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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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CNS Research StoryLibya and Nonproliferation
by Anjali Bhattacharjee and Sammy Salama[*] December 24, 2003
The State of Libya's WMD Program Nuclear Libya signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969, ratified it in 1975, and placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards in 1980. It has yet to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Libyan president, Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi, never hid his nuclear ambitions. It is widely believed that one of the reasons Libya chose the nuclear route was to counter the emerging covert Israeli nuclear program. In the 1970s, Libya allegedly attempted to purchase a nuclear weapon from China. It was unsuccessful in this endeavor.[2] Most analysts claim that Libya's main nuclear facility is its 10 megawatt (MW) research reactor in Tajura, which Libya acquired from the USSR during the late-1970s. The facility is reportedly staffed by hundreds of nuclear technicians and scientists, some of whom were trained in the West. Besides the reactor in Tajura, the Soviet Union and Libya engaged in talks for constructing a Soviet-built nuclear power plant in Libya in the early to mid-1970s.[3] After negotiations stalled, the Libyans turned to Belgonucleaire, a Belgian-based firm, to take over the supply side of the deal. The Belgians, however, backed out due to pressure from other European countries and the United States, and the Soviet Union reportedly re-entered discussions. Though details are unclear, sometime in the late 1970s Moscow agreed to build a light water power reactor in Libya for approximately $4 billion, but the contract was not implemented.[4] Given the recent end of UN sanctions, new reports claim that the Russian Federation has renewed talks with Libya to upgrade the nuclear reactor in Tajura as well as to conclude a power reactor agreement.[5] In 1981, Libya reportedly declined an offer by former-CIA agent, Edwin Wilson to supply it with 20% enriched uranium because it required an enrichment level of 80%.[6] Libya appears to have succeeded in obtaining some quantity of 80% enriched uranium from the Soviet Union.[7] Last week's revelations shed some new light on Libya's nuclear research capabilities and facilities. American and U.K. intelligence officials, who inspected nine or 10 Libyan nuclear sites, stated that Libya was further ahead in its quest for nuclear weapons than had been previously estimated. It is worth noting that Libya had not yet attained a nuclear weapons production capability or the ability to enrich uranium. One American intelligence official claimed that "by far the most significant revelation they [Libyans] made was their disclosure of centrifuges. That was quite a milestone in their admissions."[8] However, this same official emphasized that his team did not find any functioning centrifuges, supporting Libyan denials that they ever succeeded in enriching uranium. As far as its nuclear programs are concerned, a significant part of Libya's announcement was that Tripoli intends to sign the Additional Protocol agreement, permitting short-notice inspections of nuclear sites by the IAEA. As a result, IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei announced that he would lead an international team to Libya to "kick start a process of verification" as early as next week.[9] Once Libya signs the IAEA additional protocol, it will commit to the following:
Chemical Limited information on Libya's chemical weapons program is available from open sources, but Libya is reported to be one of the few countries to have employed chemical warfare on the battlefield. In 1987, it allegedly dropped Iranian-supplied mustard-filled aerial bombs on Chadian forces.[11] To date, Libya has refused to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and it is believed to have developed and produced CW agents at three main sites: Pharma 150 (the Rabta complex), Pharma 200 (at the Sabha oasis), and the Tarhuna complex.[12] Several western enterprises, knowingly or not, assisted in the development of these facilities, which had the potential to produce various CW agents including phosgene, mustard, and nerve agents. Moreover, the United States and Britain were extremely concerned that Dr. Wouter Basson and others involved in the covert South African CBW program, Project Coast, might transmit sensitive CBW information to Libya. In April 1994, U.S. and British officials met with South African President F. W. de Klerk to express their concerns, and the following year they urged his successor Nelson Mandela to rehire Basson in order to monitor his activities more closely.[13] Due to fears of a possible military strike by the United States, Libya claimed that it was no longer producing any chemical weapons and that its former CW facilities were now involved in legitimate pharmaceutical-related work. However, intelligence reports estimated that Libya had restarted its program in 1996. Biological Much less is known about the alleged Libyan biological warfare (BW) program. Libya acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, and there are scattered reports as to whether or not Libya is actively pursuing a BW program. Most intelligence estimates have concluded that Libya may have a limited R&D capability but that it lacks a full-scale weapons program. Again, however, there were concerns that Libyan scientists may have obtained sensitive information from South African BW experts. See, the CNS chart at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/libya.htm. Missiles More information is available about Libya's delivery systems. Open source reports have indicated that since the 1970s, Libya has opted to acquire cruise and ballistic missiles to enhance its regional deterrence. Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Libyan cruise missile capabilities are modest, consisting of three main designs: the SS-N-2c Styx, the Otomat Mk2, and the Exocet, none of which has a range exceeding 85 km.[14] As for ballistic missiles, during the 1970s the USSR provided Libya with a small arsenal of Scud-B missiles with a range of up to 300 km. Libya also possesses Scud-C variants with a range of up to 550 km.[15] Libya encountered various difficulties in developing an effective indigenous missile production capability and has allegedly relied on foreign suppliers, mainly European nations, China, and North Korea. Since the early 1980s, Libya has pursued the development of al-Fatah, a longer-range ballistic missile with a reported range of 950 km. This missile has yet to be completed and remains untested.[16] The recent Libyan revelations also include an acknowledgement of cooperation with North Korea to develop a longer-range Scud missile design. Moreover, the Libyans showed American and British intelligence officials North Korean-supplied Scud-C missiles with a range of up to 800 km.[17] According to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Libyans have now committed themselves to limiting their entire missile arsenal to a range "no more than 300km."[18] Libya's Intentions Libya's recent announcement may come as a surprise to many, but in reality it is the culmination of several steps Libya has undertaken over the past few years. Its decision to hand over a primary suspect involved in the Lockerbie bombings, Abdul Basit `Ali Muhammad al-Magrahi, to a Scottish court and to accept that court's jurisdiction proved to be a positive step in thawing its previously frigid relations with the West. As a consequence, the United Nations recently eased the financial, travel, and arms-related sanctions it had placed on Libya in 1992. Libya's decision to dismantle its WMD program can therefore be viewed as further evidence of that country's interest in repairing its relations with western states and restoring its international image. Why has it chosen to do so at this time? (WMD) Cost-Benefit Analysis Possessing a WMD program is a status symbol that several leading Arab nations have pursued. However, Libya now seems to have recognized that investing millions of dollars in such a dangerous and costly program is futile in the long run. From the brief overview of the Libyan WMD program presented above, it is clear that this program did not pose a significant offensive threat compared to those of other states in the region. The quality of Libya's chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities was always marginal, and Libya stands to gain a lot by abandoning its programs from a cost-benefit perspective. The United Nations has already lifted its arms embargo on Libya, and from a security standpoint Libya may well be better off concentrating on building up its conventional forces rather than diverting scarce resources into costly and militarily ineffective WMD programs.
Libya and Terrorism Libya's prior provision of weapons, training, and financial support to a wide range of terrorist groups has long been a source of contention in its relations with the United States. However, the terrorist threat that exists today is quite different from that during the Cold War era, when the principal struggle was between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Libya lost the support of its principal ally and supplier of military hardware, and it has since become increasingly isolated from the rest of the international community. The current "War on Terrorism" essentially pits secular western nations and their allies against extremist religious groups, above all Islamist terrorist networks. The doctrine enunciated by Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi in his principal ideological treatise, the three-volume Green Book, is a utopian revolutionary ideology combining radical nationalism and non-Marxist socialism, albeit one with a noticeable Islamic veneer. Although not as avowedly secular as the nationalist and socialist doctrines advocated by Jamal `Abd al-Nasir in Egypt or the Ba`th regimes in Syria and Iraq, the revolutionary republic of Libya has never seen eye to eye ideologically with radical Islamist movements, even though it has at times provided financial assistance to terrorist factions of the Palestinian resistance movement. Given this background, and in the context of the Bush administration's post-9/11 anti-terrorist doctrine "you are either with us or against us" the Libyan leadership has sought to avoid being categorized as a state sponsor of terrorism by the U.S. government. Although Libya was an active supporter of nationalist and secular terrorist organizations during the 1970s and 1980s, ranging from factions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to European Marxist and neo-fascist terrorist groups, it is clearly opposed to Islamist terrorist networks like al-Qa`ida, which Qadhdhafi's regime regards as a national and international threat. Indeed, on 16 March 1998, Libya was the first nation to issue an official Interpol arrest warrant for 'Usama Bin Ladin and three of his associates, who were accused of killing two German citizens near Surt on 10 March 1994. One of those German citizens is believed to have been a counterintelligence officer.[19] The Oil Factor Libya is one of North Africa's largest oil producers, with estimated oil reserves of 29.5 billion barrels.[20] Both the United States and Libya stand to gain significant profits if U.S. sanctions on Libya are lifted. Even viewed from a purely economic standpoint, Libya's abandonment of its WMD programs is a shrewd and calculated move. After all, U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil is matched by the dependence of various oil-producing states on their markets in the industrialized world. For this reason, mending fences with Libya will allow U.S. companies to expand their access to Libyan oil resources and possibly reduce their dependence on oil produced in the Gulf states. Given the increasing internal instability plaguing Saudi Arabia, as well as the documented links between al-Qa'ida and factions of the Saudi royal family and Saudi-sponsored charities, it makes sense for American oil importers to diversify their sources of supply by expanding economic interactions with the secular regime in Tripoli. Conclusion Apart from Libya's legitimate desire to regain international respectability, it is quite likely that the recent overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq has had a psychological impact on the leaders of other Middle Eastern and North African countries. Although Libya has been gradually taking steps to gain worldwide support and end its isolation, the events in Iraq may have provided a final impetus. Libya is aware that the United States is not afraid of taking unilateral actions if its national security is threatened. Iraqi pursuit of WMD was greatly touted by the Bush administration as justification for engaging in military action. If the recent statements of Libyan government officials and academics are to be believed, this awareness may have played a role in leading Qadhdhafi to abandon his WMD programs. He wants to prove that Libya's intentions are pure when it comes to launching Libya's new role as a potential member of the nonproliferation community and by opening the country up for inspections, he has made it clear that Libya wants to do so in a multilateral fashion. From the U.S. perspective recent events provide a great opportunity to test its fledgling relations with Libya and attempt a different approach in matters of WMD and nonproliferation. With its military clearly bogged down in Iraq, the United States is not very likely to intervene militarily in other Arab countries for the foreseeable future. The Bush administration now appears to be placing greater emphasis on diplomacy as a means to resolve proliferation challenges in Iran and North Korea, as well as Libya.
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