CNS Research Story
Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the Availability of HEU
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U.N. flags.
Links to Relevant Resources:
Websites:
"Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance," U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration website,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/frrsnf.shtml.
"Global Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Stocks: Summary
Tables and Charts," Institute for Science and International Security, June 30, 2004,
http://www.isis-online.org/
global_stocks/summary_tables.html.
"Research Reactors" Briefing/Information Paper, December 2004, World Nuclear Association website,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.htm.
"Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program," NIS Nuclear
and Missile Database, NTI website, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/rertr.htm.
"Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors," Argonne National Laboratory website,
http://www.rertr.anl.gov.
"Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors," U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration website,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/rertr.shtml.
"Russia: Overview of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Program," NIS Nuclear and Missile
Database, NTI website, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/heudeal/overview.htm.
"2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," United Nations website,
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005.
Articles and Reports:
Philipp Bleek, "Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat,"
(Cambridge, MA and Washington, D.C.: Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 2004),
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/bleekglobalcleanout.pdf.
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives
(Cambridge, MA and Washington, D.C.: Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2005), http://www.nti.org/c_press/release_cnwmupdate_050505.pdf.
Robert L. Civiak, "Closing the Gaps: Securing High Enriched Uranium in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," May 2002, p. 9, Federation of American Scientists website,
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/020500-heu/index.html.
Jean
duPreez, "The Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons
Purposes: is it Still Relevant?" Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
website,
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No9.pdf.
Charles
Ferguson and William Potter, eds., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
(Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004). Excerpts
available at:
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/books/4faces.htm.
Eduard Fesko, "Russian Floating Nuclear Reactors - Proliferation
Risks," June 24, 2002,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020624.htm.
General
Accounting Office, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of
Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (July
2004),
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-807.
Chunyan
Ma and Frank von Hippel, "Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium
for Naval Reactors," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring
2001),
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/
vol08/81/81mahip.pdf.
Morten
Bremer Maerli and Lars van Dassen, "Eliminating Excessive Stocks of Highly
Enriched Uranium," Pugwash Issue Brief, Vol. No. 1 (April 2005),
available at:
http://www.pugwash.org/publication/
pb/2005brief.6.pdf.
Frank von Hippel, "A Comprehensive Approach to Elimination of
Highly-Enriched-Uranium From All Nuclear-Reactor Fuel Cycles," Science
and Global Security, No. 12 (2004),
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/
pdf/von_Hippel_SGS_137-164_1.pdf.
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By Cristina Chuen
May 6, 2005
On April 25, the United Nations
Security Council reaffirmed the danger of nuclear terrorism, expressing its
"'grave concern' at the risks posed by non-State actors who
attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of
delivery."[1] On May 2, at the opening of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in New York,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei
called on the conference to support initiatives "to minimize, and
eventually eliminate, the use of high enriched uranium in peaceful nuclear
applications."[2] This echoes a statement
made by U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration head Linton Brooks to the
IAEA Conference on Nuclear Security in London on March 16, where he stated that
"efforts to secure high-risk materials must be expanded," and part
of the strategy to ensure this security was "to the extent possible,
ending the use of [highly enriched uranium] in civil nuclear
applications."[3]
Other countries
have added their voices to these calls. On May 3 the Kyrgyz delegation to the
NPT pointed out that "creative efforts must be undertaken to reduce the
possibility that terrorists could gain access to fissile material, and
especially highly-enriched uranium, which might be used to fabricate crude
nuclear weapons," adding that "the Kyrgyz Republic believes this
Review Conference should consider means to enhance the security of existing
stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium, while consolidating them, reducing their
size, and moving toward the elimination of the use of highly-enriched uranium in
the civilian nuclear sector."[4] Two days
later, on May 5, Norway issued a Position Paper encouraging the Conference to
adopt "a moratorium on the production and use of highly enriched uranium
(HEU), like the moratorium on the production of weapons grade material declared
by certain [nuclear weapons states]. The long-term objective should be the
establishment of a total ban."[5] Moving
towards the elimination of the civilian use of this material is an important
part of the fight against WMD terrorism, since HEU is the terrorist's
fissile material of choice for constructing a nuclear device. Current efforts
to reduce this risk are inadequate. Additional steps need to be taken as soon
as possible--adopting the principal that HEU should not be used for
civilian purposes would be a good first step, facilitating further practical
action.
Why HEU is dangerous
The most difficult challenge
for a terrorist organization seeking to build a nuclear weapon or improvised
nuclear device is obtaining the fissile material needed, either plutonium or
HEU. HEU, or uranium that has been processed to increase the proportion of the
U-235 isotope from the naturally occurring level of 0.7% to 20% or more, is
required for the construction of a gun-type nuclear device, the simplest type of
nuclear weapon. The greater the proportion of U-235 (i.e. the higher the
enrichment level), the easier it is to cause a nuclear detonation.
"Weapons-grade" uranium generally refers to uranium enriched to at
least 90%, but material of far lower enrichment levels, found in both fresh and
spent nuclear fuel, can be used to create a nuclear explosive
device.[6] In 2002, the U.S. National Research
Council warned that "Crude HEU weapons could be fabricated without state
assistance," noting that "the primary impediment that prevents
countries or technically competent terrorist groups from developing nuclear
weapons is the availability of [nuclear material], especially
HEU."[7] Creating a nuclear weapon from
plutonium requires the construction of an implosion-type device, which is a more
technically difficult proposition (plutonium cannot be used in a gun-type
weapon). Therefore, securing and eliminating stocks of HEU is the surest way to
decrease the risk that terrorist groups use this material to create a nuclear
explosion. As of the end of 2003, there were some 1,900 tons of HEU in global
stockpiles.[8] These stocks, spread over
hundreds of sites, continue to grow each year.[9]
Yet as little as 25 kg. are needed to produce a nuclear
weapon.
Efforts to Eliminate HEU
The dangers posed by HEU
have been recognized since the 1940s. The most obvious way to deal with the
threat of HEU would be simply to ban its production and use entirely. However,
efforts to achieve a production ban have proven unsuccessful thus far, while
there have only been partial successes to date in restricting the use of HEU.
Most endeavors to ban production have focused on all fissile materials, both
plutonium and HEU, although the latter is the greater terrorist
threat.[10] Further, the focus has been on HEU
for military, not civilian, uses, though some countries, like Mexico and Egypt,
have argued that a comprehensive fissile material ban is needed as fissile
materials could be clandestinely diverted from civilian programs for weapons
purposes. The United Nations General Assembly finally adopted a resolution
recommending that a multilateral treaty be negotiated to ban the production of
all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in
1993. Last year there was some progress towards re-starting negotiations on such
a treaty, after a six-year deadlock, but an actual agreement remains a long way
off (for an overview of the Fissile Material Treaty negotiations to date, see
Jean duPreez, "The Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons
Purposes: is it Still Relevant?" Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
website, http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No9.pdf). While it is important to
continue efforts towards a ban on military production of fissile materials,
restricting and eventually eliminating the civilian use of HEU (not plutonium)
is both relatively realizable and important to achieve in the near-term in order
to reduce the terrorist threat.
The overwhelming majority of HEU stocks are held by the United States and
Russia, a legacy of the Cold War. Bilateral efforts to reduce these military
fissile materials stocks have been moderately successful. In February 1993, the
United States and Russia signed the HEU Purchase Agreement, whereby 500 metric
tons of HEU from dismantled nuclear warheads are being converted into low
enriched uranium (LEU) and sold for use in US commercial reactors. As of
March 31, 2005, 237 metric tons of weapons-grade HEU had been recycled,
eliminating the material derived from 9,482 nuclear
warheads.[11] (For more information on the HEU
Purchase Agreement, please see the "U.S.-Russian HEU Deal Overview"
on the NTI website, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/heudeal/overview.htm.)
This still leaves more than half of the original amount of HEU destined for recycling
untouched, and at the current rate of some 30 tons per year, the downblending
process cannot be completed by the expiration of the current contract, in 2013.
In addition, Russia has large military stockpiles that it has not declared
excess, by some estimates as much as 500 additional metric tons of HEU, of which
only some 150 tons are needed for Russian
weapons.[12] The United States, too, has been
estimated to have some 385 tons of HEU in excess of its weapons needs, which it
is holding in reserve for possible future use in naval
fuel.[13]
Since 9/11 it has become
clear that the timeline envisioned by the HEU Purchase Agreement is dangerously
lengthy, additional military HEU stocks should be eliminated, and civilian HEU
stocks, in Russia and across the globe, pose as much or greater risk than
military HEU--civilian HEU tends to be less well-guarded than military
holdings, and often is enriched to the very high levels that make construction
of an improvised nuclear device relatively easy. The U.S. Department of Energy
has a program to address this problem within Russia: the Materials
Consolidation and Conversion effort removes HEU from potentially vulnerable
facilities and blends them down to 19% U-235. The program hopes to address 29
tons of HEU in this manner.[14] Although
concern over insecure civilian HEU was voiced before 9/11, efforts to recover
this material were greatly accelerated after the terrorist attacks.
Civilian Uses of HEU
HEU is currently used to fuel research
reactors, critical facilities, pulsed reactors, and a few icebreakers.
Globally, 672 research reactors have been built, of which some 272 are
operational in 56 countries (85 in 40 developing countries), 214 are shut down,
and 168 have been decommissioned. Quite a few of these facilities use HEU fuels.
(For a table of research reactors with HEU fuel worldwide, including enrichment
levels and the source of the fuel, see "Research Reactors"
Briefing/Information Paper, December 2004, World Nuclear Association website,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.htm.
The table only covers research reactors, however: there is no comprehensive,
authoritative inventory of civil HEU globally, another obstacle to progress in
this area.) Many of the reactors that have been shut down, but not
decommissioned, have spent HEU fuel on site--and spent fuel, like fresh HEU
fuel, can be used in the construction of a nuclear explosive device. There are
also four research reactors under construction in developed countries, five
under construction in developing nations, and eight more planned for the future
(three in developed nations)--all but one of these new reactors are to use
LEU fuels.
The United States and Russia supplied much of the HEU fuel
used in research reactors world-wide; other producers include China (which sent
HEU fuel for research reactors to Nigeria,[15]
Ghana, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria,[16] as well
as enriched uranium to South Africa, and
Argentina[17]), France (to Chile and India),
the United Kingdom (to Australia, India, and Japan) and South Africa (which did
not export this fuel).[18] Most of the fuel
supplied by the United States (the bulk of which went to North American and the
Asia-Pacific) was of very high enrichment levels (90% and above), while most of
the Soviet-supplied fuel was 36% enriched (this fuel was chiefly send to eastern
Europe). At present, there is more HEU than LEU in North America, while LEU now
outweighs HEU in Western Europe (more European reactors have already been
converted to LEU). Many of these reactors are underutilized, and should be shut
down. Others, as explained below, should be converted to LEU fuels (either
immediately, or as appropriate technology is developed).
Other civilian
uses of HEU are similarly unnecessary in the long run. Reactors that use HEU as
targets, for the creation of medical isotopes, can be converted, though current
production capacities for appropriate LEU fuels are limited. Studies on the
conversion of naval reactors that use HEU fuels, too, are being conducted (more
on these topics, below).
Efforts to Remove HEU and Convert
U.S.-Supplied Reactors to LEU Fuel
Since 1996, the U.S. Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program has facilitated the return of
spent nuclear fuel of U.S. origin from countries around the
world.[19] Most of this fuel was enriched to
90% and above.[20] As of October 2003, there
were 12,850 spent fuel assemblies of U.S. origin
at research reactors abroad; most of them are eligible to be returned under the
U.S. acceptance program, as long as they are discharged before 13 May
2006.[21] The U.S. program also seeks
to assist in the conversion of research reactors to LEU fuel, in both the United
States and abroad. A related program, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and
Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, was launched in 1978 to develop the technical
means to convert these reactors through the development of new LEU fuels. The
IAEA has been involved with this program since its inception. To date, 39
research reactors in 22 countries (including 11 in the United
States)[22] have been fully or partially
converted to LEU fuel. A similar number of Western-supplied reactors remain to
be converted.[23] In addition to the United
States, Argentina, Canada, China, France and Indonesia produce LEU fuels for
export, and Brazil, Chile, and South Korea are developing this capacity.
Argentina and China have supplied LEU fuel to converted research reactors in
Iran and Pakistan, respectively.[24]
To
give reactor operators a strong incentive to convert to LEU, in 1992 the U.S.
Congress adopted the Schumer Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, whereby the
export of HEU as fuel or targets for use in foreign research reactors was
prohibited unless 1) there is no suitable fuel or target of lesser enrichment
than the proposed export that can be used in the reactor, 2) the reactor
operator agrees to convert the reactor to LEU as soon as an appropriate fuel or
target is available, and 3) the United States has an active program to develop
an LEU fuel or target suitable for the reactor in question. Funding for the
RERTR program was increased after 9/11, and much scientific progress has been
made in reactor conversion. As of 2003, the program scientists indicated that
conversion of all U.S. and Russian-supplied research reactors should be possible
within nine years.[25] Nevertheless, there
continue to be difficulties persuading some companies to live up to their
conversion commitments. For instance, Canada's MDS Nordion, the largest
provider of medical isotopes to the United States, has been accused by analysts
at the Nuclear Control Institute, a nonpartisan NGO, of "deliberately
[taking] actions that increased the cost of converting its facility to LEU
[targets]" and subsequently trying to claim an exemption from conversion
because the costs are too high.[26] The U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission continues to investigate the
situation.
Conversion of Soviet-built Reactors and Repatriation of
Soviet-Supplied HEU
In 1978, Moscow initiated a program to reduce the
enrichment of research reactors outside of the Soviet Union and changed its HEU
export policies, supplying these reactors with 36% HEU in lieu of 90% HEU.
However, Russia's economic difficulties in the 1980s hampered the
conclusion of the conversion program. In 1994, the US Department of Energy and
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed a protocol of intent to reduce fuel
enrichment in civilian research and test reactors. This program has focused on
the development of higher-density 19.75% enriched uranium fuels and has
demonstrated the feasibility of converting specific reactors to LEU
fuel.[27] As of October 2003, there were
24,803 fuel assemblies originally enriched in the
former Soviet Union at research reactors abroad, however, the total amount of
HEU in these assemblies is significantly less than in the U.S.-origin
inventory.[28] Russian work on developing LEU
fuels for reactor conversion continues.[29]
Russia, however, continues to supply small quantities of HEU fuel abroad (it has
no legislation like the U.S. Schumer Amendment), and has supplied European
reactors that can no longer import U.S. HEU
fuel.[30]
Along
with converting research reactors, the removal of Soviet-supplied HEU from
vulnerable facilities has continued off and on for over a
decade.[31] The earliest transfers were from
facilities in former Soviet states: the removal of 581 kg of HEU from the Ulba
Metallurgy Plant in northern Kazakhstan in November 1994 (under "Project
Sapphire," the material was taken to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee), and the April 1998 removal of fresh and spent HEU- and LEU-based
nuclear fuel from the IRT-M research reactor in Mtskheta, Georgia to the
Dounreay Nuclear Complex in Scotland (through a joint U.K.-U.S.-Georgian
endeavor).[32] However, removing HEU from
other vulnerable locations was not a priority at the time. The first project to
remove civilian HEU from an insecure site outside the former USSR, the Vinca
Institute of Nuclear Sciences near Belgrade, Serbia, did not occur until August
2002.[33] Since that time the repatriation of
HEU fuel to supplier states (the United States and Russia) has accelerated, as
have efforts to convert HEU reactors to LEU fuel. Since Vinca,
HEU fuel has been repatriated to Russia from
Bulgaria, Romania, Uzbekistan, and the Czech Republic; on April 25, Latvia
signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy on cooperation in the
return of HEU fuel from the Salaspils reactor to
Russia.[34] Russia, the United States, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have formalized their cooperation in
this sphere under the so-called Tripartite Initiative, which was brought under
the framework of the new Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), announced in
May 2004. However, much remains to be done on both conversion and HEU
repatriation. One essential problem that besets both efforts is the lack of a
commitment by the global community to halt the use of HEU in civilian reactors,
and the concomitant reluctance of individual facilities and countries to give up
their holdings of this material.
Conversion of Research Reactors of
non-U.S./Russian Origin
China too, though not part of the U.S. RERTR
program, has been working toward the conversion of research reactors to LEU
fuels, and designed its new 60 MWt China Advanced Research Reactor to use LEU
fuel.[35] France has led the way in the
military sphere by converting its nuclear navy to LEU fuels. This can also be
done for civilian naval propulsion plants (Russian icebreakers--for more on
nuclear naval propulsion, see below). Further, France will shut down one of its
two HEU-fueled research reactors and has pledged to convert the other. In
tandem with the U.S. RERTR program, France has been working since 1999 to
develop, qualify and license a high density fuel for reactor conversion
(involving France's CEA, CERCA, COGEMA, Framatome-ANP and Technicatome).
The Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) has had a similar program since
2000.[36]
Unfortunately, not all
countries have committed to converting every research reactor to LEU fuels.
Germany, for instance, has only promised to convert its new FRM-2 research
reactor, which began operation in early 2004, to what it refers to as
"medium" enriched uranium (less than 50% enriched) before the end of
2010.[37] However, this level of enrichment is
far above that of much of the HEU fuel the GTRI program is removing as a
security hazard from research reactors worldwide. The only other HEU-fueled
reactor under construction since 1978, the Jules Horowitz Reactor in Cadarache,
France, will likely be started up on 35% HEU fuel but converted to LEU fuel as
soon as that fuel becomes
available.[38]
Continuing
Problems
Despite the efforts outlined above, much more will be
required if the risk of HEU falling into terrorist hands is to be eliminated.
While the United States and Russia have agreed that all research reactors should
be converted, many states have yet to agree to conversion, and the conversion of
research reactors in Russia itself is likely to be contentious. Similarly, not
all states are willing to give up HEU stocks, either because they argue that it
is necessary for scientific work or, as is more typically the case, because of a
political view that holding on to the HEU is in some way prestigious. Still
other countries may be willing to give up HEU, but not return it to particular
countries--diversifying material destinations could solve this problem.
While some technical issues remain in a few cases, it is critical that the
principle of eliminating the use of HEU from civilian use be set, so that
countries are willing to undertake the scientific and financial costs of
conversion. Further, eliminating HEU stocks through downblending is also an
important part of the puzzle--while Russian and U.S. HEU stocks are
arguably better secured than HEU at most research reactors, it remains difficult
to persuade states that they should give up their last holding of HEU if Russia
and the United States do not continue to make strong efforts to eliminate all
excess HEU stockpiles as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, additional
civilian uses of HEU should be reconsidered, as they are security risks, like
research reactors, and provide disincentives for states considering whether to
eliminate the use of HEU in research reactors. The RERTR program has already
tackled the problem of converting reactors that use HEU targets in the
production of medical isotopes. A greater problem is the use of HEU in other
civilian applications: fast breeder reactors, icebreakers, and, possibly,
floating nuclear power plants. New initiatives to eliminate these uses are
essential partners to an overall effort to abolish the use of
HEU.
Proposals to Accelerate HEU Elimination
There have
recently been quite a few ideas mooted on how to accelerate the elimination of
HEU, both in the civilian and the military sphere. Several deal with the
acceleration of excess Russian uranium blenddown.
One proposal involves
the funding of accelerated blenddown by European nations, and the eventual sale
of the resulting LEU on the commercial nuclear power market. For more
information on this proposal, please see Morten Bremer Maerli and Lars van
Dassen, "Eliminating Excessive Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium,"
Pugwash Issue Brief, Vol. No. 1 (April 2005), available at:
http://www.pugwash.org/publication/pb/2005brief.6.pdf.
In addition, there are purely commercial efforts that result in HEU
blenddown: at present, one ton of HEU is being blended down with European
uranium each year at Russia's Elektrostal, under license from
France's Framatome.[39] TVEL, the Russian
nuclear fuel producer, and Framatome are currently exploring blending down
additional quantities of HEU to produce LEU for sale on the U.S. market;
however, such sales would require a U.S. Commerce Department finding that they
do not violate U.S. uranium antidumping
legislation.[40] While the amounts of HEU to
be blended down under such a plan are unlikely to be large, Washington should be
encouraged to allow such imports.
Another effort, spearheaded by the
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), involves a detailed study by Russian
scientists, with the cooperation of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency
(Rosatom), of the options for accelerating HEU blenddown at Russian facilities.
The study examines various options for increasing the amount of HEU blended down
each year from 30 metric tons to 35, 40, 50, or 60 tons per year, and considers
different possible enrichment levels for the final product--4.5%, 12%, and
19% U-235, taking into account technological, proliferation, and financial
considerations.[41] Results of the study are
expected within the next few months, and will be presented at the Institute of
Nuclear Materials Management's annual meeting this July. If it were
possible to double the rate of HEU blenddown, significant reductions in the risk
that this material might fall into terrorist hands would be made. Further, such
facilities might subsequently be available to blend down additional military and
civilian HEU stocks, which are considerable. Only by eliminating these
materials, can we truly ensure that they cannot be used to construct a nuclear
device.
NTI is also funding a preliminary study on the conversion of
Russian icebreaker reactors to LEU fuel.[42]
Russia's nuclear icebreakers, which typically use 36% HEU but can use
enrichment levels as high as 90%, operate along Russia's Northern Sea
Route, which runs from near the Norwegian border to
Kamchatka.[43] Based in Murmansk, on the Kola
Peninsula, fresh and spent HEU fuel for these vessels is stored in the center of
this regional capital. While the storage facilities have received security
upgrades, with U.K. and Swedish assistance, the fuel continues to be transported
to and from these facilities, increasing the vulnerability to theft and the
consequences of an accident. Further, the use of HEU fuel maintains a civilian
market for this material. Finally, the icebreakers themselves, though they too
have upgraded security measures to some degree, pose risks. Furthermore, if the
conversion of icebreaker reactors is technically and financially feasible, then
it should also be possible to construct floating power plants fueled by LEU.
Rosatom has plans to construct such floating plants for sale or lease
world-wide, including China, Indonesia, Brazil, and India. If the floating
reactor program does indeed get off the ground, it is of critical importance in
the fight against terrorism that these power plants are do not use HEU fuel.
(For an overview of the floating nuclear plant issue, see: Eduard Fesko,
"Russian Floating Nuclear Reactors - Proliferation Risks," June 24,
2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020624.htm.)
Conclusion
There are currently some 1,900 tons of HEU
stockpiled around the globe, while more is produced every year. As the material
of choice for would-be nuclear terrorists, it is critical that everything that
can be done to secure, consolidate, reduce, and ultimately eliminate this
material is done as quickly as possible. Accelerating the downblending of
military HEU stocks, through both commercial means and with foreign assistance,
is necessary if we are to really reduce the risks of theft. Downblending must
also come to include additional military stocks, and civilian stocks too.
Accelerated downblending not only makes the downblended material safe; it also
makes arguments for repatriation more palatable for all involved (the argument
that one nation is turning over a "valuable commodity" to another
country is invalidated if the recipient nation is eliminating the material as
quickly as possible). In tandem, removing HEU from vulnerable facilities too
should be accelerated.
As long as there is commercial demand for this
material, however, it will be extremely difficult to eliminate from civilian
sites - generally the most vulnerable locations. The successes of the
RERTR program suggest that there may be some momentum to make the elimination of
the use of HEU in research reactors possible, though the start-up of two
European research reactors with HEU in the past decade make such an effort far
more difficult (though not impossible, as these reactors too as slated for
eventual conversion to LEU). But all civilian uses of HEU, including HEU
icebreaker fuel and floating power plant fuel, must be stopped for a ban to
hold. Only agreement on a future total ban will put further pressure on all
countries to agree to HEU removal.
This report focuses on civilian use
as civilian sites are the most vulnerable, and the minimization and eventual
elimination of civilian HEU use is most achievable. In future, however, nations
with nuclear-powered navies should also consider following the French
Navy's example, and convert their nuclear-powered ships and submarines to
LEU fuels. Currently, some 175 tons of HEU is stockpiled for naval fuel
worldwide.[44] But nuclear submarines could be
converted to LEU without significantly increasing their size or reducing
performance characteristics.[45]
Efforts to convert naval vessels and the negotiation of a Fissile
Material Treaty are needed, but will take some time. In order to reduce risks
today, the world should focus its attention on the greatest risks, especially
where there are clear ways to reduce those risks. Consolidating and blending
down stockpiles are mutually reinforcing policies, doubly so if all nations
agree to the principle that the civilian use of HEU should ultimately be
eliminated worldwide.
Given the vulnerabilities posed by the presence of
HEU in the civilian nuclear sector globally, and the on-going programs to
convert research reactors to LEU, it would be timely for States Parties at the
2005 NPT Review Conference to recognize that the wide distribution of and
international commerce in HEU for peaceful purposes poses serious security risks
in the age of global terror. The Parties, therefore, should agree that
minimizing HEU commerce and use of HEU in civilian nuclear activities is
desirable, as is the goal of total elimination of HEU is the civilian nuclear
sector as soon as technically feasible. In this regard, States Parties should
call on the IAEA to undertake further study, and to promote activities in
pursuit of this goal.
[1] "Any acts of terrorism are
'criminal, unjustifiable,' Security Council reaffirms," April 25, 2005, United Nations website,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=14073&Cr=terror&Cr1=.
[2] Mohamed ElBaradei statement,
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2005 Review Conference,
United Nations, New York, May 2, 2005, from IAEA website,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/NPTRevCon.pdf.
[3] Transcript of Linton Brooks' remarks, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
A Responsibility of Each Nation," States News Service, March 20, 2005, in
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.lexis-nexis.org.
[4] Statement by H.E. Nurbek Jeenbaev, Permanent Representative of the Kyrgyz Republic to
the UN at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York, May 3, 2005), http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt03kyrgyz.pdf.
[5]
Norwegian Position Paper, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
2005 Review Conference, May 5, 2005.
[6] Nuclear devices can be created with material with as low as 6.9% enrichment.
However, to create a bomb with 19.9% enriched uranium, about 800 kg of the
material would be needed, and the explosive device is more complicated to
construct. Uranium in spent, or irradiated, nuclear fuel can be extracted and
used to build a nuclear device. There are large stockpiles of spent highly
enriched fuels that pose this danger, both at research reactors worldwide and at
Russian sites where old nuclear submarine and nuclear icebreaker fuel is stored.
When this fuel has been stored for many years, it loses its radioactivity,
making it easier to handle and thus more attractive to terrorists. Charles
Ferguson and William Potter, eds., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
(Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004), pp. 107-108.
[7] Committee on Science and
Technology for Countering Terrorism, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of
Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 2002), pp. 40, 45, as cited in Charles Ferguson and William
Potter, eds., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p. 132.
[8] Of this total, some 50 tons are in
power and research programs, and an additional 125 tons are excess U.S. military
stocks that have been transferred to civilian use. The remaining 1,725 are
military stocks. "Global Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
Stocks: Summary Tables and Charts," Institute for Science and
International Security, June 30, 2004,
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/summary_tables.html#table2.
[9] See David Albright and Kimberly Kramer,
"Stockpiles still growing," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Vol. 60, No. 6 (November/December 2004), pp. 14-16,
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/ bulletin_albright_kramer.pdf.
[10] Furthermore, plutonium is used in both
breeder reactors and MOX fuel programs (where nuclear power plant spent fuel is
reprocessed to create new power plant fuels). These commercial uses have strong
support in certain countries, making the limitation of plutonium use in civilian
settings more difficult to achieve than a future HEU ban.
[11] "Fact Sheet,"
U.S.-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program, USEC website,
http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/megatons_fact.asp.
[12] Robert L. Civiak, "Closing the Gaps: Securing
High Enriched Uranium in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," May 2002, p. 9, Federation of American Scientists website,
http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/020500-heu/index.html.
[13] Ibid., p. 15.
[14] Thomas Wander,
"Material Consolidation and Conversion: Current Status and Future
Prospects," in Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Institute
for Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, Florida, June 23-27, 2002
(Northbrook, Illinois: INMM, 2002; and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), FY
2004 Detailed Budget Justifications--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, February 2003), p. 647,
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/04budget/content/defnn/nn.pdf; as cited in
"Reducing Excess Stockpiles: U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement,"
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, NTI website,
http://www.nti.org/analysis/speeches/controlling-nuclear-warheads-and-materials-sam-nunn/.
[15] The 2004 shipment to Nigeria of 90%
HEU is the most recent Chinese HEU export, sent for a new research reactor built
with IAEA assistance. The Miniature Neutron Source type reactor uses about 1
kilogram of HEU fuel. Similar reactors, the Slowpoke type built by Canada, have
been converted. On May 23-25, 2005, representatives of the eight countries
operating these two reactor types will meet at the IAEA in Vienna to discuss
conversion to LEU. According to Pablo Adelfang, and IAEA export, Syria has
nearly exhausted the current fuel load in its reactor and is highly motivated to
cooperate internationally. Greg Webb, "Nigeria Commissions Research
Reactor; HEU-Fueled Facility Goes Against U.S.-Led Nonproliferation
Effort," Global Security Newswire, October 1, 2004, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/10/1/255a6161-b010-4711-a111-b12697bedd56.html;
Ann MacLachlan, "Operators of small reactors to meet to discuss conversion
to LEU fuel," NuclearFuel, April 25, 2005, p. 5.
[16] These four countries also operate
the Miniature Neutron Source type reactor. "Research Reactors"
Briefing/Information Paper, December 2004, World Nuclear Association website,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.htm;
MacLachlan, "Operators of small reactors to meet to discuss conversion to LEU fuel."
[17] Judith Miller,
"U.S. is Holding up Peking Atom Talks," New York Times,
September 19, 1982 and Michael Brenner, "People's Republic of
China," in International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation,
William Potter, ed. 1990, p. 253, and Leonard Spector, Nuclear Ambitions,
1990, p. 274, as cited in Steven Dolley, "China's Record of
Proliferation Misbehavior," September 29, 1997, Nuclear Control Institute
website, http://www.nci.org/i/ib92997.htm.
[18] "Research Reactors" Briefing/Information Paper, December 2004, World
Nuclear Association website, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.htm.
[19]
The 41 countries with U.S.-origin uranium are: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, South Africa, South Korea,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. "Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
Acceptance," U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration website,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/frrsnf.shtml.
[20]
Pablo Adelfang and Iain G. Ritchie, "Overview of the Status of Research
Reactors Worldwide," p. 8, presentation at the 2003 International Meeting
on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, October 5-10, 2003,
Chicago, Illinois, Argonne National Laboratory website,
http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR25/HTML/Ritchie.html.
[21] Adelfang and Ritchie, "Overview of the Status of Research Reactors Worldwide."
[22] The 28 research
reactors fully converted to LEU fuels outside the United States include ASTRA
(Austria), BER-II (Germany), DR-3 (Denmark), FRG-1 (Germany), IAN-R1 (Colombia),
IEA-R1 (Brazil), JMTR (Japan), JRR-4 (Japan), NRCRR (Iran), NRU (Canada), OSIRIS
(France), PARR (Pakistan), PRR-1 (Philippines), RA-3 (Argentina), R2 (Sweden),
R2-0 (Sweden), SAPHIR (Switzerland), SL-M (Canada), THOR (Taiwan), and TRIGA II
Ljubljana (Slovenia). As of 2003, seven foreign reactors had been partially
converted: GRR-1 (Greece), HOR (Netherlands), La Reina (Chile), MNR (Canada),
SSR (Romania), TR-2 (Turkey), and TRIGA II Vienna (Austria). (ASTRA, DR-3, GTRR,
ISUR, MCZPR, SAPHIR, and UVAR were shut down after conversion). Armando
Travelli, "Status and Progress of the RERTR Program in the Year
2003," presentation at the 2003 International Meeting on Reduced
Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, October 5-10, 2003, Chicago,
Illinois, Argonne National Laboratory website, http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR25/HTML/Travelli.html.
[23] "Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors," U.S. National
Nuclear Security Administration website, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/rertr.shtml.
[24] Frank von Hippel, "A Comprehensive Approach to Elimination of
Highly-Enriched-Uranium From All Nuclear-Reactor Fuel Cycles," Science and Global Security, No. 12 (2004), pp. 137-164,
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/von_Hippel_SGS_137-164_1.pdf.
[25] Travelli, "Status and Progress of the RERTR Program."
[26] Daniel Horner, "Nordion headed for 'showdown' with U.S.?"
NuclearFuel, Vol. 29, No. 6 (March 15, 2004), p. 14.
[27] For more information on the Russian
efforts, see "Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)
Program," NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, NTI website,
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/doe/rertr.htm.
[28]
A significant fraction of Russian-origin HEU was originally enriched to only
36%. Also, the inventory of spent fuel assemblies of Russian origin contains
many thousands of small, spent fuel slugs and EK-10 elements, which considerably
inflates the numbers of spent fuel assemblies of Russian origin compared with
those of U.S. origin. Adelfang and Ritchie, "Overview of the Status of
Research Reactors Worldwide," p. 8.
[29] V. Bezzubtsev, N. Arkhangelsky, V.
Aden, V. Chernyshov, and A. Vatulin, "The Current Status and Future Plans
of the Russian RERTR Program," presentation at the 2003 International
Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, October 5-10,
2003, Chicago, Illinois, Argonne National Laboratory website,
http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR25/HTML/Arkhangelsky.html.
[30] Since 2000, Russia has supplied HEU
to: Germany (an agreement on supplying the FRM-II reactor was signed in 1998),
the Netherlands (an agreement was concluded in 2001 to supply 93% HEU to the
High Flux Reactor (HFR) at the Joint Research Center in Petten; in 2000, the
United States also approved shipments to the HFR, which is to be converted to
LEU in the near future), and Poland (for use in the Maria research reactor, also
slated for conversion). Moscow has also approved negotiating the export of HEU
to the United States (for use at Oak Ridge National Laboratory research
reactors) and the Czech Republic. Russian Government Decree 250, "O
podpisanii Soglasheniya mezhdu Pravitelstvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii i
Pravitelstvom Federativnoy Respubliki Germaniya o postavkakh
vysokoobogashchennogo urana dlya issledovatelskogo yadernogo reaktora
'Myunkhen II'" [On the signing of an Agreement between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the German Federal Republic on
supplying highly enriched uranium for the Munchen II nuclear research reactor],
February 26, 1998, in the Legislation in Russia, http://law.optima.ru; Russian
Government Decree "O podpisanii soglasheniya mezhdu pravitelstvom
Rossiyskoy federatsii i Evropeyskim soobshchestvom po atomnoy energii o
postavkakh vysokoobogashchennogo urana dlya issledovatelskogo yadernogo reaktora
v g. Pettene (Korolevstvo Niderlandov)" [On the signing of an agreement
between the government of the Russian Federation and Euratom on the supply of
highly enriched uranium for the nuclear research reactor at Petten (Kingdom of
the Netherlands)], December 21, 2001, in http://www/businesspravo.ru; Russian
Government Directive № 1557-r, "O peregovorakh mezhdu OAO 'TVEL' i Institutom atomnoy energii
(g. Sverk, Respublika Polsha)" [On negotiations between the TVEL joint
stock company and the Atomic Energy Institute (Sverk, Poland)], November 11,
2002, Rosatom website, http://www.minatom.ru; "Minatom of
Russia Is To Sign HEU Supply Contract with ORNL," Nuclear.ru, February 27,
2003, in RANSAC Nuclear News, http://www.ransac.org.
[31] As of September
2000, there was Soviet-supplied HEU fuel in sixteen countries: Belarus,
Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Libya, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. Since
that time, fresh HEU fuel has been removed from Yugoslavia (in 2002), Romania
and Bulgaria (in 2003), Libya, Uzbekistan, and the Czech Republic (in 2004;
fresh fuel from the Rez reactor was removed in 2004, an additional shipment of
fresh fuel from the Czech Technical University is expected in 2005). A pilot
shipment of spent fuel from Uzbekistan is expected in 2005 (after the conclusion
of a much-delayed Russian "ecological expertise" assessment).
Negotiations are under way to remove spent fuel from the Czech Republic,
Romania, and Bulgaria as well as fresh fuel from Latvia and a critical assembly
in Libya. In addition, the joint U.S.-Russian-IAEA program aims to eventually
repatriate Soviet-supplied spent fuel from: Hungary, Germany, Latvia, Poland,
Belarus, Ukraine, former Yugoslavia, North Korea, Vietnam, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Libya and Egypt. Adelfang and Ritchie, "Overview of the
Status of Research Reactors Worldwide;" Philipp Bleek, "Global
Cleanout: An emerging approach to the civil nuclear material threat,"
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University,
September 2004; "Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR),"
National Nuclear Security Administration website,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/rrrfr.shtml;
Daniel Horner and Ann MacLachlan, "Libya sends Tajura HEU to Russia,
prepares to convert reactor to LEU," NuclearFuel, Vol. 29, No. 6
(March 15, 2004), pp. 4-5; Ann MacLachlan, "Shipments of fresh HEU pending
from Latvia, Czech Rep., Libya," NuclearFuel, April 25, 2004, pp. 5-6.
[32] For more information on these two
transfers, please see "Kazakhstan: Project Sapphire," NIS
Nuclear and Missile Database, NTI website, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/fissmat/sapphire.htm and
"Georgia: Operation Auburn Endeavor," NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, NTI website, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/georgia/auburn.htm.
[33] For an early warning about the danger
of leaving HEU at the Vinca facility, see William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic, and
Ivo Slaus, "Tito's Nuclear Legacy," The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2 (March/April 2000),
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma00potter, pp. 63-70. For
information on Project Vinca, the 2002 removal of HEU from the Vinca Institute,
see Philipp Bleek, "Project Vinca: Lessons for Securing Civil Nuclear
Material Stockpiles," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 10, No. 3
(Fall/Winter 2003), pp. 1-23.
[34] Latvia,
the United States, and the IAEA will now have to negotiate arrangements with
Russia. "U.S., Latvia Sign Nonproliferation, Threat-Reduction
Pact," April 26, 2005, Washington File,
http://www.usembassy.ro/WF/200/eur202.htm.
[35] There may also be Chinese interest in converting the small reactors it has
exported (see endnote 15). Von Hippel, "A Comprehensive Approach."
[36] "Research
Reactors" Briefing/Information Paper, December 2004, World Nuclear
Association website, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf61.htm.
[37]
"Germany: FRM-2 reactor to be converted to 'medium' enriched
uranium," WISE News Communique, November 2, 2001,
http://www.antenna.nl/wise/557/5334.html.
[38]
Ann MacLachlan, "CEA likely to use HEU to start up new test
reactor," NuclearFuel, Vol. 29, No. 24 (November 22, 2004), pp. 1, 9, 10.
[39] "Reducing Excess
Stockpiles: U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement," Controlling Nuclear
Warheads and Materials, NTI website,
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/reducing/heudeal.asp#_ftnref20,
citing
Mark Hibbs, "Framatome, Elektrostal Looking to Double Business
in Down-Blended HEU Fuel," Nuclear Fuel, August 19, 2002; Ann
MacLachlan, "Dutch Utility EPZ Buys Russian Fuel Made From Blending HEU,
Reprocessed Uranium," Nuclear Fuel, September 30, 2002; and
personal communication from Frank von Hippel, March 2002, based on his
discussions with Wolf Dieter Perschmann, one of the initiators of the program.
[40] Ann MacLachlan and Michael
Knapik, "TVEL eyes collaboration to serve U.S. market,"
NuclearFuel, Vol. 29, No. 20 (September 27, 2004), pp. 1, 19-20.
[41] Daniel Horner, "NTI
Blend-Down Study of Russian HEU to Examine Many Options for Speed-Up,"
NuclearFuel, Vol. 28, No. 6 (March 17, 2003), pp. 12-13.
[42] More information on the
conversion of these reactors will soon be available in Alexander M. Dimitriev,
Anatoli C. Diakov, Jungmin Kang, Alexey M. Shuvayev, and Frank N. von Hippel,
"Feasibility of Converting Russian Icebreaker Reactors from HEU to LEU
Fuel," submitted for publication in Science and Global Security.
[43] For information on icebreaker
reactors, see Ole Reistad, Morten Bremer Mærli and Nils Bøhmer,
"Russian Naval Reactors and Fuel: Dangerous Unknowns,"
Nonproliferation Review, forthcoming.
[44] Albright and Kramer,
"Stockpiles still growing," p. 14.
[45] Reistad, Mærli and
Bøhmer point out that the Russian Navy is now at a crossroads, where it
could choose to invest in new generations of submarines with LEU or HEU of
increasing enrichment levels. Both nonproliferation and commercial
considerations (the French program has shown that submarine fuel can be
integrated with the commercial nuclear fuel industry) suggest that the former
path is the better one. For more information on conversion of naval reactors,
see Chunyan Ma and Frank von Hippel, "Ending the Production of Highly
Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors," Nonproliferation Review, Vol.
8, No. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 86-101.
Monterey Institute Experts on HEU Issues:
- Dr. William Potter | Bio
CNS Director
Phone: (831) 647-4154
E-mail: wpotter@miis.edu
- Dr. Lawrence Scheinman | Bio
Distinguished Professor
Washington D.C. Office of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Phone: (202) 478-3427
E-mail: lscheinman@miis.edu
- Ms. Cristina Chuen | Bio
Senior Research Associate
Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program
Phone: (831) 647-6540
Email: cristina.chuen@miis.edu
- Dr. Scott Parrish | Bio
Senior Research Associate
Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program
Nonproliferation Review Editor
Phone: (831) 647-6654
Email: sparrish@miis.edu
- Elena Sokova | Bio
Director
Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program
Phone: (831) 647-3521
Email: esokova@miis.edu
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