections as opposed to voluntary ones and, if not, what conclusions should be drawn about the ability of the inspections regime to deal with such cases.

In examining challenges to the inspections regime, it was noted that intelligence is a key problem (e.g., IAEA satellite imagery, open sources from academic institutions, and national intelligence). The success of inspections in Iraq was dependent on accurate intelligence data from countries with the most advanced intelligence networks. Information provided by U2 and Mirage IV over-flights was a key source of information, but IAEA work has been hampered by misinformation from defectors and national governments. The provision of intelligence information is likely to be a key focus for debate once the Iraq crisis is finally resolved.

It was remarked that a more serious challenge to the future of the inspections regime comes from the conflicting approaches of different states over the role of inspections and the issue of the use of force. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated, “the disarmament of Iraq is regime change,” whereas the French President Jacques Chirac has asserted, “inspections will lead to regime change.” While a large degree of consensus exists over the usefulness of political and military pressure when cooperation is not forthcoming, there is fundamental disagreement over the use of pre-emptive force to achieve disarmament. This conflict of approaches is exacerbated by the lack of understanding of enforcement issues in the media and in world public opinion. The distinction between Chapter VII Security Council resolutions (which are about enforcement) and all other resolutions (which are not) is not generally understood. In this regard, specific reference was made to the UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).

Further challenges to the inspections regime in the case of Iraq included: timeframe and the need for a “smoking gun.” Concerning timeframe, there was significant disagreement over the time that should be given for the inspections process to achieve results. It was suggested that it was still far too soon to assess whether UNMOVIC inspections had been effective, and that at least nine more months were required for the relevant technical information to emerge. While some “smoking gun” evidence of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and missile programs emerged in the 1990s, no such hard evidence of the existence of biological weapons was ever found. In effect, one of the lessons learned by the Iraq inspections was the difficulty of identifying biological weapons programs.

Ways the International Community Should Respond to Developments in Iraq:
Views were expressed that inspection regimes need to be rethought, not just to enhance confidence among states but also to effectively deal with non-compliance cases. The use of force will have important implications for how proliferation problems will be dealt with in the future. An essential component of this reassessment of inspection regimes will be cooperation with and among the five permanent members of the Security Council, as unity is greatly needed to deal with non-compliance challenges. Divisions go well beyond the issue of Iraq, and will have serious repercussions beyond the NPT. It was emphasized that an urgent dialogue among the NWS is needed to agree on objectives for inspections and to come to consensus on enforcement issues.

An additional step for the international community on the issue of Iraq is to examine and understand the factors that motivate states to acquire nuclear weapons and other forms of WMD. The links between all forms of WMD proliferation, vertical and horizontal, are clear, but the underlying drivers in the current international political environment require more study. A further topic for study is that of export controls. Questions that need to be addressed are how Iraq acquired its missile and WMD capabilities, and which states supplied the necessary materials.

Further, the job undertaken by weapons inspectors should be recognized by the international community as an extremely demanding task. Those with the knowledge and will to undertake such an important role should be properly rewarded for their efforts.

Addressing Iraqi Non-Compliance at the 2003 PrepCom:
The issue of Iraqi non-compliance is likely to be a difficult issue at the 2003 PrepCom, as Iraq was not found to be in clear non-compliance by the IAEA inspectors; Iraq will be given a platform to argue this case at the 2003 PrepCom. [As a result of the recent war in Iraq, it is not yet clear whether Iraq will be represented at the meeting.] Care needs to be taken to ensure that the meeting is as balanced as possible, and that the Iraq situation is not allowed to eclipse other important issues. For example, lack of progress in the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East is likely to be raised, and problems may arise due to the lack of attention that has been given to Israel’s nuclear program.

Session 6

PRACTICAL MECHANISMS TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Mr. Ian Donaldson of the United Kingdom and Ambassador Chris Westdal of Canada.

The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was part of a broader package of commitments, which included a strengthened review process to implement permanence with accountability. This includes the obligation in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document to report on steps taken to fulfill Treaty commitments. Step 12 of the “13 practical steps” calls for regular reports by all states parties on the implementation of Article VI. The NWS are opposed to the notion that they have an obligation to report within a proscribed format, but this should not prevent them from providing full and accurate reports. NNWS consider reporting by the NWS to be “their business,” too, as the fulfillment of NPT commitments by the NWS affects the security of all states.

The record of reporting on Article VI has varied from NWS to NWS. It has been seen that NWS have not been sufficiently transparent in their reports about their nuclear arsenals, and as a result comparisons have been difficult. It was underlined that there is a need for more meaningful information (not just graphs without numbers, which have been issued in the past). Reasonably detailed information is required to provide predictability and thus greater stability.

In addition to reporting on progress on Article VI, reporting on implementation of the Middle East Resolution was also agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. In this regard, it was suggested that the incoming and outgoing chairmen of PrepComs should remind states parties that they have an obligation to report on this issue at the 2003 PrepCom. The 2003 PrepCom must prepare the ground for the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

Several proposals were put forward on means to encourage reporting:

Reporting should be viewed in a positive light by the NWS because it can be seen as a form of deterrence. Given that nuclear deterrence requires publicity and openness, states that maintain a deterrent role for their nuclear arsenals should have no objection to transparency. Transparency will only be a genuine problem for states that envisage a battlefield role for their nuclear arsenal. This argument was refuted on the basis that the NWS should not be allowed to justify their continued possession of nuclear weapons on any grounds, including deterrence.
Reporting should be “demand driven.” The reports submitted to the 2002 PrepCom need to be read and quoted in order to increase the demand for future reports and to give them a purpose. There is a real unfulfilled potential, partly because the reports are a means of determining compliance.

In this regard, it was suggested that reports could be useful to clarify concerns over non-compliance. Given concerns over Iran, it could be requested to report on its activities at the next PrepCom. If the reports are seen to be inadequate, then the states could put pressure on Iran to provide more accurate or complete reports. Reporting could also be used by states suspected of being in non-compliance to prove the opposite.

It was noted that prospects for a meaningful reporting session are far better in 2003 than they were in 2002. The situation was very unclear in 2002 as reporting had never been attempted before. In 2003, however, the reports from the first PrepCom are available, so the discussion should be more useful. There has also been a great deal more debate on this issue over the past year. In addition, due to global security problems, there may be more press attention than usual on the PrepCom this year. It was noted that it is necessary to be especially careful to ensure that the meeting is balanced. With this in mind, the NWS should take a more proactive approach in the way they provide reports (they will have the opportunity to set an example where compliance is concerned). This would enhance trust, and allow the PrepCom to focus on other vital issues rather than becoming stuck on the issue of Article VI.

It was emphasized that, while important, reports are only one instrument to enhance and ensure transparency and accountability. There are many ways to ensure accountability such as the implementation of safeguards, open discussion, and the fulfillment of Treaty commitments.

The main conclusion on the issue of reporting is that it is an important confidence-building measure and can help facilitate interaction to show that the regime is fit and well. While it is not essential to be prescriptive, reporting should be meaningful and based on core guidelines. The NWS should discuss this issue among themselves and agree on a format for their reports to allow comparisons to be drawn.

Session 7

HOW CAN THE RELEVANCE AND RELIABILITY OF THE NPT BE SUSTAINED
IN THE EVOLVING GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT?

The panelists offering introductory remarks for this session were Ms. Rebecca Johnson of the Liu Institute of Canada and Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi of Japan.

In addressing the continued relevance of the NPT, it was observed that efforts to promote nuclear disarmament as a security-enhancing opportunity seem to be diminishing. The NPT may respond to these types of challenges, but the Treaty needs to be given new tools to be able to do so. These could include: new incentives for the NNWS to fulfill their commitments; new compulsory conditions for NPT membership, such as the mandatory rather than voluntary implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol; and a new drive to ensure that export controls are not misused and do not contradict Article IV. An additional suggestion was to consider new incentives to induce holdouts to join the NPT. These might include technology assistance, the provision of health and environmental assistance, and a commitment to address the genuine security concerns of the holdouts.

Most importantly, it was emphasized that the NPT is not simply a forum for discussion. Rather, it was suggested that a permanent mechanism is required to address non-compliance issues and to oversee the implementation of the NPT. This new organization, or NPTO, could be based in New York, be headed by a Director General, and could have its own small secretariat. It would work closely with the IAEA, DDA, UNSC, etc. Failing the creation of an NPTO, an annual three- to four-day meeting could replace some of the current arrangements, with a specific agenda to address proliferation priorities.

At the conclusion of this session it was acknowledged that the outcome of the next PrepCom is likely to be determined by geopolitical developments. The issue of resolving outstanding problems and upholding the Treaty in the long term will have to be addressed at this PrepCom, especially if the NPT is seen to be failing to fulfill the needs of the international community. This should include measures that could be taken outside the Treaty context (e.g., bilateral talks between the United States and the DPRK).