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Space Weapons or Space Arms Control?

U.S. Air Force depiction of deployed Space-Based Laser constellation.

By James Clay Moltz

On April 3, China again reiterated its call for a global effort to prevent an arms race in outer space,[1] a topic it has raised repeatedly at the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time, the United States is moving forward with plans for three possible types of space weapons: two systems intended for missile defense in space (the Space-Based Laser and the kinetic kill interceptor) and one for anti-satellite purposes (the Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite [KEASAT] system). Other U.S. missile defense systems will use low-Earth orbital space (from about 60 miles to several hundred miles above the Earth) for interception of ballistic missiles, but will not require space basing. A number of other countries, possibly including China itself (which has allegedly been conducting research on microsatellites for military uses and has a People's Liberation Army general in charge of its national space program)[2] are also considering the development and possible deployment of space weapons.

Technical Characteristics of Space Weapons and Space Debris

Questions have been raised both in governmental and non-governmental circles about the long-term implications of the current path. There are a range of possible impacts. Use of space for testing ground-, sea-, or air-based interceptors may raise international tensions and fears that space-based assets could be attacked. However, debris from collisions between non-orbital ballistic missiles and direct ascent interceptors (launched from Earth) de-orbits in a matter of minutes and is unlikely to disrupt other activities in low-Earth orbit. Anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptions--that is, attacks on targets moving at orbital velocity (about 18,000 mph)--may be considerably more destabilizing. Tests against such space-based objects will create uncertainties about the safety of commercial, scientific, and military satellites in low-Earth orbit, while generating persistent debris that may take months to de-orbit. These clouds of metal create the possibility of deadly collisions with manned and unmanned spacecraft. Currently, there are no internationally agreed upon rules for controlling space debris, despite the fact that the U.S. Space Command must track over 8,000 orbital objects in order to ensure the safety of U.S. spacecraft.[3] Although ground- and space-based lasers are unlikely to generate significant orbital debris, they could lower the warning time before possible space attacks, creating further instability.

Arguments for Space Weapons

Supporters of space weapons argue that arms control negotiations will be too difficult and that cheating will occur, in any case, thus making space weapons inevitable.[4] They argue that commercial and military assets alike are vulnerable to simple ASAT attacks, thus requiring countermeasures in the form of anti-ASAT weapons. In the area of missile defense, space-based systems are touted by supporters as the best means of achieving boost-phase interceptions. One problem for such defenses, however, is that they suffer from the "absentee problem"--the necessity of orbiting multiple constellations so that weapons are always in place over the target in case of a missile launch. This will raise costs considerably. Laser enthusiasts point to the possible attractiveness of weapons against hostile missiles or satellites and the possible utility of lasers for removing space debris. Yet current lasers lack power sources light enough to boost them into space. Russian sources continue to discuss the desirability of space weapons for the purposes of anti-asteroid defense and other exotic schemes, but it is not clear whether these are serious initiatives or make-work efforts intended to save cash-strapped missile and space design bureaus within the former Soviet weapons complex.[5]

Arguments Against Space Weapons

While the vulnerability of spacecraft, in theory, is quite real (as it has been since the dawn of the space age), critics argue that weapons enthusiasts are "manufacturing" a threat to justify their programs and may end up stimulating an arms race in space.[6] They also point to high costs and problems of maintaining these systems in orbit. Current U.S. policy opposes negotiations on space issues (including the Chinese proposal), preferring to maintain maximum flexibility for weapons developments, particularly for missile defense. However, the long-term costs of this policy may be significant if other states are motivated to copy or counter U.S. space weapons, while adopting policies of opposing further space arms control. The main arms control agreement governing international space activities (the 1967 Outer Space Treaty) bans only weapons of mass destruction in orbit, without addressing conventional or other possible weapons systems. Yet it is not clear that the physical environment of space--with its extreme transparency, lack of protective zones, and capacity to retain orbital debris for months and even years--will be able to sustain multilateral testing and weaponization without serious harm to other users of space.

The current situation lacks agreed upon rules for space weapons and active negotiations to develop such guidelines. Negotiations will be needed to ensure that the long-term international and commercial interests in safe access to space are not jeopardized. A number of countries have already voiced support for the Chinese approach, which would ban all weapons from space. If the Bush administration wants to prevent such a consensus from forming, it should consider offering a compromise proposal for addressing international space security concerns.

Sources:
[1] Reuters (Beijing), April 3, 2002.
[2] "China's militarization of space," Geostrategy-Direct.com, April 16, 2002, http:www.geostrategy-direct.com.
[3] For more on this issue, see Orbital Debris Quarterly News, available on-line from NASA's Johnson Space Center at http://www.orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/news_index.html.
[4] See, for example, Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of the Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2001); also George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
[5] See projects listed under several enterprises in Raketno-Kosmicheskaya Promyshlennost' Rossii (Russian Space Industry Directory) (Moscow: Rosaviakosmos, 2001).
[6] See, for example, Michael Krepon in "Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive Toward Antisatellite Weapons," Foreign Affairs (May/June 2001); Rebecca Johnson, "Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponisation of Space," Disarmament Diplomacy (April 2001); and Theresa Hitchens, "Rushing to Weaponize the Final Frontier," Arms Control Today (September 2001).

Additional CNS Resources:

• James Clay Moltz, "Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control," Arms Control Today (April 2002), www.armscontrol.org.

• James Clay Moltz, "Space Arms Control and the International Missile Defense Debate," in Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects, CNS Occasional Paper No. 7 (joint publication with the University of Southampton's Mountbatten Centre) (July 2001).