Research Story of the Week

Renewed Efforts to Strengthen the BTWC

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Amb. Tibor Toth, Chairman of the BTWC Ad Hoc Group.

By Jean du Preez and Daniil Korbyakov

With a new sense of optimism among delegates, the resumed session of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) started in Geneva on November 11. After opening the Conference, the Chairman, Ambassador Tibor Toth from Hungary, suspended the formal session and called for informal consultations on a draft Review Conference decision circulated by him the week of November 4. This draft decision followed several informal consultations -- in New York and Geneva -- during which Ambassador Toth attempted to find the middle ground between the hard-line position of the United States and substantive proposals made by States Parties such as the United Kingdom and South Africa since the December 2001 session of the Conference.

Despite speculation that the Conference would be a "ten minute revolving door exercise" as originally advocated by the United States without any substantive outcome, early indications are now that Ambassador Toth's compromise proposal has the support from the vast majority of States Parties, including the United States, the European Union, China, the Russian Federation, and most members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Although the Conference is scheduled to conclude on 22 November 2002, it is expected that the Chairman will promote a rapid conclusion of the Conference as soon as agreement is reached on his draft decision, thereby avoiding any divisive issues.

In terms of Ambassador Toth's proposal, the Conference would agree to hold three annual one-week-long meetings of State Parties, commencing in 2003 and leading up to the 2006 Sixth BTWC Review Conference. The purpose of these meetings would be to promote common understanding and effective action on issues of concern to all States Parties. Each annual meeting will be prepared by a two-week meeting of experts. The first meeting in 2003 will consider the adoption of national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of criminal legislation as well as national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic micro organisms and toxins. The meeting in 2004 will consider enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating, and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In addition, the meeting will also consider strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants. The third and final meeting to be held in 2005 will consider the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. The Sixth Review Conference will be held no later than 2006 to consider the work of these meetings and to decide on any further action. The procedural provisions in the Chairman's proposed decision specify that all conclusions or results will be reached through consensus; that the meetings of experts will prepare factual reports describing their work; and that the first annual meeting will be chaired by a representative of the Eastern Group, the second by a representative of the Group of the Non-Aligned and Other States, and the third by a representative of the Western Group.

The 1972 BTWC prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons, but lacks a formal verification system to monitor compliance of its 146 States Parties. In order to remedy this shortcoming the States Parties agreed in 1994 to establish an Ad Hoc Group with a mandate to negotiate and develop a legally binding verification regime and to present a pursuant protocol to the Fifth Review Conference in 2001. After seven years of the work, the elaboration of the draft protocol was nearing completion before it was finally and somewhat unexpectedly rejected by the United States in July 2001. The United States at that time argued that traditional multilateral arms control mechanisms would not work in the case of biological weapons and that consequently there would be no need to continue with the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

In a working paper circulated at the December 2001 Review Conference, the United States proposed a set of alternative measures to strengthen the Convention. These measures included the enactment by States Parties of national criminal legislation with respect to biological weapons offenses and making it a criminal offense for any person to engage in activities prohibited by the BTWC. It called for States to adopt and implement strict national regulations for access to particularly dangerous micro-organisms and to report internationally any releases or adverse events that could affect other countries. The United States also proposed a professional code of conduct for scientists working with pathogenic micro-organisms as well as a mechanism for international investigations of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged biological weapons incidents. In addition, it called for the adoption and implementation of strict biosafety procedures (based on World Health Organization or equivalent national guidelines). Also, it called for States Parties to provide rapid emergency medical and investigative assistance, if requested, in the event of a serious outbreak of infectious disease, and to indicate in advance what types of assistance they would be prepared to provide. The United States at the time argued that these measures, if adopted and implemented, "will contribute significantly to doing what none of the measures in the draft BWC Protocol would do: control access to dangerous pathogens, deter their misuse, punish those who misuse them, and alert states to their risks. Individually and collectively, they would establish powerful new tools to strengthen the BWC by enhancing our ability to prevent the development, production or acquisition of dangerous pathogens for illegal purposes." The United States also made a direct linkage between the prohibition of biological weapons with the ongoing campaign against terrorism and emphasized that neither the Convention nor the draft Protocol prepared by the Ad Hoc group "would stop biological terrorism by groups like al Qaeda or restrain their rogue-state patrons."

The United States position was in stark contradiction to the positions of the majority of the States Parties, thus threatening the outcome of the Review Conference and the BTWC review process as a whole. In the final hours of the Conference, it became clear that no agreement would be reached on crucial issues such a follow-up procedure after the Review Conference with a view to intersessional activities; scientific and technological cooperation between the States Parties regarding peaceful use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins related to Article X; non-compliance with the Convention and whether and how to establish an efficient comprehensive survey system; and the evaluation of the Ad Hoc Group and the completion of its work. The United States took its objection to the Protocol a step further and proposed that the Conference's Final Declaration terminate the Ad Hoc group's mandate. This proposal was unacceptable to the others State Parties, including many U.S. allies. However, rather than terminating the Conference with no agreement, it was decided to adjourn the session and resume it after a one-year "cooling-off" period, hence the resumed session that started on November 11.

Despite the pessimistic outlook for the resumed Review Conference, a number of substantive proposals reflecting different approaches to the future BTWC review process have been made. During April 2002, the United Kingdom issued a "green paper" (PDF) that identified several measures for consideration, some of which were similar to the proposals put forward by the United States during the December 2001 meeting. These measures included increased efforts to address the threat of infectious disease; the criminalization of violations of the BTWC; increased restrictions on work that involves dangerous pathogens, toxins, and genetic modification; support for UN investigations into use of biological weapons; assistance to states affected by biological attacks; and the establishing a code of conduct for scientists. South Africa, in its statement to the First Committee of the 57th General Assembly (PDF), made a detailed proposal in an attempt to accommodate both the interests of the majority of the States Parties and the U.S. concerns. It called for a rapid conclusion of the Review Conference, without raising divisive issues. In this regard, South Africa proposed that the final documents of the Conference should make no reference to the BTWC Ad Hoc Group and its draft protocol. As an alternative a "Group or Groups of Experts" should deal with a "limited and non-exhaustive" list of specific issues related to the Convention with the purpose of forging an agreement on measures that could enhance the implementation of the Convention. The proposed Experts Group or Groups would meet annually in two separate periods. The proposal also included a provision for annual meetings of States Parties for a limited duration of time (a few days). These meetings (coinciding in time with Experts' meetings) would review the work of the Expert Groups and decide upon future work. The proposal also provided for the possibility of strengthening the UN secretariat in the area of biological weapons.

Consequently, Ambassador Toth's substantive consultations culminated in his proposed draft decision for consideration by the Review Conference. His proposal, clearly based on elements taken from both the United Kingdom and South African proposals, already enjoys wide support. Given the inclusion of some of its earlier proposals, expectations are that the United States would lend it support to the draft decision. Although the United States has so far strongly opposed any meetings prior to the Sixth Review Conference, it may show flexibility in this regard, especially given the inclusion of the substantive topics for consideration by the annual meetings of States Parties. All of these topics were included in the statement by John Bolton and the United States working paper delivered at the 2001 session of the Review Conference.

The challenge facing the States Parties at the Conference will be to find agreement on this delicately balanced draft decision against the backdrop of a possible total failure of the BTWC review process. This is of particular importance in view of the volatility in the international community's fight against biological weapons threats, exacerbated by the scourge of terrorism. Several basic options for a possible outcome exist, including the "ten minute revolving door exercise" or a Conference that would allow an escalating acrimony among States Parties which could lead to abandoning consensus in favor of the voting procedure. The most desirable option is the adoption of a Final Declaration based on a compromise formula as suggested in Tibor Toth's initiative. It is encouraging that early indications show wide support for this initiative. There are, however, a handful of State Parties that continue to play a precarious game through their insistence that the Final Declaration should include issues that would clearly jeopardize consensus. These States Parties should take responsibility for their actions and seize this delicate opportunity to reach a compromise agreement. It would be detrimental for the Convention and for the international community's fight against biological weapons threats to allow a situation where no further work is done to enhance the implementation of the Convention.

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Author(s): Jean du Preez and Daniil Korbyakov
Related Resources: Treaties, CBW, Weekly Story
Date Created: November 11, 2002
Date Updated: January 10, 2003
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