Research Story of the Week

Exploring Linkages among Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security:
CNS Occasional Paper No. 12

By James Clay Moltz

Photo X-Band Radar.
[Src: Missile Defense Agency]

August 14, 2003

Although missiles, missile defense technology, and space issues are intricately related, most policy analysis tends to treat each in a separate category. This tendency causes policymakers to miss the linkages among them and the overlap in the issues that affect developments in each of the other sectors. For this reason, four organizations--the Mountbatten Centre of the University of Southampton, the Simons Centre of the University of British Columbia, the U.N. Center for Disarmament Research in Geneva, and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute--decided jointly to organize an international conference that would explore these linkages and treat the relevant issues in an integrated manner, benefiting from the expertise of specialists from each of the three fields.

The conference on "Missile Proliferation, Missile Defenses, and Space Security: Confronting and Addressing New Challenges" was held at Wiston House in England from June 1-4, 2003. The meeting brought together government officials, military personnel, and experts from Austria, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In each area, the conference organizers sought out accomplished experts to give technical presentations examining emerging threats and cooperative opportunities on subjects not receiving enough attention in mainstream analysis. Although government officials did participate, the meeting was not "political," and there was a remarkably harmonious discussion of common interests and shared concerns among the many officials present. The discussions were held off-the-record, but a number of participants agreed to share their papers with a wider audience. CNS Occasional Paper No. 12, New Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security, offers some of the key papers presented at the conference.

Rather than repeating old questions, the materials presented in Occasional Paper No. 12 examine emerging issues, many of which cut across current disciplines. Dennis Gormley from CNS analyzes the possible terrorist use of unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles, an issue of particular concern given the widespread availability of these systems on the international market. Drawing on the past experience of the United States, Clayton Chun from the Army War College discusses the technical challenges that states with medium-range missiles will face in trying to develop effective anti-satellite weapons. His study provides hope that threats to U.S. space assets may not be as serious or as imminent as feared. Philip Baines, a former aerospace engineer now serving in Canada's Department Foreign Affairs and International Trade, examines prospects for developing so-called "non-offensive" defenses in space as an alternative to space weapons. In some areas, there are promising new technologies that could make U.S. and other national space assets extremely difficult to locate, track, and attack even by the most sophisticated of weapons (many of which do not yet exist). Each of these studies breaks new ground and offers considerable food for thought as the United States and other countries seek to understand the true nature of emerging threats and the range of options states might adopt to combat them.

Other topics that the conference organizers believed merited attention include the new budget politics of U.S. missile defense in the context of a rising U.S. federal deficit and an emphasis on early deployment, factors that did not affect the program in the 1990s. David Mosher, a security and budget expert formerly at the General Accounting Office and now at RAND, takes account of these pressures and indicates why the rising cost of specific programs within the missile defense portfolio could make them targets of Congressional cuts in coming years.

The status of the ongoing U.S. missile defense test program also poses challenging questions, particularly given the decision by the United States to move to an initial deployment of interceptors in Alaska by October 2004 without full testing. What are the implications of deploying systems in advance of working out problems or having the advanced radars in place necessary to make them effective? Theresa Hitchens from the Center for Defense Information addresses these and related technical issues.

Finally, another topic of increasing importance is the emerging--but uncertain--role of China as a major space power. Although few beyond the space community have been following these developments, China is likely soon to become only the third country (after the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States) to launch human beings into orbit. It is also rapidly developing its broader scientific programs and the reliability of its boosters. Yet, China to date has been denied a role on the International Space Station, partly due to U.S. Congressional politics; China is viewed by some as an untrustworthy partner or even a potential enemy. Some defense officials in the West also harbor concerns about China's intentions in the military space field, despite its repeated opposition to the weaponization of space in a number of international fora. Thus, it remains to be seen if China will become (from the U.S. perspective) "the next Soviet Union" in space, or whether peaceful cooperation will instead emerge. Brian Harvey, a long-time analyst of space activity based in Ireland, examines the history and current trajectory of the Chinese space program.

From the discussions at the Wiston House conference, a consensus emerged that states face a number of common interests in regards to halting missile proliferation and ensuring space security. At the same time, the proliferation of missiles of different capabilities (including propulsion, payload, range, altitude, and radar signature) makes these challenges difficult, particularly when certain countries feel that they are more of a "target" than others and have space assets that are also more at-risk.

Developing protective weapons may be the only answer in certain circumstances. Yet, there may also be useful means of cooperating internationally to mitigate other threats and to isolate those countries or groups that would violate international norms. In still other cases, there may be evasive means to eliminate or greatly reduce the vulnerability of national assets to attack. From the discussions at the conference, it became clear that solutions are not likely to come in a "one size fits all" package. Instead, they are likely to vary across issues, with some calling for formal multilateral treaties, others bilateral cooperation, still others new forms of cooperative defense. The discussions among the experts at the Wiston House conference, however, concluded that governments have not come close to exhausting the various possible options in their current deliberations. Thus, there is considerably more work for states to do. The near-term objective must be to begin a process of mutual engagement on these issues--something that is not occurring today.

The selections in Occasional Paper No. 12 are not meant to present a comprehensive solution or even a complete set of questions. Rather, they are intended to inform and to stimulate debate by highlighting issues that have not achieved wide publicity. They also seek to offer potential new approaches to policymakers.


CNS Experts on Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Space Security Issues:


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Author(s): James Clay Moltz
Related Resources: Missile, Weekly Story
Date Created: August 14, 2003
Date Updated: -NA-
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