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Research Story of the WeekThe Historical Roots of Current Terrorist Tactics and Methods
Sammy Salama & Kathleen Thompson November 21, 2003
Fourteen centuries ago an important schism occurred within the Islamic umma (community of believers). From this rift, two main factions emerged: the Sunna and the Shi'a. In addition to generating the concepts of Sunna and Shi'a, this schism sparked yet another idea that would have a tremendous impact on the course of Middle East history. The origins and justification for the concept of shahada, or martyrdom, stem from this schism. Gaining notoriety in the 1980s, shahada has become a popular military paradigm used by various Shi'i and Sunni militant groups to justify their use of suicide bombings as a legitimate method of warfare. To best understand the motives behind self martyrdom, one needs to return to the roots of the Shi'i-Sunni conflict and explore how early Islamic history continues to affect the attitudes and religious interpretations of militant Islamist groups that rely upon suicide operations as integral parts of their military operations. This story will trace the historical root of modern Middle Eastern suicide warfare tactics and methods. Islam's Original Schism and the Origins of Shi'i Islam Shi'i Islam grew out of a schism that developed within the Islamic community after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 A.D. The majority of Muhammad's followers believed that his successor should be selected from his tribe, the Quraysh, by elders close to the Prophet. The elders chose Abu Bakr, the father-in-law of the Prophet and the first adult male convert to Islam, to succeed him as leader of the Islamic community.[1] The successor, or caliph, would rule the community according to Islamic law, or Shari'a, which had been established under Muhammad. Those who believed in this method of succession became known as Sunni; from the Arabic word Sunna, meaning custom or tradition. Thus, the term Sunni has the connotation of being a follower of the example of the Prophet. [2] Today, Sunnis comprise approximately 90 percent of the Muslim population.[3] Ali (The First Imam) Unlike their Sunni counterparts, a minority of Muslims believed that Muhammad's eldest male relative, Ali ibn Abi Talib, should succeed him.[4] The cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, Ali was viewed by this faction (or shi'a) to be the true leader of the community (known as the Imam).[5] In addition to being a blood relative of the Prophet, Ali had repeatedly proven himself to be devoted to the nascent religion. In fact, a number of Ali's supporters regarded him as the Prophet's intended heir.[6] Thus, Shi'i Islam grew out of the belief that only descendents of Ali (and thus of the Prophet) could be leaders of the Islamic community.[7] Initially members of this faction were called Shi'at Ali (partisans of Ali); later their name was shortened to Shi'a. The Early Caliphate The Sunni majority would select four caliphs in close succession in the three decades following Muhammad's death. The first caliph, Abu Bakr, was followed first by 'Umar ibn al-Khattab and then by 'Uthman ibn 'Affan. Finally, in 656 A.D., the Sunni elders selected Ali as the fourth caliph. Ali would rule only four-and-a-half years, until 661 A.D. These first four caliphs are known as the rightly guided caliphs, or al-khulafa' al-rashidun. This era, during which Islam took root across the Arabian Peninsula, is viewed by many Sunnis as a continuation of the "golden age" of the Prophet Muhammad. For most Shi'a, however, the true height of the Islam occurred only during Muhammad's rule in Medina (622-632 A.D.) and Ali's brief reign as caliph (656-661 A.D.).[8] Jihad and the Advent of Islamic Fundamentalism Ali's term as caliphate was marred by controversy. His legitimacy as successor to the Prophet was challenged by Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, a member of the powerful Ummayad tribe. Mu'awiyah, the governor of modern Syria, accused Ali of supporting the assassination of his cousin, the late caliph 'Uthman.[9] In 657 A.D., the two men's armies met at the battle of Siffin. Neither side could claim victory, although according to Shi'i tradition, Mu'awiyah's troops faced certain defeat. The battle ended before Ali was able to secure his victory, however, when Mu'awiyah's troops carried Qu'rans onto the field of battle, calling for arbitration that would "Let God decide." Ali consented but the arbitration, like the battle itself, was inconclusive. Consequently, Ali and Mu'awiyah remained locked in a struggle for leadership.[10] In the wake of the arbitration, there emerged a Shi'i faction known as the Kharijites (or Khawarij from the Arabic "kharaja," meaning to exit or secede).[11] The Kharijites had initially regarded Ali as the rightful successor to Muhammad. They also considered Mu'awiyah to be an infidel for his opposition to Ali's reign. After Ali consented to arbitration, the Kharijites became convinced that he, too, was guilty of takfir, or unbelief. By submitting to arbitration, Ali had flouted God's right to decide the victor of the battle at Siffin.[12] The Kharijites withdrew their support from Ali and formed their own religious community that preached strict adherence to the Qu'ran and the Sunna (example of the Prophet). Central to the fundamentalist beliefs of the Kharijites was the concept of jihad. This concept existed long before the advent of the Kharijites. The Qu'ran places great emphasis on jihad, the Arabic term for "struggle." According to the Qu'ran, followers of Islam must struggle to remain on the path of God and the Prophet. Over time, there have been various interpretations of what form this struggle should take. Often, jihad is believed to be a peaceful struggle; an effort to foster virtue and charity in the face of evil and adversity. Most interpretations of jihad often focus on improvement within an individual or the Islamic community. Fundamentalist and militant interpretations take a more aggressive view, believing that jihad justifies force and violence in order to spread God's word to nonbelievers and to combat perceived injustices.[13] The Kharijites placed a great emphasis on violent jihad, believing that force was often necessary to "command the good and forbid evil," as they construe the Qur'an to mandate. The Kharijites viewed the world in dualist terms as "us against them"; "them" being both non-Muslims and those Muslims who deviate from the Kharijite vision of Islam. The Kharijites' fundamentalist interpretation of the Qu'ran led them to equate the majority of other Muslims with infidels. In order to protect and purify Islam, the Kharijites believed that it was their duty to kill any unbelievers who did not repent. One of their more notable victims was Ali himself, whom the Kharijites assassinated in 661 A.D., as punishment for his consent to arbitration with Mu-awiyah.[14] Ali's assassination took place in the southern Iraqi town of Najaf, and his shrine there remains among the most sacred sites in Shi'i Islam. The assassination itself was carried out by sleeper cells that infiltrated Ali's ranks, waiting patiently for the opportunity to strike. Although the Kharijites comprised a small minority of Muslims that remained on the fringes of the Islamic community,[15] the impact of fundamentalism and violent jihad has echoed throughout Islamic history. In particular, it has taken center stage in the twentieth century with the resurgence of extremist Sunni Islamic fundamentalist groups.[16] Present-day terrorist groups, such as al-Qa'ida and Egyptian Islamic Gihad, have adopted strict interpretations of the Qur'an and embraced the practice of takfir, casting all Muslims who disagree with them as apostates. Like the Kharijites, these groups organize sleeper cell formations that assimilate within various communities and target opposing political leaders and civilian institutions that they regard as infidels or non-believers. Hasan (The Second Shi'i Imam) Following Ali's assassination, his eldest son, Hasan, became
the second Imam. Hasan quickly ceded the caliphate to Mu'awiyah,
who launched the Ummayad dynasty that would rule the Sunni Muslim
community from 661 until 750 A.D. Although Hasan did not act as caliph,
Shi'a Muslims continued to regard him as their Imam until
his death, sometime around 670 A.D. Shi'i tradition states that
Hasan abdicated to Mu'awiyah in order to prevent another conflict, but
with the understanding that Hasan would one day be Mu'awiyah's heir
to the caliphate. Mu'awiyah then allegedly went back on his word and had
Hasan assassinated.[17]
Shortly before his own death, Mu'awiyah named his son, Yazid, as his successor. Yazid came to power in 680 A.D. Hasan's younger brother, the third Imam, Husayn, refused to declare his loyalty to the new caliph and took haven in the Sacred Mosque of Mecca. Supporters of his late father, Ali, encouraged Husayn to organize a revolt against new caliph's regime in Kufa. Located in southern Iraq, Kufa had been the seat of Ali's rule.[18] Shi'i tradition holds that Husayn accepted the call to rebellion in order to combat the growing hedonism of the Umayyads and to guide the Muslim people back to the path of Muhammad.[19] According to Shi'i accounts, Husayn left for Kufa knowing that he would not return. It is reported that before departing Mecca, he proclaimed that he would become a martyr in the struggle against the Umayyad "government of injustice and tyranny."[20] In fact, Husayn met his end before reaching Kufa. The caliph's forces lashed out at the Shi'i leaders in Kufa before Husayn reached them to lead the revolt. On October 10, 680 A.D. Husayn and his small band of close supporters were routed and killed at Karbala in southern Iraq.[21] Although his head was taken to Damascus as a sign of Yazid's victory, Husayn's body was entombed in Karbala and, like his father's tomb in Najaf, remains one of the most important holy sites in the Shi'i faith.[22] The Arabic term for martyr is shahid, meaning "witness" (just as the Greek word martyr literally means "witness").[23] As a result of his death at Karbala, Husayn is revered in the Shi'i faith as Sayyid al-Shuhada', Lord of the Martyrs.[24] The death of Husayn illustrates the strong bond between the concepts of martyrdom and jihad. To sacrifice one's self in the struggle for Islam guarantees one entry into Paradise. Thus, the example set by Husayn has served as a source of faith and inspiration to the Shi'i community for several centuries. In the twentieth century in particular, his example has been heralded as a battle cry in numerous conflicts, from the Palestinian struggle against Israel to the Iran-Iraq War.[25] Modern Applications of Shahada (Martyrdom) and Origins of Suicide Bombings On November 11, 1982, a new method of warfare debuted: the first human bomb. Seventeen-year-old Ahmad Qassir, a Shi'i from southern Lebanon, drove a white Mercedes filled with explosives into the Israeli military headquarters in the Lebanese city of Tyre, killing 141 people. This was the beginning of new era, the inception of a deadly trend of suicide bombings.[26] Over the course of the next three years, there would be more than 30 similar attacks against Israeli targets. The Shi'a suicide bombers drove cars, carried suitcases, and in one instance, even detonated a bomb while riding a donkey. The legitimacy for these instances of "self martyrdom" stems directly from the death of Husayn Bin Ali. The image of Husayn and his small band of devotees, marching bravely toward certain death at the hands of Yazid and his vast army, has had a particularly profound impact on Shi'a resistance movements in the twentieth century.[27] Shi'i theology glorifies the act of "self martyrdom" against overwhelming odds, claiming to provide the "martyr" with a direct path to heaven. What is more, the shuhada' (martyrs) see themselves as continuing Husayn's tradition of "self martyrdom." The following Hizb`allah fighter echoes these sentiments: I, Salah Mohammed Ghandour, known by my alias Malak [angel], ask God to grant me success. I will be meeting the master of martyrdom Imam Hussein, this great Imam who taught all the free people how to avenge themselves on their oppressions. I shall, inshaallah [God willing], shortly after saying these words, be meeting my God with pride, dignity and having avenged my religion and all the martyrs who preceded me on this route. In a short while I shall avenge all the martyrs and oppressed of Jabal Amel, South Lebanon, as well as the children and sons of the Intifada in ravished Palestine.[28] While religious fervor may have inspired the first suicide bombings, strategic acumen has perpetuated their use. Suicide bombs are notoriously cost effective and enable groups to inflict extensive destruction upon the enemy while incurring minimal damage themselves. Consequently, groups such as Hizb`allah consider suicide bombing to be the ultimate method of attack, religious ideology aside.[29] In the early 1980s, the growing trend of Shi'a suicide bombings in Lebanon took a heavy toll on the Israeli military, killing more than 650 soldiers in three years. These bombings marked the beginning of the end for the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. On June 10, 1985, the Israeli forces withdrew from most of Lebanon, limiting their presence to a "Security Zone" in the South, from which they withdrew in the year 2000. How the Shi'i
Concept of Martyrdom Reached Sunni Palestine
Stranded in "no man's land" just north of Israeli Occupied Southern Lebanon, the Palestinian deportees initially had little or no support system in Lebanon. The Lebanese government resented their presence, contesting Israel's use of its territory as a prison. The Palestinian exiles, however, soon received support from another powerful force within Lebanon. Hizb`allah, the perpetual thorn in Israel's side, provided the Palestinians with food and medicine. The advent of the relationship between Hizb`allah and the Palestinian militants represents an important juncture in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was during their exile in Southern Lebanon that the Palestinian Islamists learned the value of shahada, or "martyrdom," from the Hizb`allah religious leaders. Until 1992, the Palestinians had relied upon secular nationalism as the justification for their resistance to Israeli occupation. From the birth of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 until the Islamist exile in 1992, all Palestinian fighters were regarded as fida`iyin, or freedom fighters. Although the fida`iyin were willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause, their intent was not suicide, which Islam considers haram (forbidden).
Lebanon continued to voice its opposition to harboring the militants. Consequently, Israel was forced to readmit the Islamic militants nine months after the initial deportation. In southern Lebanon, the Palestinian Sunni Islamists had adopted Hizb`allah's Shi'i paradigm of shahada. Upon returning to the West Bank and Gaza, they imported this deadly paradigm, giving rise to Palestinian suicide bombings. Sacrificing one's life for the liberation of Palestine ceased to be a nationalistic obligation of the fida`iyin. For the Islamist fighters, it also became a religious duty, rewarded with a direct path to heaven. In the years that followed, many young Palestinian men and women follow this path. Although the Palestinian Islamists are Sunni, the sheer efficacy of suicide bombings drew them toward the Shi'i concept of shahada. The use of suicide bombers against Israeli targets had enabled Hizb`allah to significantly impair Israel's 1982 invasion and occupation of Lebanon. While the Israeli military easily overcame both Syrian troops and PLO guerrillas, the Shi'a of south Lebanon killed hundreds of Israeli soldiers, forcing the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw from most of Lebanon. The Hamas leadership found inspiration in these successes, and reasoned that by emulating Hizb`allah's tactics they could force the Israelis to end their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The first wave of Palestinian suicide bombings began in April 1994. The attacks came in response to the massacre of 29 Muslims in the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, carried out by Jewish settler Baruch Goldstein on 25 February 1994. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas unleashed an unprecedented onslaught of attacks on Israeli military personnel and civilians, killing more that 40 Israelis in five separate operations. Since that time, the suicide bomber has become the weapon of choice for Palestinian radicals (see Graph 1). Over the course of the current intifada, there have been more than 70 confirmed suicide bombings and 50 other attacks, which have killed more than 800 Israeli civilians and soldiers and wounded thousands more. Other Sunni Militants Adopt the Paradigm of Shahada: The hundreds of casualties inflicted by Sunni Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel have inspired Islamist radical groups such as Al-Qa'ida, Egyptian Islamic Gihad, Ansar al-Islam and others to adopt the Shi'i paradigm of martyrdom. Thus, suicide bombers have come to represent a legitimate method of warfare across the spectrum of Islamic militancy. In August 7, 1998, two suicide car bombs struck the American embassies in Tanzania and in Kenya, killing hundreds of civilians and injuring thousands more. These attacks marked the first stages in a pattern of Al-Qa'ida suicide terror attacks, culminating in the deaths of almost 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001. Similar attacks by al-Qa'ida and associates were carried out more recently in Riyadh, Casablanca, Bali, and Istanbul.
Currently in Iraq suicide car bombings have become a weekly fixture. Since early August 2003, suicide car bombings have blown up the Jordanian embassy, the UN headquarters, the Turkish Embassy, Iraqi hotels, the Shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, the Red Cross building in Baghdad, and the Italian Police Base in Nasiriyah (see Graph 2).[32] In Iraq it is still uncertain who is behind the suicide attacks, it may be Ba'ath loyalists, foreign fighters that infiltrated Iraq from Saudi Arabia or other borders, and/or Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a Islamists who are targeting American personnel and their allies in the hope of hindering the American occupation and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Recent statements by American officials in Iraq indicate that they consider Saddam loyalists as the main culprit behind these attacks.[33] Considering the increasing violent attacks on American personnel in Iraq, which presently average 35 attacks per day,[34] it is possible that in the near future, Beirut-style suicide bombings will be unleashed on American forces and their allies in Iraq. It appears that since 680 A.D., Shahada has come full circle and returned to the vicinity of Karbala. The historical
roots of current terrorist tactics stem from militant interpretations of early
Islamic history. Gaining fame in the 1980s, shahada has become a popular
military paradigm used by various Shi'i and Sunni extremist
militant groups to justify their use of suicide bombings as a legitimate method
of warfare. In addition, many current Islamist extremist groups like
al-Qa'ida and Egyptian Islamic Gihad also utilize the tactics of
takfir, sleeper cells, and infiltration strategies that were initially
used by the Kharijites in 661 A.D. to target the army of the fourth caliph Ali
ibn Abi Talib. To best understand these tactics, one needs to return to the
roots of the Shi'i-Sunni conflict and explore how early Islamic
history continues to impact the attitudes and religious interpretations of
militant extremist Islamist groups that rely upon these tactics as integral
parts of their military operations.
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