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Research Story of the Week

Study Details Steps To Reduce Dirty Bomb Threat

By Charles D. Ferguson

Photo of an old transport container.

The Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies today released an assessment of the security risks posed by commercial radioactive sources, an important class of radioactive materials that might be used by terrorists to fabricate a "dirty bomb." Until recently, the security of common radioactive sources in medicine, industry, and scientific research had not been perceived as a major security concern. But the expressed interest of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) has caused policymakers to seek new measures to ensure these materials do not fall into the wrong hands.

The report, part of an on-going CNS study on the "Faces of Nuclear Terrorism," concludes that the challenge of securing commercial radioactive sources around the world is difficult, but manageable. It provides practical recommendations to government and industry that, if implemented, could significantly reduce this component of the dirty bomb threat over the next five years.

Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks by Charles D. Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi, and Judith Perera is available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op11/index.htm. Dr. Ferguson is Scientist-in-Residence, at the CNS Washington, D.C. office. Among the report's major findings:

• RDDs or "dirty bombs" are generally not weapons of mass destruction. Few, if any, people would die immediately after exposure to the ionizing radiation from an RDD.
• Only a small fraction of the radioactive sources in use today pose inherently high security risks, and the great majority of these are under regulatory control in advanced countries.
• The production of commercial radioactive sources is concentrated in a handful of countries and enterprises, creating regulatory opportunities to ensure adequate security in recipient states.
• U.S. and Canadian export licensing rules, typical of suppliers, permit the export of most high-risk sources without any governmental review of the credentials of end-users. Pending new regulations, Canada has alerted exporters to verify the bona fides of end-users, but the U.S. has not.

The CNS report urges that several high priority actions be taken to combat the risks from commercial radioactive sources. These include:

• Improve source controls by expanding programs to securely dispose of sources no longer in use ("disused sources") and by intensifying already active programs to track down and secure lost and discarded "orphan" sources, especially in the former Soviet Union.
• Enhance regulatory measures by assisting nations with weak source security rules and by improving export control measures, especially end-user checks.
• Prepare now for RDD attacks. Although risks from radioactive sources can be significantly reduced in coming years, the RDD threat will never be eliminated. Through public education, training of first responders, and active planning exercises the impacts of a future RDD attack could be greatly mitigated.