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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Research Story of the WeekRussian-Ukrainian Missile CooperationMichael Jasinski
September 19, 2003
This transfer demonstrates the growing importance of the SS-19 for the Russian Federation, and the continued close ties between the Ukrainian aerospace industry and its Russian counterpart. It is another in a series of indications of the post-START II reorientation of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) away from single-warhead ICBMs toward multi-warhead ones. Although the transfer was not unprecedented (Russia had previously obtained ICBMs from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and strategic bombers from Ukraine and Kazakhstan), it may be a precursor to closer cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian ballistic missile design and production facilities, cooperation that largely ceased following the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Importance of SS-19s for Russia While initial reports of the transfer suggested the SS-19s would be used for conversion into Rokot space launch vehicles (SLVs) by Russia's M.V. Khrunichev State Space Scientific Production Center that produced the SS-19 ICBMs,[4] later sources reported that they would instead be placed on combat alert with the SRF. According to one report, the transferred SS-19 stages will be used to modernize missiles deployed with the 60th Missile Division in Tatishchevo.[5] The latter scenario certainly appears to be more likely, due to the increased importance of the SS-19 to the SRF. Maintenance of the SS-19 component of the Strategic Rocket Forces has acquired higher priority in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and subsequent collapse of prospects for START II ratification, which the Russian Federation made conditional on continued U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty. Under START II, which banned land-based MIRVed ICBMs, Russia would have been obligated to reduce its SS-19 force to 105 missiles and to convert them to single-warhead configuration. With no prospect of START II entering into force, and with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as Moscow Treaty) omitting any mention of limits on MIRVed missiles, the SS-19 force has received a new lease on life. As a result, the SS-19 ICBM-to-SLV conversion programs, which were conceived when START II was widely expected to eventually enter into force, may now be curtailed. The SS-19's importance to the SRF is also due to it being the only ICBM in Russia's inventory that is both MIRVed and produced by Russian enterprises. Missiles such as the SS-18 and SS-24, while also MIRVed, were designed and/or produced in Ukrainian facilities, which complicates modernization efforts. SS-25 and SS-27 ICBMs, although designed and manufactured in Russia, carry only a single warhead. While the single-warhead SS-27 Topol-M ICBM was once touted as the future of the SRF, in no small part due to its START II compatibility, the demise of that treaty has put its future into some doubt. Its rate of deployment, instead of increasing, has instead decreased from 10 to no more than six missiles per year. The apparent decision to use the recently transferred SS-19 stages to upgrade missiles belonging to the Tatishchevo division (which had already begun the process of replacing its SS-19s with SS-27s) may be an indicator that reliance on the Topol-M has been reconsidered, at least until a MIRVed variant is developed. The SS-19 stages sold to Russia were never deployed in silos and therefore were not subjected to the metal fatigue and corrosion-inducing processes deployed missiles experience. As a result, these missiles are for all intents and purposes brand new and capable of remaining in service for decades.[6] While in the late 1990s Ukraine transferred 19 SS-19s to Russia, these were previously-deployed and relatively aged missiles whose usefulness to the SRF was limited.[7] U.S. Reaction The U.S. government did not object to the SS-19 stage sale. Shortly after the SS-19 stage transfer was announced, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency announced a suspension of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program's solid-fuel rocket motor elimination project in Pavlohrad (intended to convert the fuel from disassembled SS-24 ICBMs into industrial explosives). However, the reason appears to have been safety considerations rather than a linkage to the SS-19 stage sale. Furthermore, the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual assured the Ukrainian government that the United States had no plans to curtail its CTR spending in Ukraine.[8] In other cases, however, the U.S. government resisted such transfers. For example, in August 2000 the U.S. government announced that it would cease funding strategic bomber elimination programs in Ukraine if it transferred additional heavy bombers to Russia in return for cancellation of energy debts.[9] An earlier transfer of 11 strategic bombers to Russia was not opposed, however. The threat to cut $7 million in funding appears to have had the desired effect on the Ministry of Defense, which moreover wanted to obtain U.S. funds for the elimination of non-strategic bombers.[10] In the wake of Ukraine's refusal to transfer additional bombers to Russia, the U.S. government agreed to fund the elimination of 47 Tu-22 and Tu-22M non-strategic bombers.[11] Ukraine's Priorities Had the United States attempted to dissuade Ukraine from selling the missiles to Russia, its efforts might not have had the same result as they did in the case of the second bomber transfer deal, due to the difference of outlooks among the involved Ukrainian ministries. Whereas the Ministry of Defense, which had custody of the bombers, has adopted a pro-Western outlook (as evidenced, for example, by the dispatch of Ukrainian troops to Iraq), various branches of the defense and aerospace industry view cooperation with Russia as more advantageous, and remain closely tied to their Soviet-era industrial partners in Russia. Furthermore, they view such cooperation as essential to preserving Ukraine's rocket technology base. Although Ukraine will not be able to take advantage of CTR funding that would have been available to eliminate the SS-19 components, it instead earned $50 million that will be applied to the Dnepr (an SS-18 ICBM-to-SLV conversion) and Tsiklon-4 SLV projects.[12] The issue here is not ideology but pragmatism. Ukrainian aerospace firms are interested in cooperation with their Western counterparts. Ukraine's desire for a closer industrial relationship with Western aerospace firms was communicated, for example, during the debate on the future of the ABM Treaty. Ukrainian officials have expressed willingness to participate in a project to develop a theater missile defense system for Europe, and indicated that their position on the ABM Treaty would support the U.S. position if Ukrainian firms received commercial orders from the United States.[13] Although the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual praised Ukraine's space technology prowess and indicated such cooperation was possible, to date this has not resulted in Ukrainian firms receiving any large U.S. contracts.[14] However, since large-scale cooperation with Western partners failed to materialize, Ukrainian aerospace firms remain closely tied to their Soviet-era partners in Russia, even when they participate in joint projects with Western firms. While Pivdenmash and Pivdenne Design Bureau participate in the Sea Launch project[15], their combined share of the project is only 15 percent, less than the share of the Russian firm RKK Energiya, which has 25 percent.[16] Kharkiv-based Khartron, which is well known for its guidance systems, continues to sell nearly all of its rocketry-related products to Russia,[17] and participates in SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM-to-SLV conversion projects led by Russian enterprises. Not surprisingly, given the absence of prospects for large-scale prospects with Western companies, Ukrainian aerospace industry managers see their future in a closer relationship with Russia. That attitude is exemplified by the former Khartron General Director Yakov Ayzenberg, who believes that Ukraine ought to aim for a closer economic relationship with Russia, and who advocates selling large blocks of shares in Ukraine's aerospace firms to Russian enterprises.[18] Conclusion The sale of SS-19 stages most likely exhausts Ukraine's ability to supply previously non-deployed ICBMs to Russia. Although Ukraine still possesses about 55 disassembled SS-24 ICBMs awaiting disposal, these solid-fueled missiles are unlikely to be of much use to the SRF, as their solid fuel would require complete replacement. In contrast to liquid-fuel missiles, which can be stored in defueled state, there is no way to store solid-fuel missiles in that state, or to arrest the decomposition processes within their fuel elements. However, the sale of SS-19s may also be an indicator that Ukrainian firms are going to play a larger role in the maintenance of the SRF's Ukrainian-manufactured ICBMs. During the February 2001 visit by Vladimir Putin to Dnipropetrovsk, the location of both the Pivdenmash missile plant and Pivdenne design bureau, Pivdenmash officials acknowledged they were assisting Russia in maintaining both SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs in service.[19] The demise of START II also extended the life of the SS-18 in Russian service. Had START II been ratified, all of them would have had to be destroyed (or converted into SLVs). Following the collapse of START II, the SRF announced that SS-18 ICBMs would be modernized and retained in service until 2016.[20] Ukrainian enterprises may well become more directly involved in that modernization effort. In the longer term, Ukrainian aerospace entities may even become more closely involved in the development of new strategic weapon systems. The Russian side has already explored that possibility on other occasions. The Ukrainian Pivdenmash plant, which during the Soviet era produced SS-18 ICBMs, reportedly received Russian inquiries during the START II ratification debate on the feasibility of restarting SS-18 production, which according to Pivdenmash director would require considerable investments of time and money.[21] Although following the break-up of the Soviet Union Russia made an effort to ensure the new Topol-M ICBM would use only components manufactured in Russia, it made an exception in the case of the launch vehicle for the planned mobile variant of the missile. The choice fell on the Belarusian firm MZKT, which designed launch vehicles for Soviet road-mobile ICBMs. Whether Ukrainian enterprises become more involved in Russian
defense programs will depend on the degree of political and economic integration
between the two countries. While Ukraine is pursuing a pro-Western foreign
policy, its dependence on Russia for energy supplies, close ties between
Ukrainian industries and their Soviet-era counterparts in Russia, difficulties
in implementing political and economic reforms, and the Western
governments' concern with Ukrainian President's Leonid
Kuchma's human rights record, mean that Russia will remain Ukraine's
most important partner for the foreseeable future. On September 18, 2003,
Ukraine signed an agreement with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to create a
"joint economic space" in spite of warnings by European and U.S.
officials that it may complicate Ukraine's efforts to establish a closer
relationship with Western countries.[22]
Although Ukraine signed the agreement on condition that its agreements with
other countries will take precedence over the "joint economic
space," it nevertheless creates the possibility of closer integration with
Russia in the future.
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SS-19 ICBM, as a unit without front section and without self-contained dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister).
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