Research Story of the Week

North Korea Lifts the Freeze on Its Nuclear Program

Photo
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean National Defense Chairman Kim Jong Il after signing the "Pyongyang Declaration" on 9/17/02.

By Daniel A. Pinkston

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea) announced on December 12, 2002, that it would lift the freeze on its nuclear facilities to generate electricity.[1] The announcement came in the wake of a Spanish and American interception of a North Korean vessel loaded with ballistic missiles. The announcement raises several questions regarding the current status of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the timelines for any diversion of nuclear materials to bomb fabrication.

The most urgent concern is the 8,000 spent-fuel rods in a temporary storage pond at the nuclear complex in Yongbyon-kun, North P'yong'an Province. North Korea has sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requesting the Agency to remove its cameras and seals that have been monitoring the nuclear freeze.[2] If the IAEA complied, it would be a serious development that would likely mean Pyongyang's expulsion or withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). And if the IAEA's monitoring equipment is disabled or removed, North Korea could probably reprocess the 8,000 spent-fuel rods into enough plutonium for about five bombs within about one month.

The second most critical aspect of the program's recommencement is the time it would take North Korean scientists and engineers to begin operating the country's nuclear reactors and reprocess the spent fuel into weapon-grade plutonium. North Korea has a small research reactor in Yongbyon-kun that is not under IAEA safeguards. The reactor initially used 10 percent enriched uranium fuel in the 1960s, but it has used 80 percent enriched uranium since it was upgraded to 8MW(th) in 1987. According to the IAEA, the Soviet Union and Russia have provided the fuel for this reactor, and it is uncertain whether North Korea is capable of producing the enriched uranium fuel rods for its operation. If the DPRK can make the fuel rods, this reactor could produce about 2.2 kilograms of plutonium per year, assuming the reactor is operated at about 75 percent capacity.

The second reactor of concern is the 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor, which is also located in Yongbyon-kun but under IAEA safeguards and frozen under the terms of the Agreed Framework. This reactor produced the spent-fuel rods that are now in temporary storage. It could probably be back in operation in one or two months if North Korea has the fuel rods to load into the core. North Korea has the capability to produce the fuel rods for this reactor, and it would probably take an additional month to restart this reactor if new fuel rods are required. This reactor can produce about 5.5 kilograms of plutonium per year, or enough for about one bomb. Although Pyongyang has announced that it is lifting the freeze on its nuclear program to generate electricity, this reactor has never been connected to the power grid, and the amount of electricity that it could produce is not significant.

The DPRK also has two nuclear reactors that were under construction but frozen by the Agreed Framework in 1994. These reactors could greatly expand Pyongyang's capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons, but it could take three to five years before construction could be completed and full-scale operation begins. The 200MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant in T'aech'on, North P'yong'an Province could produce about 220 kilograms of plutonium per year, or enough for about 30-40 bombs. The estimated start-up timeline for the 50MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant in Yongbyon-kun is also about 3-5 years, and this reactor could produce enough plutonium for about 7-10 bombs per year once it becomes fully operational.

A recent South Korean press report claims that North Korea has been operating a secret nuclear reactor at an underground location in the Pyongyang area. However, the accuracy of this report is doubtful, and there is no information regarding the capacity of this reactor, if in fact, it does exist. Nevertheless, the DPRK has the resources to quickly assemble a nuclear arsenal to augment the two plutonium bombs that U.S. intelligence assumes they already possess. Meanwhile, the Bush administration continues to reiterate that it will not negotiate with Pyongyang until the Kim Jong Il regime verifiably abandons its nuclear program.

[1] "Operation and Building of Nuclear Facilities to Be Resumed Immediately," Korean Central News Agency, December 12, 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "DPRK Gov't to Immediately Resume Operation and Constr. (sic) of Its Nuclear Facilities," Korean Central News Agency, December 12, 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "Haekshisoltul'ui Kadonggwa Konsol'ul Chukshi Chaegae," Korean Central News Agency, December 12, 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.
[2] "IAEA Director General Calls for DPRK Restraint," WorldAtom Press Release PR 2002/21, December 12, 2002, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/P_release/2002/prn0221.shtml>.


CNS Contacts on North Korea's Nuclear Program:

View previous Research Stories.

 

Author(s): Daniel Pinkston
Related Resources: Nuclear, N. Korea, East Asia, Weekly Story
Date Created: December 16, 2002
Date Updated: -NA-
Return to Top