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In Post-War Iraq, Placating the Shi'a is Paramount

Iraqi Shi'a demonstrating demanding free elections. [Src: www.aljazeera.net]

Sammy Salama, Kathleen Thompson, and Jennifer Chalmers[*]

January 30, 2004

The United Nations Secretary-General has just announced his intent to dispatch a team of experts to Iraq to explore whether it is possible to hold open elections. This new UN mission to Iraq comes on the heels of week-long mass demonstrations held in most of Iraq by the tens of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a who answered the call of their Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to oppose the Coalition plan to appoint a new provisional government.[1] This presents a serious obstacle to the U.S.-led Coalition in post-Saddam Iraq.

Many leading figures among the Iraqi Shi'a majority reject the current Coalition plan to transfer Iraqi governance to a provisional government, and are demanding direct and open elections to determine the legitimate leadership of Iraq prior to the July 1st deadline. The Coalition has claimed that flaws in the current Iraqi infrastructure seriously hamper the possibility of direct elections, and instead proposed that power be transferred to a selected provisional government by the end of June. This argument has fallen on deaf ears. Iraq's foremost Shi'a cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has issued a fatwa (religious decree) opposing this plan and demanded full and open elections in the absence of an UN-certified finding that supports the Coalition's claims. The following essay will discuss the major Iraqi Shi'a organizations in Iraq and their sources of discontent with the transfer of power plan presented by the U.S.-led Coalition.

Due to its long history of oppression and bitter experience with perceived betrayal the Iraqi Shi'a have a mistrust of Coalition intentions. The support of the Shi'a has the potential to "make or break" any new Iraqi government, and thus it is essential for the occupying forces to understand how this aspect of Shi'i history affects the current political climate.

Shi'ism in Modern Iraq

Although they constitute a majority of the population, the Shi'a of Iraq have long been subjugated by the ruling power, be it the Ottomans, the British, or most recently, the Ba'ath Party. Following the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Shi'a majority will play an integral part in the establishment of a new Iraqi government. At present, there are four predominant Shi'i factions in Iraq: the "Quietists," the al-Sadr faction, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the D'awa Party.[2]

The "Quietists"

The "Quietist" movement evolved under the leadership of Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei in the first few decades of Ba'athist rule. Following al-Khoei's death in 1992, the Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-Sistani assumed control of the movement. Quietism, a long-standing Shi'i tradition, discourages religious clerics from becoming directly involved in politics. According to the Quietists, the clergy may monitor and debate politics, but it should refrain from becoming directly involved in the development of policy. Thus, the Quietist view is a challenge to the ruling elite in Iran, where the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini launched velyat al-faqih, or the rule of the jurisprudent. In fact, Khomeini's establishment of clerical rule is considered anathema to a majority of leading clerics in both Iraq and Iran.[3]

Under the rule of Saddam Hussein, Quietism served as a survival mechanism for a number of Iraqi Shi'a. Their opposition to velyat al-faqih portrayed the Quietists as posing a limited threat to Hussein's regime. Quietists, however, do not necessarily renounce politics completely. With the threat of Ba'athist rule no longer looming over their heads, the Iraqi Shi'a may turn to Sistani, one of the maraji' al-taqlid (sources of emulation), for political guidance. Having been subject to minority rule for so long, Sistani and the Quietists may have found that they must take a more active role in politics, or lose their popular support.[4]

Following the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was helpful to the Coalition's war effort. He adhered to the Quietist tradition and rarely issued political statements. On some occasions al-Sistani has also advocated the separation of religion from the state in post-war Iraq.[5] Moreover, he issued religious decrees asking his Shi'a followers not to resist Coalition troops and not to hinder the Coalition's effort to overthrow the Ba'ath regime. For that, on various occasions al-Sistani was repeatedly praised by American forces.[6] But he is the most vociferous proponent of open elections now.

The al-Sadr Faction

The al-Sadr faction is led by Muqtada al-Sadr, whose father, the popular Sayyid Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr, was assassinated by the Iraqi government in 1999. Another member of the al-Sadr family, the extremely influential Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, was also killed by the government in 1980. Muqtada al-Sadr, young and inexperienced, has relied on his family name to attract followers. The core of the Sadr faction is the Jama'at al-Sadr al-Thani (Association of the Second al-Sadr). Muqtada al-Sadr has used this association as a vehicle to propel himself to fame among the Shi'a of Iraq, primarily in and around Baghdad. The Shi'a dominated area of Baghdad once known as "Saddam City" has been renamed "Sadr City" in honor of the Sadr faction.[7]

Muqtada al-Sadr is known for fostering discord within the Shi'a community, often targeting the Quietists. Following the U.S.-led invasion, al-Sadr declared that al-Sistani and two other prominent clerics, Baqir al-Hakim and Muhammed Ishaq al-Fayyad, should leave Iraq. Following the death of 'Abd-al-Majid al-Khoei in April 2003, rumors circulated that al-Sadr was involved in the murder, though no evidence of this has been brought to light.[8]

Muqtada al-Sadr has targeted a number of leading clerics based on their ethnicity. He is leading a "nativist" campaign to drive clerics of foreign descent out of Iraqi politics. Several prominent Iraqi clerics were actually born elsewhere, such as al-Sistani, who is of Iranian origin. The nativist line touted by al-Sadr eschews Iranian interference in Iraqi Shi'i politics. Should al-Sadr's faction emerge as the dominate Shi'i force in the state, Iraq will pose a serious challenge to Iran's influence over Shi'i Muslims in the region.[9]

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was founded in Tehran in 1982, by then-exiled Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim. SCIRI has received considerable support from the Iranian government, and lingering ties to the Islamic regime could endanger SCIRI's popularity among Iraqis. While al-Hakim created a vast power base for SCIRI, including the 10,000-strong Badr Brigade that followed him from Iran to Iraq in the spring of 2003, he also developed a number of enemies. Much of the animosity directed toward al-Hakim stemmed from his ties to Iran, and his support for Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.[10]

Though some believed that al-Hakim would be to Iraq what Khomeini had been to Iran, al-Hakim adopted a rather moderate stance upon returning to Iraq after 20 years of exile in Iran. Al-Hakim denounced the possibility of a puppet government installed by the United States, but encouraged Iraqi Shi'i to work with the United States in order to develop a new Iraqi government.[11] Also, he began to promote a separation of church and state in the future Iraqi government. Al-Hakim then turned his focus toward more spiritual issues. His brother, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, assumed leadership of SCIRI's political objectives, joining the interim Governing Council.[12]

Under the leadership of Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Hakim, SCIRI developed ties with the United States, despite U.S. reservations about SCIRI's relationship with Iran. SCIRI is also an important part of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), which has received substantial backing from the United States for several years.[13] SCIRI suffered a serious blow when al-Hakim was killed by a car-bomb on August 29, 2003, outside the sacred Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. More than 120 Iraqi Shi'a civilians were killed in the blast, for which no one has claimed responsibility.[14]

Following the assassination of al-Hakim, more than 400,000 Shi'a attended these funeral ceremonies in Najaf in a display of great support and solidarity that highlighted the immense popularity of Baqir al-Hakim and his SCIRI organization. Moreover, the assassination of this popular Shi'i Ayatollah and bombings of the shrine of Ali have driven many Shi'a groups in Iraq to form their own armed militias to defend themselves from threats. SCIRI was among the major organizers of the mass Shi'a demonstrations against the U.S. transfer of power plan, in the cities of Karbala`, Dajil and in the province of Nissan.[15]

The D'awa Party

Founded in 1957 by Sayyid Baqir al-Sadr and his associates, the D'awa (call to Islam) Party predates the other major Shi'i movements in Iraq. The party attacked Saddam Hussein's regime in an effort to establish an Islamic state in Iraq. A vast number of D'awa members suffered at the hands of the regime and consequently the Iraqi Shi'i populace developed a great reverence for the party.[16]

Although it played an active role in the founding of SCIRI in 1982, the D'awa leadership's support for velyat al-faqih led to a rift within the organization. Members opposed to the rule of the clergy and Iranian influence in the D'awa movement broke with the party. Today, there are two main factions behind the D'awa movement. One faction, Islamic D'awa, remains affiliated with SCIRI and maintains a base of power in Iran. The other faction is based in London and promotes a more "Iraqi" character for the movement. The true extent of D'awa's influence in post-Saddam Iraq is still unknown. Thus far, the D'awa leadership has cooperated with the occupation forces, but it may well align itself more closely with the al-Sadr faction should popular opinion continue to turn against the U.S.-led forces.[17]

Iraqi Shi'a Self-Restraint in Post-War Iraq

In the aftermath of the fall of the Ba'ath regime, the long subjugated Iraqi Shi'a majority have shown restraint. Up to this point and contrary to the predictions of many, there have been very few cases of revenge killing by the majority Shi'a against the Sunni minority who brutally ruled Iraq for many decades. Moreover, Iraq's Shi'a majority has shown immense restraint in the face of continuous provocations by Ba'ath regime remnants. The most egregious provocation was the attack on the Shrine of Ali on August 29, 2003, which damaged a part of the holy mosques and killed more than 120 Shi'a, including the head of SCIRI Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim (see Table 1).

Many in and outside Iraq feared the beginning of a campaign of Shi'a revenge killings and possibly a civil war. Yet, for the most part the Iraqi Shi'a have shown high levels of restraint and have not been dragged into a cycle of revenge. A reflection on events at this time shows that heads of SCIRI and other major Iraqi Shi'a groups abstained from full-blown violence so that Coalition rebuilding efforts and the upcoming transfer of power could take place. Many in the Shi'a leadership may have reasoned that revenge killings and civil war would only hamper the Shi'a long-term strategy of supporting free elections in which they would surely win due to numerical majority. However, in the event of a Coalition-appointed provisional government made up of Iraqi expatriates vs. a freely elected government headed by a domestic Shi'a figure, it may be that the Shi'a leadership's motivations for cooperation and restraint could be replaced with animosity and hostility toward the Coalition and the appointed provisional government. In that event, it would not be surprising if Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other influential local Shi'a leaders begin to encourage the Iraqi Shi'a population to reject the Coalition's efforts and plans for post-war Iraq.

Coalition Plan to Transfer Power

The Coalition's plan is somewhat complicated. Local caucuses are to convene in each of Iraq's 18 regional governorates. Each governorate will then elect delegates from their caucus to become part of the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly. By June 30, 2004, this National Assembly is to elect Iraq's leaders from its ranks, who will then assume full sovereignty of the country.[25] If all goes according to plan, Iraq's interim governing council and the Coalition Provisional Authority will be dissolved on that date, thereby ending the UN-specified responsibilities of the Coalition as an occupying power. The plan has some snags, however. First, the Iraqi population has no accurate electoral roll and it is unlikely that the more than 20 million people in the country could be registered in time for the June 30 deadline. Second, direct elections at this stage might give undue representation to Ba'athists, fundamentalist groups, or the Shi'a. Moreover, the United States believes the security situation is currently too volatile to hold free and fair elections - a position UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has agreed with. The June 30, 2004, date is significant. Washington wants to bring the occupation of Iraq to a close as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so, and in the atmosphere of upcoming U.S. presidential elections, George Bush stands to regain the political ground that he has lost as a result of American troop losses and failure to locate WMD in Iraq.[26]

Causes of Iraqi Shi'a Discontent with the Coalition and Plan to Transfer Power

While most of the Iraqi Shi'a and their leaders had been largely supportive of the U.S.-led effort to overthrow the oppressive Ba'ath regime in Iraq, it appears that in the last few months Shi'i support and hope have given way to suspicion and opposition. The root of the current disagreement between the Coalition and the most influential leaders of the Iraqi Shi'a, including al-Sistani, SCIRI,and Sadr, seems to stem from various Shi'a concerns. First and foremost, the majority of the Iraqi Shi'a community wants the Coalition to transfer power to a freely elected government and not a government that is selected by the U.S.-led Coalition by the July 1, 2004 deadline.[27] Many Shi'a leaders justify open elections by pointing out that their community has long been subjugated by a ruling minority (Ottomans, British and the Sunni Ba'athists). Moreover, due to the Shi'a numerical majority, they will surely win the elections and elect a leadership that will grant them the long-awaited control over Iraq. It is important to note that two leading Shi'a figures in Iraq the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the late Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim have adhered to the Shi'i Quietist tradition and have advocated an Iraqi democratic secular state and not an Islamic Republic a la Iran. As al-Hakim told Reuters in May: "We should not make a copy of the Iranian revolution and establish it in Iraq."[28]

Second, in recent weeks al-Sistani and many of his assistants have rejected the possibility of a U.S.-selected government made up primarily of Iraqi expatriates who returned to Iraq following the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime. On January 14, al-Sistani told a meeting of local tribes and clans in the holy city of Najaf: "The authority should be given to you and not to those who came from abroad.... The next council should be made up from the elected sons of the people."[29] Sistani and other Shi'a leaders have stated that any imposed, un-elected transitional government devoid of local representation will not be considered legitimate by the local Iraqi Ayatollahs, who will not adhere to its authority. Hashem al-Awad, a representative of al-Sistani warned: "The sons of the Iraqi people demand a political system based on direct elections and a constitution that realizes justice and equality for everyone... Anything other than that will prompt people to have their own say."[30]

Third, in spite of their tacit support for the overthrow of Saddam's regime, many in the Iraqi Shi'a mistrust U.S. intentions in Iraq. Some of this mistrust is fueled by the Shi'a sense of betrayal by the United States in the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991. Following the liberation of Kuwait, President George Bush Sr. called on the Iraqi people to revolt against the Saddam regime stating: "There's another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and their people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside."[31] However, when the Shi'a and Kurds succeeded in taking control of over 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces and overpowering many of Saddam's forces, the United States allowed Saddam Hussein to deploy helicopter gun ships and crush the rebellion, killing thousands of Shi'a.[32]

Finally, much of Iraqi Shi'a mistrust is fueled by the current administration of various Shi'a areas, including the holy city of Karbala`. According to Dr. Hussein Shahristani Iraq's former leading Nuclear Chemist and founder of a Shi'i relief organization in Karbala', the Coalition has failed to live up to its promise of dealing with former members of the Ba'ath party. Shahristani told "60 Minutes" in December: "The expectations were that the Ba'athists would be immediately arrested and put on trial for their crimes against humanity, for their crimes against the Iraqi people. Now this hasn't happened. And people were alarmed when the Ba'athists were actually reinstated back into the government."[33] Dr. Shahristani indicated that the local Shi'a population is very concerned with this turn of events and the fact that various local Shi'a figures who spoke against this governing arrangement were arrested by the Coalition forces. He added, "People feel vulnerable."[34]

In the last few weeks various moderate Iraqi Shi'a leaders have expressed distrust of the Coalition's intentions. On January 7, Al-Sistani stated: "the (occupation) authorities are not entitled to name the members of the assembly charged with drafting the constitution.... There is no guarantee that such a convention will draft a constitution upholding the Iraqi people's interest and expressing their national identity."[35] By mid-January, Sheikh Abdul Mahdi, Ayatollah al-Sistani's local representative in the Shi'a holy city of Karbala` warned during Friday prayers: "In next few days, we will see protests, strikes and many clashes with the occupation troops if they insist on their colonialist scheme and on designing Iraq's policy according to their own interests."[36] Shi'a disenchantment and agitation with Coalition plans culminated in a letter from Iraq's second most senior Shi'a cleric, Hojat al-Islam Ali Abd al-Hakim al-Safi, to President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. The letter calls into question their sincerity in transferring power to an Iraqi provisional government and warns the Coalition leaders that, if they deny Iraqis the ability to choose their leaders, the United States and England will face an unwinnable war. Mr. al-Safi expressed distrust of the Coalition's claims of logistical difficulties, stating that it was simply a pretext to deny the Iraqi people their legitimate aspirations.[37] The current powder keg situation may ignite into outright opposition between the Shi'a and Coalition forces if the Coalition selects a provisional government and denies the Shi'a free elections. As summed up by Dr. Hussein Shahristani, "If that process doesn't happen, god only knows what will be the consequences of such a move."[38]

A Possible Way Out - Enlisting the United Nations

A possible way to defuse the currently brewing crisis between the Coalition and the leadership of the Iraqi Shi'a is to proactively enlist the help of the United Nations. On more than one occasion, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other Iraqi Shi'a leaders have agreed to give the Coalition more time to set up the necessary institutions and infrastructure to conduct free elections at a later date, possibly by 2005, if an official, unbiased UN survey shows that Iraq currently lacks the potential to hold open, free elections. In the last few days, Paul Bremer and members of the Coalition-appointed Iraqi Governing Council were in the midst of negotiating such an effort with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. As a result, Kofi Annan has just announced that he will send an international team of experts to asses the feasibility of holding Iraqi free elections prior to the July 1, 2004 deadline.[39] If the UN team concurs with the Coalition's assessment, it is likely that such international, legitimized finding will encourage Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his followers to moderate their demands. During the Friday prayers on January 23, 2004, al-Sistani urged his Shi'a followers to halt mass protests against the current plan until the UN Secretary-General rules on the possibility of direct elections, after which the Grand Ayatollah will address his followers.[40] This is a positive development that gives the Coalition much needed breathing room.

Learning from Israel's Mistakes in Shi'i Southern Lebanon

In the immediate aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982, initial Lebanese Shi'a reactions were mostly encouraging to the Israelis. The majority of the Lebanese Shi'a wanted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and their forces removed from their areas; they were mostly indifferent to the Israeli presence in Southern Lebanon. However, all that changed within a year. Misguided Israeli policies resulted in the death of many Lebanese Shi'a. On October 16, 1983, an Israeli Army convoy tactlessly interrupted the Ashura ceremonies in Nabatiya that were attended by 50,000 Lebanese Shi'a to commemorate and mourn the Martyrdom of Imam Husayn Bin Ali.[41] The following day, Sheikh Mehdi Shamseddin, the head of Beirut's Higher Shi'a Council, issued a fatwa (religious decree) calling for "civil resistance" against Israeli forces. Similar calls were soon issued by other Lebanese Shi'a leaders.[42] These events marked the beginning of the end of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, an umbrella organization called the Lebanese National Resistance (LNR) was formed and became dominated by AMAL. In the following years, AMAL and other militant Shi'i militias (the Lebanese Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah) entered and dominated the Lebanese civil war, which up to that point was mainly fought among the Christian Phalanges, Sunni, and Palestinian militias.

While reflecting on this troubling new situation in Lebanon, former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's remarked, "We have let the Shi'a genie out of the bottle." In the next three years, militant Shi'i militias became the most formidable force in the Lebanese civil war. These groups re-invented and perfected the notion of martyrdom and the tactic of suicide bombings. AMAL, and Lebanese Islamic Jihad militias killed more than 600 Israeli soldiers and 241 U.S. marines.[43] Following the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon, Shi'a militants overwhelmed the Christian Phalanges and on June 10, 1985, forced the Israeli Army to withdraw from most of Lebanon. Continued guerilla resistance by Hizbullah against the Israeli Defense Forces in the next 15 years resulted in Israel's complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, after which Hizbullah decimated the Israeli-sponsored South Lebanon Army.

The U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq would do well to learn from Israel's mistakes in South Lebanon. Failure to placate the 14 million Iraqi Shi'a by attempting to impose an un-elected outsider government in Iraq may very well result in an open conflict between the Coalition and the Shi'a population. Such a conflict has the potential to deteriorate into a Beirut-style cycle of violence that results in the death of many thousands. One cannot overstate the apparent danger in a policy that would alienate the Iraqi Shi'a, who constitute more than 60% of the Iraqi population. Most insurgent attacks against Coalition targets that claimed the lives of hundreds of Coalition forces have come from the Sunni triangle, which accounts for only 15% of the Iraqi population. An armed Shi'a uprising as in South Lebanon has the potential of turning Iraq into a truly ungovernable quagmire. The Coalition will do well to heed Prime Minister Rabin's advice and not let the "Shi'a genie out of the bottle" again.

Conclusion

With the ongoing U.S.-led occupation and nation-building effort in Iraq, the Coalition may be running into a potential conflict with the Iraqi Shi'a population over plans to hand over control to a provisional government. Last week's mass demonstrations in Baghdad and Southern Iraq have brought to light the concerns of Iraq's Shi'a majority. These demonstrations have also revealed the formidable power that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his followers possess among the Iraqi Shi'a community. Shortly after al-Sistani issued his fatwa opposing the Coalition plan, the streets of Baghdad, Basra, Karbala` and many other Iraqi cities and towns were filled with tens of thousands of peaceful Iraqi Shi'a demonstrators who condemned the Coalition plan and demanded free elections.

Currently post-war Iraq is still unstable; in the last few weeks a report was given to the Pentagon indicating that there is a strong possibility of a civil war breaking out.[44] In such a tense situation, understanding the concerns of the Iraqi Shi'a leadership and opting to address them by reaching out to the long victimized Shi'a population of Iraq might be the difference between success and failure in rebuilding Iraq. If the United States and the Iraqi Governing Council are unable to find a way to placate Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his many Shi'a followers there is a possibility that a cycle of violence may break out among Coalition troops and some of the Shi'a militias. If and when that happens, the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq will become a much more difficult undertaking and may deteriorate to Lebanon-style violence. In post-war Iraq, enhancing the American - Iraqi Shi'a peace is paramount.

NOTES:

[*] This article is drawn in part from Sammy Salama and Kathleen Thompson, "Islam, Shi'a and Sunna: The history of the Shi'a breakaway and consequences on current times," in Richard Pilch (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense (Wiley Publications: forthcoming).

[1] Shi'a in Arabic is the name of the Shi'a branch of Islam. It is also a plural of Shi'i, meaning a community of people who practice the Shi'a faith. In the Seventh Century this community was called Shi'at Ali (Partisans of Ali) for their support of Ali Ibn Abi Taleb the first cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and the fourth Khalifa. At a later time, their name was shortened to Shi'a. A Shi'i in Arabic is a single person or group who believe in the Shi'a branch of Islam.
[2] Graham E. Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 108 (August 2003), <http://www.usip.org>.
[3] Ibid., p. 4.
[4] Ibid., p. 4.
[5] 'The Rising Voice of Iraq's Shias." BBC NEWS, January 16, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[6] "Iraq Cleric Condemns US Plans," BBC NEWS, January 7, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[7] Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein," p. 4.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., p. 5.
[10] Ibid.
[11] "Al-Hakim Had Called for Iraqi Unity," CNN.com, August 29, 2003, <http://us.cnn.com/>.
[12] Valentinas Mite, "Iraq: SCIRI Head Killed in Al-Najaf," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, August 29, 2003, <http://www.rferl.org/>.
[13] Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein," p. 5.
[14] Mite, "Iraq: SCIRI Head Killed in Al-Najaf."
[15] "Sistani Calls for Halt of Protests," Dar Alhayat, January 23, 2003, <http://www.daralhayat.com>.
[16] Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein," p. 5-6.
[17] Ibid., p. 6.
[18] "US Shocked at Iraq Hotel Attack," BBC NEWS, October 26, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[19] Ibid.
[20] "Shi'a Cleric 'Escapes Assassination,'' BBC NEWS, September 3, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[21] "Baghdad Police Station Bombed." BBC NEWS, October 9, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[22] "Sistani Representative Injured in Karbala," Dar Alhayat, October 30, 2003, <http://www.daralhayat.com>.
[23] "Iraq Blast Hits Main Shi'a Group." BBC NEWS, December 19, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[24] "Five Dead in Iraq Mosque Blast." BBC NEWS, January 9, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[25] "Sovereignty Timetable." Coalition Provisional Authority, November 15, 2003, <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/>.
[26] "Q&A: Handing Over Power in Iraq." BBC NEWS, January 27, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[27] "Iraqis Protest at Handover Plan." BBC NEWS, January 19, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[28] Valentinas, "Iraq: SCIRI Head Killed in Al-Najaf."
[29] "Sistani's New Slogan: No Authority to Those Who Came from Abroad," Dar Alhayat, January 15, 2004, <http://www.daralhayat.com>.
[30] "Iraqis Protest at Handover Plan," BBC NEWS, January 19, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[31] "The Ayatollah al-Hakim," CBS NEWS, August 29, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/>.
[32] Ibid.
[33] "Operation Iraqi Freedom," CBS NEWS, December 4, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/>.
[34] Ibid.
[35] "Iraq Cleric Condemns US plans, BBC NEWS, January 7, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[36] "US downplays rift with Iraq Shia," BBC NEWS, January 16, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[37] "Election Plan for Iraq Attacked," BBC NEWS, January 16, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/>.
[38] "Operation Iraqi Freedom." CBS NEWS, December 4, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/.
[39] "UN to Send Mission to Iraq to Decide on Elections." AFP, January 27, 2004, <http://www.afp.com/>.
[40] "Sistani Calls for on His Followers to Halt Protests Against the Occupation," Al Jazeera, January 23, 2004, <http://www.aljazeera.net/>.
[41] Hala Jaber, Hezbollah Born With a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 18.
[42] Ibid. p 19.
[43] Sammy Salama and Kathleen Thompson, "The Historical Roots of Current Terrorist Tactics and Methods," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 21, 2003, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/031121.htm>.
[44] "David Kay: Exclusive Interview." NBC NEWS, January 26, 2004. <http://msnbc.msn.com/>.

CNS Experts on Iraq:

• Anjali Bhattacharjee | Bio
  Research Associate, CBWNP
  anjali.bhattacharjee@miis.edu

• Sammy Salama | Bio
  Research Associate, PRAP
  sammy.salama@miis.edu