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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Research Story of the WeekThe 10 plus 10 over 10 Initiative: A Promising Start, But Little Substance So Far
Authors: Cristina Chuen, Michael Jasinski, and Tim Meyer On June 27, 2002, the G8 (the seven major industrial countries: France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, also known as the G7, plus Russia) issued a statement outlining a new initiative, entitled the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It committed the G7 to raising up to $20 billion over the next 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia but also in other nations. The so-called "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative, agreed to at the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, calls for the United States to contribute $10 billion, and the other original G-7 nations a combined $10 billion. Despite the size of the numbers and the fanfare accompanying the announcement, it is unclear how much new money has actually been pledged. The $10 billion to be contributed by the United States is largely comprised of funds needed to carry out existing programs at current levels; on the other hand, it does represent a new commitment to continue programs for the next ten years. The agreement allows nations to count monies slated for use but not yet disbursed, and even has a provision for contributions from non-G8 countries should the European nations and Japan fail to produce $10 billion. In addition to questions about funding, the short duration of the summit precluded agreements on more than the general principles of the plan, although, as explained below, this in itself represented important progress in some respects. The partnership was a U.S. concept that required intense lobbying by the American delegation. The final agreement required last-minute negotiations about the program's implementation in Russia and issues of taxation, liability, access, and privileges and immunities.[1] Nevertheless, the new initiative could prove a useful tool for expanding nonproliferation assistance to Russia. The G-7 nations are now on record as financially supporting this cause, while the United States promised to continue funding nonproliferation work for an additional ten years. If subsequent negotiations can work out mechanisms for implementing this initiative -- a big if -- the Global Partnership will be an important step towards undoing the lethal Cold War legacy inherited by the former Soviet states. The Global Partnership In the G8 joint statement, the group pledged to work toward stemming the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD) by assisting Russia and other countries in their efforts to address nonproliferation problems. The joint statement contains a pledge to raise up to $20 billion ($10 billion by the United States and $10 billion by other G8 members, apart from Russia). The specifics of the financing of the initiative remain to be decided, and may include bilateral debt exchanges for nonproliferation (explained below), as well as direct assistance. Although Russia is to be the primary recipient of the assistance, other states will also be eligible to participate. The joint statement outlines a number of important guidelines for projects that are to be carried out under the partnership. These guidelines include:
The statement also provides for the establishment of procedures to conduct annual reviews of project progress, consultations on priorities, project gaps, and overlaps, other coordinating measures, and the reporting of findings to G8 governments.[2] At a briefing on June 27, 2002, a senior Bush administration official stated that each participating country would select projects on which it would participate, conduct independent negotiations with Russia, and proceed with their implementation.[3] U.S.-Russian negotiations regarding the Global Partnership are already in the planning stages, and were discussed by Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov during preparatory talks for the late September meeting of the U.S.-Russian advisory committee on strategic security.[4] Italian diplomats have reportedly begun discussions with Russia on implementation of the G8 pledge as well, most recently in a July 16 meeting between Georgiy Mamedov and Giancarlo Aragona, director of the Department of Multilateral Political Issues and Human Rights at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[5] In addition to the discussion of global nonproliferation projects, the G8 statement included a commitment to six "principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction." The first principle, to "promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items [and to] strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments." The endorsement of this principle by the Bush administration is particularly significant, since many of its previous actions have been viewed by critics as undermining such treaties as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Biological Weapons Convention. The other five Global Partnership principles reflect pledges to maintain effective physical protection, accounting, border control, and export control measures with regard to WMD materials, as well as a promise to strengthen management of WMD materials, minimizing the stocks of nuclear and biological materials and eliminating all chemical weapons.[6] Russian Participation and Reactions The Russian government reaction to the Global Partnership initiative has been positive.[7] However, while Russian statements have reflected agreement with the general principles of the G-8 statement, they point out that the difficult task of negotiating the specifics of liability, transparency, and other issues in each aid program agreement remains. Nonetheless, Russia's Kananaskis commitment is a significant step forward, as it had heretofore refused to accept the terms included in the joint statement during on-going negotiations on a multilateral environmental aid agreement, known as the Multilateral Environmental Nuclear Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) agreement, and in negotiations on a trilateral U.S.-Russia-Norway aid agreement.[8] Putin's support of the G8 partnership aims should provide additional impetus toward progress in further negotiations. During a press conference on June 27, 2002, President Putin gave an indication of the Russian government's nonproliferation priorities. While asserting that Russian nuclear weapons pose no proliferation threat, only an environmental one, Putin identified chemical weapons elimination and disposal of non-strategic nuclear submarines as two of the most important problems facing Russia today. He noted that Russia itself is committed to working on these issues, but welcomes the financial support of the G8 partners.[9] Some Russian observers speculated that the G8 summit statement was mainly political in nature, and noted that previous assistance commitments have been considerably larger than actual funding received. Further, they pointed out that assistance commitments similar to those declared at Kananaskis were made at the May 2002 NATO summit in Rome, where Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated that the European Union would provide $10 billion in nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states over 10 years, and U.S Secretary of State Colin Powell made a similar promise.[10] Some Russian politicians critical of Putin's foreign policy course, such as Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov and General Leonid Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Sciences, predictably criticized the G8 initiative as highlighting Russia's weakness, threatening to undermine Russia's defense capabilities, and preventing Russia from establishing itself as a counterweight to unilateralist U.S. foreign policy. Others, however, praised the initiative and the formal recognition of Russia as a full member of the G8 as a victory for Putin.[11] Several Russian experts predicted that implementation of the 10 plus 10 over 10 program would run into considerable difficulties, due to the conflict between the donor countries' insistence on maintaining close supervision of the projects and the Russian government's desire to protect sensitive information.[12] U.S. Contribution Of the G8 countries, the United States has been the undisputed leader in organizing and implementing nonproliferation assistance programs. Beginning in the early 1990s, the U.S. government initiated a series of projects under the CTR program addressing the problems of arms control treaty implementation, nuclear weapon and materials security, export controls, strategic nuclear submarine elimination, weapon scientist "brain drain," and many others. Between 1992 and 2002, the United States allocated approximately $7 billion for nonproliferation projects in Russia and other former Soviet republics.[13] U.S. government agencies have developed effective guidelines for ensuring project accountability and transparency, guidelines which have been incorporated into the G8 joint statement on global partnership. The Bush administration requested $957 million (which includes $428 million for Department of Defense programs, $420 million for Department of Energy programs, and $109 million for State Department programs) in nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet republics in its FY 2003 budget request. This figure compares favorably with the $760 million requested by the administration for FY 2002, although it is less than the total FY 2002 figure of $1,014 million, which included supplemental funds approved by Congress after the events of September 11, 2001.[14] The United States appears set to meet its 10-year $10 billion commitment if it continues to fund nonproliferation assistance projects for the newly independent states (NIS) at the current rate. Although the long-term commitment to continue to assist the former Soviet states is new, this funding level may actually represent a decrease in funding of particular programs. It in no way meets the needs identified by a top-level, bipartisan commission, known as the Baker-Cutler Commission, which issued a report in January 2001 calling for the United States to spend $30 billion on nonproliferation efforts in Russia over the next eight to ten years.[15] Other Countries' Contributions Other members of the G8 have also begun to commit funding, although few particulars as to financing details or specific programs are available. Reports on the G8 meeting suggest that the initiative for the partnership belonged to the United States, which pursued the nonproliferation issue with considerably greater energy than the issue of aid to Africa, the designated main topic of the Kananaskis meeting. Possibly due to the lack of extensive prior consultations on the matter and the apparently unexpected emergence of nonproliferation as one of the key issues on the summit agenda, Germany was the only G8 country other than the United States that was eager to commit to funding new nonproliferation assistance programs. Moreover, in contrast to the United States, most G8 countries would have to significantly increase their spending for such programs in order to meet the $10 billion figure. Between 1992 and 2001, the European Commission and individual European Union countries spent approximately 550 million Euro (about $468 million as of June 2001) on nonproliferation projects in Russia and other former Soviet republics.[16] This amount does not include substantial E.U. and Japanese assistance in the nuclear safety sector. The G8 initiative was received very positively by the German media, which emphasized the environmental aspects of the program, and the possible benefits for German industrial concerns that would be involved. Germany also was, next to the United States, one of the first countries to pledge assistance, committing itself to $1.5 billion.[17] It also supported the initiative at the summit. While Germany had principally been promoting economic debt exchanges (an exchange of debt cancellation for stock in Russian companies) before the summit, according to the Berliner Zeitung German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had also discussed the idea of applying a debt exchange mechanism to nonproliferation funding with President Putin in December 2001.[18] Other reports suggest Germany is cool to the idea of funding its assistance via debt exchange. Germany favors assistance projects that will utilize its expertise in nuclear material storage and transportation, such as moving naval reactors from Gremikha into temporary storage at Sayda Bay, low- and medium-level radioactive waste storage at Novaya Zemlya, plutonium reactor shut-down at Krasnoyarsk, and improving the safety of nuclear transports.[19] Germany has been assisting Russia in eliminating its chemical weapon arsenals, and is conducting talks on new programs in this area.[20] Although Canada was disappointed with the results of the summit, the Canadian government indicated its willingness to commit $1 billion Canadian (about US$600-650 million) over 10 years for the G8 Global Partnership Program.[21] Canada will reportedly also offer technical support for nonproliferation activities.[22] The pledge was made without consulting parliament. No public debate has yet taken place in Canada on the partnership, due to the unexpectedness with which the announcement was made.[23] Thus, Canada has yet to make an official funding announcement.[24] Great Britain was also surprised by the change of agenda away from Africa. However, on July 1, Prime Minister Tony Blair said that Great Britain would provide up to $750 million over the next 10 years.[25] The British funding, based on current and planned future assistance, will include support for the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium, destruction of chemical weapons, defueling and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines, decommissioning of nuclear reactors, materials control and accountancy (MC&A) assistance, nuclear safety work, physical protection of nuclear materials, provision of non-weapons employment to personnel in closed nuclear cities, and alleviation of the social and economic impacts of nuclear plant closures, in addition to British participation in European Union programs. However, this work requires a legal framework, an issue raised at the G8 summit. The United Kingdom is a party to the stalled MNEPR negotiations, and is also in talks with Russia on a bilateral agreement to allow substantive project work in northwest Russia to commence. The British have already concluded a legal framework agreement with Russia to cover the destruction of chemical weapons stocks.[26] According to the Japanese press, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged $200 million for the initiative, although intense U.S. lobbying was reportedly required to secure Japan's endorsement of the partnership.[27] A Japanese Foreign Ministry source suggests that currently Japan is ready to spend $250 million on nonproliferation in the former Soviet Union. Of this sum, $150 million is money that was previously pledged but not yet expended, while $100 is new money likely to be earmarked for an international plutonium disposition project and the BN-600 fast neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, which is being converted to dispose of plutonium by burning mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel fabricated from weapons-origin plutonium.[28] One Japanese official complained that the Global Partnership figure of $20 billion was arrived at in an arbitrary manner, and that the manner in which the funds were to be spent remained unspecified, while other officials questioned President Bush's eagerness to provide Russia with this assistance.[29] However, Japan may find itself unwilling to provide more funding if problems with existing Japanese projects are not resolved. Koizumi is dissatisfied with Russia's level of cooperation on ongoing nonproliferation projects funded by Japan, while the Japanese Diet has also voiced its opposition to the foreign assistance programs. While Japan originally assigned 25 billion yen (approximately $208 million) to these projects, 16.5 billion yen worth of projects are yet to be implemented due to Russia's unwillingness to disclose certain information and other reasons.[30] In July 2002, Japan dispatched auditors to Russia and Kazakhstan to ascertain the causes of delays in implementation of nonproliferation projects. Only one Japanese-funded project (the Landysh processing facility for low-level liquid radioactive waste from nuclear submarines, for which 4.2 billion yen were allocated) has been completed, although with great delays.[31] Japanese officials have reportedly insisted on not spending additional funds on Russian nonproliferation projects until Russia establishes an effective system for administering them. Public revelations of problems with Russian assistance programs have had a negative effect on Japanese public support of the programs.[32] Much of the $200 million pledge, therefore, appears to represent previously allocated but not yet spent funds, rather than new funding. France and Italy have yet to make any public commitments of funds for the Global Partnership. However, Italy expects to make a decision by September.[33] To date, French aid to Russia has been subsumed under the country's AIDA ("Aide au démantèlement," or dismantlement assistance) program. Between 1992 and 1996, France committed $57.1 million to this effort, and has since maintained that commitment as similar levels. Beginning in 1993, France has also been involved in studies aimed at adapting Russian nuclear plants to the use of mixed-oxide, or MOX, fuel.[34] In addition, France has pledged about $60 million for plutonium disposition, and participates in the European Union's 1999 Joint Action on Nonproliferation in Russia program, under which a chemical weapons elimination facility in Gorniy is being constructed. In addition to bilateral programs, the European Commission has committed 1 billion Euros.[35] European countries that are not members of the G8 have been invited to make contributions to the Global Partnership, in addition to bilateral, European Union, and other multinational programs.[36] European countries are quite likely to engage in multilateral efforts, using such programs and organizations as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Germany, in particular, wants to use the EBRD as the venue for providing nonproliferation assistance), Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), and the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI) that was formally launched in April 2001.[37] The latter program has been proposed to complement existing nonproliferation programs, improve nonproliferation cooperation between European countries and Russia, introduce new approaches for converting Russian nuclear cities to non-military efforts, and facilitate the involvement of nuclear cities in commercial endeavors. The European Commission has created an International Working Group (IWG) in order to pursue ENCI objectives and coordinate different countries' efforts.[38] Global Partnership Programs Nonproliferation projects under the partnership will continue to address the concerns that are the subject of existing programs. In addition, partnership projects may expand into areas thus far not addressed by existing assistance projects. One of the leading proponents of nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states, Senator Richard Lugar, has proposed expanding assistance to cover cruise missile-armed and general-purpose nuclear-powered submarine elimination and dismantling tactical nuclear weapons.[39] Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations committee, Secretary of State Powell also voiced support for expanding nonproliferation assistance to cover tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons.[40] However, new moneys must be found if this is to occur. In many respects these areas correspond closely to the nonproliferation priorities identified by President Putin, namely chemical weapon and non-strategic nuclear submarine elimination. Nonproliferation projects addressing these issues probably have a high likelihood of success, despite difficulties in chemical weapons elimination programs to date. The process of dismantling nuclear submarines, in addition, has already been perfected and can easily be expanded from strategic submarines to include new classes of submarines. However, other issues identified by Senator Lugar and Secretary Powell are likely to experience considerable difficulties. The Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile, for instance, which at present time remains outside existing formal arms control regimes, lacks transparency, while the U.S. concern with Russian tactical nuclear weapons runs counter to President Putin's position that Russian nuclear weapons do not pose a proliferation threat and are well guarded.[41] Debt Relief Initiatives The G8 joint statement on the global partnership on nonproliferation has raised the profile of the concept of exchanging Russian foreign debt for nonproliferation program financing. The inclusion of this provision in the joint statement raises the possibility that not all of the funding for the initiative will come in the form of budget allocations.[42] The concept of exchanging Russian debt is not new and has been discussed in various forums in recent years. It was, for example, suggested in June 2001 by representatives of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Landau Network-Centro Volta, and has since been discussed at ENCI-related IWG meetings.[43] The German government, which holds the lion's share of Russian debt, has also promoted debt exchange.[44] The idea may have gained greater popularity within the Bush administration following President Putin's visit to the United States in November 2001, during which he reportedly expressed concern about the debt burden facing the Russian Federation.[45] Indeed, the Russian government has been concerned that servicing its foreign debt might require up to 40 percent of its budget in the near future. In 2003, the peak year for Russian debt payments, Russia will be required to return nearly $18 billion to its creditors. Only a relatively small proportion of Russia's $71.5 billion debt is held by the United States. Of the $3.8 billion owed to the United States, over $2 billion is Soviet-era debt. Germany, by comparison, is owed $26 billion, Italy $6.4 billion, and other European states a total of $35 billion.[46] The distribution of Russian foreign debt suggests debt forgiveness might be particularly attractive to the European members of G8. The concept of debt for nonproliferation exchange envisions a mechanism for applying forgiven debts toward the funding of nonproliferation projects, and is similar to "debt for environment" swaps implemented in other countries. The Russian government has developed two competing proposals for implementing debt exchange. Under the terms of the first proposal, the debt would be exchanged for shares in Russian enterprises. Under the second proposal, debt would be exchanged for nonproliferation funding.[47] The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has estimated that the cost of defense conversion and job creation efforts in the 10 nuclear cities may reach $500 million, and the debt swap project could provide funding for such efforts.[48] The debt exchange concept has also found support in the United States. The Security Assistance Act of 2001 (S.1803) Subtitle B (Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act of 2001) contained language authorizing the U.S. government to exchange $100 million of Soviet-era debt in FY 2002 and $200 million of Soviet-era debt in FY 2003, and to establish a "Russian Nonproliferation Investment Facility" at the Department of Treasury.[49] On July 25, 2002, the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee held a hearing on discussing the possibility of using Russian debt cancellation as a means of financing nonproliferation assistance programs.[50] Representatives Adam Schiff and Ellen Tauscher are among the co-sponsors of the Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation Act (HR. 3836) of 2002 (the companion to S.1803, discussed above). This legislation, which was introduced several months before the Kananaskis G8 summit, was modeled after earlier debt swaps for environmental efforts, and would replace the debt with new Russian obligations, to be defined though a nonproliferation investment agreement and to result in the creation of a nonproliferation fund. The Russian government would also be required to provide nonproliferation commitments and transparency measures. The U.S. government would have the authority to approve nonproliferation programs. The programs would incorporate many of the features of current U.S. nonproliferation programs, including U.S. audits, Russian tax exemptions, and ceilings on the proportion of funds to be spent outside of Russia. The bill will also authorize the U.S. government to encourage other creditor states to pursue similar policies.[51] Conclusion While the Global Partnership initiative has yet to result in significant new nonproliferation assistance funding, it could prove to be a landmark in dealing with WMD issues in the former Soviet Union. It is not clear how or whether the $10 billion promised by Europe and Japan will be raised, but the initiative has clearly rejuvenated efforts to procure funding for the elimination and safeguarding of WMD weapons and sites. Since there is as yet no administrative organ to implement projects, and no specificity with regard to project recipients, much work remains to be done. The initiative is, nevertheless, the best hope for pushing through legal framework agreements that have stymied the provision of promised funding in the past. Issues for Future Research Before more detailed agreements on the Global Partnership
are concluded, the G8 countries need to determine the most effective way to
address particular nonproliferation concerns. The diversity of nonproliferation
needs, from weapons elimination to the physical protection of radioactive waste
storage facilities, demands a variety of approaches. Although the Kananaskis G8
statement included several overarching guidelines, liability, transparency,
access and the like, the details underlying these concepts have yet to be
negotiated. The G8 might therefore consider the possibility of moving forward
on certain projects by expanding programs under existing agreements (for
instance, subsuming new submarine dismantlement programs under the CTR
agreement). Other projects might be best handled bilaterally. Management of
programs via a general fund implies the oversight of eight nations (or more, if
additional nations contribute). For some programs, the flexibility of a single
donor, and the attention a single donating state might provide, could make more
sense. Programs should also take advantage of the variety of donor nations,
which have different priorities, transparency and access requirements,
resources, and relations with Russia.
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