Research Story of the Week

Congressional Debate on Nuclear Weapons Policy:
From the Nuclear Brink to the Slippery Slope

Charles D. Ferguson

Photo Capitol Hill.

October 27, 2003


Update:
On November 7, the House-Senate Conference Committee reached agreement on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R. 1588). With regard to the nuclear programs discussed in the following story, the conferees: 1) repealed the 1993 Spratt-Furse ban on research of low-yield nuclear weapons, but stipulated that the Department of Energy is not allowed to perform any development work until authorized by Congress; 2) granted the administration's request for $15 million for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP); and 3) authorized $6 million for low-yield nuclear weapons research (Advanced Weapons Concepts Initiative) as requested by the administration. The House-Senate Conference Committee on the Energy and Water Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R. 2754) reached somewhat different decisions on these issues. It cut $7.5 million or half the funds from the Administration's request for the RNEP program. Also, this conference committee stipulated that $4 million of the $6 million dedicated to the Advanced Weapons Concept program would not be available until DOE submits a detailed report to Congress on future nuclear reductions. The appropriations conferees reduced the Modern Pit Facility funding from $22.8 million to $10.8 million.


"Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote," observed Benjamin Franklin over 200 years ago near the start of the American experiment with representational government. Often congressional politics and debates resemble Franklin's culinary contretemps. This year, for instance, the nuclear weapons policy menu included four items that boiled on Capitol Hill.

A previous CNS Research Story of the Week[1] in May described in some detail the Bush Administration's request for congressional funding for four nuclear weapons issues. Since May, dueling versions of the Defense Authorization and Energy and Water Appropriation bills have led to a showdown this fall among House of Representatives and Senate conferees, as discussed below. In sum, the issues are:

Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator

The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) would be intended for the role of a nuclear "bunker buster," and the administration asked for $15 million in fiscal year 2004 (FY '04) to research this program. This program actually began last year, and the administration anticipates conducting a three-year study. According to congressional testimony by Ambassador Linton Brooks, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), "this study will examine whether or not two existing warheads in the stockpile - the B61 and the B83 - can be sufficiently hardened through case modifications and other work to allow the weapons to survive penetration into various geologies before detonating."[2] Despite confusion among some about whether the RNEP program would examine low-yield nuclear weapons, Ambassador Brooks' comment clarifies that the RNEP involves the high-yield B61 and B83 weapons.

In the mid-1990s, the B61 was modified by wrapping it around a hardened bomb casing. This version is called the B61-11. However, non-nuclear bombing tests showed that the penetration depth was not deep enough to allow the radioactive contamination to be contained. Reportedly, unlike some versions of the B61, which have a dial-a-yield feature, offering sub-kiloton yields, the B61-11 reportedly has only a single yield, which is much greater than a kiloton.[3]

A previous CNS Research Story of the Week presented some of the pros and cons of nuclear and non-nuclear bunker busters.[4] As indicated above, one of the biggest challenges is figuring out whether bombing technology can bury the bomb far enough into the ground to contain the radioactive debris. The current state of this technology is such that massive amounts of radioactive fallout would occur and, depending on the weather conditions, could contaminate a wide area potentially resulting in large numbers of unintended casualties. The higher the explosive yield, the deeper the bomb has to be buried to contain the radioactive contamination. Higher yield weapons have a greater likelihood than lower yield weapons of destroying deeply buried and hardened targets.

Advanced Weapons Concept Initiative

The Advanced Weapons Concept Initiative would explore new types of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, or so-called "mini-nukes." The administration has requested $6 million in FY '04 for this study. Ambassador Brooks characterized the Initiative as a "modest" program "to provide nuclear deterrence options."[5]

Enhanced Test Site Readiness

The Enhanced Test Site Readiness program would reduce the amount of time to prepare for a nuclear weapons test from the current 24-36 months to 18 months. The FY '04 budget request is $24.8 million for this program. While the administration continues to adhere to the nuclear testing moratorium, some political analysts have raised concern that if President George W. Bush wins the presidential 2004 election, he would decide to renew testing.[6] Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham articulated the administration's current policy on nuclear testing and new nuclear weapons development in a July 21 Washington Post op-ed, which states, "We are not planning to resume testing; nor are we improving test readiness in order to develop new nuclear weapons. In fact, we are not planning to develop any new nuclear weapons at all."[7]

Modern Pit Facility

The Modern Pit Facility would enable the United States to have a full-scale plutonium pit production complex to be able to remanufacture several hundred nuclear weapons per year. (Pits are the nuclear "triggers" for the primary, or fission, part of thermonuclear weapons.) The FY '04 budget request for this program is $22.8 million. This money would go toward conceptual design and technology development activities. The ultimate price tag for building the facility would run upwards of $4 billion. NNSA is currently exploring five candidate sites: Pantex, Texas; the Nevada Test Site; Savannah River, South Carolina; Carlsbad, New Mexico; and Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) has championed a proposal to build the pit factory in Carlsbad, NM, an economically-depressed location in his state. Although the other senator from New Mexico, Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) generally opposes the other programs, he favors this program and specifically expressed support for the Carlsbad location because of its nearness to Los Alamos National Laboratory, where a smaller pit production facility has recently begun to manufacture a few pits.[8] The newly manufactured Los Alamos pits are scheduled to be certified "war-reserve" by 2007.[9] The Los Alamos facility will cost an estimated $2.3 billion and could ramp up to produce up to 150 pits per year.

Opposing the proposed pit facility, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) pointed out that the United States already stores more than 5,000 plutonium pits.[10] However, most of these pits were extracted from types of warheads that are no longer in the active stockpile. Therefore, they would probably not be usable for remanufacturing current types of warheads.


Summary of Funding Requests and Allocations (Dollars in millions)

Nuclear weapons program Administration
request
House
action
Senate
action
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator $15 $5 $15
Advanced Weapons Concepts 6 0 6
Enhanced Test Site Readiness 24.8 0 24.8
Modern Pit Facility 22.8 10.8 22.8
Note: The House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee directed that
DOE use the $5 million for the RNEP program to work with DOD "to maximize
the dual-use applicability for both conventional and nuclear weapons."
Source: Congressional Record - Senate, September 15, 2003, p. S11445.


Wolves in Lambs' Clothing?

In July, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives surprised many Congress watchers by voting 377 to 26 to slash funding for the RNEP and Modern Pit Facility and deny funding for the Advanced Weapons Concepts and Enhanced Test Site Readiness programs. (See the funding summary table.) While traditionally congressional Republicans have by and large been identified as more hawkish, or wolfish, than their dovish, or lamb-like, Democratic counterparts on nuclear weapons issues, many of the "wolves" joined forces with the "lambs" to thwart the administration.

Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman David Hobson (R-Ohio) led the pack. On July 8, he said, "Based on the President's decision to reduce our nuclear stockpile, I thought we were trying to consolidate the nuclear weapons complex around the country - not expand it."[11] The opposition mainly stems from a belief that the administration is moving too fast and too soon on new programs. In addition, the House report that accompanied the subcommittee's decision expressed concern about NNSA's management of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and made demonstration of effective management a prerequisite to congressional consideration of new activities.

The House action should not be construed as an ideological attack against maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Both supporters and opponents of the administration's proposed nuclear programs asserted support for nuclear deterrence. À la Franklin, even "well-armed lambs" consider U.S. nuclear weapons essential for preserving American liberty, though many draw the line on producing new nuclear weapons, as discussed below. Importantly, the House vote showed that many Republican congressmen are willing to challenge the administration on a national security issue.

Spratt-Furse Low-Yield Ban - Following Franklin's Spirit of Compromise?

Franklin, arguably one of the strongest advocates of democracy among the Founding Fathers, realized that for democracy to survive and thrive, citizens and lawmakers need to be able to work toward compromise.[12] Compromise appeared evident when the House decided to split the difference on the 1993 Spratt-Furse ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, defined as those with yields less than five kilotons, which is less than the approximately 13-kiloton yield from the Hiroshima bomb. (For more on the Spratt-Furse law, see two previous Research Stories of the Week[13] [14].) Representative John Spratt (D-SC), one of the eponymous architects of the ban, recently conceded, "They [proponents for repealing the ban] disavow any intention of building such weapons, but they at least seek the flexibility to conduct research in that realm. Let me tell everybody, they basically won that argument."[15]

He acknowledged that the original ban arose from the 1991 presidential nuclear initiatives (PNIs), which were ordered by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, to remove thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from the American and Soviet arsenals. Further development of new low-yield nuclear weapons was then to a large extent connected to and perceived as leading to new tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Spratt-Furse law stood against such development and was aligned with the intent behind the PNIs.

In the early twenty-first century with increased concerns about nuclear terrorism, proponents of lifting the research ban argue that the new security paradigm calls for giving weapon scientists more intellectual freedom to explore the types of low-yield nuclear devices that terrorists might seek to build. Nonetheless, critics claim that this argument is just a fig leaf to cover other low-yield weapons work. In fact, the Defense Science Board completed a study in summer 2003 that urges investigation into different types of small nuclear weapons.[16] This study, however, might be divorced from definite military requirements. The Defense Science Board consists of civilian advisers to the Pentagon, whereas most professional military officers find little or no war-fighting value in nuclear weapons because conventional weapons are far more usable and do not constrain friendly troop movement on battlefields the way that nuclear weapons would.

The House supported building a firewall between research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons and clearly stated that the administration would have to seek specific authorization to go beyond research into development or production. Similarly, the Senate voted to repeal that part of the ban on research, but earlier in 2003 also repealed the ban on development while stipulating that Congress holds the power of the purse over any move toward development and production. During the later September 16 debate, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) offered an amendment along with Senators Kennedy and Reed that "would require the Department of Energy to obtain a specific authorization from Congress before the Department could move to phase 3 or beyond in the nuclear weapons development process. Phase 3 is the engineering development phase, the point at which a concept would begin to be a new weapon."[17] Senator Domenici, chairman of the Senate Energy and Water Committee, concurred with this amendment.

Renewed Arms Race?

In the Senate on September 16, the pro-administration-funding-request wolves tasted victory over the anti-funding-request lambs. Instead of Franklin's two-to-one wolf-to-lamb ratio, the Senate vote to support the administration was a relatively narrow 53 to 41 votes - largely along partisan lines. However, the vote would have been even closer had the four Democratic senators (Edwards, Graham, Kerry, and Lieberman) campaigning for the presidency voted. (Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) has subsequently dropped out of the presidential race.) Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) did make a statement in the Congressional Record opposing the administration's request. He said, "I fully support Senator Feinstein's efforts to attempt to put an end to nuclear proposals that have not yet been justified by hard arguments but would likely result in adverse consequences."[18] The Congressional Record also noted that Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) would have voted for the Feinstein-Kennedy amendment had he been present.[19] This amendment was intended to "prohibit the use of funds" for all four programs and to make that money available for debt reduction.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia backed away from the nuclear brink. Nonetheless, thousands of nuclear weapons in both countries remain on hair-trigger alert, raising the risk of accidental nuclear war. Although the four nuclear weapons programs on Congress' plate this year do not appear to be directed at Russia, some senators opposed to these programs were quick to point to the administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which included Russia on a list with six other countries (China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria) that "could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies."[20]

During the Senate debate, Senators opposed to the administration's nuclear weapons proposals often tried to spark fears that the administration is leading the country into a nuclear arms race. If this does come to pass, it would probably not resemble the massive buildup of the Cold War. Instead, the race would be essentially one-sided with countries such as North Korea hurrying to build a modest arsenal to try to deter the United States. However, states seeking nuclear arms are not necessarily primarily driven to do so because of the United States. Often, regional power struggles spur acquisition of nuclear weapons, or domestic political factions want potent symbols of national power to shore up support for their agendas. Even if the United States decided to develop new nuclear weapons, it would likely increase its nuclear arsenal by a small amount. Characterizing the administration proponents' position, Senator Wayne Allard (R-CO) said, "Nobody is out here saying we need to go into a nuclear arms race. I think that is overstated."[21]
Falling down the Slippery Slope?

While a renewed Cold War-style arms race sounds like hyperbole, opponents of new U.S. nuclear weapons assert that at a minimum the administration is taking the first steps toward restarting nuclear testing and rebuilding the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Senator Feinstein warned about proceeding down this "slippery slope." Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) also spoke of a "slippery slope that could irreversibly lead us to testing and maybe even deploying these new nuclear weapons."[22]

Senator Feinstein also repeatedly emphasized the theme of hypocrisy in her debate speeches. For instance, she said, "So for me, it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile building a multibillion-dollar nuclear bomb factory [the Modern Pit Facility] ... as we preach the importance of limiting proliferation and preventing other nations from developing weapons of mass destruction. And, if I may say so, it is hypocritical."[23] Like-minded senators also warned about the backsliding of the United States toward its commitments under the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 1995 NPT indefinite extension pledge to pursue nuclear disarmament.

However, proponents of the administration's position would characterize the four programs as prudent planning for emerging national security contingencies as outlined in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review.[24] These senators want the United States to have sufficient flexibility in its nuclear weapons capabilities to meet these contingencies. Weapons scientists would benefit from this policy, according to Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA). He said, "This [Feinstein] amendment prohibits our Nation's scientists from researching one of the foremost military challenges our Nation faces, which is an enemy using a hardened, deeply buried facility to protect weapons of mass destruction or carry out command and control operations."[25] This remark echoes comments that administration officials had made earlier this year about removing the "chilling effect" on nuclear weapons research at the national labs.

Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons and Credible Deterrent

Does the United States need to bolster its nuclear deterrent with lower-yield warheads? Administration officials have expressed concern that enemies might not believe that the United States has a credible deterrent if it is self-deterred from threatening to use the high-yield nuclear weapons extant in the current U.S. stockpile because such weapons would likely produce extensive damage to civilian populations. Jack Spencer, an analyst with the conservative Heritage Foundation, captures this dilemma in the essay "Learn to Love the Bomb," which states, "An enemy leader ... may doubt the United States would retaliate with existing nuclear forces because of our demonstrated reluctance to kill innocent people."[26] Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) expressed a similar thought by saying, "And if smaller, more precise weapons could do the job just as well, wouldn't people of good will, who are concerned about unnecessary death, be interested in at least thinking about weapons that would pose a deterrent to an attack but would not kill as many people, would not kill so indiscriminately?"[27]

This argument does not account for the destructive power of so-called low-yield nuclear weapons (which would typically have explosive yields hundreds or more times greater than conventional bombs). Moreover, nuclear weapon detonations produce harmful effects, such as radioactive contamination, that are not present in conventional explosions. These low-yield nuclear weapons would probably cause massive harm to civilians. By burying bunkers under cities, enemy leaders know that they could deter the United States from striking those targets with "mini-nukes." Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) gave an example during the recent debate. He said, "If we use a 5-kiloton earth-penetrating nuclear explosion in Damascus - this is just a for instance, obviously - and they had the traditional winds that flow from the east to the west, it gives the general flowline of where the radioactivity and the dust would flow, ... it would go from Syria, across northern Israel through southern Lebanon, just north of Haifa. The best estimates would be 230,000 fatalities and 280,000 casualties."[28]

Even if low-yield nuclear weapons would in certain scenarios, such as attacks on isolated targets, not lead to large numbers of deaths, the United States already has low-yield nuclear weapons, thus rushing toward developing new types does not appear imperative. According to congressional testimony by Secretary of Energy Abraham, "The U.S. has two existing nuclear weapons that have certified yields of less than five kilotons."[29] In the past, the United States had deployed and designed many other types of low-yield nuclear weapons.

Calling attention to the intelligence assessment challenges and political constraints faced when deciding to use nuclear weapons to attack bunkers or other targets in so-called rogue states, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) cautioned, "Any decision to order such a strike must rely upon unimpeachable intelligence because no rational President will order even a low-yield nuclear weapons [attack] without great confidence in the success of the mission."[30]

During the Senate debate, Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) raised the rhetorical question: "But does our nuclear arsenal no longer deter?" He continued, "Deterrence involves credibly threatening an enemy to deter them from taking unwanted actions," and argued that the United States with the strongest military in the world has a sufficient deterrent. Considering the RNEP and Advanced Weapons Concepts programs, he ridiculed them by saying, "This search for a perfect nuclear deterrent reminds me of the mad logic of the cold war where the United States and Soviet Union pursued more and more nuclear weapons of more and more sophisticated designs to try to cover more and more contingencies. These endless improvements are unnecessary, expensive, and dangerous."[31]

Nuclear Weapons Issues Facing Congress Next Year

Reportedly, NNSA officials believe that the administration's funding request will triumph in the conference committee deliberations.[32] Regardless of the outcome, many of the same nuclear weapons issues will return next year to confront Congress.

The Modern Pit Facility program is reaching the point where it will move beyond the site selection phase. As mentioned above, the current funding of $22.8 million under consideration for FY'04 would be directed to concept design and technology development. This amount represents only a tiny fraction of the $4 billion projected expense for the complete facility. Because the administration is determined to build the pit production plant, it will undoubtedly submit a request for funding for FY'05. Opponents to building the facility or at least stalling construction until the Stockpile Stewardship Program is better managed would, therefore, have another opportunity to block money allocated to this program.

Both the Senate and the House have, in effect, given research into low-yield nuclear weapons a green light. Thus, the Advanced Weapons Concepts program will likely continue to receive funding. However, a major question for Congress next year is: How should it respond to a funding request for development of low-yield nuclear weapons?

The security concern over hardened and deeply buried targets will not vanish by next year. Therefore, the administration will request the third tranche of funding for the final part of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study. The next decisions will revolve around determining whether to fund development of new or modification of existing earth penetrating warheads. These weapons can take the form of either conventional or nuclear weapons, depending on the recommendations of the RNEP study.

Because the administration is committed to enhancing test site readiness, it will continue to ask for enough money to effectuate this policy. However, a move toward actual nuclear testing is very unlikely at least during the upcoming year.

While this year's congressional debates touched on major issues affecting U.S. nuclear policy, members of Congress have yet to delve into a debate that really articulates what this policy should be. If such a debate occurred, it would probably not reach consensus. As Janne Nolan documented in a comprehensive study of the Bush I and Clinton administrations, such consensus has often eluded the executive branch, which by the nature of its construction, should have a greater unity in its policy positions than the legislative branch with its inherent competing interests.[33] Even a prominent senator has recently acknowledged that consensus would surely be lacking in Congress if there were a proposal to build a new nuclear weapon; in particular, Senator Domenici said, "... if we were authorizing the building of new nuclear weapons, there would be a block of Senators on this floor. There would be steam heat from those who oppose it."[34] In this scenario, the most congressional wolves would likely not unite with the lambs, but neither would the wolves devour the lambs because both sides would come well-armed with arguments and information for the ensuing vigorous debate.


[1] Charles D. Ferguson and Peter D. Zimmerman, "New Nuclear Weapons?" CNS Research Story of the Week, May 29, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030528.htm.
[2] Prepared Statement of Linton F. Brooks before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, April 10, 2003.
[3] NRDC Nuclear Notebook, "The B61 Family of Bombs," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2003), pp. 74-76, available at: http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/jf03nukenote.html.
[4] Charles D. Ferguson, "Mini-Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review," CNS Research Story of the Week, April 8, 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020408.htm.
[5] Ambassador Brooks testimony.
[6] Private conversations with Congress watchers, October 17 and 23, 2003.
[7] Spencer Abraham, "Facing a New Nuclear Reality," The Washington Post, July 21, 2003.
[8] Senator Jeff Bingaman, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11525.
[9] NRDC Nuclear Notebook, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2003," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 2003), p. 75, available at: http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/mj03nukenote.html
[10] Ian Hoffman, "Senate OKs New Nuclear Weapons Spending," Tri-Valley Herald, September 17, 2003.
[11] Christine Kucia, "House Slashes Nuclear Weapons Budget Request," Arms Control Today (September 2003), available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_09/Nuclearweaponsbudget.asp.
[12] Walter Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
[13] Charles D. Ferguson, "Mini-Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review," CNS Research Story of the Week, April 8, 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020408.htm.
[14] Ferguson, "Mini-Nuclear Weapons and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review."
[15] Representative John Spratt, Congressional Record - House, July 16, 2003, p. H6904.
[16] Ian Hoffman, "Pentagon Pushing Smaller Nukes," Tri-Valley Herald, October 23, 2003.
[17] Senator Carl Levin, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11537.
[18] Senator Joseph Lieberman, "Strip Funding from New Nuclear Weapons," Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003.
[19] Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11533.
[20] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons," The New York Times, March 10, 2002.
[21] Senator Wayne Allard, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11522.
[22] Senator Frank Lautenberg, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11525.
[23] Senator Dianne Feinstein, Congressional Record - Senate, September 15, 2003, p. S11439.
[24] Department of Defense, "Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review," Press Conference, January 9, 2002, available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html.
[25] Senator Saxby Chambliss, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11521.
[26] Jack Spencer, "Learn to Love the Bomb," FOXNews.com, August 25, 2003, available at: http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed082603b.cfm
[27] Senator Jon Kyl, Congressional Record - Senate, September 15, 2003, p. S11449.
[28] Senator Edward Kennedy, Congressional Record - Senate, September 15, 2003, p. S11447.
[29] Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11528.
[30] Senator Joseph Biden, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, p. S11526.
[31] Senator Daniel Akaka, Congressional Record - Senate, September 16, 2003, pp. S11527-8.
[32] Kucia, "House Slashes Nuclear Weapons Budget Request."
[33] Janne E. Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
[34] Senator Pete Domenici, Congressional Record - Senate, September 15, 2003, p. 11448.


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Author(s): Charles Ferguson
Related Resources: Nuclear, Americas, Weekly Story
Date Created: October 27, 2003
Date Updated: November 10, 2003
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