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CNS Research StoryPossible Suspects and Motives for the Suicide Bombings In Iraq
By Sammy Salama March 30, 2004
A number of coalition and Iraqi officials have blamed various actors for the wave of recent suicide bombings attacks that have plagued Iraq. Some have pointed the finger at the alleged al-Qa'ida affiliate Abu Musab al Zarqawi and his network of foreign Jihadis that have allegedly infiltrated Iraq with aspirations of starting a civil war to hinder the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Others have argued that this is the work of former regime remnants who are attempting to hinder Iraq's transition following the fall of the Saddam regime. This report explores the possible suspects and motivations behind the current wave of suicide bombings attacks in Iraq. Is Abu Musab al Zarqawi behind the Bombings? Various Coalition officials have declared that Abu Musab al Zarqawi is the main culprit behind the wave of suicide attacks; they claim that much of the intelligence points to him. U.S. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt named Zarqawi as "one of the chief suspects."[1] Members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) have also supported this assertion -- in the immediate aftermath of the Ashura attacks in Karbala` and Baghdad, Mowaffaq al-Rubaie a member of the Iraqi Governing Council stated: "the civil war and sectarian strife that Zarqawi wants to inflict on the people of Iraq will not succeed."[2] According to the Coalition and IGC, the evidence against Zarqawi is mounting. They claim that Hasan Ghul, a known Pakistani al-Qa'ida courier, was captured by the Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq carrying a 17-page letter from Abu Musab al Zarqawi to al-Qa'ida that details Zarqawi's current operations in Iraq, in which he details a plan to spark a civil war by targeting Shi'a religious targets in the hope that such attacks will drag the Shi'a into the fighting.[3] According to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which published the text of the alleged Zarqawi letter on its website, the current wave of suicide bombing attacks in Iraq follows the scenario outlined in the alleged Zarqawi letter and thus proves Zarqawi's and, by extension, al-Qa'ida's complicity in the attacks in Iraq.[4] As a result, Coalition authorities have offered a $10 million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of Zarqawi.[5] The 38-year old Jordanian militant Abu Musab al Zarqawi was also mentioned in Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation in front of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in February 2003, in which he highlighted the Iraqi threat and the need for military action against Iraq. At that time, Colin Powell told the UNSC that Abu Musab al Zarqawi was an active and known al-Qa'ida associate who sought medical treatment in Baghdad in May 2002.[6] What Is the Composition of the al Zarqawi Network in Iraq? In the letter that was seized with the alleged Pakistani al-Qa'ida courier Hasan Ghul, Abu Musab al Zarqawi describes to the recipient of the letter the makeup of his network in Iraq. He says that his network consists mainly of Iraqi Sunnis who have little experience in insurgency operations, a problem he will remedy through training. As he states, they "are the quintessence of the Sunnis and the good sap of this country. In general, they belong to the Sunni doctrine and naturally to the Salafi creed.... Most of them have little expertise or experience, especially in organized collective work.... Most of the groups are working in isolation, with no political horizon, farsightedness .... But matters are still in their initial stages."[7] Equally important, Zarqawi claims in his letter that the number of foreign fighters who infiltrated Iraq and are helping his network to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq is rather small. Referring to these "Immigrant Mujahidin," Zarqawi indicates that "their numbers continue to be negligible as compared to the enormity of the expected battle."[8] Why Are the Insurgents Specifically Targeting the Iraqi Shi'a? If the text of the Zarqawi letter is indeed authentic, it is abundantly clear about its goals and methods. Zarqawi claims that his objective is to hinder the U.S. occupation of Iraq and to motivate the majority of the Iraqi Sunna to join the ranks of Islamist organizations. He believes the way to accomplish both these goals is to collectively target the Shi'a institutions and leadership in an effort to drag the Iraqi Shi'a majority into a civil war. A civil war would make Iraq ungovernable to the Americans and would scare the Iraqi Sunnis into the arms of his radical fundamentalist Mujahidin network. According to the text of the Zarqawi letter: The only solution is for us to strike the religious, military, and other cadres among the Shi`a with blow after blow until they bend to the Sunnis. Someone may say that, in this matter, we are being hasty and rash and leading the [Islamic] nation into a battle for which it is not ready, [a battle] that will be revolting and in which blood will be spilled. This is exactly what we want, since right and wrong no longer have any place in our current situation.... If we are able to strike them with one painful blow after another until they enter the battle, we will be able to [re]shuffle the cards. Then, no value or influence will remain to the Governing Council or even to the Americans, who will enter a second battle with the Shi`a. This is what we want, and, whether they like it or not, many Sunni areas will stand with the Mujahidin. Then, the Mujahidin will have assured themselves land from which to set forth in striking the Shi`a in their heartland, along with a clear media orientation and the creation of strategic depth and reach among the brothers outside [Iraq] and the Mujahidin within.... As for the Shi`a, we will hurt them, God willing, through martyrdom operations and car bombs...along with the anticipated incitement of the wrath of the people against the Americans, who brought destruction and were the reason for this miasma.[9] Abu Musab al Zarqawi has claimed credit for carrying out more than 25 attacks against Coalition and Shi'a targets including the killing of the Shi'a Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim in the Najaf bombing of August 2003. As it pertains to attacks against the Shi'a, the situation on the ground most definitely affirms the scenario portrayed in the Zarqawi letter. Since the fall of the Saddam regime, Shi'a holy sites, neighborhoods, and political leaders have been targeted extensively by the current insurgency forces in Iraq (see Table 1).[10] However, that does not exclude that attacks on the Shi'a may also be the work of the secular Ba'ath remnants. In the past three decades, Saddam's regime killed tens of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a and executed and tortured many of the Shi'a political leaders. There is no reason to believe that regime remnants will not attack Shi'a targets in post-war Iraq.
What Are the Possible Results of Continued Suicide Bombings against Iraqi Shi'a Targets? Currently post-war Iraq is unstable; in the last few weeks, a report was given to the Pentagon indicating that there is a strong possibility of a civil war breaking out.[11] Up to this point and despite numerous attacks on Shi'a holy sites, the Iraqi Shi'a leadership has shown immense restraint; however, as more of these attacks are perpetrated against Shi'a targets, the Shi'a leadership, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, will be under increased pressure from his Shi'a constituents to form Shi'a armed militias and to retaliate for these murders. Such vociferous calls from members of the Iraqi Shi'a community have already started.[12] If the United States and the Iraqi Governing Council are unable to find a way to convince Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his many Shi'a followers to continue to show restraint and work on building a stronger unified Iraq there is a possibility that some Shi'a elements will seek revenge against whomever they perceive to be directly responsible. There is also the possibility that some Shi'a elements will begin to target Coalition personnel whom they may view as indirectly responsible for the harm visited on their holy shrines. As long as these terror attacks continue, Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority must go the extra mile to placate Sistani by addressing his concerns and providing the Shi'a with the necessary tools to better defend their holy sites. The CPA has released $100,000 to aid the victims of the Ashura bombings.[13] This is a good first step in placating the Iraqi Shi'a, and it encourages their restraint. In this delicate period, enhancing the restraint of the long victimized Iraqi Shi'a majority is paramount. Fortunately the United States is not alone in this task. Following the Ashura bombing, there have been unanimous regional condemnations of these criminal attacks on holy sites in Karbala. More so, all the important regional actors, including the governments of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and even regional militant organizations such as Hizbullah have all called on Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the Iraqi Shi'a to show restraint, maintain Iraq's national unity, and to avoid being dragged into a civil war that would exact a terrible toll on Iraqi society.[14] Hizbullah's Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, during Ashura ceremonies in South Lebanon, called on both Sunni and Shi'i Muslims to reject actions that target all Muslims as a whole, and warned against delving into the turmoil and civil war that the perpetrators are attempting to foment. He added that such a civil war would give the United States a pretense to stay in Iraq. He called the perpetrators of these attacks "a group of dark, stonehearted, living in the middle ages, mindless, heartless, religion-less, radicals without manners, who claim to belong to Islam."[15] Is Abu Musab al Zarqawi a Subordinate of al-Qa'ida? There is a lot of contradictory information on whether Abu Musab al Zarqawi is a subordinate of al-Qaida. Some in the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition claim that Abu Musab al Zarqawi is an al-Qa'ida associate who works at the behest of Osama Bin Laden. Various U.S. officials, including Paul Bremer, have stated that Zarqawi is connected to the Kurdish Islamist organization, Ansar al-Islam, or its subset Jaish Ansar al-Sunna that is connected to al-Qa'ida.[16] This view is supported by the characteristics of the attacks in Iraq. The attacks in Iraq have unmistakably been carried out by a group of professionals who have been able to undertake multiple attacks simultaneously -- the trademark of a sophisticated terror organization such as al-Qa'ida. In addition, the March 2 Ashura bombings in Iraq were paralleled by attacks on a Shi'a shrine in Quita, Pakistan which resulted in the death of 44 Pakistani Shi'a.[17] If these attacks are indeed related, this coordination of attacks in more than one country is the hallmark of al-Qa'ida, which previously attacked U.S. embassies simultaneously in Kenya and Tanzania. This view, however, is not unanimous. Some European intelligence analysts claim that al Zarqawi is actually a competitor to Osama Bin Laden.[18] While they were both prominent members of the Afghani Arabs Mujahidin in the 1980s, some contend that Abu Musab al Zarqawi attempted to head his own independent terrorist outfit called al Tawhid. In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Zarqawi returned to his homeland of Jordan, but was imprisoned for seven years for conspiring to overthrow the Hashimite monarchy. It is believed that upon his release, Zarqawi fled to Europe, where he headed a militant cell of Jordanians who did not want to join al-Qa'ida.[19] The letter seized by Hassan Ghul portrays a complex relationship between Abu Musab al Zarqawi and al-Qa'ida. The text of the Zarqawi letter gives the impression that Zarqawi is not a subordinate of al-Qa'ida. It appears that he operates an independent terror outfit as he writes in his letter to al-Qa'ida: "You, gracious brothers, are the leaders, guides, and symbolic figures of jihad and battle. We do not see ourselves as fit to challenge you, and we have never striven to achieve glory for ourselves."[20] Furthermore, it
appears that Zarqawi is attempting to solicit al-Qa'ida's help and
support, and is offering the services of his organization in the global battle
against the United States and the Iraqi Shi'a who are cooperating
with the Coalition. He adds:
In the last few months, there has been a great deal of contradictory information regarding the role of Abu Musab al Zarqawi and his whereabouts. Some have alleged that Zarqawi was being harbored in Iran with other al-Qa'ida personnel including Osama Bin Laden's son Saad.[23] In a conflicting report, a statement circulated in Fallujah in early March by Iraqi militants claiming to belong to the "Leadership of the Allahu Akbar Mujahedeen" group stated that Abu Musab al Zarqawi was killed some time ago during the U.S. bombings of Ansar al Islam's strongholds in the Sulaimaniyah Mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan.[24] The group stated that Zarqawi's injury and artificial leg prevented him from escaping the bombings. The "Leadership of the Allahu Akbar Mujahedeen" also alleged that al-Qa'ida is not present in Iraq, and that the text of the 17-page "Zarqawi letter" to al-Qa'ida is a forgery fabricated by the Coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council "to back up their theory of civil war."[25] Time will tell if any of these conflicting reports are accurate. Are Regime Remnants Carrying out the Suicide Bombing Attacks? Current suicide attacks on civilian targets in Iraq may also be the work of domestic Iraqi Fida`iyin and remnants of the Ba'ath regime. This theory contradicts conventional wisdom that leads many to believe that such suicide bombings are consistent with the modus operandi of fundamentalist Jihadis and not the work of secular nationalist, but immediately following the onset of the war various Iraqi men and women carried out suicide bombings against U.S. forces on behalf of the regime. On various occasions in the first few weeks of the war, numerous Iraqis got close enough to Coalition Forces to detonate explosive-laden vehicles and kill U.S. soldiers. Also, on their way to Baghdad, many coalition vehicles were ambushed by members of Fida`iyin Saddam, who attacked them with reckless abandon using RPG's, mortars, and rifles. As a result, many hundreds of these Fida`iyin Saddam were killed by Coalition Forces on the road to Baghdad. It is quite possible that after the fall of Baghdad many of these elements expanded their tactics to include the suicide vests and car bombs that have been the culprits in the recent attacks on Iraqi Shi'a and Kurdish targets. Relevant History of Recent Iraqi Martyrdom Methods It appears that in spite of the secular nature of the Ba'ath regime -- a staunch opponent and oppressor of organized religion in Iraq -- since the invasion of Kuwait, the Iraqi military and intelligence apparatus may have planned to instill a secular patriotic Iraqi version of the martyrdom concept among its forces. Months after the occupation of Kuwait, when a looming military coalition campaign aimed at liberating Kuwait became evident, the Iraqi security and intelligence apparatus was in the process of creating a new force called the Fida`iyin (a secular Arabic term meaning "those who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause"). Internal Iraqi correspondence from December 1990 reveals that the regime of Saddam Hussein embarked on a search for volunteers from the ranks of the Iraqi military and civilians to create a volunteer force of Fida`iyin. The Iraqis planned to deploy this force behind enemy lines to carry out special suicide operations by sabotaging Coalition equipment and killing Coalition personnel. As this memo from a Third Corps Brigadier General indicated: December 17th 1990
Please do what
is necessary and provide us with whoever volunteers to work as a Fida-i,
so we can get an answer within 72 hours.
In addition, other recovered Iraqi correspondence from the 1991 Gulf War suggested that concepts of martyrdom and sacrificing one's life in defense of the Iraqi motherland in the face of U.S. "aggression and colonialism" were instilled by the Iraqi regime and designated as the ultimate demonstration of a soldier's patriotism and duty. As an example, the following classified Iraqi internal correspondence in February 1991 from an AMN (General Security) Captain at the 18th Field Engineering Battalions to a subordinate Lieutenant ended with the following words: Victory is ours because up until now we have done what God has promised, up until now the new colonialism and aggression on Iraq aims at our present and our future as Iraqis. Their goals will not be achieved, the land of the motherland will remain pure, the flag of Iraq will continue to fly, and the people of Iraq will remain full of joy and happiness. The great victory is at hand, we are all sacrifices for the great Iraq, no life without dignity; no life without the motherland, there is nothing more beautiful than martyrdom for you Iraq.[27] Are Regime Remnants Cooperating With Islamist Jihadis? Due to its ultra secular orientation, the Iraqi Socialist Ba'ath regime has consistently seen organized religious fundamentalist organizations as the prime threat to its rule in Baghdad. In its internal correspondence prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi regime classified its various enemies on a list of its most significant security threats. The following Istikhbarat (Military Intelligence) memo clarifies the order of these threats as indicated by Saddam Hussein to his security staff; it ranks religious movements as the premier security threat to the Iraqi state: From Istikhbarat at Air force and Air defense Command regarding Security Action Plan for 1990. Military Security Threats The military security is facing a combination of threats from foreign and domestic sources. It comes from states, parties and political movements as follows:
However, Coalition officials argue that,
driven by desperation, some elements of the former Iraqi Ba'ath regime are
creating their own insurgent cells and loosely cooperating with the foreign
Jihadi elements. In testimony in front of the House Armed Services Committee,
General John Abizaid the Commander of U.S. forces in Iraq stated, "we also
have intelligence that shows some linkages between Zarqawi and former regime
elements, particularly the Iraqi intelligence
services."[30]
Who Is Carrying out the Suicide Bombing Attacks in Iraq?
In the case of Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza have worked inside Israeli cities since the onset of Israeli occupation in 1967. Most of these Palestinians are employed as cheap labor in Israeli restaurants, gas stations, hotels, farms, construction companies, factories, and hospitals. They have utilized Israeli public buses and taxis as their major source of transportation. Thus, thousands of Palestinians are intimately familiar with the locations of various would-be targets within Israeli cities and are proficient in getting around within Israel. Integral parts of the Palestinian population are also intimately familiar with the language and mannerisms within Israel. The vast majority of Palestinian bombers are residents of the occupied territories, with the possible exception of very few foreigners such as Asif Hanif, the English suicide bomber who carried out the Tel Aviv bombing in April 2003 on behalf of Hamas, killing three Israelis and wounding 55 more.[34] Many of the Palestinian suicide bombers who operated in Israel were disguised as Israeli soldiers or Hasidic Jews. When taking all these trends into account, it becomes clear that acquiring a target for a suicide bombing is not an easy task, even when chosen randomly. A bomber must have intimate familiarity with the society which it seeks to target. The bomber must speak the native language and dialect and be familiar with the location of targets in order to successfully navigate within a city and acquire a suitable, if not specific, target. Even in Israel, where the targets are often random restaurants or buses in Tel Aviv or Haifa, the bombers needed to make their way through various Israeli population centers without raising suspicion until they acquired the target. Security services in Middle Eastern nations routinely employ racial and ethnic profiling, and perpetrators who are not able to efficiently assimilate within the target societies are more easily identified and engaged. In light of this information, the theory that suicide bombings in Iraq are exclusively the work of foreign Jihadi infiltrators does not hold water. It goes against common sense to believe that a large group of non-Iraqis who are not proficient in Iraq's colloquial Arabic dialect, customs, traditions and mannerisms and, most importantly, not familiar with Iraqi cities and towns, are somehow able to move around through major Iraqi cities and identify specific targets within these cities, and carry out dozens of suicide bombings. It would be a challenge for a non-Iraqi who is not fluent in Iraqi dialect to move freely under the watchful eye of the Coalition Forces, the Iraqi Police, and the naturally suspicious and territorial sectarian militias such as the Kurdish Pesh Merga and the Shi'a Badr Brigades who have been patrolling and guarding Iraqi Shi'a and Kurdish targets in anticipation of such acts. Such a scenario of foreign fighters targeting sectarian Iraqi facilities would have been more likely during the early suicide attacks in Najaf in August 2003, but since then the local population and security services have been much more vigilant in looking for outsiders. A more likely scenario is that many of the actual martyrs are young Iraqi men who are intimately familiar with the location of these targets within Iraqi cities and who can enter a Shi'a Mosque or Kurdish building without raising alarm. It would take a non-Iraqi much more than few weeks or months to learn to master the Iraqi dialect, mannerism, look, customs and, most importantly, the location of specific Shi'a or Kurdish targets within a relatively big city such as Baghdad, Basra, or Karbala`. In short, it may have been relatively easy for foreign infiltrators to carry out some early suicide bombings, but it is extremely difficult for a non-native group to sustain a seven-month effort of more than 40 suicide bombings on random and select specific targets without extensive aid and involvement by local Iraqi elements.[35] Simply put, whether the suicide bombings are being organized by the Zarqawi's Islamist network, remnants of the Iraqi intelligence services or a combination of both, it is quite clear that some Iraqi elements are playing an integral role in the planning, dispatching and the execution of suicide bombings in Iraq. To a large extent Iraqi suicide bombings are the work of domestic forces. Conclusion The current suicide bombings in Iraq could be
the work of various actors. They might be carried out by the Zarqawi terror
outfit, which claims to have conducted more than 25 attacks. The attacks might
also be the work of Saddam loyalists or former members of the Iraqi security and
intelligence apparatus. While it is unclear who is ultimately behind them, it is
very likely that local Iraqis play a major role in the organization and
execution of these suicide bombings on various Shi'a, Kurdish, and
Coalition targets, be it for the sake of Zarqawi and his holy Jihad, the old
regime, or for Iraqi nationalism and the removal of foreign troops. All of these
actors have one thing in common; they all want to turn Iraq into an ungovernable
turmoil with the ultimate goal of driving the United States and the Coalition
out of Iraq.
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