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Research Story of the WeekRussia's Views On the Crisis in Iraq
By Michael Jasinski
Commenting on Powell's presentation, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that it illustrated the need for inspections to continue in Iraq.[1] According to Ivanov, the decision on how long the inspections ought to continue should belong to the inspectors, and that there was no need for any additional UNSC resolutions.[2] On February 9, 2002, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said that there was no need to discuss another resolution before the UN inspectors' report due on February 14, 2003.[3] Russia also offered to make available for the inspectors a reconnaissance aircraft that would monitor Iraqi territory.[4] In a statement that implied doubts about Powell's evidence, Russian President Putin said on February 9, 2003, that the main task facing the international community was ascertaining whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD), not a regime change in Iraq.[5] In spite of the skepticism, the Russian Foreign Ministry did call on Iraq to improve its cooperation with the international community.[6] Foreign Minister Ivanov said that Iraq had the greatest interest in clarifying all WMD issues, and that progress in this area was the only way to a political settlement of the crisis and eventual removal of economic sanctions on Iraq.[7] However, the Russian position on the eventual support for the use of armed force remained ambiguous. On February 12, 2003, Putin said that he did not see the need to use Russia's veto power at the UNSC, and that he valued the UNSC's unity. At the same time, Putin said that Russia would act to obstruct any UN measures that would lead to an "unjustified" use of force.[8] Throughout the Iraqi inspections crisis, Russia has attempted to balance its commercial interests in Iraq with its desire to maintain good relations with the United States. Although Russia, as a permanent UNSC member, had the power to block any U.S.-backed proposal, it never resorted to using its veto power. In part this may have been due to the fear that the United States would proceed unilaterally. The Russian veto would only result in the diminution of the importance of the UNSC, whose membership is one of the cornerstones of Russia's international status. Moreover, even if by exercising its veto Russia succeeded in dissuading the United States from military action, the result would be a deterioration of its relationship with the United States, an outcome it wants to avoid. Initially Russia supported the idea of returning arms inspectors to Iraq without any additional UN resolutions.[9] On October 2, 2002, Igor Ivanov said that the Iraqi crisis ought to be resolved through political means, on the basis of existing UN resolutions, and that Iraq's acceptance of resumed inspections would be an important step in that direction.[10] Due to the U.S. pressure to produce a resolution on Iraq, Russia's position shifted to opposing any provisions that would enable any country to use force without seeking additional UN approval.[11] The shift became evident on October 11, 2002 when, following a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Vladimir Putin said that one cannot discount the earlier experience with Iraqi obstructions, and that Russia was prepared to seek out ways to ensure the inspectors would be able to operate unhindered.[12] On October 16, 2002, Putin expressed willingness to consider an additional UN resolution on Iraq.[13] On the same day, Foreign Minister Ivanov said he opposed any resolution that would merely serve as a legal basis for a military intervention, and reiterated the earlier position that no additional resolutions were necessary for the UN inspectors to resume their activities.[14] Initial U.S.-proposed drafts of the resolution were opposed by Russia for containing provisions for automatic use of force.[15] Instead, Russia supported a resolution draft that, in its opinion, did not contain such provisions.[16] In this effort, Russia worked closely with France.[17] Russia voted, along with all other members of the UNSC, to support the final draft of Resolution 1441, which did not contain language unacceptable to Russia.[18] Russia's ambassador to the UN, Sergey Lavrov, said on November 11, 2002 that the new resolution removed the imminent threat of war and opened a path toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict.[19] The new resolution was a compromise for Russia, since it did not contain provisions it wanted for a second UNSC resolution to authorize military action.[20] Following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441, Russia's actions to minimize the possibility of war took the dual path of arguing to give the inspectors time to do their work, and encouraging Iraq to cooperate with the inspectors. On November 13, 2002, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuriy Fedotov said that the Iraqi leadership still had time to show pragmatism and goodwill toward the inspections.[21] On January 24, 2003, Fedotov said that Russia would strive for a continuation of inspections after the initial reports by the inspectors.[22] Following the presentation of the first inspection report by Hans Blix, on January 27, 2003, Fedotov said that Russia did not see the need for any additional UNSC resolutions, but would rather like to see the continuation of inspections.[23] This position was also supported by Putin, who said that diplomatic measures were not yet exhausted.[24] In late January 2003, there were some indications that Russia might support the use of force under certain circumstances. While urging the Iraqi government to cooperate, [25] Igor Ivanov also indicated that armed force might be unavoidable if Iraq fails to abide by the resolution.[26] This harder line was echoed by Putin, who said that Iraqi noncompliance might compel Russia to be more receptive to the U.S. position.[27] Nevertheless, on January 30, 2003, Putin once again called for the intensification of political efforts.[28] In contrast to the United States, the Russian government never unequivocally stated under what circumstances it would support an armed resolution of the crisis. Throughout the crisis, Russia expressed considerably less concern about Iraqi WMD ownership than the United States. At times, senior Russian officials expressed doubts that Iraq had any WMD at all. On October 11, 2002, Putin said that Russia did not have any reliable evidence that Iraq had WMD, and that it had not received any such evidence from the United States.[29] On November 11, 2002, Deputy Foreign Minister Fedotov said that the issues Russia was concerned about included the elimination of rocket fuel and clarification of information on the elimination of Scud missiles.[30] As recently as January 28, 2003, Foreign Minister Ivanov ruled out the possibility that Iraq was capable of quickly producing nuclear weapons.[31] That view was shared by the Ministry of Atomic Energy, according to which Iraq did not have the technological and scientific capabilities to create nuclear weapons.[32] The head of the Russian Munitions Agency Zinoviy Pak said on February 7, 2002, that Iraq did not have modern chemical weapons and lacked the necessary infrastructure. Pak also said that the Chemical Weapons Convention permits some research in this area in order to devise defensive measures.[33] At the same time, the ultimate goal of Iraqi disarmament was never challenged by any Russian officials. The Russian government, however, remained resolutely opposed to the idea of "regime change" in Iraq. According to Foreign Minister Ivanov, "regime change" was not justified by any UN resolution.[34] A number of Federation Council members characterized U.S. calls for a "regime change" in Iraq as a call to violence and lawlessness.[35] The view that "regime change" was the real U.S. goal, although never officially expressed, appears to have numerous adherents. An unnamed senior Russian expert claimed in October 2002 that U.S. war plans regarding Iraq were already prepared, and that the ultimate U.S. goal was a change of government and the ouster of Saddam Hussein. According to the expert, the U.S. attitude toward Iraq was a reflection of the new U.S. strategic doctrine and an indicator of the deteriorating U.S. respect for the UN and the international society.[36] Another point of contention between the United States and Russia was the efficacy of toppling the Iraqi regime in the context of the war against terrorism. According to some Russian experts, the prospect of U.S. military action only enhances the terrorist threat, and is leading to the intensification of terrorist operations, including in the Caucasus.[37] Russia's ambassador to the UN, Sergey Lavrov, cited Moscow's Nord-Ost theater hostage crisis in October 2002 in a call to focus on "real" threats, namely the counter-terrorist struggle, rather than on "alleged" ones, implying Iraq.[38] On November 14, 2002, Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov said Russia had no information of any ties between Iraqi citizens and terrorist organizations. No Iraqi citizens were known to be fighting with the Chechen rebels, according to Ivanov.[39] Foreign Minister Ivanov voiced concern on January 20, 2003, that war on Iraq would threaten the integrity of the anti-terrorist alliance.[40] On January 30, 2003, an unnamed General Staff source went so far as to claim that the preparations for war against Iraq had forced the United States to cease anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan.[41] Due to its desire to avert military action and continue the inspections, the Russian government also opposed any U.S. actions it deemed provocative. On a number of occasions, Russia spoke against U.S. and British air strikes in the so-called "no-fly zones" in Iraq. The Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs characterized such strikes as violating Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty.[42] Deputy Foreign Minister Fedotov criticized such air strikes following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441, stating that such actions did not help establish a proper atmosphere for inspections.[43] Fedotov also said on November 13, 2002, that he hoped there would be no repetition of the 1998 U.S. air strikes that were conducted while the UNSC was reviewing the UNSCOM report.[44] Russia also termed the "no-fly zones" unlawful, unilateral, and not based on any UNSC resolution, including Resolution 1441. Therefore Russia would not consider any Iraqi actions against U.S. and British aircraft enforcing these zones as violations of Resolution 1441.[45] As discussed earlier, the Russian desire to avert an armed conflict was to a significant degree affected by its economic interests in Iraq, and the Russian economy's vulnerability to sudden shifts in the global economic situation, including swings in the price of oil. In the view of Yuriy Shafranik, President of the Committee for International, Cultural, Scientific, and Business Cooperation, a U.S. occupation of Iraq would reduce oil prices to $12-15 per barrel, which he considered contrary to Russia's economic interests.[46] According to Shafranik, in the event of war, some 200 Russian firms would suffer severe economic setbacks. The hardest hit would be the Russian oil and gas industry.[47] Prominent Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, head of the YUKOS oil company that has dealings with Iraq, said that the United States ought to compensate Russia for any economic losses suffered as a result of war in Iraq. Khodorkovskiy also said that although he did not know how the Russian position at the UNSC was formed, Russia's relationship with Iraq had an economic, rather than political, nature. Khodorkovskiy believed that Russia could be induced to support the United States if it were willing to compensate Russia for its economic losses.[48] Russia's economic concerns also translated into a desire to relax or lift sanctions on Iraq. During the negotiations on UNSC Resolution 1441, Russia supported the idea of extending the "food for oil" aid program for Iraq,[49] and proposed that the resolution include the promise of lifting sanctions as a reward for Iraqi cooperation.[50] Although Russia was opposed to the tightening of restrictions on goods which may be imported into Iraq, it chose to abstain rather than veto the decision. Following the passage of UNSC Resolution 1441, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that sanctions on Iraq could be lifted in as little as a year, if the Iraqi government cooperates with the inspection process.[51] Foreign Minister Ivanov also voiced the view that if the inspectors either do not find any WMD, or find and eliminate them, after a certain period of time inspections should cease and sanctions be lifted.[52] In
spite of the consistent Russian efforts to avert an armed conflict and concerns
that a war would harm Russia's economic interests, there are strong
reasons to believe that Russia will not actively oppose military operations.
Should a new resolution authorizing a war against Iraq be put on the UNSC
agenda, the most likely Russian course of action will be an abstention. In the
course of the latest crisis, time and again Russia chose to either compromise or
retreat rather than exercise its veto power. In contrast with the United States,
which adopted a very pronounced pro-war position, Russia was careful not to
stake out an equally categorical anti-war stance. Instead, it favored exhausting
all diplomatic options, a position that does allow the possibility of an
eventual war. Although the likely Russian acquiescence to an attack on Iraq will
probably be due to the desire to preserve good relations with the United States
and the importance of the UNSC, another factor may be the U.S. willingness to
help preserve its economic interests in Iraq.
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