James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

Research Story of the Week

What to Expect from the Six-Party Talks on the Korean Nuclear Crisis

Phillip C. Saunders[1]
Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program

Kim Jong Il and senior military officers of the Korean People's Army.

August 25, 2003

On August 27-29, 2003, diplomats from the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China will meet in Beijing for talks about the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. A lot has happened since the previous round of trilateral (United States, North Korea, and China) talks in April 2003, but the fundamental positions of the six countries have not changed significantly.

In the April 2003 talks, the United States stressed that Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program was a multinational problem rather than a U.S.-North Korea bilateral issue and that threatening North Korea behavior would not be rewarded by the international community. The United States insisted that North Korea must dismantle its nuclear program and accept inspections before other issues could be considered. North Korea acknowledged having a nuclear weapons capability and put forward a proposal to resolve the crisis. Under the plan, North Korea would dismantle its nuclear facilities, allow inspections, and curb ballistic missile exports in return for a U.S. non-aggression pledge, establishment of diplomatic relations, and a commitment not to obstruct North Korean economic relations. The talks represented an exchange of views rather than serious negotiations.

Over the past five months, the United States and North Korea have both attempted to strengthen their negotiating position in preparation for renewed talks. The United States has sought to isolate North Korea and to increase political, economic, and military pressure on Pyongyang to give up its nuclear capability and accept international inspections. The U.S. refusal to rule out the use of force; the new Proliferation Security Initiative; and encouragement of unprecedented joint military exercises between Russia, Japan, and South Korea are examples. North Korea has attempted to increase pressure on the United States by restarting a nuclear reactor, announcing its need for a nuclear deterrent, and beginning to reprocess 8,000 spent fuel rods to produce plutonium that could be used to make additional nuclear weapons. At the same time, both sides have expressed a desire to resolve the issue diplomatically. China played a key role in brokering an agreement which added Japan, South Korea, and Russia to the talks, setting the stage for the upcoming six-party meeting. Nevertheless, the central questions--whether the DPRK is really willing to verifiably dismantle its nuclear program and what other countries would offer in return--remain unanswered.

Interests and Objectives of the Six Parties

United States: Washington feels that it has already achieved a tactical victory by forcing North Korea to accept multilateral talks that include South Korea and Japan. Washington will strive to make the talks "five against one" as much as possible, with the goal of convincing Pyongyang that North Korea must dismantle its nuclear program if it wants to improve relations with its neighbors and to keep the regime in power. Participation in the talks allows the United States to demonstrate that it is taking a reasonable diplomatic approach to the crisis, but the U.S. objective is to force North Korea to back down. It is unclear whether Washington is really interested in a negotiated settlement. Some Bush administration officials believe North Korea would cheat on any agreement and that regime change is the only permanent solution. However, the United States has also indicated that it may be willing to grant certain concessions, such as some kind of security guarantee, if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program first. Given skepticism about North Korean intentions, the United States will insist upon effective verification of any agreement and push North Korea to make concessions first. One advantage of the multilateral format is that a package deal that includes other parties would make it easier for the United States to disguise any concessions that might otherwise appear to reward North Korean blackmail.

North Korea: Pyongyang's negotiating objectives will include obtaining a formal security guarantee from Washington and removing political and legal obstacles to economic assistance from Japan, South Korea, and international financial institutions. North Korea will portray itself as being reluctantly forced to pursue nuclear weapons due to security threats from the United States. North Korea will attempt to play the other five nations against another and exploit differences with respect to the urgency of disarming North Korea and the quality of a verification regime. North Korea might, for example, make a settlement offer that is acceptable to China and South Korea but unacceptable for the United States, sowing tension and disunity among the other parties. Analysts differ on the extent to which international pressure is affecting North Korea; Pyongyang's ultimate willingness to make the tough concessions necessary for a diplomatic solution is unclear.

South Korea: Seoul seeks a negotiated settlement that would remove the North Korean nuclear threat, but is reluctant to pressure Pyongyang to the point where the regime might collapse or lash out militarily. South Korea would like to see North Korea adopt economic reforms and a less threatening military posture that might facilitate eventual reunification. At the same time, South Korea also worries about possible U.S. military actions that might escalate into a larger military conflict. South Korea will seek to coordinate its position with the United States and Japan while pushing North Korea to take the steps needed to resolve the crisis. If North Korea puts forward a serious offer to give up its nuclear weapons capability in exchange for a security guarantee and economic assistance, South Korea will likely try to address U.S. objections in order to achieve a diplomatic solution.

China: Beijing has been forced to take a more active diplomatic role in order to ward off negative outcomes such as a major military conflict, a permanent North Korean nuclear weapons capability, or a regime collapse that might send North Korean refugees flooding into China. Beijing played a critical role in arranging the six-party talks, and its efforts to resolve the crisis have helped improve relations with Washington. At the same time, China has continued to supply North Korea with critical food and energy assistance and recently sent a military delegation to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il and top officials. China's short-term goal is to halt escalation (by either side) toward a military conflict and to keep the negotiation process going. China would prefer a negotiated settlement that encourages North Korea to adopt economic reforms and to improve relations with its neighbors. China's long-term goal is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, but an interim agreement that resolved the immediate crisis (without permanently removing North Korea's nuclear weapons potential) might also be acceptable.

Japan: Tokyo is concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons capability, deployment of Nodong missiles that can reach Japan, and North Korea's past abduction of Japanese citizens. Influential Japanese security analysts have recently raised concerns that a U.S. security guarantee for North Korea might weaken extended deterrence. Tokyo does not want a deal that resolves the nuclear issue but leaves Japan vulnerable to North Korean missiles. If a negotiated settlement involves significant economic assistance to North Korea, Japan will be expected to foot a large part of the bill. However Japan will want to ensure that the missile and abduction issues are resolved first. Japan hopes to raise the abduction issue at the six-party talks, but will probably be content to negotiate with North Korea on a bilateral basis. (There are some indications that North Korea is willing to release children of the abductees, but a number of Japanese citizens are still missing or unaccounted for.) Japan feels the five nations should try to get a complete package deal so that North Korea will be unable to drive a wedge between them. Some Japanese analysts worry that unexpected North Korean concessions might expose differences between the other parties.

Russia: Moscow's reemergence as a key player in the Korean negotiations represents a major victory for President Vladimir Putin, who has steadily increased Moscow's attention to Pyongyang since entering office in 2001. Russia has now won a critical place (at least temporarily) as a "middle man" between the United States and North Korea. Moscow sees the Beijing talks primarily as an opportunity to promote long-term Russian economic, political, and security interests in Northeast Asia, including: (1) a greater role for the Russian Far East in regional trade; (2) regional integration and the facilitation of multinational cooperation in law enforcement, economic development, and regional energy networks; and (3) a comprehensive settlement to the Korean Peninsula crisis that would normalize conditions on Russia's southeastern border--thus preventing the possible outflow of millions of North Korean refugees into the ill-prepared Vladivostok area. Russia's unprecedented joint maritime maneuvers with Japan and South Korea show a new commitment to work with other regional players who were formerly enemies. Russia will likely use its seat at the table to pursue a more comprehensive strategy aimed at promoting regional integration. Fortunately, these interests are largely consistent with those of the United States.

What to Watch for at the Six-Party Talks:

• Do not expect a major breakthrough that will resolve the nuclear crisis. Even if an agreement in principle can be reached (which is doubtful), verification issues will be critical and will require time to resolve.
• The United States will try to make the talks "five versus one" to increase pressure on North Korea, while Pyongyang will seek to create and exploit differences in interests among the other five parties.
• China and South Korea have a strong desire to keep the negotiating process going, even if no agreement can be reached at this time.
• The sequencing of any deal would be a major issue. The United States has insisted that North Korea dismantle its nuclear program before receiving any benefits, but Pyongyang will want to receive major concessions before giving up its most important negotiating leverage.
• Issues for further consideration include: Have U.S. efforts to isolate and pressure North Korea made Pyongyang more willing to make concessions? Is North Korea nearing the breaking point, or can the regime and people continue to bear privations indefinitely? Does North Korea really want a deal, or does it simply want to convince other countries that U.S. intransigence is forcing it reluctantly towards an overt nuclear weapons capability?

Possible Outcomes

The most likely outcome is an inclusive meeting where the six delegations exchange views, but no conclusive agreements are reached and the issue remains unresolved. A key question is whether the parties agree to convene a third round of talks at a later date. If not, the talks may turn out to be only a temporary break in the crisis, with North Korea returning to its brinkmanship tactics and moving toward a more robust nuclear weapons capability. (For an overview of North Korea's nuclear potential, see "North Korea's Nuclear Program: Key Concerns").

A less likely outcome would be for North Korea to make a surprise offer that includes significant concessions. In this case, the details of the deal and verification measures would be crucial, possibly leading to an outcome where some parties are satisfied with the North Korean offer and others are not.

North Korea may also attempt to splinter the U.S.-led coalition by giving certain parties what they want most, with the goal of obtaining bilateral economic assistance and support for a settlement that addresses North Korean concerns. North Korean statements suggesting a desire to resolve the abduction issue and revive the Pyongyang declaration with Japan are an indicator of this possibility.

[1] This piece is based partly on discussions by the CNS North Korea Working Group and conversations with Daniel Pinkston; the Russia section was written by James Clay Moltz.

CNS Experts on North Korea and Six-Party Talks:

• James Clay Moltz | Bio
  Deputy Director
  cmoltz@miis.edu
  (general questions, U.S. policy, Russian policy)

• Sandy Spector | Bio
  Deputy Director, DC Office
  leonard.spector@miis.edu
  (general questions, U.S. policy, regime impact)

• Phillip C. Saunders (on travel 8/25-8/29) | Bio
  Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program
  phillip.saunders@miis.edu
  (general questions, China's policy)

• Daniel Pinkston (on travel 8/25-8/29) | Bio
  PRAP, Senior Research Associate
  daniel.pinkson@miis.edu
  (general questions, North Korean nuclear capabilities, South Korea's perspective)

• Katsu Furukawa | Bio
  Research Associate, DC Office
  katsu.furukawa@miis.edu
  (Japanese perspectives, regional impact)

• Mari Sudo | Bio
  PRAP Research Associate
  mari.sudo@miis.edu
  (North or South Korea questions, general questions, North Korean nuclear capabilities)

• Charles Ferguson | Bio
  Scientist-in-Residence, DC Office
  charles.ferguson@miis.edu
  (general questions, U.S. policy, technical questions, North Korean nuclear capabilities)

• Jean duPreez | Bio
  Director, IONP
  jean.dupreez@miis.edu
  (regime impact, international responses, United Nations role)