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Research Story of the WeekIran Rebuked for Failing to Comply with IAEA SafeguardsJean du Preez and Lawrence Scheinman
June 18, 2003
Significantly, the Chairperson recognized that the Board noted Iranian actions taken thus far to correct these failures, and urged Iran to promptly rectify all safeguards problems identified in the report and resolve questions that remain open. She also said that the Board "welcomed Iran's reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expected Iran to grant the Agency all access deemed necessary by the Agency in order to create the necessary confidence in the international community." While "noting that the enrichment plant is under IAEA safeguards, the Board encouraged Iran, pending the resolution of related outstanding issues, not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot enrichment plant, as a confidence-building measure." The Chairperson stated further that the Board "called on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency in its on-going work." In this regard, it "took note of the Director General's 16 June Introductory Statement which called on Iran to permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exists." Referring to the need for Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol, she stated that the Board "welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an additional protocol, and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement an additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and activities." The IAEA report was prepared as a result of a series of visits to Iran by Dr. ElBaradei and other senior IAEA officials following allegations that Iran is completing two secret nuclear facilities -- a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak. The Board considered the report during one of its regular meetings at which it also considered the IAEA budget for 2004-05; actions by the IAEA to combat nuclear terrorism; and nuclear verification. Following the Board's consideration of the Iranian report, Director-General ElBaradei in his concluding statement remarked that "there is a need to encourage Iran to cooperate fully and demonstrate full transparency" to resolve the outstanding questions identified in the IAEA report as soon as possible before the next Board meeting in September 2003, and that, if deemed necessary, the Board could meet at a special session to consider further options. The Board of Governors meeting followed an intense campaign by the United States in preparation for the meeting. It managed to convince the Heads of States of the G-8 -- the world's seven richest industrial economies and Russia -- to send a strong message (especially given Russia's support) to Iran saying: "We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program."[3] On 11 June, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated that while Iran does not have nuclear weapons yet, the "assessment is that they do have a very active program and are likely to have nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time."[4] U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher continued this trend stating; "We think the (IAEA) report and Iran's programs themselves are deeply troubling and need to be studied carefully by all members of the IAEA's board of directors. Iran's clandestine nuclear program represents a serious challenge to regional stability, the entire international community and to the global nonproliferation regime. We think this report can provide important insights into the Iranian nuclear program and the problems that exist concerning Iran's safeguard obligations."[5] In a more conciliatory statement just prior to the Board of Governors meeting, the United States called on the "Board to make clear its concerns, to call on Iran to fix the problems, to call on Iran to sign the additional protocol and to support the efforts of the IAEA to find out more information and get compliance."[6] The U.S. representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Kenneth Brill reacted to the outcome of the meeting by saying: "I'm very satisfied with the outcome today. We have an important message from the board that supports the U.S. position and concern about the Iranian program." He also welcomed the Board's call for "unqualified cooperation by Iran" to help the agency "get to the bottom of this." (This is an adaptation of the language used by the Chairperson, who stated that the Board "called on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency in its on-going work.") Keeping the door open for further consideration, and possibly a more stringent reaction, Ambassador Brill stated: "And we expect to hear back soon from the I.A.E.A. in that regard."[7] The Board is scheduled to consider another Agency report on Iran at its next meeting in September 2003. "Failures" by Iran The main source of concern in the IAEA report is "the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement." These "failures" included:
The IAEA report acknowledges that these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran and that the Agency will continue the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations under its Safeguards Agreements. Although the report recognized that the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been large and that the material would need further processing before being suitable for use as the fissile material component of a nuclear explosive device, it deemed the number of failures by Iran to report the material, facilities, and activities in question in a timely manner, as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement, as a matter of concern. The report also stated that the total amount of nuclear material (approximately 1.8 tons or 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium) imported from China in 1991 is not insignificant in terms of a state's ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities. The IAEA report also stated that while these failures are in the process of being rectified by Iran, the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations (in terms of its safeguards agreement) is still ongoing. In this regard, Iran was requested to cooperate with the Agency to address a series of "open questions," including:
In introducing his report at the Board meeting, Director-General ElBaradei stated: "Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities, and that corrective actions are being taken in co-operation with the Iranian authorities. The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards. In this respect, we are continuing our efforts -- through technical discussions, inspection and environmental sample analysis -- to understand all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, including: the research and development work relevant to its uranium conversion and enrichment programme; and its programme for the use of heavy water." In response to these allegations, Iranian Vice-President and head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Reza Aghazadeh admitted on a state-run television program a week prior to the Board meeting that Iran had, in fact, bought and imported the Chinese uranium. He said the purchase was not reported to the IAEA because Iran, at the time, thought safeguard requirements did not require it. In an effort to downplay the significance of the report and referring to the ongoing dialogue between the IAEA and his government, Vice-President Aghazadeh stated: "There is no mention of the word 'violation.' The report only mentions 'failure,' which is still a debate between us. And these are normal differences." It is interesting that while the Iranian representative to the IAEA, Ambassador Ali A. Salehi, in his statement to the Board on June 18, admitted his government's "negligence in delayed declaration of this small amount of nuclear material (referring to the 1.8 tons or 0.13 effective kilograms of uranium) that is far below the inspection threshold of the Agency" (i.e., 8 kg of plutonium; 8 kg of Uranium-233 and 25 kg of Uranium-235), he also referred to a list of "essential failures" by 15 other States (listed in SIR 2002, GOV/2003/35) "to fully attain the quantity component of the inspection goal." He also questioned why the "transfer of nuclear shielded ammunition in hundreds of kilograms" had not been reported to the Agency, referring to the use of depleted uranium ammunition by the United Sates in the war in Iraq. Concerns over Iran's Nuclear Program All non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) parties to the NPT are obliged by the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements with the Agency. Safeguards agreements are concluded on the basis of a document entitled "The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (INFCIRC/153). While specific safeguards agreements are the result of negotiations between the Agency and the State or States in question, agreements must be consistent with the provisions of INFCIRC/153. The particular approach adopted by the Agency with respect to the implementation of its safeguards responsibilities at a particular facility and associated technical and administrative procedures, records, and reporting requirements and inspections are incorporated in subsidiary arrangements that normally are treated as confidential between the Agency and the State. Iran possesses five research reactors and two partially constructed power reactors at Bushehr. It acceded to the NPT on 2 February 1970 as one of the original signatory States and concluded its comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC 214) with the IAEA on 15 May 1974. By the mid-1970s, Iran initiated a nuclear power program, but the 1979 revolution ended all nuclear efforts until 1984, when Iran revived the nuclear power program and reportedly began covert procurement for a nuclear weapon program. Iran has over the years collaborated with several countries to develop its nuclear energy program, including the United States, China, the Soviet Union (and later the Russia Federation), Germany, France, Pakistan, Spain, South Africa, and Argentina. Iran's plans for building a civilian nuclear power program have prompted much concern among some Western countries, in particular the United States. Although the NPT allows transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear weapon States,[8] the United States has been strongly opposed to such cooperation with Iran as it believes that Iran is misusing this provision of the Treaty to obtain and develop technologies and materials for a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The United States believes that nuclear energy is not necessary in a country with an oil supply as large as Iran's. To this end, the United States vehemently opposed a 1992 Russian-Iranian deal to construct a light water reactor at Bushehr, which is now nearing completion, with Russia supplying the nuclear fuel needed to run it. Iran also entered into various agreements with China regarding the supply of research and power reactors, and related technologies and equipment. The United States has argued that these arrangements and other deals are being used as cover for the transfer of more sensitive nuclear technology to Iran and to provide training for Iranian nuclear specialists that could be used to support a nuclear weapon program. Iran has consistently denied these charges and maintains that nuclear technology for civilian use is the right of every non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. IAEA inspections in Iran have so far not found that Iran is in breach of its agreement with the Agency or its NPT obligations. Concerns over Iran's nuclear program increased in February 2003 when Iran revealed a new plan to develop a nuclear energy plan using entirely domestic resources. Many states, in particular the United States, again raised concerns that these facilities might contribute to Iran's development of a complete nuclear fuel cycle, which would enable Iran to build nuclear weapons without importing nuclear material. These concerns particularly relate to Iran's compliance with its safeguards undertakings; concerns regarding the undeclared imported nuclear material (UF6, UF4, and UO2); the processing and use of this material without notifying the IAEA; and the development of a (still not operating) uranium enrichment plant. In addition, questions have been raised regarding the on-going construction of a heavy water production plant and plans for constructing a heavy water research reactor at Arak. Iran informed the IAEA in May about its intentions to build this heavy water reactor for research, training, and development purposes. Although heavy water production plants are not covered by comprehensive safeguard agreements, concerns exist that this plant could potentially yield weapons-grade plutonium. Since the Additional Protocol covers facilities such as the Arak production plant, Iran's adherence to this additional safeguard instrument would enable the IAEA to address these concerns. When Director-General ElBaradei and other senior IAEA officials visited the pilot-scale hexafluoride gas centrifuge enrichment plant under construction at Natanz in February 2003, they were "surprised by the sophistication" of the plant and discovered that the centrifuges they were shown were at least twice as powerful as claimed by Iran in its declaration to the IAEA. The existence of the Natanz plant had initially been disclosed to the IAEA by an Iranian opposition group called the National Council for the Resistance of Iran. According to Iran's safeguard declaration, based on data provided by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the designed throughput of the centrifuges it had set up at Natanz was about 6 or 7 seperative work units per machine per year (SWU/yr). The IAEA officials visiting the site in February, however, concluded that the throughput of these centrifuges might instead have been as high as 12-14 SWU/yr.[9] This discrepancy has since been narrowed down to a factor of two following an additional visit by IAEA officials to the Natanz facility on 25 February 2003. The Agency has since investigated the technology upon which the Iranian centrifuge program is based with a view to resolve the discrepancy between information provided by Iran and that of the IAEA. Although Iran declared the Natanz facility at the time of the Director-General's visit in February 2003, it was required to report, but failed to do so, any difference of this magnitude to the IAEA before operating the facility so as to allow the Agency to verify that the facility is not being used to secretly produce more nuclear material than its declared design limitations would allow. The governing provision in safeguards agreements is set forth in paragraph 42 of INFCIRC/153 which, in regard to new facilities, specifies that "the time limits for the provision of (design) information shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements" but that the agreement should stipulate that "such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility." While different agreements may vary, it is understood that "as early as possible" means "no less than 180 days before nuclear material is to be introduced." In practice, however, this has come to mean that information is provided at any time between 30 and 180 days before nuclear material is introduced into the facility. Whether that threshold had already been passed depends on the status of the enrichment facility's completion and readiness to accept nuclear material. However, in discussions about strengthening safeguards that began in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the Board of Governors reviewed the meaning of "as early as possible" and decided in 1992 (GOV/2554/Att.2/Rev.2) to call upon all States with comprehensive safeguards agreements to modify their Subsidiary Arrangements to reflect the decision that as "early as possible" means "as soon as a decision is taken in the State to construct a facility in which nuclear material will be present." Virtually all subsidiary arrangements now contain new language; Iran, however, acceded only in February 2003. One can conclude that at the least Iran did not make a timely effort to comply with the new directive on reporting design information; at worst that it did not intend to notify the IAEA of the existence of the facility on a voluntary basis. The IAEA report also considers necessary further follow-up on information regarding allegations about undeclared enrichment of nuclear material, including, in particular, at the Kalaye Electric Company outside Teheran. This will require unimpeded access for Agency inspectors to carry out environmental sampling at the workshop located there. Despite Iranian nuclear head Aghazadeh's insistence that Iran is not concealing any of its facilities from the IAEA and that it has cooperated with the Agency's inspectors, there are concerns that inspectors are being denied access to the electric company to test centrifuges to determine whether any nuclear material might have been used there. If the centrifuges were used, it would be a significant violation of Iran's international obligations. Iranian officials have never outright denied testing uranium material in centrifuges, although they insist that they have never violated any agreement with the IAEA. Iran furthermore informed the agency that its testing at the Kalaye Electric Co. in Tehran was simulated and employed no nuclear material. Environmental sampling would serve to clarify that claim. A more egregious failing relates to Iran not declaring to the IAEA the import of uranium in a variety of forms all of which are relevant to uranium enrichment. The import dates to 1991 (from China). Paragraph 34 of INFCIRC/153 (that deals with the starting point of safeguards) requires that when any nuclear material of a composition or purity suitable for fuel fabrication or enrichment is imported, the nuclear material is subject to safeguards upon entering the State; and when nuclear material containing uranium which has not reached the stage of being suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched is imported "the State shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition...." This, the Iranian government clearly failed to do, thereby failing to meet an obligation under its safeguards agreement. It appears likely that Iran has processed and used some of this material presumably in relation to its uranium enrichment program. Transfer, processing, and use of this material would require safeguards pursuant to the safeguards agreement to be applied. Whether this took place is what the IAEA has to ascertain, and to this end the Iranian government needs to cooperate to the fullest extent. A major question that arises is whether Iran would have committed to the construction of the pilot enrichment facility at Natanz without having satisfied itself that the centrifuges being installed operated as intended. To do this likely would have required running some centrifuges with nuclear material, namely UF6. The question then becomes whether that in fact occurred and if so whether the material used was part of the imported undeclared material. If not, what material was used, where did it come from, and why wasn't it reported. Either way it would seem that Iran has significant questions to answer. Allegations of Iranian Non-compliance at the NPT PrepCom The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT parties was held from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in Geneva. Despite North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT -- the first State party to do so -- concern over the scope and sophistication of Iran's nuclear program was the focus of many States parties at the PrepCom. The United States delegation, for instance, used every opportunity possible to accuse Iran of "conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program."[10] The United States, and a number of other States, most notably European Union members and Australia, also repeatedly questioned the economic justification for Iran's advanced nuclear program -- which includes pursuit of the entire nuclear fuel cycle -- and called on Iran to demonstrate its peaceful intentions through increased co-operation with the IAEA, including the signing and bringing into force of an Additional Protocol. In rebuttal, Iran stated: "unlike some others [referring presumably to the United States], we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defence doctrine."[11] Iran also objected to being prejudged before the June 2003 IAEA report on its nuclear program, and argued that its nuclear program should be "viewed on its own merit without political burden of US-Iran bilateral relations." Pressure by these States on the PrepCom Chairman, Ambassador Laszlo Molnar of Hungary, to specifically address concerns over Iran's compliance with its NPT obligations, raised the possibility that Iran could have rejected the Chairman's factual summary and not agreed that it be attached to the official report of the PrepCom. However, the Chairman, following intense consultations with the United States and Iranian delegations, presented a carefully worded paragraph in which he linked the Iranian issue with the need for all States parties, particularly those with advanced nuclear programs, "to conclude, bring into force and implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement at the earliest opportunity, which enhances the confidence of States parties and helps eliminate concerns regarding their nuclear programmes." In a clear attempt to reflect concerns expressed over Iran's compliance with its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, this paragraph also includes a call on Iran "to sign an Additional Protocol and to ensure full and forthcoming cooperation with the IAEA, whose Secretariat is expected to provide a comprehensive report at the June 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors." To counter-balance this approach, the Chairman included a reference to Iranian explanations regarding their program, by referring to the Iranian Vice-President's statement on 6 May 2003 and to the "inalienable right of all States parties in full compliance with the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well as the inviolability of nuclear facilities." While not objecting, the United States made its discontent with the Chairman's approach clear by stating that "the PrepCom had done more than call for Iran to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol." It noted that the United States had "called on Iran to make full, truly transparent disclosure and compliance on all its NPT obligations." The United States also argued that there should have been more weight given to the concerns and accusations it and several other States raised over Iran. The United Kingdom also complained that the language on Iran was weak, reiterating concern regarding the "scale, scope and lack of transparency" of Iran's program, "as stressed by some 40 states parties." Iran in turn again stated that the Chairman prejudged the outcome of the June IAEA report on Iran and emphasized Iran's "desire and effort to become economically strong and be able to distribute prosperity, where we are not dependent only on the revenue from the sale of oil as a raw material." Iran's Position Vis-à-Vis Acceptance of the Additional Protocol The essence of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540 of 1997) is to reshape the IAEA's safeguards regime from a quantitative system focused on accounting for known quantities of materials and monitoring declared activities to a qualitative system gathering a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including nuclear-related imports and exports. The Additional Protocol also substantially expands the IAEA's ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities by providing the Agency with authority to visit any facility -- declared or not -- to investigate questions or inconsistencies in a State's nuclear declarations. During the IAEA's visit to Iran, senior Iranian officials informed IAEA Director-General ElBaradei that Iran would honor its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, but did not clearly indicate Iran's willingness to accept the Additional Protocol. Only by concluding this mechanism additional to its existing comprehensive safeguards agreement, would the IAEA be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material in Iran. This means that without the Additional Protocol in place, the Natanz facility, and any enriched uranium it produces, will be subject to IAEA inspections. But, as long as no nuclear materials are present, the IAEA would have no ability to examine other locations in Iran where it believed nuclear-related activities such as weapons design research might be under way. Iran is, however, not the only State with extensive nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies that has not yet concluded this agreement with the IAEA. While 73 States have signed the Additional Protocol, only 35 of those States, excluding the United States, have to date brought the protocol into force.[12] Iran's intention to accept the Additional Protocol was stated at the IAEA in Vienna on 6 May 2003 by the Iranian Vice-President and head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization H.E. Reza Aghazadeh.[13] He said that his "country has no difficulty accepting this protocol, as a matter of fact, it is approaching it positively." He added, however, that Iran "doesn't intend to ratify and enforce the provisions of this protocol without any condition" referring to restrictions on the supply of nuclear-related technologies and materials imposed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This statement was repeated at the recent PrepCom meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Although the United States at the same PrepCom, proposed that the NSG by 2005 make adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition for receiving nuclear exports, it has stated on several occasions (repeated last week by a senior State Department official[14]) that Iran should submit to the Additional Protocol without preconditions and that even with such arrangement in place, "the United States would oppose Iran's acquisition of advanced technology until it answered questions about its nuclear program." In contrast to the U.S. position, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed no conditions on the continued supplied of nuclear materials to Iran when he stated at the recent G-8 Summit in Evian, France, that Russia would continue to export nuclear materials -- including uranium fuel -- to Iran for use at its Bushehr site. But he "urged" the Iranian government to sign the Additional Protocol. It is also encouraging that Russian Defense Minister Ivanov stated on June 12 in Brussels: "Russian fuel will be supplied (to nuclear power station in Bushehr under the full supervision of the IAEA) only if Iran signs a memorandum committing itself to sending spent nuclear fuel back to Russia." He also stated: "Iran itself must have an interest in seeing a situation in which all its programs are transparent and monitorable and no ambiguities or different interpretations can arise on this score."[15] The IAEA report on Iran includes a specific reference to the Director-General's repeated calls on Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. This is particularly the case for States, like Iran, with extensive nuclear activities and advanced fuel cycle technologies. In introducing the IAEA report at the June 18 Board meeting, Director-General ElBaradei continued to "call on Iran to permit us to take environmental samples at the particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exist. This is clearly in the interest of both the Agency and Iran. I will keep the Board informed of the results of our work." In what appears to be an indication that Iran is moving forward to conclude the Additional Protocol, a spokesman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization stated on 17 June 2003, that "we are studying positively the appeal by the International Atomic Energy Agency to sign an additional protocol."[16] This positive development was acknowledged by the Chairperson of the Board in her statement that "the Board welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an additional protocol." She, however, added that the Board "urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement an additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement." Iran's Perceived Energy Requirements Iran's justification for an advanced nuclear program to generate electricity continues to be questioned by many, in particular by the United States. Addressing the 2003 PrepCom, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Semmel disputed Iran's need for "expensive and indigenous nuclear fuel cycle facilities to meet expanding electricity demands while preserving oil and gas for export" by stating that given Iran's "vast oil and gas reserves, the large expenditure it would make on nuclear facilities makes no economic or energy sense."[17] In his well-timed statement at a conference held in Vienna on 6 May 2003, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Aghazadeh justified his nation's need for an advanced nuclear program by arguing that "rising living standards and improvement of economic indicators have prompted an increase in demand for energy in domestic and industrial sectors" while the Iranian "national economy is dependent upon oil revenues." For these reasons, he stated that Iran "cannot merely rely on the provision of its energy from fossil fuels just on the ground of possession of large fossil resources." In support for Iran's position, he claimed that fossil fuels "are limited and belong to generations to come"; that the utilization of these resources "will generate much greater added value"; that these fuels offer the potential of "foreign exchange earnings from export of crude oil and natural gas"; and that the plan addresses "environmental issues which are now of concern to the entire international community."[18] In an attempt to address concerns over the need for its nuclear program, the Iranian government, in an open letter addressed to European governments at the time of the Board of Governors meeting, again justified its pursuit of nuclear energy stating: "Iran has no choice but to seek access to more diversified and secure sources of energy" given its territory of 636,308 square miles and a population of about 70 million, projected to be more than 105 million in 2050. It also argued that the "air pollution, especially in big cities, and the associated rising environmental hazards is giving rise to growing popular resentments" and that its consequently has "no choice but to shift to low carbon content energies in our national energy consumption pattern." The letter also claims that a 1974 study, "sanctioned by the then Iranian Government and carried out by the prestigious American Stanford Research Institute," predicted Iran's need for nuclear energy and recommended the building of nuclear plants capable of generating 20,000 megawatts electricity up to 1994. In this regard, the Iranian government now aims "at getting off the ground a modest 7000 megawatt-nuclear energy program and to operationalize it by [2020], which may save us an equivalent amount of [190 million barrels of crude oil], which is worth about $5 billion per year. Therefore, contrary to some claims, our program is neither ambitious nor economically unjustifiable." Taking a stab at those questioning Iran's justification of a nuclear energy program, it stated: "Iran is not the only oil producing country wishing to acquire nuclear energy. Nor could a country's oil reserves be a legal or sensible ground for barring it from using the nuclear energy." While addressing the justification for Iran's nuclear energy program, the open letter does not address the concern raised in the IAEA's report over Iran's failure "to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed." It only refers to the Natanz facility as capable of producing "nuclear fuel for power plants using low enriched uranium of around 3% to 5% U-235 (very much lower than weapon-degree enriched uranium), under the surveillance of IAEA safeguards" stating that it is not "dissimilar to the enrichment activities going on in at least 12 other countries." Referring to the Bushehr plant, it stated: "we need (the Natanz) facility for providing fuel to plants we intend to build and the one in Bushehr after the expiration of the agreement with the Russians to provide the plant with fuel." If Iran remains serious about addressing the international community's concerns over its nuclear program -- as embodied in the IAEA's report -- then it should do so in a comprehensive and transparent manner. Although the letter to European governments sheds some light on the justification of Iran's nuclear energy program, it does little to address concerns over the possible diversion of this program for military purposes. Conclusion At a time when international safeguards and multilateral institutions such as the IAEA are on the defensive, when confidence in their ability to fulfill their expected mandates is low in important political quarters, it is essential that the international community take a firm position on full compliance by States in meeting their commitments and obligations. While the action taken by the Board is appropriate and avoids precipitating a crisis, it is incumbent on the Iranian government to respond to all questions raised by the IAEA relative to its nuclear program and activities in an expedited fashion and to provide whatever information, records, reports, and access to facilities are necessary for the IAEA to fulfill its obligation under INFCIRC/153. In this regard, the appropriate level of pressure must be applied to Iran -- by its traditional friends and foes alike -- to address these concerns. Iran must, however, not be "squeezed" so hard that the reformists in the Khatami government are sidelined by the more radical supporters of Ayatollah Khamenei. It is therefore of critical importance that the international community, in particular the United States, seize the opportunity to convince Iran to accept the Additional Protocol and to pursue activities that institute confidence -- and not distrust -- in the Khatami government's initiatives to reform Iranian society. While the legitimate right of all States to utilize the atom for peaceful purposes should be recognized and respected, ownership of capabilities that could be utilized to develop nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the States concerned, especially in the case of Iran. For Iran to be accepted as a responsible possessor of nuclear capabilities, it needs to take compelling actions to prove that it is not seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Only then will the strong sentiments expressed by Iranian government officials that they consider "acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles" and their explanations for seeking nuclear energy as a "more diversified and secure source of energy" be accepted at face value. A starting point in building this confidence would be for Iran to accept the Additional Protocol without insisting that it be conditional on the removal of restrictive measures against peaceful technological cooperation in the nuclear energy field. Iran would not be the only country to take such measures in good faith. South Africa, a country once considered a political and nuclear pariah, came clean about its nuclear weapons program and gave the IAEA unimpeded access to all facilities some years before all international trade restrictions against that country were removed. Today South Africa is a responsible member of the international community, and Iran could be the same. In this regard, Iran should take seriously the South African message during the recent NPT PrepCom: "having taken the responsibility of building confidence that accrues from being in possession of the capabilities that could be used to develop nuclear weapons, it is our view that these States must also accept the responsibility of building confidence with the international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation, including through the urgent conclusion of Additional Protocols for strengthened safeguards."[19] It is encouraging that this message had some impact if judged by the Iranian statement at the IAEA Board meeting that "Iranians know that more capacity necessarily prompts more responsibility. We would prove that accountability is part and parcel of our quest for full nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." It is also significant, especially given Iran's traditional criticism of nuclear export control groups, that the Iranian representative welcomed "any constructive interaction with other parties including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)." Given its increasing
presence -- both politically and militarily -- in the Middle East, the United
States also has a particular responsibility to ensure that Iran gets back
into regional affairs. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and Security recently suggested that a "regional
dialogue" should be convened under leadership of the UN Secretary-General
on the post Iraq-war future of the Persian Gulf
region.[20] Such a dialogue should aim at
devising principles, rules, and confidence-building measures to structure
security relations among not only States in the region, but also with States
outside, including the United States. To this end, regional States would need to
clarify that they are not seeking weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons, while the United States needs to provide credible assurances that it
will not threaten these States through its military presence in the region, and
even worse, by making them potential targets of U.S. nuclear weapons. However,
any convincing initiative to address the aspirations -- real and potential
-- of States in the region to acquire weapons of mass destruction, would
need to involve all States there, including Israel. Israel's nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction programs have long been the motivation for
other States in the region to acquire these weapons themselves. To paraphrase
U.S. Secretary of State Powell's recent statement, conditions should
therefore be created in the Middle East where no nation would have a need for
any weapons of mass destruction.
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Director-General ElBaradei.
@CNS Updates