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IAEA Board Gives Iran Yet Another Chance

Bushehr, Iran Satellite Photo [Src: Space Imaging]

Jean du Preez and María Lorenzo Sobrado

September 27, 2004

Despite repeated, strenuous attempts, the United States could not convince the IAEA Board of Governors to establish an October 31 deadline to report Iran to the Security Council for violating its nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. Instead the Board adopted on September 18, a strongly worded resolution closely resembling a draft sponsored by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom demanding that Iran fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to allow the Agency to understand the full extent and nature of Iran's enrichment program. The Agency intends to take all steps within its power to clarify the outstanding issues (identified in the Agency's September report[1]) before the Board's next meeting in November.

The "outstanding issues" include the sources of, and reasons for, enriched uranium contamination, and Iran's import, manufacture, and use of centrifuges. The Board also expressed its deep regret that Iran reversed its decision to voluntarily suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities, and again urged Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement. The voluntary suspension and Iran's undertaking to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol were part of an eleventh hour deal with the three European powers just prior to the November 2003 Board meeting that allowed Iran to avoid tougher action by the Board at that stage. Earlier the Board had set an October 31, 2003 deadline by which Iran had to provide information on its past and present nuclear activities.

The fact that the United States was not represented by its Vienna-based diplomats, but by Under-Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Bolton and one of his strongest supporters, Ambassador Jackie Sanders (the Geneva-based U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament), indicated the U.S. plan to steamroll over any resistance to a stronger resolution against Iran. However, the U.S. arguments failed to convince the Board that the latest report contains enough evidence to bring Iran before the Security Council.

In the absence of a deadline, the Board's decision whether or not to take further action at its November meeting leaves open for interpretation what steps may be considered should Iran not meet the demands set in the resolution. Unlike the November 2003 resolution,[2] the latest resolution does not contain a reference to the IAEA statute -- something that the United States had insisted upon in an earlier draft. The linkage between the statute and Iran's safeguards agreement in the November 2003 resolution was intended as a "trigger" to force the issue to the UN Security Council should Iran not undertake and complete "all necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis, to sustain full cooperation with the Agency."[3] Thus, the November 2003 resolution was far stronger than the most recent resolution. In 2003, many believed that any failure by Iran to cooperate with the Agency by March 2004 would enable the Board to refer the matter to the Security Council for further action. However, Iran managed to avoid being found in contempt of its obligations through cunning diplomacy and good timing, and it continues to play a dangerous cat-and-mouse game with the Agency and the Board.

U.S. Ambassador Sanders statement that the latest resolution "sends an unmistakable signal to Iran that continuing its nuclear weapons program will bring it inevitably before the (UN) Security Council"[4] may prove to be a hollow threat. The strategists in Tehran may have a few more aces up their sleeves. However, since they are quickly running out of options, playing a continued brinkmanship game with the Agency may result in friendlier members of the Board, including those from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), losing their patience with Iran and eventually agreeing to refer the matter to the Security Council.

The latest resolution leaves open "further steps" in relation to Iran's obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement. Significantly, the Board did not ask the Agency to prepare just another report -- as has been its standard practice -- but instead requested that the Agency report by November 2004 on the implementation of the resolution and on Iran's response to requests made by the Board in previous resolutions, especially the ones relating to full suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Furthermore, the Board called for an unprecedented review ("recapitulation") of the Agency's findings on the Iranian nuclear program since September 2002, further leaving the impression that it is reaching the end of its patience with Iran.

The European Board members clearly favored a tough reaction by the Board to Iran's continued failures to provide sufficient cooperation, but their approach -- in contrast to that of the United States -- was to ensure that the Board maintains unanimity. The U.S. government seems to have decided prior to the Board meeting to push the issue to the limit, and to pressure the Board to refer the matter to the Security Council, even at the expense of consensus. Aggravating matters, Mr. Bolton declared in Jerusalem soon before the Board meeting started that Washington "would not rule out an attack if peaceful diplomacy failed to stop Iran getting atomic weapons," a statement likely reacting to opposition from the European states. He added, "it is by no means inevitable that the Security Council has to impose economic sanctions or take other steps, that's why this really lies in Iran's hands."[5]

In addition to setting a negative tone for the Board meeting, Mr. Bolton and his team proposed changes to the European draft that were not only too strong for their European allies, but showed obvious disregard for the concerns of other states such as China and those from the NAM. The U.S. proposals would have forced the resolution to a vote. Despite an earlier agreement on the draft, Mr. Bolton's team demanded the inclusion of an October 31 deadline, and that further steps should be considered under the provisions of the IAEA statute (i.e., the potential for Security Council action). The United States also demanded that two essential paragraphs be removed from the draft. These paragraphs (i) "recognized the right of states to the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes"[6] and (ii) expressed appreciation for the "professional and impartial efforts by the Director-General and the Secretariat to implement Iran's NPT safeguards ... as well as to verify Iran's suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities ...."[7] The deletion of one or both these paragraphs would likely have resulted in the NAM members, possibly supported by China, abstaining on the resolution, placing any future action based on the resolution in jeopardy.

The demand to delete the paragraph on the IAEA's role leaves the impression that the United States may be frustrated with how Dr. ElBaradei and the Agency have dealt with Iran. Dr. ElBaradei was instrumental in arguing against setting any deadline and stating several times that the Agency has not discovered any proof that Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

The U.S. demand to delete the paragraph recognizing the right of states to develop and apply atomic energy for peaceful purposes -- introduced by the NAM at the June 2004 Board meeting -- is another example of how the United States continues to deny one of the most essential bargains in the NPT. The majority of states agreed not to pursue nuclear weapons in return for a promise that all NPT parties will have an "inalienable right" to peaceful nuclear energy provided they comply with the NPT nonproliferation obligations.[8] This bargain was sugarcoated by a "good faith" promise by those with nuclear weapons to disarm.[9] The demand to delete this language is in line with the Bush administration's strategy to internationally prohibit any further nuclear fuel development.

However, Iran's insistence that the right to nuclear energy is enshrined in the NPT fails to recognize the nature of the NPT bargain, as this is not an unchecked right. It places a special responsibility on each state exercising this right to declare enrichment activities pursuant to their IAEA safeguards agreement, and to allow the Agency unfettered access to verify the correctness of these declarations -- something which Iran has failed to do so far. In response to threats of a forced halt of enrichment activities, Tehran has hinted that it may take the issue to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.[10]

The United States and leading European Board members finally reached a compromise by retaining the two paragraphs and not including a reference to a deadline; overall the wording of the resolution was strengthened. The deadline disagreement was resolved by emphasizing that the outstanding issues should be clarified before the Board's November 25 meeting. In the second operative paragraph, the wording was further strengthened by stating that the Board considered "it necessary that Iran immediately suspend all enrichment activities." Since this suspension must be verified by the Agency, and will be included in the reports to be submitted to the November Board meeting, an indirect deadline has been set.

Iranian reaction to the resolution was expected. On September 19, Hasan Rowhani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, convened a news conference in Tehran.[11] He declared that the Board's request to freeze all work on uranium enrichment was "illegal." Without rejecting outright the Board's demands and holding out the possibility of negotiations on the issue, he said that "the IAEA Board of Governors has no right to make such a suspension obligatory for any country." Technically, Iran's safeguards agreements do not prevent Tehran from enriching uranium, provided it does so for peaceful purposes in a transparent manner. In what has become a typical Iranian reaction, Rowhani warned that "Iran will stop implementing the Additional Protocol and will limit its cooperation with the IAEA" should the matter be referred to the Security Council. It is, however, disconcerting that more than 200 lawmakers in Iran's parliament threatened to block ratification of the Additional Protocol in reaction to the IAEA's decision. On September 21, the Iranian government announced that it had begun converting 37 tons of uranium oxide into hexafluoride gas.[12]

What Are the Outstanding Issues?

The Agency's September report clearly identifies a number of outstanding issues that must be addressed before a determination can be made about whether Iran is involved -- potentially or currently -- in a nuclear weapons program. Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei in his statement to the Board emphasized that although the Agency is making progress, more time is needed to assess the nature of the Iranian program. On several occasions, he also strongly opposed setting an artificial deadline for concluding the IAEA's investigations in Iran.

The most recent IAEA resolution is based on the findings in the IAEA's September 1 report[13] on Iran's implementation of its NPT safeguards agreement as requested by the June 2004 Board meeting. Although the report welcomed the new information provided by Iran on some of the issues that remained unclear in June, it points mostly to the remaining inconsistencies in information provided by Iran. Although some questions remain open and several gaps were identified, nothing in the report can lead to the conclusion that Iran is indeed busy developing a nuclear weapons program. The following outstanding issues are identified in the report and were subsequently included in the Board's latest resolution:

Centrifuge Program
The accuracy of the Iranian statements regarding its P-2 centrifuge enrichment program and its chronology continues to be in question. Iran acquired the design drawings of P-2 centrifuges from Pakistan in 1995, but it insists that prior to 2002 efforts were only concentrated on the P-1 centrifuge enrichment program. Iran has repeatedly asserted that work on P-2 centrifuges started only after signing a contract in March 2002 with a small private company to study the mechanical properties of the P-2 centrifuge. In August 2004, Iran offered the Agency new details on the manufacturing and mechanical testing of the modified P-2 composite rotors under that contract and during 2002-2003. Questions regarding the scope of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture, and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 design remain unanswered. The alleged absence of activities related to the P-2 centrifuge in Iran between 1995 and 2002 and the P-2 centrifuge procurement-related activities are also still subject to investigation. Iran is allegedly trying to retrieve information on these topics. Given concerns over clandestine supply networks, such as the one linked to Dr. A.Q. Khan, ongoing IAEA investigations should shed light on the origin of both Iran's P-1 and P-2 centrifuge enrichment programs.

Origin of Contamination
According to Iranian officials, the low enriched uranium (LEU) and high enriched uranium (HEU) particles found in different locations in Iran derive from imported P-1 centrifuge components. Iran's assertion does not entirely satisfy the IAEA's concerns over the type and level of contamination at various sites, and the Agency is still conducting investigations on the supply network. As a result, the report concluded that the source and reasons for HEU and LEU contamination detected in various locations in Iran are still not clear. Although the September report stated that information explaining each particular case may look plausible, the Agency remains concerned that the different pieces of information do not fit together.

Laser Enrichment
Regarding the Iranian atomic vapor isotope separation (AVLIS) program, the levels of enrichment declared by Iran are consistent with the IAEA determinations. The IAEA experts have pointed out, however, that despite Iranian experts' alleged lack of knowledge on the issue, the AVLIS facility at Lashkar Ab'ad could eventually be capable of limited HEU production (albeit gram quantities only).

Plutonium Separation Experiments
Iran finally agreed with the Agency's estimate regarding the amounts of plutonium that were produced by irradiation, but discrepancies remain on the age of the plutonium. Iran claims the plutonium was separated 12-16 years ago, while the IAEA is pursing the possibility that it was irradiated more recently.

Hot Cells
Although Iran provided some new information -- drawings received by a foreign company not identified in the report in 1977 for hot cells -- the IAEA still intends to follow up on this issue in order to obtain a clearer picture of Iran's plans regarding hot cells.

Additional Protocol
Iran has not yet ratified the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreements. Iran's initial declarations, voluntarily submitted as if it had ratified the Additional Protocol, are still being reviewed by the Agency, along with the information revealed in the most recent meetings between the IAEA and Iran.

Transparency Visits and Discussions
Following questions that arose during the June Board meeting concerning potential concealment of alleged nuclear-related activities at the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran, Iran granted Agency experts access to that site. The inspectors were allowed to inspect the site. Despite Iran's claims that no declarable quantities of nuclear material were present at Lavisan-Shian and that no nuclear material and nuclear activities related to the fuel cycle were carried out there, the Agency continues to analyze data collected during the visit.

Dual-use Equipment and Materials
Discussions on open source information relating to dual use equipment and materials, which could have both military and civilian applications, have been initiated.

Suspension of Enrichment
Neither Iran's safeguard agreement nor the Additional Protocol requires the suspension of enrichment activities. Such activities are permitted under these agreements provided that they are declared to the Agency and that they are within limits of a non-military nuclear program. The report pointed out that the Agency was able to verify Iran's suspension of certain enrichment-related activities at specific sites, and that as of September 1, 2004, the Agency did not detect any activities at those locations inconsistent with Iran's current suspension undertakings. Nevertheless, concerns over Iran's intentions gave rise to the strong language in the Board's resolution. Iran promised to suspend its enrichment activities as part of the deal with the three European states in 2003 in an attempt to avoid the deadline set last year. However, recent statements by Iran announcing the resumption of enrichment activities indicate that Tehran has reconsidered this promise.

What Next?

The latest IAEA resolution -- although without deadline and implicit reference to Security Council action -- gives the United States an opportunity to remit the matter to the UN Security Council at the November meeting should Iran not cooperate with the Agency. Although it does not refer to the IAEA statute -- which would have provided the United States with sufficient reason to report Iran to the Security Council -- the resolution includes the notion that "further steps" in relation to Iran's NPT safeguards agreement could be taken at the November meeting.

Given that almost two years will have passed by the time the Board considers the issue again and that very few options remain, the United States is likely to argue -- as was emphasized by Ambassador Sanders -- that the time has come to report Iran to the Security Council. Iran's defiance of the Board's call to continue its voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment only three days after the adoption of the resolution plays into the hands of those in the U.S. administration who want Iran to be reported to the Security Council. President Khatami, speaking at a military parade in Tehran on September 21, reiterated earlier denials that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons and stated that his government is determined to obtain peaceful atomic technology. However, his comment that this would be done "even if it causes the stop of international supervision," leaves the impression that Tehran may kick the IAEA inspectors out. These types of statements, in clear defiance of the Board's decision, will make it very difficult for the Board, at its next meeting, to resist U.S. pressure.

Any consideration by the Board to report Iran to the Security Council should, however, be weighed very carefully. Since consideration of the issue by the Security Council could lead to yet another deadlock -- as was the case with Iraq prior to the U.S. led invasion -- such action should only be contemplated once all other options have been exhausted.

Although a strong condemnation by the Security Council might increase international pressure on Iran, the Islamic Republic is likely to ignore any non-Chapter VII-related[14] action by the Council, especially if judged by the reactions in Tehran to the June 2004 Board of Governors resolution. A Chapter VII-type resolution seems unlikely given Iran's extensive trade relations with close U.S. allies and many developing countries, including China. The impact of such sanctions on both Iranian political reforms, and the current international energy crisis, would clearly weigh heavily on any Security Council decision.

Since a Chapter VII sanction is an unlikely first step, then a strong condemnation of Iran's actions combined with a warning that further noncompliance with its NPT obligations may lead to "serious consequence" may be deemed appropriate. However, this could be a mistake since it will create another "slippery slope" toward unilateral action as was proven in the case of UN Resolution 1441 regarding Iraq.

The only real and sustainable solution to Iran's situation is to confront Iran's reasons for wanting nuclear weapons. The time has come for Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency, and to comprehensively address all the outstanding concerns related to its nuclear program. However, consideration of Iran's own security concerns as they relate to the security framework of the region in general, is equally overdue. Although there can be no justification for developing a nuclear weapons program, it cannot be denied that Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood. Chemical weapons were used by Iraqi forces against Iran in the 1988 war, and Iran has two nuclear weapons states (Pakistan and Israel) on or near its borders and the United States maintains a large military presence in Iraq. Many conservatives in Iran would argue -- and in some case already have done so -- that Iran is fully justified in developing a nuclear weapons program of its own. Dr. ElBaradei's recently suggested that until Israel becomes engaged in a dialogue to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and be engaged in WMD disarmament, that "there will be continued incentive for the region's countries to develop weapons of mass destruction to match the Israeli arsenal."[15] This proposal needs serious consideration. Not only is it in the United States' own security interest to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons program, but as a stakeholder in the promotion of regional peace and stability in the Middle-East, it has a particular responsibility to ensure that Iran remains engaged in regional as well as international affairs. Isolating Iran in the Security Council will have the opposite effect.

[1] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (GOV/2004/60), 1 September 2004.
[2] At its November 2003 meeting, the Board decided (GOV/2003/81) that should any "further serious failures come to light," it would meet immediately to consider "in the light of the circumstances and of advice from the Director-General, all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and Iran's safeguards agreement."
[3] Ibid.
[4] Associated Press report, September 19, 2004.
[5] "US refuses to rule out Iran attack," Reuters, September 12, 2004, <http:www.reuters.co.uk>.
[6] Preambular paragraph (f) in GOV/2004/60.
[7] Operative paragraph 6 in GOV/2004/60.
[8] Referring to Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
[9] Referring to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
[10] "What's next in Iranian Nuclear saga?" The Christian Science Monitor, September 16, 2004, <http:www.csmonitor.com/2004/0916.htm>.
[11] Ali Akbar Dareini,: "Iran: U.N. nuclear demands illegal," Monterey County Herald, September 20, 2004.
[12] "Iran's Plans for Nuclear Fuel Widen Rift Over Technology," New York Times, September 24, 2004.
[13] Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran: U.N. nuclear demands illegal," Monterey County Herald, September 20, 2004..
[14] Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for provisional measures and action (not involving the use of armed force, unless deemed necessary) that shall be decided upon by the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security.
[15] "Scrap nuclear arms' Israel urged," BBC, December 12, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/3312865.stm.>.

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