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CNS Research StoryDespite Nuclear Terrorism Risks, Congress Relaxes HEU Export Controls
By Scott Parrish August 4, 2005
In the current environment of increased terrorist threats and proliferation concerns, further restrictions on civilian commerce in HEU should be a top priority. Instead, on July 29, 2005 Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which includes provisions relaxing restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production. The primary beneficiaries of the new law are producers of medical radioisotopes, who claim that conversion to LEU is too costly and could disrupt production of needed medical isotopes. The new law will permit the export of U.S. HEU to medical isotope producers even if they refuse to convert to LEU.[3] Passed after heavy lobbying efforts by Canadian medial isotope producer MDS Nordion, the new legislation establishes an unfortunate precedent legitimizing continued international commerce in HEU. It essentially places the economic interests of medical isotope producers above the nonproliferation interests of the United States and the international community. It is virtually certain to complicate ongoing efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. For example, the new law stands in contradiction with established U.S. efforts--like GTRI--to eliminate the civilian use of HEU. It will also complicate a promising initiative, led by Norway at the 2005Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT Review Conference), to seek an international consensus on eliminating the civilian use of HEU.[4] The new law thus represents a step backward for nonproliferation. CIVILIAN USES OF HEU: WORTH THE RISK? There are currently three principal uses of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector: in research reactors, for medical isotope production, and as fuel in icebreaker propulsion reactors. Historically, the proliferation risks posed by civilian uses of HEU have been underestimated. HEU at civilian facilities, for example, is less well-protected than that at military or weapons production facilities, and more vulnerable to theft by terrorists. While reducing all stocks of HEU is a worthy nonproliferation goal, eliminating the civilian use of HEU would address the most vulnerable and thus highest priority material. The two most widespread civilian uses of HEU are as research reactor fuel and as targets for the production of medical isotopes. While the United States and the Soviet Union exported large quantities of HEU for these purposes in the 1950s-1970s, by the late 1970s both countries, citing proliferation concerns, began to limit these exports. Initiatives were also launched at the time to begin converting research reactors and radioactive isotope production from HEU to LEU, although Russia has yet to convert any of its domestic research reactors. In 1978, the United States launched the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which aims to develop new LEU fuels and targets to replace HEU.[5] In 1992, in order to provide foreign users of U.S.-origin HEU with an increased incentive to convert their reactors and production processes, Congress adopted the Schumer Amendment. This legislation restricted U.S. exports of HEU to facilities that meet the following conditions: 1) there is no existing alternative LEU fuel for the reactor or production process; 2) the facility has agreed to switch to LEU fuel as soon as it is available; and 3) the United States is actively developing an alternative LEU fuel suitable for the facility.[6] While U.S. exports of HEU had already declined prior to the Schumer Amendment, they subsequently fell to very low levels. [7] According to data from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in recent years there have been only a handful of HEU exports for medical isotope production.[8] As nuclear material at greatest risk of theft during transit, reducing international commerce in HEU is an effective way to reduce proliferation risks and bolster international security. Considering current terrorist threats, civilian uses of HEU should be eliminated, unless their benefits are so great and so difficult and/or expensive to obtain by other means that they justify the increased risk of nuclear terrorism. HEU USE FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION HEU continues to play a major role in the production of radioactive isotopes for medical applications. HEU targets are irradiated in a reactor, producing the fission product molybdenum-99, which has a 2.7-day half-life and decays to 6-hour half-life technicium-99m, a gamma ray emitter used in medical imaging.[9] There are currently four major international producers of radioisotopes who use HEU: MDS Nordion (Canada), Mallinckrodt (Netherlands), Institute National des Radioelements (Belgium), and the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa. All four have resisted efforts to convince them to convert to LEU, citing concerns about cost and disruption of production.[10] According to a 2004 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, these four producers use about 85 kg of HEU each year.[11] That is enough material to make a few improvised nuclear devices, considering that the IAEA regards 25 kg of HEU as a significant quantity, and independent experts believe that terrorists could fabricate a simple gun-type nuclear weapon with 40-55 kg of HEU.[12] Three of these producers--those in the Netherlands, Belgium, and South Africa--either use domestically produced HEU or import it from sources outside the United States. One, Nordion, located in Canada, has continued to receive some HEU exports from the United States in recent years, based on its pledge to convert to LEU. Critics, however, contend the company is not serious about converting its operations to LEU.[13] According to its press materials, Nordion is "the world's largest supplier of short-lived radioisotopes for medical diagnostic nuclear imaging and therapeutic applications," and generated $343 million in revenues in 2002, most of it from exports to 95 countries.[14] The company claims to provide medical isotopes for most of the 15 to 20 million nuclear medicine procedures performed around the world every year.[15] Nordion produces molybdenum-99 in Canada's more than 50-year old NRU reactor at Chalk River, using HEU targets supplied by the United States.[16] Nordion has planned for a number of years to switch to a new pair of reactors, the MAPLE reactors, also located at Chalk River, and to construct a new processing facility for the isotopes. The NRU reactor was to have shut down years ago, but technical problems have repeatedly delayed the start-up of MAPLE. NRU is now slated to run until the end of 2005, and perhaps longer.[17] Nordion also now argues that it will take additional time to develop LEU targets, stating that the increased waste produced by the LEU targets during the production process presents a serious technical and financial challenge to conversion.[18] This posture reflects a change from earlier plans and pledges made by Nordion and Atomic Energy of Canada, LTD, which operates the reactors. As early as 1990, the companies promised to switch to the use of a new LEU target by 1998, and to "phase out HEU use by 2000."[19] Later, when it was granted a U.S. export license for HEU in 1999, Nordion pledged to submit annual progress reports on its conversion efforts, but its conversion efforts appear to have been minimal, and the company now contends that it could not convert to HEU without interrupting the supply of critically needed medical isotopes, and has said it cannot proceed with conversion unless provided with $90 million in financing to construct a new LEU-based processing facility.[20] Officials from Argonne National Lab, who are in charge of the RERTR Program efforts to develop LEU targets, do admit that it will take a few more years to implement conversion to LEU. But they also insist that it is technically feasible, and have even suggested that it could ultimately result in a more economic process, compensating for the costs of conversion.[21] EFFORTS TO REPEAL THE SCHUMER AMENDMENT While dragging its feet on conversion, Nordion also began lobbying efforts to modify the Schumer Amendment so it would no longer be required to convert. Working with Mallinckrodt, Nordion lobbied the U.S. Congress to remove the restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production. The company drafted an amendment to the 2003 energy bill under consideration in the U.S. House of Representatives, and persuaded Congressman Richard Burr (D-NC), who has since been elected Senator from North Carolina, to sponsor it. The amendment would lift restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production pending the completion of a study on the restrictions' effectiveness and economic impact.[22] Senator Christopher Bond (R-MO) sponsored a similar amendment in the Senate. Nordion's lobbying activities were also supplemented with well-targeted campaign contributions. According to the Washington Post, the principal energy lobbyists of the Alpine Group, a firm hired to promote the change in HEU export restrictions, donated $25,000 to members of the House and Senate energy committees. Nuclear medicine groups also made large campaign contributions to these members of Congress.[23] The Alpine Group lobbyists, James D. Massie, Richard C. White and Rhod Shaw, for example, contributed $6,400 to Burr's campaign war chest in 2003 and 2004, according to Federal Election Commission data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics.[24] Nevertheless, the amendments, which drew substantial opposition from several nonproliferation organizations, did not pass, since the entire bill died in the U.S. Senate.[25] Nordion did not give up its efforts, however, and the 2005 version of the energy bill passed in the House on April 21, 2005 again included the language from the Burr Amendment, allowing exports of HEU for medical isotope production, even if the recipient did not agree to convert to LEU.[26] This change in the law would take away any incentive for Nordion to convert to LEU, and will also ripple through the entire radioisotope industry, as other producers will similarly have no incentive to convert. Supporters of relaxing the restrictions have argued that the limits imposed by the Schumer Amendment are creating a crisis in medical isotope production, and they also claim that conversion is simply too costly. Opponents, including a number of scientists and nonproliferation specialists, as well as the editorial board of the New York Times, contend that smaller producers have already successfully converted to LEU, that there is no shortage of medical isotopes, and that continued HEU exports are too risky under current circumstances.[27] In the Senate, the provisions gutting the Schumer Amendment and relaxing HEU export restrictions were removed following the approval of an amendment sponsored by Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ), by a 52-46 vote on June 23, 2005.[28] However, in the House-Senate Conference committee, efforts to retain the Schumer Amendment or to at least draft compromise language retaining some of its key provisions failed. The conference report retained the Burr Amendment language passed by the House in April 2005, and the House and Senate passed the conference report on July 27 and 29, respectively. President Bush signed the bill into law on August 8, 2005. Under the provisions of the newly-passed legislation, restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production will be relaxed, and the National Academy of Sciences will conduct a study of the effectiveness of efforts to convert isotope production to LEU CONCLUSIONS In an era of increased terrorist threats, when the main obstacle standing between terrorists and nuclear explosives is the difficulty of obtaining fissile material, it makes no sense to relax export controls on HEU. It is particularly short-sighted to place the economic interests of a few companies ahead of the international interest in reducing the risk of terrorist access to HEU. While it may be reasonable to study the costs of conversion more thoroughly and consider whether additional incentives to foster conversion are needed, such a study should be done before making any changes in existing law, which is encouraging many facilities to convert to LEU, rather than after relaxing it and potentially giving terrorists easier access to HEU. The strongest reason to regret the change to U.S. law, however, is that is that the Schumer Amendment had not only been working directly to reduce proliferation risks, but was also catalyzing additional steps in that direction. The changed U.S. law on HEU exports will almost certainly make it harder for these efforts to succeed, exacerbating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Many research reactors around the world have already converted to LEU with help from RERTR, and ongoing efforts under GTRI are securing and eliminating civilian HEU stocks in countries around the world. But these efforts to convince other countries to give up their stocks of civilian HEU will be less effective now that the U.S. has set a contrary example by relaxing its own controls on HEU exports. Countries that are already reluctant to part with their civilian HEU, like Ukraine, will now be less likely to respond to U.S. appeals. In addition, the change in U.S. law will
complicate ongoing efforts to build an international coalition to support
delegitimizing civilian use of HEU. Many countries are coming to agree that the
benefits of civilian use of HEU do not justify the risks involved. A recent step
reflecting the emergence of a broader international consensus on this issue was
a working paper presented to the 2005 NPT Review Conference by Norway on behalf
of itself and Iceland, Lithuania, and Sweden. This paper also enjoyed the
support of many other countries, including Austria, Canada, Germany, Kyrgyzstan,
Japan, and the United States. The paper endorsed as a goal "the
elimination of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector as soon as technically
feasible."[29] It is likely
that additional steps to follow up on this proposal will be made this fall at
either the UN General Assembly or the General Conference of the IAEA. The
recently adopted changes in U.S. law stand in contradiction to this initiative,
and may hamper its progress. In its consideration of revoking the Schumer
Amendment, Congress should have placed more emphasis on broader nonproliferation
efforts than on the interests of medical isotope producers. Those efforts will
now have to be redoubled in the face of this unfortunate decision.
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