Research Story of the Week

Overview of the 58th Session of the First Committee:
Assessing the United Nations Role in
International Nonproliferation and Disarmament

Photo
First Committee Room at the U.N.

by the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program[1]

Note: the files linked in the document below are in PDF format.

[Updated January, 15, 2004]
November 3, 2003


For the voting results on First Committee resolutions adopted by the Fifty Eighth session of the UN General Assembly, see the "developments" section of the United Nations profile in the IONP Inventory.
The United Nations General Assembly voted in December 2003 on the 52 resolutions and decisions submitted by the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, covering the full spectrum of issues related to nonproliferation, arms control, disarmament, and international security. The 2003 First Committee session began on 6 October amid growing international distress about the continued relevance of multilateral nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control in the face of narrow self interests, unilateralism, and a general lack of political will. The Committee commenced its work with a two-week long general debate that set the mood for the four weeks to follow of thematic discussions, introductions of resolutions, and the adoption (or non-adoption as the case may be) of resolutions.

The First Committee began its work in the shadow of events of the past year, such as the war in Iraq that did not receive the green light from the UN Security Council, the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the recent findings that Iran has programs to enrich uranium. These events sparked much discourse in the First Committee general statements on the value of multilateralism. Several states noted that they consider multilateralism to be a "core value" in the realm of international security and disarmament (Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Nigeria, Norway, Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam). In this context, the importance of making the United Nations a central player in this field was emphasized (China, DPRK, Iran). Other states, however, suggested that multilateralism was merely one option among several approaches (Armenia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Republic of Korea, United States). The sharpest rebuke to multilateralism came from the United States, which "does not believe in multilateralism for its own sake," but rather is committed to what it called "an effective multilateralism, properly targeted at today's security threats."

A plethora of issues were highlighted and flagged by Member States, including nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), export controls, missiles, terrorism, and conventional weapons, and nonproliferation and disarmament education. New topics on this year's agenda were the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and reform of the First Committee. The constant theme throughout this general debate was the need for reassessment of the current path of international peace and security, and the mechanisms within the United Nations to address this path.

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) - Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden - countries expressed their deep frustrations over the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and especially towards the implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Indonesia described the current situation as "a creeping sense of pessimism and the future looks bleak." These countries are even more concerned about the broader role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, including re-rationalizations for the use and the development of new types of such weapons. South Africa maintained that "[t]he concept of a second nuclear era, which seeks to return a lost claim to legitimacy, should be opposed with all our endeavors." These non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) also worried about the increasing focus on nonproliferation in terms of terrorists' access to nuclear materials; they stressed that "the legitimacy of any action concerning non-proliferation will suffer as long as the weapon states disregard their obligations and responsibilities."

States Parties to the NPT continued to call on India, Israel, and Pakistan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Brazil, Switzerland, and the NAC particularly stressed the need to achieve universality as a way to strengthen the treaty. Egypt reaffirmed its commitment to achieve universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East.

A number of states welcomed the entry into force of the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT/Moscow Treaty) as a positive development towards the goal of nuclear disarmament, and expressed hope that the treaty would spur further nuclear disarmament efforts. The Republic of Korea praised the treaty as "a significant step which will help bring about quantitative reductions through a practical step-by-step approach." Indonesia, although it too welcomed the Moscow Treaty, remarked that the treaty lacks provisions for data exchange or verification mechanisms, and called for continued steps "to improve the treaty so that it would adhere to the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability which will have far-reaching ramifications for the future of genuine nuclear arms reductions and elimination." Nigeria, Malaysia, and Iran suggested the treaty was deficient in terms of transparency, irreversibility, and verifiability.

Switzerland, Norway, Japan, and Mongolia praised the Moscow Treaty, and further encouraged nuclear weapons states to initiate efforts to address entire arsenals, including the reduction and possible elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons. In this regard, Switzerland stated, "My country favors a multilateral and universal agreement to totally ban these weapons."

On the issue of tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons, the NAC announced that it was submitting a resolution for the second year in a row, stating "that there is a disturbing trend to erase the distinction between conventional weapons and non-strategic weapons." Egypt and South Africa reinforced this statement, noting that reducing tactical weapons is part and parcel of the entire nuclear disarmament process. Mongolia referred to the UNIDIR study on tactical nuclear weapons, calling for a more effective control regime over these types of nuclear weapons.

Negative security assurances (NSAs) - the assurance from nuclear weapon states to NNWS that they will not threaten nuclear attack or attack them with nuclear weapons - were referred to by the NAC, which stated "...the sole guarantee against the use of any weapon of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their total elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again." Ukraine used the strongest language on NSAs, calling for, "... legally binding security assurances ... eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities."

Concern about the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and doctrines was highlighted by several states (Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Mongolia, NAC, and New Zealand). Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Mexico expressed concern regarding the development of new nuclear weapons that may lower the threshold of actual use of nuclear weapons. India explained the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy, stating "we have a declared policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons and a firm commitment to avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states - except in the event of a major WMD attack." In addition, China stated emphatically, "it is against the trend of the times to lower the threshold of nuclear war by developing new types of nuclear weapons which are easier for use in actual combat, to refuse undertaking, in a legally binding manner, no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, or even to list other countries as targets of nuclear attack."

Many delegations called for the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and expedition of its entry into force. Many also viewed the treaty as an important element in the international nonproliferation regime. Those who supported the CTBT's entry into force believe the treaty establishes an international norm against nuclear testing and thus prevents the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons programs. Delegations from Bangladesh, Croatia, Eritrea, Indonesia, Italy (on behalf of the European Union), Kazakhstan, Korea, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Thailand all voiced their commitment to actively engage in diplomatic efforts that will result in the CTBT's entry into force. The Chinese delegation suggested that the spirit, principles, and objectives set out by the CTBT have been adopted as an important part of the international norm of nonproliferation despite the treaty having not been entered into force. Significantly, China announced that it is currently in the process of ratifying the treaty in its legislative body. Other delegations demonstrated their commitment to the CTBT by highlighting events in which their governments participated during the last year, including a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) conference in Jamaica in December 2002 to promote adherence to the CTBT in Latin America and the Caribbean; the joint ministerial letter to those countries whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force sent by Japan's Foreign Minister, Mrs. Yoriko Kawaguchi, in partnership with the Foreign Minister of Australia; and the recent Facility Agreement between the Philippines and the CTBTO covering operations and maintenance of three facilities that will be governed by the International Monitoring System.

Some delegations expressed concern about the future of the CTBT. The Nigerian delegation suggested that the international community is losing faith in the disarmament process, the CTBT being a main factor. South Africa's delegation stated that the treaty is being crippled by a lack of commitment by some the signatories. Russia called for all states to adopt the Plan of Action of the international community and the Political Declaration supporting the CTBT made at The Third Conference to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT. Norway stated that most states are still committed to the treaty, however, it sees an increasing need to preserve the integrity of the CTBT norms.

Several countries addressed the issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). The Chairman of the Committee, Jarmo Sarevo (Finland), opened the discussion by stressing "the need to promote universal membership in multilateral treaty regimes along with further consolidation of regional arrangements, including nuclear weapon free zones." Mexico and Mongolia made very similar statements reiterating their support for NWFZs. They were both prepared to "promote a resolution to convene a conference of States parties and Signatures of Treaties establishing such zones before 2005." Mongolia stated that the creation of NWFZs "constitutes an important nonproliferation measure, which enhances regional peace and security and promotes nuclear disarmament." It congratulated the five Central Asian States on reaching an agreement to conclude a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The creation of such a treaty would, according to Mongolia, "establish a NWFZ in this vast and volatile region thus making a valuable contribution to the cause of turning Central Asia into a zone of peace and predictability."

Mexico and Kazakhstan both recognized Mongolia for its important effort to be a nuclear-weapon-free state. Kazakhstan, an involved member of the Central Asian NWFZ, stated that the "establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone throughout the world was compatible with the integrity and sustainability of the international nonproliferation regime." It reiterated its support for the consolidation of the status of Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free state; it welcomed the recent announcement by the Cuban government of its intent to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and recognized Brazil's effort to join the NWFZ in the Southern Hemisphere to create a Southern Hemisphere free of nuclear weapons.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Several states expressed support for the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system - and for the Additional Protocol in particular - as a fundamental pillar of the nonproliferation regime, and urged all states which have not yet done so to sign and bring into force an Additional Protocol as soon as possible. Australia and Norway stated that the Additional Protocol should be considered an essential prerequisite for the supply of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the European Union went even further by stating that the comprehensive safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol together constitute the verification standard and should be considered essential to demonstrating compliance with Article III of the NPT. Mexico urged states to strengthen the credibility of the IAEA by allowing the IAEA to effectively verify the peaceful nature of their nuclear facilities, and Malaysia emphasized that political will is required to ensure that verification mechanisms can operate in a fair, balanced, and non-discriminatory manner. New Zealand also stressed the importance of effective, objective, and independent verification, and called upon "not only those States under scrutiny to fully co-operate with the IAEA but also for all other States to support its processes and to follow due process."

Compliance Challenges of Iran and the DPRK

A number of states expressed concern with regard to the current NPT and IAEA compliance challenges posed by Iran and the DPRK. Nine states - almost all of which served on the 2002-2003 IAEA Board of Governors that adopted the recent resolution on Iran - expressed support for that resolution and urged Iran to comply fully and immediately with its provisions. The European Union, Switzerland, and Japan particularly emphasized that Iranian signature, ratification, and entry into force of an Additional Protocol, as well as the immediate application of the Protocol's provisions during the interim, would serve as a first step in reassuring the international community of Iran's peaceful intentions. The European Union further urged Iran "to refrain from fuel cycle activities which can also be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons." This urging seems to have been effective, as subsequently, Iran announced that it will sign the Additional Protocol as a direct result of negotiations with the European Union. Russia, meanwhile, expressed support for the efforts by the IAEA to clarify outstanding questions on Iran's nuclear program, and hope "that reciprocal efforts will make it possible to resolve the existing concerns in the nearest future." Egypt also welcomed Iran's stated willingness to cooperate with the IAEA, and added, "We must also stress that if the non-proliferation regime is to remain credible, effective and universal, it must address the legitimate security concerns of all its member States."

In keeping with its continued pressure on both Iran and the international community to comply with and enforce nonproliferation obligations, the United States stated: "The mass of evidence arrayed against Iran in the IAEA Director General's past two reports leads to the unequivocal conclusion that Iran is in violation of its safeguards agreement and is working hard to cover up that pattern of covert noncompliance.... No one should doubt that it is the hard cases, such as North Korea and Iran that ultimately will determine the degree to which multilateralism will remain relevant to the security challenges of the 21st century."

In response to these continuing suspicions, Iran reiterated and defended the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, stating, "Iran has declared on many occasions that it has never pursued a nuclear weapons program and will never do so. Our nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes and therefore, we have principally no problem with the transparency, including the implementation of the provisions of the Additional Protocol. In this direction, we worked and continue to cooperate with the IAEA to remove all doubts about the peaceful nature of our nuclear program at the earliest possible time. Hopefully, all outstanding issues would be solved if and when the politically motivated propaganda allows that."

Many countries also expressed concern with regard to North Korea's January announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT, and urged the country to reconsider and reverse its decision. Several called for the immediate, permanent, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, and Switzerland specifically noted that verification of the dismantlement should be conducted in close cooperation with the IAEA. Japan and the Republic of Korea stressed that North Korea's nuclear weapons program - including any development, acquisition, possession, testing, and transfer of nuclear weapons - cannot be tolerated. In their statements on the DPRK, all countries urged a peaceful resolution through diplomatic means, particularly through the six-party process. The United States expressed disappointment that no action had been taken in the Security Council with regard to the North Korean nuclear issue, but China stated its opposition to "unjustifiable sanctions under the pretext of nonproliferation." China also commented that "the legitimate security concerns of each sovereign state should be accommodated and respected. This will help eliminate the root causes for some states to seek weapons of mass destruction."

Iraq

Interestingly, although the issue of Iraq was a major topic of last year's First Committee meeting, less than a handful of countries (Pakistan, Malaysia, Belarus, and Iran) even mentioned the country's name during this opening session. Citing the lack of evidence of Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Malaysia criticized the casting aside of the UN inspections regime and Pakistan stated the danger of the doctrine of pre-emptive and coercive nonproliferation. Belarus addressed the influence of the Iraq war on the position of small and vulnerable states, commenting that "trends towards the intensification of international tension in different regions accompanied by a decreasing UN role in conflict resolution result in accelerated formation and consolidation of regional and sub-regional military-political alliances and organizations. Many states consider now the participation in such alliances as a prerequisite for their security." Iran remarked: "The waging of the war under the pretext of removing the threat of weapons of mass destruction not only undermined the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime but also weakened the whole concept of multilateralism and the United Nations. It seems, now, that the predictable consequences of the unlawful Iraq war have forced the occupying powers and indeed the advocates of unilateralism to think twice and send signals for their possible return to the multilateral mechanisms."

Conference on Disarmament

The 2003 session of the Conference on Disarmament again failed to agree on a program of work, despite the latest developments on the Five Ambassadors Proposal. Most NAM countries expressed their frustration over the lack of any substantive progress. Egypt recognized that "the crisis in the CD is symptomatic of a much deeper malaise in the state of international relations," and even asked if there were a future for the CD. On the other hand, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Ukraine, and Indonesia welcomed as a positive development the flexibility shown by China and Russia in accepting the Five Ambassadors Proposal. The United States stated that "[w]e consider this an encouraging sign, and are considering its ramifications," but it did not specify its position on the proposal. Now that China and Russia joined the consensus on the proposed program of work, the next development in the CD largely depends on the responses of the United States and other key member states such as France, Israel, and Pakistan.

Among other countries, Japan, Australia, Norway, South Africa, Mongolia and the European Union states attached special importance to the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and called on the CD Member States to attain this objective as soon as possible. China was less enthusiastic; it stated that an FMCT would "hopefully" contribute to nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. India reaffirmed its constructive participation in the FMCT negotiations. Physical security of fissile materials has been highlighted as a benefit of an FMCT in the post-September 11th environment. In this context, the Republic of Korea argued that an FMCT would "constitute an effective means of combating nuclear terrorism by reducing the risk of loose nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands." In the absence of negotiations, the best states can do is maintain the momentum and keep an FMCT high on the security agenda of the international community.

To varying degrees, China, Belarus, and South Africa stressed the need to address the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Russia highlighted its proposal to establish a moratorium on the deployment of means of combat in outer space, pending a relevant agreement. It also encouraged the outer space powers to provide information concerning forthcoming launches of outer space objects to ensure predictability of the situation in outer space. However, a limited number of states attached priority to this issue, indicating that PAROS has not been mainstreamed compared to other issues such as an FMCT.

There were relatively few references to nuclear disarmament in the CD context, which might reflect low expectations for negotiations on the subject in the CD. However, Bangladesh, Brazil, and Pakistan called for an early establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD.

A number of developing countries and two regional groupings - the Rio Group and the Caribbean countries - lamented the continued lack of consensus among states on potential objectives and an agenda for the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD IV). However, states continued to express hope and support for agreement and for convening the Fourth Special Session. Indonesia recalled the comprehensive set of proposals offered over the three sessions this year, and stated, "Bringing all these ideas, concepts and approaches will not be an easy task, but given flexibility and a spirit of compromise, we remain confident of success in coming to grips with them."

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

The first expert meeting of the BTWC was held in August 2003 as part of the new follow-up process established at the Fifth Review Conference. This process includes a one-week meeting of States Parties in each of the three years (2003-2005) leading up to the next Review Conference, with the purpose of promoting common understanding and effective action on issues of concern to all States Parties. Each annual meeting will be preceded by a two-week expert level meeting. Most countries approved the meeting as "momentum in the right direction" and expressed their support for the follow-up process. The United States welcomed States Parties' efforts to fulfill "their national responsibilities to implement and strengthen the BWC." South Africa, although doubtful about the substantive contribution of the new process, noted that the process reflected a commitment to a multilateral approach. Since the expert meeting did not go further than information exchange on national legislation, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand expected the meeting of States Parties in November to produce more concrete results. In this regard, the European Union called for an "agreement on a core package of legislation that all States Parties should have in place." Iran expressed its hope that the focus on control measures would not hinder international cooperation in the field of peaceful use of biotechnology in accordance with Article X of the convention.

Although some countries (Mexico, South Africa, Pakistan, and Russia) continued to prefer a verification mechanism, the new process is now put in place. In this regard, the November meeting will be a test case to see if States Parties can make use of the process to strengthen the BTWC.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Many States Parties addressed the CWC and the OPCW, as the First Review Conference took place at The Hague from 29 April to 9 May 2003. States reaffirmed their commitment to achieving the object and purpose of the CWC. Some states also welcomed the ratification of the CWC by Afghanistan. South Africa, Japan, Brazil, the European Union, and Pakistan, among others, stated that they welcomed the First Review Conference as it provided a useful forum for discussion. However, Iran claimed that its adherence to the CWC, by making declarations and receiving inspections, has "produced little rewards except the continuation of the unjustified restrictions" against it. Pakistan stated that it was committed to fulfilling its obligations under the convention fully and faithfully. Pakistan also commented on the arms race with India: "For Pakistan, a major priority is to secure the verified destruction of chemical weapons, which India declared when it ratified the CW Convention. Until India's CW stocks are destroyed, Pakistan shall need to factor the threat of CW attack in any conflict with India. Pakistan also continues to cooperate with international efforts to control the destructive flow of chemical weapons and their precursors." China also referred to its neighbor, Japan: "We hope Japan will faithfully implement the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and intensify its efforts to start the destruction process so as to remove as early as possible this long-standing threat to the lives of the Chinese people." Indonesia welcomed the progress made with regard to chemical weapons, and Russia considered "the Convention .... as an effective instrument preventing the proliferation of those deadly weapons and reducing the risk of toxic chemicals being used as a means of terror. The best way to prevent the leakage of chemical weapons is to eliminate them completely. Russia has started elimination of its stocks at the facility in Gorny, which has come into operation this year. Universal adherence to the Convention remains an urgent task."

Export Controls

On the issue of export controls, China explained how it has "promulgated a series of laws and regulations and established a complete export control mechanism covering sensitive technologies and items in nuclear, biological, chemical and missile fields. Such measures as the end-use and end-user certificate system, licensing system, control list and catch-all principle have all been incorporated into China's export control mechanism in line with international practice. Penal measures have also been set out against violations of those laws and regulations. China is further strengthening its export control measures in light of its national conditions. We are willing to benefit from other countries' experiences and further improve our non-proliferation export control mechanism."

Missiles

Several states made statements on the issue of missiles. Iran stated that it would submit a draft resolution, identical to the one adopted last year, which it predicts will be passed. Pakistan agreed with global concerns regarding missile proliferation and reinforced its willingness to cooperate in "multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory measures to avert missile proliferation." Few states mentioned the fact that many "missile active" states are outside regimes such as the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). Once again, Pakistan mentioned India's weapons programs and stated: "Pakistan cannot accept discriminatory restraints especially those not accepted by our neighbor India, or those which would prevent Pakistan from ensuring the credibility of our deterrence posture."

South Africa, although a signatory to the HCOC did not mention the initiative, but stated instead that it believes that the proliferation of missiles, specifically those capable of delivering WMD has not been collectively addressed. Thus it implied that the HCOC failed to curb missile proliferation.

The European Union stated its belief that a relationship between the Code and the United Nations should be established, as did Russia and Japan. Republic of Korea and Australia claimed a desire for the HCOC to be "firmly established as a universal and viable confidence-building measure to help prevent ballistic missile proliferation." Russia reconfirmed its "initiatives concerning a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies, which are aimed at creating a global regime of missile non-proliferation." Japan expressed its views on the HCOC by describing it as "a significant step forward as the first international norm which promotes the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and calls for maximum self-restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles."

Terrorism

Delegates presented the development of WMD and its potential possession by international terrorists as the terrorism threat of greatest concern. Delegates noted that WMD or related material may be given to terrorists by states of proliferation concern or stolen. Delegations from Bangladesh, China, Japan, Indonesia, and South Africa all cited the development of WMD and terrorist access to them as a threat to international security. All expressed a commitment to meeting these challenges. The delegation from Norway also raised concerns over terrorists taking advantage of weak and failed states to use as bases of operations to plan new attacks. It suggested dealing with the problems through a multilateral framework. Pakistan presented an alternative perspective on the issue of terrorism. Its delegation described the focus on WMD falling into terrorist hands as distracting the international community from the real threat, the existence of disputes among nuclear-armed states. India introduced a resolution on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" that was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

On May 31, 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a coalition of 11 countries (Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) which aims to develop a set of "principles" that identify practical steps necessary to interdict shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern at sea, in the air, or on land. The United States claims that the Initiative is consistent with and a step towards the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for Member States of the United Nations to prevent proliferation. In addition, a series of 10 maritime, air, and land interdiction training exercises have been implemented, the first of which was held 13-14 September 2003. The PSI countries maintain that the initiative is consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international laws and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. However, opponents argue that the PSI contravenes international law and undermine the international treaty-based nonproliferation regime.

Surprisingly, not many states provided statements on the PSI. Australia and Japan both voiced their support for the PSI by calling on states to be "vigilant in ensuring they do not supply or assist in delivering items that could advance proliferators' WMD or missile programs." In addition, Australia outlined the PSI and assured states that "the interdiction principles agreed between PSI members complement existing non-proliferation regimes and are entirely consistent with international laws." Australia strongly encouraged states that are committed to preventing the spread of WMD to lend their support to this initiative. Japan also requested countries in Asia, in particular, to participate in, and cooperate with, the PSI. Japan claimed that the PSI is consistent with Japan's effort to hinder the spread of WMD and their delivery systems and described Japan's participation in the maritime exercises held near Australia's northeast coast in mid-September.

Conventional Weapons

The First Committee has discussed several issues pertaining to conventional weapons and there were many positive statements made by countries during the session. Some of the topics included the limiting of conventional weapons, the Group of Governmental Experts to study the problem of explosive remnants of war (ERW), and legally binding instruments to help support the First Biennial Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons Program of Action (POA). It was reaffirmed that the POA and all other programs geared toward addressing this issue are founded on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which was the primary instrument of international law regulating weapons that may have indiscriminate effects or cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. Those weapons include primarily landmines and conventional weapons. In its statement to the First Committee, Namibia maintained that small arms and light weapons (SALW) are considered WMD in Africa. Guyana and Uganda supported this statement and focused their statements to the First Committee on the landmine and SALW issues.

Another important topic that was discussed was the First Biennial Conference on the POA, put forth in July 2001. The POA received positive attention and was strongly supported by Australia, South Korea, Peru, Kenya, and Russia. Uganda, Guyana, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Switzerland, France, and Norway stated that more needed to be done, however, in order to make the POA feasible. These delegations reiterated their support for a legally binding instrument to regulate brokering and establish more effective transfer controls.

Switzerland announced it would be submitting a draft with France on an international instrument for tracing and marking of SALW. Countries that were in favor of such a draft were Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Brazil, Norway, Uganda, Romania, Madagascar, China, South Africa, Kenya, Italy on behalf of the European Union, and Jordan.

The majority of the countries commended the success of the Fifth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, which took place in Bangkok in September. The European Union, Mexico, Switzerland, and Australia attached great importance to universality and the full implementation of the treaty. Countries affected by mines, including Nigeria, Myanmar, Mexico, and South Africa, highlighted the importance of international assistance for mine clearance and victim assistance, while the European Union reaffirmed its undiminished financial support for the purpose.

On the issue of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the European Union, Mexico, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Norway expressed their concerns about the humanitarian impact of ERW and hoped that the ongoing negotiations in Geneva would result in a new legally binding protocol on such weapons. They also wanted a negotiating mandate on anti-vehicle mines to be adopted at the next meeting of States Parties in November. Given the lack of a compliance mechanism within the Convention, the European Union attached great importance to the establishment of an overall mechanism for addressing compliance.

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Education

Japan and New Zealand, both of which have been consistent and ardent supporters of nonproliferation and disarmament education, were the only two countries to include this issue in their opening statements. Both emphasized the power and importance of individuals and civil society in advancing towards peace and disarmament, and New Zealand urged cooperation between States Parties, international organizations and civil society in incorporating peace education programs into all levels of society. India, ..... and .... also expressed support for this issue.

First Committee Reform

For the past few years there have been about 50 resolutions, many of which are "principle" rather than "action" oriented, and many of which reoccur year after year, adopted by consensus, bogging down the focus and process of the First Committee. For the first time, several states are expressing concern regarding this disarmament forum, and calling for drastic reform. Several statements and three non-papers (European Union, Norway, and the United States) were presented on this issue.

Many suggested that this reform could take place in the context of greater UN reform, in particular of the General Assembly (Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines, Russian Federation, and Singapore). There were several suggestions made by states to increase the "effectiveness" and "efficiency" of the First Committee. Regarding the agenda, suggestions included prioritizing the most pressing issues to international security and disarmament (Belarus, Mongolia), maintaining a substantive balance among issues on international security (Egypt, Mongolia), and streamlining the agenda and processes (Australia, Canada, Singapore, South Africa). Suggestions for resolution improvements proposed that resolutions should include direct instructions (Belarus, Canada), the number of resolutions should be reduced (Norway, South Africa, United States), and so many resolutions should not reappear each year (South Africa, United States). Suggestions for the First Committee process itself included assuring that reforms will not affect the right of each state to express views (China, Iran), shortening the speeches and distributing a longer version of the statements (Croatia, European Union), and having more integrated thematic debates (Norway, United States). Administrative suggestions included reducing the number of reports requested for the Secretariat (United States) and electing a Chairman well in advance of the First Committee to improve preparation and consultations (Norway). All of these constructive suggestions will provide much food-for-thought for Member States. Currently, the purpose of the First Committee is currently to "gauge" the political mood regarding international security and disarmament. If the First Committee were to promote progress on nonproliferation and disarmament issues, it would be a welcome change for the crippled international disarmament regime.

Resolutions

The First Committee has now entered its final stage of deliberations, namely the voting on the 53 draft resolutions. In the realm of nuclear disarmament, the New Agenda Coalition again submitted two resolutions. The first, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda" has several controversial elements, elaborating in great length on issues such as non-strategic nuclear weapons, legally binding security assurances and the need for nuclear weapon states to make more effort towards nuclear disarmament. In contrast, the Japanese-sponsored resolution, "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" practically reiterates verbatim the NPT 13 steps, in a more middle-of-the-road position than that of the NAC resolution. On the other hand, "Nuclear Disarmament" sponsored by several of the Non-Aligned Movement states is a fairly weak and watered-down resolution with few concrete recommendations. Mexico proposed a new resolution calling for a "Conference of States parties and signatories to treaties by which nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established." If adopted, it would take place before the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

On the issue of missiles, Iran again sponsored a resolution "Missiles," requesting the convening of a panel of governmental experts in 2004 to further explore the issue of missiles in all its aspects. This would be as a follow-up to the meeting of the first panel of governmental experts that took place during 2002 and submitted a report that set out definitions and issues of concern, but did not make concrete recommendations. The 58th session's resolution on missiles comes on the heels of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, which has already gained 109 signatures. The HCOC represents a process outside of the United Nations framework. It operated in the context of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which is essentially a "suppliers club" setting the rules on missile-related export controls. Therefore, this resolution from Iran represents an effort to bring the issue of missiles back into the UN framework.

Export controls saw a resolution for the second year in a row from the Netherlands, "National legislation on transfer of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods and technology." This resolution invites states to enact or improve national legislation in these areas, and to submit such information, on a voluntary basis, to the Secretary-General to be available to all Member States.

In the realm of conventional weapons, a resolution sponsored by Colombia, Japan, and South Africa entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects," proposes convening a conference no later than 2006 to review the progress made in the implementation of the Program of Action, as well as a second biennial meeting of states in 2005 (the first was held in July 2003). In addition, it calls for the development of an international instrument to trace SALW, and to establish an open-ended working group to pursue this matter, beginning with a meeting on 3-4 February 2004. A new resolution this year is the "Promotion at the regional level in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of the United Nations programme of action on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects," emphasizing the need for regional and subregional measures to combat SALW and highlighting the OSCE "best practices" guide.

A resolution, "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" appeared for the second year in a row, calling for Member States to support international antiterrorism efforts, strengthen national measures, and encourage regional and international cooperation to strengthen national capacities. It also calls for the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures taken by international organizations in this regard.

A new resolution this year, "Enhancing the contribution of the First Committee to the maintenance of international peace and security," sponsored by the United States, calls for the Secretary-General to request the views of states on improving the effectiveness of the First Committee and to prepare a report with options to be considered at next year's General Assembly session.

Conclusion

The General Assembly adopted 52 texts covering all areas of disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and international peace and security. The texts of each resolution, as well as voting results can be found on the Reaching Critical Will website. Later, they will also be available on the United Nations website.


[1] Prepared by IONP graduate research assistants Emily Schroeder, Shawnee Delaney, Sean Lucas, Risa Mongiello, Maya Nakamura, and Maiko Tamagawa under the supervision of Jean du Preez (IONP Director).


CNS Experts on the First Committee:


View previous Research Stories.

 

Author(s): Jean du Preez
Related Resources: Treaties, Weekly Story
Date Created: November 3, 2003
Date Updated: January 15, 2004
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