Research Story of the Week

"START III": An End Or Beginning of Negotiations

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Elimination of missile front sections.

By Nikolai Sokov

During their meeting on May 23-25, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin will sign a new agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, often referred to -- especially in the Russian press -- as "START III." The text was finalized 10 days before the summit, which represents a rare departure from the tradition of negotiating until the final hour. Judging by the available information, the agreement will be short and simple, not much beyond what the two presidents announced last fall. At the November 2001 Washington-Crawford summit, Bush announced that the United States would reduce its arsenal to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads. Putin, who in November 2000 had proposed that the two countries go down to 1,500 warheads each, reciprocated in December 2001 (immediately following the U.S. formal declaration of its intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty) with the figures 1,500-2,200. Although the United States clearly preferred unilateral, parallel reductions, Bush agreed to Putin's insistence that the announced reductions be codified in a legally binding agreement.

Subsequent negotiations did not resolve one fundamental problem pertaining to the intended reductions: the Russian demand that they be irreversible and verifiable. With some notable exceptions (dismantlement of MX inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), conversion of four Ohio-class strategic submarines (SSBNs) to carry sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and the decision not to maintain nuclear capability for B-1B heavy bombers, in total amounting to probably about 1,500-2,000 warheads), the United States plans to implement reductions through downloading, i.e., by removing and storing warheads. By downloading rather than dismantling weapons, the United States preserves the possibility that under certain conditions its arsenal could be reconstituted and thus could increase to about 5,000 warheads. Russia, in contrast, cannot retain many of its present delivery vehicles for long, and consequently its reductions will be irreversible.

Interim Solution

From the very beginning of negotiations, the Russian side continued to raise the issue of "uploading" -- the ability of the United States to reconstitute its nuclear arsenal. The Russian side tried two solutions to this problem: verified elimination of warheads removed from delivery vehicles and elimination of delivery vehicles. The first option would have limited the uploading capability by limiting the number of warheads that could be redeployed, while the other would have reduced the number of delivery vehicles on which warheads could be deployed -- stored warheads are useless unless there are missiles and heavy bombers that can carry them. Whereas the first option was well-known from the first days of negotiations, the other one was apparently proposed by Russia close to the end of negotiations.[1] Evidently, neither option satisfied the United States, although some limited reduction of delivery vehicles is planned anyway, as some delivery vehicles and types of warheads are slated for retirement. Reportedly, in the end, the United States agreed to provide three months' advance notice if it intends to return warheads to delivery vehicles.

Judging from available information, U.S. and Russian negotiators decided to "kick the can down the road." After the two presidents sign the new agreement, the United States and Russia will continue negotiations on transparency and verification issues.[2] Mainly for that reason, representatives of both sides have emphasized lately that the new document will be "simple," unlike START I (signed by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991), which Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch described as "a good snooze."[3] The decision to postpone controversial issues was explained away by the Russian side with a reference to the fact that both START I and the ABM Treaty "continued to develop" after they entered into force.[4] The difference is, of course, that by the time of signing, both treaties were complete documents, while the future "START III" looks more like a framework agreement.

The simplicity of "START III" results from the absence of the most complex elements: transparency and verification. When (and if) the two sides agree on a transparency and verification package for "START III," the new document will no longer be "simple" and will be as good a "snooze" as START I. In the meantime, the verification mechanism of START I will be used to keep track of "START III" developments.

In the end, "START III" represents a convenient compromise. The presidents will be able to sign a new agreement, which is supposed to become a building block in the new relationship between the two countries. This relationship is increasingly dominated by trade and the joint fight against international terrorism. Arms control is no longer as important as it used to be only a few years ago, much less during the Cold War. The signing of "START III" will prevent arms control from becoming a stumbling block in the path of more important issues. Negotiations will continue, however, and hopefully a more robust agreement will be signed when the two countries are ready for it. Even more important, the signing of "START III" will reduce political pressures on negotiators, increasing the chances for success.

"START III": History of a Compromise

"START III" will be, indeed, very simple and short -- only three pages. In fact, even the original draft, full of square brackets (which indicate disagreements over the text proposed by each side) was short as well -- only six pages. In other words, there are good reasons to suspect that the Russian side, even as it was insisting that warheads be verifiably eliminated instead of simply downloaded, did not offer detailed provisions on a transparency and verification regime. It seems that the need to postpone serious negotiations was unavoidable.

Previous arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union never tackled warheads: SALT I (1972), SALT II (1979, never entered into force), and START I (1991) addressed only delivery vehicles -- ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. During the Cold War, each side tended to deploy the maximum number of warheads on each delivery vehicle, so the verification regimes concentrated on missiles and aircraft, which are relatively easy to address.

Downloading is a simple and cheap method of reduction, but it necessitates a shift of focus in the verification regime from delivery vehicles to warheads. This is difficult since everything about warheads, including production, storage, maintenance, and dismantlement, has traditionally been a highly sensitive and closely guarded secret. Finding acceptable ways to address verification of warheads is not impossible, but requires considerable time and was simply impossible to achieve in the half year negotiators had at their disposal before the May 2002 summit.[5] After all, even the broad language regarding transparency and verification talks required serious negotiations. Until the meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in early May, the future of "START III" hung in the balance. Only the willingness of the Russians to "dilute" the language pertaining to transparency and verification prevented the failure of the entire project.[6]

The Russian position was thus a tall order, which would have required lengthy and difficult negotiations. The Russian military itself was probably not fully prepared to face the consequences of its own proposals, which would have required unprecedented intrusiveness of verification mechanisms. Significantly, U.S. proposals for extensive exchanges of data regarding nuclear warheads, which were part of the START III draft prepared under the Clinton administration, elicited strong protests from the Ministry of Defense and prompted Russian counterproposals, which were unacceptable to the United States. Although during the last year the military's attitude toward transparency has softened, it was unreasonable to expect quick progress. The U.S. military was similarly unwilling to rush into a full-scale agreement and reportedly tried to sabotage negotiations.[7]

Given the inherent sensitivity of the issue and the problems negotiators will have to address, the decision to postpone was logical. It is actually a positive sign that the two countries did not abandon "START III" and, instead, agreed to tackle warhead verification. An earlier attempt to tackle this issue (the decision to conduct relevant negotiations was first made at the March 1997 Helsinki summit between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin) failed; now there seems to be a chance for success.

Is "START III" Worth Signing?

The modesty of "START III" is bound to generate questions about whether it was worth signing. These questions will be asked in Russia with particular insistence: at least on the surface, the Russian government had to retreat from all its original proposals.

There are good reasons to say that "START III" is not meaningless. It achieves an important political mission by addressing and "defusing" the controversial topic of arms control. Of equal importance is the decision to begin negotiations on warhead transparency and verification. This is not really about the prevention of nuclear war, as was the case with earlier arms control agreements. In the post-Cold War environment, the probability of a large-scale nuclear conflict has become negligible; thus, the U.S. uploading capability does not matter much.[8] The real issue is achievement of full transparency with regard to nuclear stockpiles, which is the only way to guarantee that the relationship between the nuclear powers is stable and predictable. Nuclear weapons will remain with us for a long time, and it is important to rule out any misperceptions or suspicions. The agreement Presidents Bush and Putin will sign at summit in late May stands a good chance of beginning a new stage for arms control rather than marking its end.

Sources:

[1] Yevgeni Bai, "Igor Ivanov i Kolin Powell Dogovorilis Pochti Obo Vsem," Izvestiya, May 5, 2002; Alexander Shmelev, "Maiskii Fors-Major," Vesti.Ru, May 3, 2002 (http://www.vesti.ru/2002/05/03/1020434485.html).

[2]Dmitri Gornostaev, "Dogovor Po SNV Budet Skoree Obshchim, Chem Konkretnym," Strana.Ru, May 2, 2002 (http://www.strana.ru); "Rossiya i SshA Soglasovali Tri Osnovnykh Printsipa Novogo Dogovora Po SNV," Strana.Ru, may 4, 2002 (http://www.strana.ru).

[3] Sharon Weinberger, U.S. Will not Destroy Nuclear Warheads, Crouch Says," Aerospace Daily, May 2, 2002; Interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgi Mamedov on ORT, April 24, 2002 (Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 848-25-04-2002 at http://www.ln/mid/ru).

[4] Interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgi Mamedov on ORT, April 24, 2002 (Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 848-25-04-2002 at http://www.ln/mid/ru).

[5] Verification of warheads has attracted considerable attention from experts, who developed several approaches to resolving this issue. See, for example, Nikolai Sokov, "Strengthening The 1991 Declarations: Verification And Transparency Components," presentation at a seminar "Time to Control Tactical Nuclear Weapons," United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), UN Headquarters, New York, September 24, 2001; Anatoli Dyakov, Timur Kadyshev,Yevgeni Myasnikov, Pavel Podvig, "Nenuzhnye Obyazatelstva," Izvestiya, March 18, 2002; Anatoli Dyakov, "START III and verification of warheads elimination," presentation at a conference " The Future of Russian-US Strategic Arms Reductions: START III and Beyond," Cambridge, MA, February 2-6, 1998; Joshua Handler, "The September 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) and the Elimination, Storing and Security Aspects of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)," presentation at a seminar "Time to Control Tactical Nuclear Weapons," United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), UN Headquarters, New York, September 24, 2001.

[6] James Dao, "Nuclear Deal Called Closer After Powell metts Russian," New York Times, May 4, 2002; Sabrina Tavernise, "Russia Offers U.S. Alternatives on Reduction of Warheads," New York Times, April 30, 2002.

[7] Jonathan Landay, "Rumsfeld Reportedly Resists Firm Limits on Nuclear Weapons," San Jose Mercury News, April 27, 2002; Sharon Weinberger, "U.S. Will not Destroy Nuclear Warheads, Crouch Says," Aerospace Daily, May 2, 2002.

[8] Two leading Russian authorities on nuclear balance and arms control, the former chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Research Institute, Vladimir Dvorkin, and an expert of the Russian Duma's Defense and Security Committee, Petr Romashkin, recently admitted as much. See an interview with them on Ekho Moskvy, an independent radio station in Moscow, on March 19, 2002 (http://www.echo.msk.ru/interview/interview/7942.html).


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Author(s): Nikolai Sokov
Related Resources: Nuclear, Missile, Americas, NIS, Weekly Story
Date Created: May 13, 2002
Date Updated: -NA-
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